SECTION 1. Short title; table of contents.

SEC. 2. Findings.

(1) The Western Balkans countries (the Republic of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Kosovo, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia and the Republic of Serbia) form a pluralistic, multi-ethnic region in the heart of Europe that is critical to the peace, stability, and prosperity of that continent.

(2) Continued peace, stability, and prosperity in the Western Balkans is directly tied to the opportunities for democratic and economic advancement available to the citizens and residents of those seven countries.

(3) It is in the mutual interest of the United States and the seven countries of the Western Balkans to promote stable and sustainable economic growth and development in the region.

(4) The reforms and integration with the European Union pursued by countries in the Western Balkans have led to significant democratic and economic progress in the region.

(5) Despite economic progress, rates of poverty and unemployment in the Western Balkans remain higher than in neighboring European Union countries.

(6) Out-migration, particularly of youth, is affecting demographics in each Western Balkans country, resulting in population decline in all seven countries.

(7) Implementing critical economic and governance reforms could help enable investment and employment opportunities in the Western Balkans, especially for youth, and can provide powerful tools for economic development and for encouraging broader participation in a political process that increases trade and prosperity for all.

(8) Existing regional economic efforts could have the potential to improve the economic conditions in the Western Balkans, while promoting inclusion and transparency.

(9) The Department of Commerce, through its Foreign Commercial Service, plays an important role in promoting and facilitating opportunities for United States trade and investment.

(10) Corruption, including among key political leaders, continues to plague the Western Balkans and represents one of the greatest impediments to further economic and political development in the region.

(11) Disinformation campaigns targeting the Western Balkans undermine the credibility of its democratic institutions, including the integrity of its elections.

(12) Vulnerability to cyberattacks or attacks on information and communication technology infrastructure increases risks to the functioning of government and the delivery of public services.

(13) United States Cyber Command, the Department of State, and other Federal agencies play a critical role in defending the national security interests of the United States, including by deploying cyber hunt forward teams at the request of partner nations to reinforce their cyber defenses.

(14) Securing domestic and international cyber networks and ICT infrastructure is a national security priority for the United States, which is exemplified by offices and programs across the Federal Government that support cybersecurity.

(15) Corruption and disinformation proliferate in political environments marked by autocratic control.

(16) Dependence on Russian sources of fossil fuels and natural gas for the countries of the Western Balkans ties their economies and politics to the Russian Federation and inhibits their aspirations for European integration.

(17) Reducing the reliance of the Western Balkans on Russian natural gas supplies and fossil fuels is in the national interest of the United States.

(18) The growing influence of China in the Western Balkans could also have a deleterious impact on strategic competition, democracy, and economic integration with Europe.

(19) In March 2022, the United States launched the European Democratic Resilience Initiative to bolster democratic resilience, advance anti-corruption efforts, and defend human rights in Ukraine and its neighbors in response to Russia’s war of aggression.

(20) The parliamentary and local elections held in Serbia on December 17, 2023, and their immediate aftermath are cause for deep concern about the state of Serbia’s democracy, including due to the final report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, which—

(A) found “unjust conditions” for the election;

(B) found “numerous procedural deficiencies, including inconsistent application of safeguards during voting and counting, frequent instances of overcrowding, breaches in secrecy of the vote, and numerous instances of group voting”; and

(C) asserted that “voting must be repeated” in certain polling stations.

(21) The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe also noted that Serbian officials accused primarily peaceful protestors, opposition parties, and civil society of “attempting to destabilize the government”, a concerning allegation that threatens the safety of important elements of Serbian society.

(22) Democratic countries whose values are in alignment with the United States make for stronger and more durable partnerships.

SEC. 3. Sense of Congress.

(1) encourage increased trade and investment between the United States and allies and partners in the Western Balkans;

(2) expand United States assistance to regional integration efforts in the Western Balkans;

(3) strengthen and expand regional economic integration in the Western Balkans, especially enterprises owned by and employing women and youth;

(4) work with allies and partners committed to improving the rule of law, energy resource diversification, democratic and economic reform, and the reduction of poverty in the Western Balkans;

(5) increase United States trade and investment with the Western Balkans, particularly in ways that support countries' efforts—

(A) to decrease dependence on Russian energy sources and fossil fuels;

(B) to increase energy diversification, efficiency, and conservation; and

(C) to facilitate the transition to cleaner and more reliable sources of energy, including renewables, as appropriate;

(6) continue to assist in the development, within the Western Balkans, of—

(A) strong civil societies;

