Union Calendar No. 558
118th CONGRESS 2d Session |
[Report No. 118–662]
To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2025 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
May 22, 2024
Mr. Turner introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
September 11, 2024
Reported with an amendment, committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic]
[For text of introduced bill, see copy of bill as introduced on May 22, 2024]
To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2025 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
(a) Short title.—This Act may be cited as the “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025”.
(b) Table of contents.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.
Sec. 303. Statute of limitation for espionage offenses.
Sec. 304. Secure communication between Congress and intelligence community.
Sec. 305. Commission to examine the national security and defense risks to the United States posed by anomalous health incidents.
Sec. 401. Congressional notifications and summaries of misconduct regarding employees within the intelligence community.
Sec. 402. Improvements to urgent concerns submitted to Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 403. Protection for individuals making authorized disclosures to Inspectors General of elements of the intelligence community.
Sec. 404. Clarification of authority of certain Inspectors General to receive protected disclosures.
Sec. 405. Codification of the National Intelligence Management Council.
Sec. 406. Analyses and impact statements regarding proposed investment into the United States.
Sec. 407. Responsibilities and authorities of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 408. Enabling intelligence community integration.
Sec. 409. Protection of intelligence sources and methods.
Sec. 410. Department of Homeland Security intelligence support for State Governors.
Sec. 411. Authorization relating to certain intelligence and counterintelligence activities of Coast Guard.
Sec. 412. Requirements with respect to access of foreign nationals to Department of Energy National Laboratories.
Sec. 413. Formalized counterintelligence training for Department of Energy personnel.
Sec. 414. Federal Bureau of Investigation proactive cyber support.
Sec. 415. Requirements relating to confidential human source program of Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Sec. 416. Congressional notice of FBI counterintelligence investigations into individuals who hold or are candidates for Federal elected office.
Sec. 417. Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office at the Department of Transportation.
Sec. 418. Ukraine lessons learned Working Group.
Sec. 419. Modification to waiver for post-service employment restrictions.
Sec. 420. Prohibition of funds for Intelligence Experts Group.
Sec. 421. Prohibition on availability of funds for certain activities of the Overt Human Intelligence and Open Source Intelligence Collection Programs of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security.
Sec. 422. Limitation on availability of funds for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence pending submission of information regarding improvements relating to intelligence community staffing, details, and assignments.
Sec. 431. Foreign malign influence interagency guidance.
Sec. 432. Foreign malign influence standard operating procedures.
Sec. 433. Intelligence support for certain executive branch departments and agencies.
Sec. 434. Intelligence community recruitment for certain security-cleared separating Military Members.
Sec. 435. Strategy to strengthen intelligence community recruitment efforts in the United States territories.
Sec. 436. Extension of requirement for annual report on strikes undertaken by the United States against terrorist targets outside areas of active hostilities.
Sec. 437. Advisability and feasibility study on updating intelligence sharing regulations.
Sec. 438. Budget transparency for open-source intelligence activities.
Sec. 439. Enhancing public-private sharing on manipulative adversary practices in critical mineral projects.
Sec. 440. Briefing on policies and procedures for addressing threats from known or suspected terrorists.
Sec. 441. Assessment on intelligence relationship between Egypt and Israel.
Sec. 442. Intelligence assessment of economic coercion by the People’s Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific region and strategies to enhance the economic resilience of countries in the Indo-Pacific region.
Sec. 443. Report on the mission effect of civilian harm.
Sec. 444. Report on the economic outlook of China.
Sec. 445. Repeal of requirement with respect to assessments regarding the Northern Triangle and Mexico.
Sec. 501. Sense of Congress on the need for increased effort and resources in the field of geomatics.
Sec. 502. Department of Defense Senior Intelligence Oversight Official.
Sec. 503. Extension and modification of Department of Defense intelligence and counterintelligence expense authority.
Sec. 504. Authority of Army counterintelligence agents.
Sec. 505. Modifications to notification on the provision of Defense sensitive support.
Sec. 506. Revision of Secretary of Defense authority to engage in commercial activities as security for intelligence collection activities.
Sec. 507. Promulgating guidance related to certain Department of Defense contracts.
Sec. 508. Sense of Congress on Space Force acquisition workforce.
Sec. 601. Requirements for the Special Victim Investigator.
Sec. 602. Reserve for Contingencies notification requirement.
Sec. 603. Government Accountability Office study and report on modernization initiative of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 701. Sensitive compartmented information facility accreditation.
Sec. 702. Study of intelligence community research security.
Sec. 703. Report on biotechnology.
Sec. 704. Data with respect to timeliness of security clearance determinations.
Sec. 705. Data with respect to timeliness of polygraph examinations.
In this Act:
(1) CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.—The term “congressional intelligence committees” has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
(2) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2025 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Federal Government.
(a) Specifications of amounts.—The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the Federal Government are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act.
(b) Availability of classified schedule of authorizations.—
(1) AVAILABILITY.—The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President.
(2) DISTRIBUTION BY THE PRESIDENT.—Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the executive branch of the Federal Government.
(3) LIMITS ON DISCLOSURE.—The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except—
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a));
(a) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2025 the sum of $650,000,000.
(b) Classified authorization of appropriations.—In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2025 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
(a) In general.—Chapter 213 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
“An indictment may be found or an information may be instituted at any time without limitation for—
(b) Clerical amendment.—The table of sections for chapter 213 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
“3302. Espionage offenses.”.
(c) Conforming amendment.—Section 19 of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (18 U.S.C. 792 note) is amended by striking “, 793, or 794” and inserting “or 793”.
Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
“(aa) Requirements with respect to secure communication between Congress and intelligence community.—
“(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of National Intelligence shall, upon the approval of specified congressional leaders—
“(A) provide secure communications to support the oversight functions of the congressional intelligence committees, including through the procurement, installation, configuration, and maintenance of sufficient software, connectivity, information technology equipment, computers, printers, and related peripheral equipment to ensure that such committees are able to communicate with the intelligence community through secure data, voice, and video communications;
“(B) ensure that such communications enabled under subparagraph (A) facilitate communication at all classification levels;
“(2) GOVERNANCE.—The Director, in coordination with specified congressional leaders, shall establish governance and security policies applicable to the connectivity, equipment, and software provided under this subsection and shall review and update such policies periodically, as appropriate, to address counterintelligence threats and technological changes.
“(3) TREATMENT AS CONGRESSIONAL RECORDS.—Any data created, stored, or transmitted by the congressional intelligence committees through networks, equipment, or software provided under paragraph (1) is a congressional record and shall not be treated as an agency record for purposes of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, (commonly known as the ‘the Freedom of Information Act’) or any other law.
“(4) DOCUMENTATION OF COST.—The Director shall document the funding required to satisfy this subsection within each annual budget submission to Congress, including any anticipated upgrades or recapitalization expenditures over the 5-year period that begins on October 1 of the fiscal year for which year-by-year proposed funding is included.
(a) Establishment.—There is established, not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, an independent commission to be known as the National Security Commission on Anomalous Health Incidents (referred to in this section as the “Commission”) to review anomalous health incidents affecting United States Government personnel and their dependents for the purpose of comprehensively addressing the national security and defense risks to the United States posed by anomalous health incidents.
(b) Membership.—
(1) COMPOSITION.—The Commission shall be composed of 9 members appointed as follows:
(B) The Chair of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives shall appoint 1 member.
(C) The Ranking Member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives shall appoint 1 member.
(D) The Chair of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives shall appoint 1 member.
(2) INITIAL APPOINTMENTS.—Members shall be appointed to the Commission under paragraph (1) not later than 30 days after the establishment of the Commission under subsection (a).
(3) EFFECT OF LACK OF APPOINTMENT BY DEADLINE.—If one or more appointments under paragraph (1) is not made by the appointment date specified in paragraph (2), the authority to make such appointment or appointments shall expire, and the number of members of the Commission shall be reduced by the number equal to the number of appointments so not made.
(4) QUALIFICATIONS.—It is the sense of Congress that each member of the Commission appointed under paragraph (1) should—
(5) PROHIBITIONS.—A member of the Commission appointed under paragraph (1) may not—
(C) be a current or former registrant under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611 et seq.);
(6) CHAIR AND VICE CHAIR.—The Commission shall select a Chair and a Vice Chair from among the members of the Commission.
(7) TERMS.—Members shall be appointed for the life of the Commission. A vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers and shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment was made. The Chair and Vice Chair shall report any vacancy in the Commission to the appropriate congressional committees immediately upon learning that there will be a vacancy in the Commission.
(c) Duties.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission shall carry out the review described in paragraph (2). In carrying out such review, the Commission shall consider both the events known as anomalous health incidents themselves, and the response to such incidents by the United States Government and other nations’ governments for the purpose of comprehensively addressing the national security and defense risks to the United States posed by the causes of, and responses to, anomalous health incidents.
(2) SCOPE OF THE REVIEW.—In conducting the review under paragraph (1), the Commission shall consider the following:
(A) A historical review of the United States Government’s response to anomalous health incidents to identify a more effective, standardized model that can be applied to complex challenges to ensure all perspectives are fully and fairly presented to policy makers, mitigate real or perceived undue influence on analytical judgments, and effectively gather and act on intelligence and information to address complex national security challenges.
(B) A historical review of the United States Government’s provision of support and medical care to United States personnel and their dependents impacted by anomalous health incidents.
(C) Whether a review of all information on collected reports of anomalous health incidents can inform the development of a categorization mechanism which can inform appropriate steps to be taken following future reports.
(D) Whether available data points to the involvement of an external actor in some or all reported anomalous health incidents.
(E) Whether known or novel mechanisms an adversary might use against United States personnel or their dependents might explain some or all reported anomalous health incidents.
(d) Reports.—
(1) INITIAL BRIEFING.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall brief the President, or the President’s designee, and the appropriate congressional committees on the progress of the activities of the Commission as of the date of such briefing.
(2) ANNUAL REPORT.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the initial meeting of the Commission, and annually thereafter, the Commission shall submit to the President and the appropriate congressional committees a report describing the progress of the activities of the Commission as of the date of such report, including any findings, recommendations, or lessons learned endorsed by the Commission.
(3) FINAL REPORT.—
(A) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 3 years after the date of the establishment of the Commission under subsection (a), the Commission shall submit to the President and the appropriate congressional committees a final report on the findings of the Commission and such recommendations that the Commission may have for action by Congress and the Federal Government, which shall address the following:
(i) Whether known or novel mechanisms an adversary might use against United States personnel or their dependents might explain some or all reported anomalous health incidents.
(ii) Whether available data points to the involvement of an external actor in some or all reported anomalous health incidents.
(iii) Whether the United States Government’s provision of support and medical care is sufficient to appropriately address the impacts of anomalous health incidents on affected personnel.
(iv) Effectively structuring United States Government responses to distinct, complex national security issues such as reports of anomalous health incidents.
(v) Research and development to improve the medical response and potential harm mitigation techniques for anomalous health incidents.
(vi) How analytic integrity and structured analytical techniques impacted the United States Government’s response to anomalous health incidents.
(e) Powers of commission.—
(1) HEARINGS AND EVIDENCE.—The Commission may, for the purpose of carrying out this section—
(A) hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, receive such evidence, and administer such oaths as the Commission considers necessary to fulfill the Commission’s duties; and
(B) subject to paragraph (2)(A), require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, cables, memoranda, papers, documents, and any other information as the Commission considers necessary to fulfill the Commission’s duties.