(B) public-private partnerships;

(C) independent media;

(D) transparent, accountable, citizen-responsive governance, including equal representation for women and youth;

(E) political stability; and

(F) modern, free-market based economies;

(7) support the expeditious accession of those Western Balkans countries that are not already members to the European Union and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (referred to in this section as “NATO”) for countries that desire and are eligible for such membership;

(8) support—

(A) maintaining the full European Union Force (EUFOR) mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina as being in the national security interests of the United States;

(B) encouraging NATO and the European Union to review their mission mandates and posture in Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure they are playing a proactive role in establishing a safe and secure environment, particularly in the realm of defense;

(C) working within NATO to encourage contingency planning for an international military force to maintain a safe and secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially if Russia blocks reauthorization of the mission in the United Nations; and

(D) a strengthened NATO headquarters in Sarajevo;

(9) continue to support the European Union membership aspirations of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia by supporting meeting the benchmarks required for their accession;

(10) continue to support the overarching mission of the Berlin Process and locally-driven initiatives that are inclusive of all Western Balkans countries and remains aligned with the objectives and standards laid out by the European Union as requirements for accession to the European Union;

(11) continue to support the cultural heritage, and recognize the languages, of the Western Balkans;

(12) coordinate closely with the European Union, the United Kingdom, and other allies and partners on sanctions designations in Western Balkans countries and work to align efforts as much as possible to demonstrate a clear commitment to upholding democratic values;

(13) expand bilateral security cooperation with non-NATO member Western Balkans countries, particularly efforts focused on regional integration and cooperation, including through the Adriatic Charter, which was launched at Tirana on May 2, 2003;

(14) increase efforts to combat Russian malign influence campaigns and any other destabilizing or disruptive activities targeting the Western Balkans through engagement with government institutions, political stakeholders, journalists, civil society organizations, and industry leaders;

(15) develop a series of cyber resilience standards, consistent with the Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy and Readiness Action Plan endorsed at the 2014 Wales Summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to expand cooperation with partners and allies, including in the Western Balkans, on cyber security and ICT infrastructure;

(16) articulate clearly and unambiguously the United States commitment to supporting democratic values and respect for international law as the sole path forward for the countries of the Western Balkans; and

(17) prioritize partnerships and programming with Western Balkan countries that demonstrate commitment toward strengthening their democracies and show respect for human rights.

SEC. 4. Definitions.

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(2) ICT.—The term “ICT” means information and communication technology.

(3) WESTERN BALKANS.—The term “Western Balkans” means the region comprised of the following countries:

(A) The Republic of Albania.

(B) Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(C) The Republic of Croatia.

(D) The Republic of Kosovo.

(E) Montenegro.

(F) The Republic of North Macedonia.

(G) The Republic of Serbia.

(4) WESTERN BALKANS COUNTRY.—The term “Western Balkans country” means any country listed in subparagraphs (A) through (G) of paragraph (3).

SEC. 5. Codification of sanctions relating to the Western Balkans.

SEC. 6. Democratic and economic development and prosperity initiatives.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) promoting partnerships between United States universities and universities in the Western Balkans, particularly universities in traditionally under-served communities, advances United States foreign policy goals and requires a whole-of-government approach, including the utilization of public-private partnerships;

(2) such university partnerships would provide opportunities for exchanging academic ideas, technical expertise, research, and cultural understanding for the benefit of the United States; and

(3) the seven countries in the Western Balkans meet the requirements under section 105(c)(4) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151c(c)(4)).

(b) University partnerships.—The President, working through the Secretary of State, is authorized to provide assistance, consistent with section 105 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151c), to promote the establishment of partnerships between United States universities and universities in the Western Balkans, including—

(1) supporting research and analysis on foreign policy, cyber resilience, and disinformation;

(2) working with partner governments to reform policies, improve curricula, strengthen data systems, train teachers and students, including English language teaching, and to provide quality, inclusive learning materials;

(3) encouraging knowledge exchanges to help provide individuals, particularly at-risk youth, women, people with disabilities, and other vulnerable, marginalized, or underserved communities, with relevant education, training, and skills for meaningful employment;

(4) promoting teaching and research exchanges between institutions of higher education in the Western Balkans and in the United States; and

(5) encouraging alliances and exchanges with like-minded institutions of education within the Western Balkans and the larger European continent.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the Peace Corps, whose mission is to promote world peace and friendship, in part by helping the people of interested countries in meeting their need for trained men and women, provides an invaluable opportunity to connect the people of the United States with the people of the Western Balkans.

(b) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace Corps should submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes an analysis of current opportunities for Peace Corps expansion in the Western Balkans region.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that regular people-to-people exchange programs that bring religious leaders, journalists, civil society members, politicians, and other individuals from the Western Balkans to the United States will strengthen existing relationships and advance United States interests and shared values in the Western Balkans region.

(b) BOLD leadership program for young Balkans leaders.—

(1) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—The Department of State, through BOLD, a leadership program for young leaders in certain Western Balkans countries, plays an important role to develop young leaders in improving civic engagement and economic development in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro.

(2) EXPANSION.—BOLD should be expanded, subject to the availability of appropriations, to the entire Western Balkans region.

(c) Authorization.—The Secretary of State should further develop and implement BOLD, which shall hereafter be known as the “Young Balkan Leaders Initiative”, to promote educational and professional development for young adult leaders and professionals in the Western Balkans who have demonstrated a passion to contribute to the continued development of the Western Balkans region.

(d) Conduct of initiative.—The goals of the Young Balkan Leaders Initiative shall be—

(1) to further build the capacity of young Balkan leaders in the Western Balkans in the areas of business and information technology, cyber security and digitization, agriculture, civic engagement, and public administration;

(2) to support young Balkan leaders by offering professional development, training, and networking opportunities, particularly in the areas of leadership, innovation, civic engagement, elections, human rights, entrepreneurship, good governance, public administration, and journalism;

(3) to support young political, parliamentary, and civic Balkan leaders in collaboration on regional initiatives related to good governance, environmental protection, government ethics, and minority inclusion;

(4) to provide increased economic and technical assistance to young Balkan leaders to promote economic growth and strengthen ties between businesses, investors, and entrepreneurs in the United States and in Western Balkans countries;

(5) to tailor such assistance to advance the particular objectives of each United States mission in the Western Balkans within the framework outlined in this subsection; and

(6) to secure funding for such assistance from existing funds available to each United States Mission in the Western Balkans.

(e) Fellowships.—Under the Young Balkan Leaders Initiative, the Secretary of State shall award fellowships to young leaders from the Western Balkans who—

(1) are between 18 and 35 years of age;

(2) have demonstrated strong capabilities in entrepreneurship, innovation, public service, and leadership;

(3) have had a positive impact in their communities, organizations, or institutions, including by promoting cross-regional and multiethnic cooperation; and

(4) represent a cross-section of geographic, gender, political, and cultural diversity.

(f) Public engagement and leadership center.—Under the Young Balkan Leaders Initiative, the Secretary of State shall take advantage of existing and future public diplomacy facilities (commonly known as “American Spaces”) to hire staff and develop programming for the establishment of a flagship public engagement and leadership center in the Western Balkans that seeks—

(1) to counter disinformation and malign influence;

(2) to promote cross-cultural engagement;

(3) to provide training for young leaders from Western Balkans countries described in subsection (e);

(4) to harmonize the efforts of existing venues throughout Western Balkans countries established by the Office of American Spaces; and

(5) to annually bring together participants from the Young Balkans Leaders Initiative to provide platforms for regional networking.

(g) Briefing on certain exchange programs.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide a briefing to the appropriate congressional committees that describes the status of exchange programs involving the Western Balkans region.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The briefing required under paragraph (1) shall—

(A) assess the factors constraining the number and frequency of participants from Western Balkans countries in the International Visitor Leadership Program of the Department of State;

(B) identify the resources that are necessary to address the factors described in subparagraph (A); and

(C) describe a strategy for connecting alumni and participants of professional development exchange programs of the Department of State in the Western Balkans with alumni and participants from other countries in Europe, to enhance inter-region and intra-region people-to-people ties.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) United States support for cybersecurity, cyber resilience, and secure ICT infrastructure in Western Balkans countries will strengthen the region’s ability to defend itself from and respond to malicious cyber activity conducted by nonstate and foreign actors, including foreign governments, that seek to influence the region;

(2) insecure ICT networks that are vulnerable to manipulation can increase opportunities for—

(A) the compromise of cyber infrastructure, including data networks, electronic infrastructure, and software systems; and

(B) the use of online information operations by adversaries and malign actors to undermine United States allies and interests; and

(3) it is in the national security interest of the United States to support the cybersecurity and cyber resilience of Western Balkans countries.