(2) SUBPOENAS.—
(A) ISSUANCE.—
(B) ENFORCEMENT.—
(i) IN GENERAL.—In the case of contumacy or failure to obey a subpoena issued under this subsection, the United States district court for the judicial district in which the subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found, or where the subpoena is returnable, may issue an order requiring such person to appear at any designated place to testify or to produce documentary or other evidence. Any failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt of that court.
(ii) ADDITIONAL ENFORCEMENT.—In the case of any failure of any witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when summoned under authority of this section, the Commission may, by majority vote, certify a statement of fact constituting such failure to the appropriate United States attorney, who may bring the matter before the grand jury for its action, under the same statutory authority and procedures as if the United States attorney had received a certification under sections 102 through 104 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (2 U.S.C. 192 through 194).
(f) Information from Federal agencies.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission is authorized to secure directly from any executive department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the Federal Government such books, records, correspondence, cables, memoranda, papers, documents, and any other information for the purposes of this section.
(2) COOPERATION.—In carrying out its duties, the Commission shall receive the full and timely cooperation of any executive department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the Federal Government in providing the Commission with analysis, briefings, and other information necessary for the fulfillment of the Commission’s duties.
(3) FURNISHING INFORMATION.—Upon receipt of a written request made by the Chair and Vice Chair of the Commission, or by vote of a majority of the Commission, the head of the department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the Federal Government shall expeditiously furnish such books, records, correspondence, cables, memoranda, papers, documents, and any other information to the Commission. Claims of common-law privileges made by any executive department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the Federal Government are applicable only at the discretion of the Chair and Vice Chair.
(4) RECEIPT, HANDLING, STORAGE, AND DISSEMINATION.—Such books, records, correspondence, cables, memoranda, papers, documents, and any other information received by the Commission shall only be received, handled, stored, and disseminated by members of the Commission and its staff consistent with all applicable statutes, regulations, and Executive orders.
(5) PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.—A department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the Federal Government shall respond to requests submitted pursuant to paragraph (2) in a manner consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.
(g) Support from Federal agencies.—
(1) DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.—The Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the Commission, on a nonreimbursable basis, such administrative services, funds, staff, facilities, and other support services as are necessary for the performance of the duties of the Commission under this section.
(2) SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.—The Secretary of Defense may provide the Commission, on a nonreimbursable basis, with such administrative services, staff, and other support services as the Commission may request.
(3) OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.—In addition to the assistance set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2), other departments and agencies of the United States may provide the Commission such services, funds, facilities, staff, and other support as such departments and agencies consider advisable and as may be authorized by law.
(h) Treatment of information relating to national security.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of National Intelligence shall assume responsibility for the handling and disposition of any information related to the national security of the United States that is received, considered, or used by the Commission under this section.
(2) INFORMATION PROVIDED BY CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.—Any information related to the national security of the United States that is provided to the Commission by a congressional intelligence committee may not be further provided or released without the approval of the chairman of such committee.
(3) ACCESS AFTER TERMINATION OF COMMISSION.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, after the termination of the Commission under subsection (m), only the members and designated staff of the appropriate congressional committees, the Director of National Intelligence (and the designees of the Director), and such other officials of the executive branch of the Federal Government as the President may designate shall have access to information related to the national security of the United States that is received, considered, or used by the Commission.
(i) Postal services.—The Commission may use the United States mail in the same manner and under the same conditions as other departments and agencies of the Federal Government.
(j) Gifts.—No member or staff of the Commission may receive a gift or benefit by reason of the service of such member or staff on the Commission.
(k) Commission personnel matter.—
(1) COMPENSATION OF MEMBERS.—
(A) NONGOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES.—Each member of the Commission who is not otherwise employed by the Federal Government shall be compensated at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day (including travel time) during which the member is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Commission.
(2) TRAVEL EXPENSES.—A member of the Commission shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission.
(3) STAFF.—
(A) APPOINTMENT AND COMPENSATION OF STAFF.—The Chair and Vice Chair of the Commission, in accordance with rules agreed upon by the Commission, shall appoint and fix the compensation of a staff director and such other personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its duties, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that payable to a person occupying a position at level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of such title.
(4) DETAIL OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES.—A Federal Government employee, with the appropriate security clearance to conduct their duties, may be detailed to the Commission without reimbursement, and such detail shall be without interruption or loss of civil service status or privilege.
(5) PROCUREMENT OF TEMPORARY AND INTERMITTENT SERVICES.—The Chair and Vice Chair of the Commission may procure temporary and intermittent services under section 3109(b) of title 5, United States Code, at rates for individuals that do not exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of that title.
(l) Funding.—
(1) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated funds to the extent and in such amounts as specifically provided in advance in appropriations acts for the purposes detailed in this section.
(m) Termination.—The Commission shall terminate 90 days after the date on which the Commission submits the final report required under subsection (d)(3), but in no event later than three years after the date of establishment in subsection (a).
(a) Annual reports for calendar years 2024, 2025, and 2026.—Not later than 60 days after the end of calendar years 2024, 2025, and 2026, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on civilian employees in the intelligence community placed on administrative leave pending possible adverse personnel action during that calendar year.
(b) Elements.—Each report under subsection (a) shall include, for the calendar year covered by the report, the following:
(1) The total number of employees who were placed on administrative leave pending possible adverse personnel action, disaggregated by intelligence community element and pay grade.
(c) Notification of referral to Department of Justice.—If a referral is made to the Department of Justice from any element of the intelligence community regarding an allegation of misconduct against a civilian employee of the intelligence community, the head of the element of the intelligence community that employs the covered employee shall notify the congressional intelligence committees of the referral not later than 10 days after the date on which such referral is made.
(a) Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.—Section 103H(k)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)) is amended—
(2) in subparagraph (B)—
(A) by striking “Not later than the end of the 14-calendar-day period beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a complaint or information under subparagraph (A), the” and inserting “(i) The”;
(B) by striking “whether the complaint or information” and inserting “whether a complaint or information under subparagraph (A)”; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
“(ii) The Inspector General shall comply with clause (i) with respect to a complaint or information under subparagraph (A) not later than the end of the 14-calendar-day period beginning on the date on which the employee who reported the complaint or information confirms to the Inspector General that the employee reported the complaint or information to the Inspector General with the intent to report to Congress the complaint or information.”; and
(b) Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency.—Section 17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)) is amended—
(2) in subparagraph (B)(i)—
(4) in subparagraph (B)—
(B) by inserting after clause (i) the following:
“(ii) The Inspector General shall comply with clause (i) with respect to a complaint or information under subparagraph (A) not later than the end of the 14-calendar-day period beginning on the date on which the employee who reported the complaint or information confirms to the Inspector General that the employee reported the complaint or information to the Inspector General with the intent to report to Congress the complaint or information.”; and
(5) by adding at the end the following:
“(I) In this paragraph, the term ‘employee’ includes a former employee or former contractor, if the complaint or information reported under subparagraph (A) arises from or relates to the period during which the former employee or former contractor was an employee or contractor, as the case may be.”.
(c) Inspectors General of other elements of the intelligence community.—Section 416 of title 5, United States Code, is amended—
(2) in subsection (b), by inserting “in writing” after “may report the complaint or information” each place it appears; and
(3) in subsection (c)—
(B) in paragraph (1)—
(C) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
“(2) DEADLINE FOR COMPLIANCE.—The Inspector General shall comply with paragraph (1) with respect to a complaint or information reported under subsection (b) not later than the end of the 14-calendar-day period beginning on the date on which the employee who reported the complaint or information confirms to the Inspector General that the employee reported the complaint or information to the Inspector General with the intent to report to Congress the complaint or information.”.
(a) Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.—Section 103H(g)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(g)(3)) is amended—
(2) by striking “The Inspector General is authorized” and inserting “(A) The Inspector General is authorized”; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
“(B) (i) An individual may disclose classified information to the Inspector General in accordance with the applicable security standards and procedures established under section 102A or 803 of this Act, chapter 12 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2161 et seq.), Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to Classified National Security Information), or any applicable provision of law.
“(ii) A disclosure under clause (i) of classified information by an individual without appropriate clearance or authority to access such classified information at the time of the disclosure shall be treated as an authorized disclosure that does not violate a covered provision if the disclosure—
“(iii) In this subparagraph, the term ‘covered provision’ means—
“(II) any otherwise applicable regulation or order issued under the authority of chapter 18 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2271 et seq.) or Executive Order 13526;
(b) Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency.—Section 17(e)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(e)(3)) is amended—
(2) by striking “The Inspector General is authorized” and inserting “(A) The Inspector General is authorized”; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
“(B) (i) An individual may disclose classified information to the Inspector General in accordance with the applicable security standards and procedures established under section 102A or 803 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024, 3162a), chapter 12 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2161 et seq.), Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to Classified National Security Information), or any applicable provision of law.
“(ii) A disclosure under clause (i) of classified information by an individual without appropriate clearance or authority to access such classified information at the time of the disclosure shall be treated as an authorized disclosure that does not violate a covered provision if the disclosure—
“(iii) In this subparagraph, the term ‘covered provision’ means—
“(II) any otherwise applicable regulation or order issued under the authority of chapter 18 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2271 et seq.) or Executive Order 13526;
(c) Other Inspectors General of elements of the intelligence community.—Section 416 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
“(i) Protection for individuals making authorized disclosures.—
“(1) IN GENERAL.—An individual may disclose classified information to an Inspector General of an element of the intelligence community in accordance with the applicable security standards and procedures established under section 102A or 803 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024, 3162a), chapter 12 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2161 et seq.), Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to Classified National Security Information), or any applicable provision of law.
“(2) DISCLOSURE WITHOUT CLEARANCE OR AUTHORITY.—A disclosure under paragraph (1) of classified information by an individual without appropriate clearance or authority to access such classified information at the time of the disclosure shall be treated as an authorized disclosure that does not violate a covered provision if the disclosure—
“(3) DEFINITION OF COVERED PROVISION.—In this subsection, the term ‘covered provision’ means—
“(B) any otherwise applicable regulation or order issued under the authority of chapter 18 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2271 et seq.) or Executive Order 13526;
“(4) DEFINITION.—In this subsection, the term ‘intelligence community’ has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).”.
(d) Rule of construction.—Nothing in this section, or the amendments made by this section, may be construed to limit or modify the obligation of an individual to appropriately store, handle, or disseminate classified information in accordance with applicable security guidance and procedures, including with respect to the removal of classified information.
Section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S. 3234) is amended—
(a) Establishment of National Intelligence Management Council.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 103L the following (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):
“SEC. 103M. National Intelligence Management Council.
“(a) Establishment.—There is within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence a National Intelligence Management Council.
“(b) Composition.—
“(1) The National Intelligence Management Council shall be composed of senior officials within the intelligence community and substantive experts from the public or private sector, who shall be appointed by, report to, and serve at the pleasure of, the Director of National Intelligence.
“(2) The Director shall prescribe appropriate security requirements for personnel appointed from the private sector as a condition of service on the National Intelligence Management Council, or as contractors of the Council or employees of such contractors, to ensure the protection of intelligence sources and methods while avoiding, wherever possible, unduly intrusive requirements which the Director considers to be unnecessary for this purpose.