(b) Interagency report on cybersecurity and the digital information environment in Western Balkans countries.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that contains—

(1) an overview of interagency efforts to strengthen cybersecurity and cyber resilience in Western Balkans countries;

(2) a review of the information environment in each Western Balkans country;

(3) a review of existing United States Government cyber and digital initiatives that—

(A) counter influence operations and safeguard elections and democratic processes in Western Balkans countries;

(B) strengthen ICT infrastructure and cybersecurity capacity in the Western Balkans;

(C) support democracy and internet freedom in Western Balkans countries; and

(D) build cyber capacity of governments who are allies or partners of the United States;

(4) an assessment of cyber threat information sharing between the United States and Western Balkans countries;

(5) an assessment of—

(A) options for the United States to better support cybersecurity and cyber resilience in Western Balkans countries through changes to current assistance authorities; and

(B) the advantages or limitations, such as funding or office space, of posting cyber professionals from other Federal departments and agencies to United States diplomatic posts in Western Balkans countries and providing relevant training to Foreign Service Officers; and

(6) any additional support needed from the United States for the cybersecurity and cyber resilience of the following NATO Allies: Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Croatia.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Agreement on the Path to Normalization of Relations, which was agreed to by Kosovo and Serbia on February 27, 2023, with the facilitation of the European Union, is a positive step forward in advancing normalization between the two countries;

(2) Serbia and Kosovo should seek to make immediate progress on the Implementation Annex to the agreement referred to in paragraph (1);

(3) once sufficient progress has been made on the Implementation Annex, the United States should consider advancing initiatives to strengthen bilateral relations with both countries, which could include—

(A) establishing bilateral strategic dialogues with Kosovo and Serbia; and

(B) advancing concrete initiatives to deepen trade and investment with both countries; and

(4) the United States should continue to support a comprehensive final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia based on mutual recognition.

(b) Statement of policy.—It is the policy of the United States Government that—

(1) it shall not pursue any policy that advocates for land swaps, partition, or other forms of redrawing borders along ethnic lines in the Western Balkans as a means to arbitrate disputes between nation states in the region; and

(2) it should support pluralistic democracies in countries in the Western Balkans as a means to prevent a return to the ethnic strife that once characterized the region.

(a) Reports required.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every two years thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other Federal departments or agencies, as appropriate, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees regarding Russian and Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns carried out with respect to Balkan countries that seek—

(1) to undermine democratic institutions;

(2) to promote political instability; and

(3) to harm the interests of the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization member and partner states in the Western Balkans.

(b) Elements.—Each report submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall include—

(1) an assessment of the objectives of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China regarding malign influence operations and campaigns carried out with respect to Western Balkans countries—

(A) to undermine democratic institutions, including the planning and execution of democratic elections;

(B) to promote political instability; and

(C) to manipulate the information environment;

(2) the activities and roles of the Department of State and other relevant Federal agencies in countering Russian and Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns;

(3) a comprehensive list identifying—

(A) each network, entity and individual, to the extent such information is available, of Russia, China, or any other country with which Russia or China may cooperate, that is supporting such Russian or Chinese malign influence operations or campaigns, including the provision of financial or operational support to activities in a Western Balkans country that may limit freedom of speech or create barriers of access to democratic processes, including exercising the right to vote in a free and fair election; and

(B) the role of each such entity in providing such support;

(4) the identification of the tactics, techniques, and procedures used in Russian or Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns in Western Balkans countries;

(5) an assessment of the effect of previous Russian or Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns that targeted alliances and partnerships of the United States Armed Forces in the Western Balkans, including the effectiveness of such operations and campaigns in achieving the objectives of Russia and China, respectively;

(6) the identification of each Western Balkans country with respect to which Russia or China has conducted or attempted to conduct a malign influence operation or campaign;

(7) an assessment of the capacity and efforts of NATO and of each individual Western Balkans country to counter Russian or Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns carried out with respect to Western Balkans countries;

(8) the efforts by the United States to combat such malign influence operations in the Western Balkans, including through the Countering Russian Influence Fund and the Countering People’s Republic of China Malign Influence Fund;

(9) an assessment of the tactics, techniques, and procedures that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, determines are likely to be used in future Russian or Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns carried out with respect to Western Balkans countries; and

(10) recommended authorities or activities that the Department of State and other relevant Federal agencies could enact to increase the United States Government’s capacity to counter Russian and Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns in Western Balkans countries.

(c) Form.—Each report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.