“(c) Duties and responsibilities.—Members of the National Intelligence Management Council shall work with each other and with other elements of the intelligence community to ensure proper coordination and to minimize duplication of effort, in addition to the following duties and responsibilities:
“(1) Provide integrated mission input to support the processes and activities of the intelligence community, including with respect to intelligence planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation processes.
“(2) Identify and pursue opportunities to integrate or coordinate collection and counterintelligence efforts.
“(3) In concert with the responsibilities of the National Intelligence Council, ensure the integration and coordination of analytic and collection efforts.
“(4) Develop and coordinate intelligence strategies in support of budget planning and programming activities.
“(5) Advise the Director of National Intelligence on the development of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (or any successor mechanism established for the prioritization of programs and activities).
“(6) In concert with the responsibilities of the National Intelligence Council, support the role of the Director of National Intelligence as principal advisor to the President on intelligence matters.
“(7) Inform the elements of the intelligence community of the activities and decisions related to missions assigned to the National Intelligence Management Council.
“(8) Maintain awareness, across various functions and disciplines, of the mission-related activities and budget planning of the intelligence community.
“(9) Evaluate, with respect to assigned mission objectives, requirements, and unmet requirements, the implementation of the budget of each element of the intelligence community.
“(10) Provide oversight on behalf of, and make recommendations to, the Director of National Intelligence on the extent to which the activities, program recommendations, and budget proposals made by elements of the intelligence community sufficiently address mission objectives, intelligence gaps, and unmet requirements.
“(d) Mission management of members.—Members of the National Intelligence Management Council, under the direction of the Director of National Intelligence, shall serve as mission managers to ensure integration among the elements of the intelligence community and across intelligence functions, disciplines, and activities for the purpose of achieving unity of effort and effect, including through the following responsibilities:
“(e) Staff; availability.—
“(1) STAFF.—The Director of National Intelligence shall make available to the National Intelligence Management Council such staff as may be necessary to assist the National Intelligence Management Council in carrying out the responsibilities described in this section.
“(2) AVAILABILITY.—Under the direction of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Intelligence Management Council shall make reasonable efforts to advise and consult with officers and employees of other departments or agencies, or components thereof, of the United States Government not otherwise associated with the intelligence community.
“(f) Support from elements of the intelligence community.—The heads of the elements of the intelligence community shall provide appropriate support to the National Intelligence Management Council, including with respect to intelligence activities, as required by the Director of National Intelligence.”.
(2) OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.—Section 103(c) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3025) is amended—
(b) Sense of Congress with respect to China mission.—It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence should create a role in the National Intelligence Management Council for a National Intelligence Manager dedicated to the People’s Republic of China.
(c) Report to Congress on strategic competition.—
(1) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of elements of the intelligence community determined relevant by the Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on strategic competition.
(2) MATTERS.—The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(A) Lessons learned by the intelligence community with respect to strategic competition from the reorganizations implemented consequent to—
(B) Examination of the potential effects of a new national intelligence center established to—
(i) integrate all-source intelligence analysis efforts with respect to the activities, plans, and intentions of strategic adversaries;
(iii) optimize resource investments in the intelligence community in support of strategic competition;
(3) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified appendix.
(d) Sense of Congress with respect to counternarcotics mission.—It is the sense of Congress that, consistent with section 7325 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (137 Stat. 1043), the Director of National Intelligence should create a role in the National Intelligence Management Council for a National Intelligence Manager dedicated to the counternarcotics mission of the United States.
Section 102A(z) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(z)) is amended—
(1) in paragraph (2)(A) by inserting “, including with respect to counterintelligence” before the semicolon; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
“(3) Definitions.—In this subsection:
“(A) The term ‘a review or an investigation of any proposed investment into the United States for which the Director has prepared analytic materials’ includes a review, investigation, assessment, or analysis conducted by the Director pursuant to section 7 or 10(g) of Executive Order 13913 (85 Fed. Reg. 19643; relating to Establishing the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector), or successor order.
Section 102A(f)(10) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(f)(10)) is amended by striking the period and inserting “, and upon receiving any such direction, the Director shall notify the congressional intelligence committees immediately in writing with a description of such other intelligence-related functions directed by the President.”.
Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 113B the following new section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):
“SEC. 113C. Non-reimbursable transfer of goods and services within intelligence community in certain cases.
“(a) In general.—
“(1) AUTHORITY.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an element of the intelligence community may, subject to such guidance or regulations as may be developed by the Director of National Intelligence, provide goods or services to another element of the intelligence community without reimbursement or transfer of funds for such goods or services for the purposes of remote work and hoteling initiatives for intelligence community employees and affiliates.
“(b) Hoteling defined.—In this section, the term ‘hoteling’ means an alternative work arrangement in which employees of one element of the intelligence community are authorized flexible work arrangements to work part of the time at one or more alternative worksite locations, as appropriately authorized.”.
Section 102A(i) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(i)) is amended—
(2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph:
“(3) (A) The Director, or the Principal Deputy Director acting on behalf of the Director, shall be responsible for the creation, modification, deconfliction, and oversight of special access programs (referred to as controlled access programs) pertaining to intelligence sources, methods, and intelligence activities (but not including military operational, strategic, and tactical programs).
“(B) In carrying out the responsibility under subparagraph (A), the Director shall—
“(i) ensure controlled access programs of the intelligence community conform with the requirements identified within Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified national security information), or any successor order;
“(ii) establish controlled access program minimum security requirements and guidance for the implementation of such requirements, to include general procedures, personnel security, physical security, and control marking requirements;
(a) In general.—Not less frequently than once per year, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, shall ensure that an officer of the Field Intelligence Directorate of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security located in each State shall engage proactively with senior officials for each State, such as the chief executive or Homeland Security Advisor of such State, with respect to matters concerning homeland security or national security, consistent with any guidance provided by the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis.
(b) Requirement in certain territories of the United States.—In the case of a territory which does not have a permanent Field Intelligence Directorate officer located in such territory, the headquarters element of the Field Intelligence Directorate shall designate a Field Intelligence Directorate officer who is responsible for carrying out the requirement under subsection (a) with respect to such territory.
The Commandant of the Coast Guard may use up to 1 percent of the amounts made available under the National Intelligence Program (as such term is defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)) for each fiscal year for the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the Coast Guard for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, which may be accounted for solely on the certification of the Commandant and each such certification shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified.
(a) In general.—The Secretary of Energy shall designate Senior Executive employees of the United States Government employed by the Department of Energy to have final approval authority with respect to authorizing the access of a foreign national into a National Laboratory in the event that an assessment of the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy identifies potential significant risks that are not agreed to by the Director of the relevant National Laboratory.
(b) Briefing.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing with respect to the progress to enhance the United States Government’s responsibility for the Department of Energy’s approval processes with regard to authorizing the access of foreign nationals into National Laboratories, including with respect to requiring that such decisions are the primary responsibility of United States Government leadership, as opposed to the Directors of the National Laboratories, and a plan for implementation of such enhancement.
(c) National Laboratory defined.—In this section, the term “National Laboratory” has the meaning given that term in section 2 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801).
(a) Training.—Section 215(d) of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144b) is amended by adding at the end the following:
(b) Reporting requirement.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing on the plans developed under section 215(d)(3) of the Department of Energy Organization Act (as amended by subsection (a)), including with respect to—
(a) In general.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall develop and make available an unclassified interface for use by owners and operators of United States critical infrastructure to connect with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to request cyber-related support.
(b) Availability to congressional offices.—The interface described in subsection (a) shall be available to congressional offices for purposes of facilitating connection with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(c) Interface requirements.—The interface described in subsection (a) shall include information with respect to the following:
(1) Best practices for cyber hygiene, specifically geared towards owners and operators of critical infrastructure.
(2) Tailored information that is relevant based on the threats to specific sectors of critical infrastructure.
(d) Critical infrastructure defined.—The term “critical infrastructure” has the meaning given that term in the Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c).
(a) Operational requirements for confidential human source program.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—No agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may open an individual as a confidential human source before the Special Agent in Charge of the relevant Federal Bureau of Investigation field office has verified the individual’s identity.
(2) PROHIBITION WITH RESPECT TO FBI HEADQUARTERS.—No Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation whose principal place of duty is at the Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters may open an individual as a confidential human source.
(3) ADDITIONAL VETTING IN CERTAIN CASES.—With respect to a potential or actual confidential human source who is identified as a potential counterintelligence concern or is the subject of an investigation for any criminal or counterintelligence purposes, a Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters agent shall conduct a validation assessment and report for such source in addition to such source validation requirements as are in effect pursuant to policies and procedures governing the confidential human source program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(4) UNAUTHORIZED ILLEGAL ACTIVITY OF CONFIDENTIAL HUMAN SOURCE.—If the handling agent with respect to a confidential human source has reasonable grounds to believe that a confidential human source has engaged in any unauthorized illegal activity, including any misdemeanor or felony criminal activity—
(5) PROHIBITION ON COMMITMENTS OF IMMUNITY IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS.—The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may not intervene in any way to impact the outcome of any proceeding relating to a civil action or administrative hearing to which a confidential human source managed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation is a party.
(6) PROHIBITION WITH RESPECT TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.—No agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may open an individual as a confidential human source if such individual is a current Member of Congress (including a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to the Congress) or a candidate in an election for Federal office.
(b) Annual validation review requirement with respect to field offices.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Each Special Agent in Charge of a Federal Bureau of Investigation field office shall conduct an annual review of each confidential human source who is being managed out of such field office.
(2) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—At the conclusion of each annual review conducted under paragraph (1), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall, on an annual basis, submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report with respect to—
(B) the number of investigations opened as the result of annual reviews of confidential human sources;
(c) Oversight.—Beginning not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall develop and implement an oversight mechanism within the Bureau for activities with respect to any confidential human source under the confidential human source program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation the management of which is funded through the National Intelligence Program.
(d) Definitions.—In this section:
(2) CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP.—The term “congressional leadership” means—
(3) NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.—The term “National Intelligence Program” has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):
“SEC. 517. Notification requirement with respect to Federal Bureau of Investigation counterintelligence investigations regarding individuals who hold or are candidates for Federal elected office.
“(a) In general.—Notwithstanding section 533 of title 28, United States Code, the delegation of the authorities of the Attorney General, or any other delegation of authority, direction, or policy of the executive branch, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall notify congressional leadership not later than 5 days after the commencement of a counterintelligence investigation into an individual who holds an elected Federal office or an individual who is a candidate in an election for Federal office.
“(b) Contents.—A notification under subsection (a) shall include, to the extent consistent with the need to protect the integrity of ongoing counterintelligence investigations or other exceptionally sensitive national security or law enforcement matters, a summary of the relevant facts associated with the counterintelligence investigation and the identity of the person subject to such investigation.
(a) Definitions.—In this section:
(b) Establishment of Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office.—
(1) AGREEMENT WITH SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION.—The Director of National Intelligence, acting through the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, shall seek to enter into an agreement with the Secretary under which the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary shall establish within the Department an office, which shall be known as the “Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office”, in accordance with this section.
(c) Personnel.—
(1) DIRECTOR.—
(A) APPOINTMENT.—There shall be at the head of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office a Director who is appointed by the Director of National Intelligence. The Director of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office shall—
(i) be supervised and subject to performance evaluations by the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, in consultation with the Secretary;
(B) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Director of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office shall carry out the following responsibilities:
(i) Serving as the head of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office, with supervisory responsibility for the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office and any other personnel assigned to the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office.
(iii) Ensuring that counterintelligence threat information and, as appropriate, finished intelligence on topics related to the functions of the Department, are provided to appropriate personnel of the department or agency without delay.
(iv) Ensuring critical intelligence relevant to the Secretary is requested and disseminated in a timely manner.
(v) Establishing, as appropriate, mechanisms for collaboration through which Department subject matter experts, including those without security clearances, can share information and expertise with the intelligence community.
(vi) Correlating and evaluating counterintelligence threats identified within intelligence community reporting, in coordination with the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, and providing appropriate dissemination of such intelligence to officials of the Department with a need-to-know.
(vii) Advising the Secretary on methods to improve the counterintelligence posture of the Department.
(2) DEPUTY DIRECTOR.—There shall be within the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office a Deputy Director who is appointed by the Secretary, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence. The Deputy Director shall—
(A) be supervised and subject to performance evaluations by the Secretary, in consultation with the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center;
(3) OTHER EMPLOYEES.—
(A) JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT.—There shall be within the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office such other employees as the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary, determines appropriate. Employment at the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office is an intelligence community joint duty assignment. A permanent change of station to the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office shall be for a period of not less than 2 years.
(B) SUPERVISION.—The Director of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office shall be responsible for the supervision and management of employees assigned to the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office, including employees assigned by program elements of the intelligence community and other Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate.
(C) JOINT DUTY OR ASSIGNED PERSONNEL REIMBURSEMENT.—The Director of National Intelligence shall reimburse a program element of the intelligence community or a Federal department or agency for any permanent change of station employee assigned to the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office from amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(D) OPERATION UNDER AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.—Employees assigned to the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office under this paragraph shall operate under the authorities of the Director of National Intelligence for the duration of their assignment or period of employment within the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office, except for temporary duty assignment employees.
(E) INCENTIVE PAY.—
(i) IN GENERAL.—An employee who accepts employment at the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office during the 120-day period after the date of the establishment of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office shall receive an incentive payment, which shall be payable by the Director of National Intelligence, in an amount equal to 10 percent of the base annual pay of the employee. Such an employee who completes 2 years of service in the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office may receive an incentive payment in an amount equal to 10 percent of the base annual pay of the employee if the Director of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office determines the performance of the employee is exceptional.
(d) Funding.—To the extent and in such amounts as specifically provided in advance in appropriations Acts for the purposes detailed in this subsection, the Director of National Intelligence may expend such sums as are authorized within the National Intelligence Program of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for—
(1) the renovation, furnishing, and equipping of a Federal building, as necessary, to meet the security and operational requirements of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office;
(2) the provision of connectivity to the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office to enable briefings, secure audio and video communications, and collaboration between employees of the Department and the intelligence community at the unclassified, secret, and top secret levels;
(3) the provision of other information technology systems and devices, such as computers, printers, and phones, for use by employees of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office;
(e) Deadline for establishment of the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office.—
(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than January 1, 2026, the Director of National Intelligence shall seek to establish, in accordance with this section, the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office within the Department.
(2) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the plan to establish the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office required under paragraph (1). Such report shall include the costs and schedule associated with establishing the Intelligence Community Counterintelligence Office.
(a) Establishment.—The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly establish a working group to identify and share lessons that the United States intelligence community has learned from the Ukraine conflict.
(b) Membership.—The composition of the Working Group may include any officer or employee of a department or agency of the United States Government determined appropriate by the Director of National Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense.
(d) Duties.—The duties of the Working Group shall be the following:
(e) Meetings.—The Working Group shall meet not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and quarterly thereafter.
(f) Termination.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), the Working Group shall terminate on the date that is 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(g) Briefs to Congress.—Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the Working Group shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the activities of the Working Group.
(a) In general.—Section 304(a)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3073a(a)(2)) is amended—
(1) by amending subparagraph (A) to read as follows:
“(A) AUTHORITY TO GRANT WAIVERS.—The applicable head of an intelligence community element may waive a restriction in paragraph (1) with respect to an employee or former employee who is subject to that restriction only after—
(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking “Director” and inserting “applicable head of the intelligence community element”;
(3) in subparagraph (C), by striking “Director” each place it appears and inserting “applicable head of the intelligence community element”; and
(4) by amending subparagraph (E) to read as follows:
“(E) REPORTING TO CONGRESS.—On a quarterly basis, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written notification of each waiver or revocation that shall include the following:
“(i) With respect to a waiver issued to an employee or former employee—
(b) Written advisory opinions with respect to post-service employment restrictions.—Section 304(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3073a(d)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
“(4) WRITTEN ADVISORY OPINIONS.—Upon request from a current employee who occupies a covered intelligence position or a former employee who previously occupied a covered intelligence position, the applicable head of the element of the intelligence community concerned may provide a written advisory opinion to such current or former employee regarding whether a proposed employment, representation, or provision of advice or services constitutes covered post-service employment as defined in subsection (g).”.
(c) Covered post-service employment.—Section 304(g)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3073a(g)(2)) is amended by striking “relating to national security, intelligence, the military, or internal security to, the government of a foreign country or any company, entity, or other person whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized, in whole or in major part, by any government of a foreign country” and inserting “to the government of a foreign country or any company, entity, or other person whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized, in whole or in major part, by any government of a foreign country if such employment, representation, or provision of advice or services relates to national security, intelligence, the military, or internal security”.
(d) Conforming amendments.—Section 304(a)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3073a(a)(1)) is amended—
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security may be obligated or expended to support the Intelligence Experts Group of the Department of Homeland Security, or any successor group.
(a) Definitions.—In this section:
(1) COVERED ACTIVITY.—The term “covered activity” means—
(A) with respect to the Overt Human Intelligence Collection Program, an interview for intelligence collection purposes with any individual, including a United States person, who has been criminally charged, arraigned, or taken into the custody of a Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency, but whose guilt with respect to such criminal matters has not yet been adjudicated, unless the Office of Intelligence and Analysis has obtained the consent of the interviewee following consultation with counsel;
(B) with respect to either the Overt Human Intelligence Collection Program or the Open Source Intelligence Collection Program, any collection targeting journalists in the performance of their journalistic functions; and
(C) with respect to the Overt Human Intelligence Collection Program, an interview for intelligence collection purposes with a United States person where the Office of Intelligence and Analysis lacks a reasonable belief based on facts and circumstances that the United States person may possess significant foreign intelligence (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)).
(2) OVERT HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROGRAM.—The term “Overt Human Intelligence Collection Program” means the program established by the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis pursuant to Policy Instruction 907 of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, issued on June 29, 2016, or any successor program.
(3) OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROGRAM.—The term “Open Source Collection Intelligence Program” means the program established by the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis for the purpose of collecting intelligence and information for potential production and reporting in the form of Open Source Information Reports as reflected in Policy Instruction 900 of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, issued on January 13, 2015, or any successor program.
(4) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term “United States person” means—
(b) Prohibition on availability of funds for covered activities of Overt Human Intelligence Collection Program and Open Source Intelligence Collection Program.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be made available to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security to conduct a covered activity.
(c) Limitation on personnel.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be used by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security to increase, above the staffing level in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (division G of Public Law 118–31), the number of personnel assigned to the Open Source Intelligence Division who work exclusively or predominantly on domestic terrorism issues.
(d) Rules of construction.—
(1) EFFECT ON OTHER INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT.—Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting or superseding the authority of any official within the Department of Homeland Security to conduct legal, privacy, civil rights, or civil liberties oversight of the intelligence activities of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
(2) SHARING AND RECEIVING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit, or to limit the authority of, personnel of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security from sharing intelligence information with, or receiving information from—
Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2025 for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, not more than 95 percent may be obligated or expended until the date on which the Director of National Intelligence submits to the congressional intelligence committees the document required to be established by the Director under section 7307(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (50 U.S.C. 3025 note).
Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees the interagency guidance that governs engagement with social media companies for each element of the intelligence community.
Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees the most recently updated standard operating procedures document, without restrictions, that governs the Federal Bureau of Investigation's engagements with social media companies.
(a) Briefing.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing with respect to intelligence support provided to executive branch departments and agencies that are not a part of the intelligence community in accordance with Intelligence Community Directive 404 (relating to Executive Branch Intelligence Customers), or successor directive.
(b) Elements.—The briefing required under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) A list of United States Government departments and agencies that have a Federal Senior Intelligence Coordinator, an Intelligence Point of Contact, or a Federal Intelligence Coordination Office.
(2) A description of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s insight into how departments and agencies that have individuals holding a position described in paragraph (1) are selected for such position, and what role the Office of the Director of National Intelligence plays in that process, if any.
(a) In general.—The Intelligence Community Chief Human Capital Officer shall, not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, develop a human resources strategy for enhancing the recruitment into the intelligence community of covered military members.
(b) Contents.—The strategy developed under subsection (a) shall address—
(1) a requirement for each intelligence community element to facilitate job applications for qualified covered military members on each element’s job application portal, on USA Jobs, or other appropriate hiring platform;
(2) additional authorities or policy waivers required to overcome identified barriers to enhancing the recruitment into the intelligence community of covered military members to include those military members with technical training and experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree; and
(3) in consultation with military services, the development of best practices for matching job applications from among covered military members who have transferable qualifying backgrounds, skills, or expertise to relevant intelligence occupational specialties within the Federal civilian intelligence community workforce, to include coordinating intelligence community recruiting events and hiring blitzes.
(c) Briefing and implementation plan.—Not later than 30 days after the development of the strategy under subsection (a), the Intelligence Community Chief Human Capital Officer shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing regarding the strategy developed under subsection (a), including a plan for how each element of the intelligence community intends to implement such strategy.
(a) In general.—The Director of National Intelligence, acting through the Intelligence Community Chief Human Capital Officer, shall, in coordination with the human capital offices of such elements of the intelligence community as determined appropriate, develop an intelligence community-wide strategy to strengthen efforts to recruit qualified individuals residing in the United States territories.
(b) Briefing requirement.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the Intelligence Community Chief Human Capital Officer, shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing with respect to the strategy developed under subsection (a), including with respect to a plan for the implementation of such strategy.
Section 1723(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 1811) is amended—
(a) In general.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with each head of an element of the intelligence community, shall assess the advisability and feasibility of revising applicable policies and regulations with respect to the sharing of intelligence by an element of the intelligence community with foreign governments to incorporate the principles described under subsection (b).
(b) Principles.—The principles to be assessed for advisability and feasibility shall be the following:
(1) The intelligence community may not share actionable intelligence with another country unless the intelligence community receives such credible and reliable written assurances from a representative of the country that the country shall use the intelligence in accordance with applicable international law.
(2) Any policies authorizing the sharing of actionable intelligence shall require special protections to reduce the risk of violations of applicable international law as a consequence of sharing such intelligence.
(3) Any policies authorizing the sharing of actionable intelligence with another country shall require the element of the intelligence community concerned to document the risks and benefits of requiring the country receiving the intelligence to make credible and reliable written assurances that the country, when using the intelligence, will conduct only lethal or capture operations that comply with policy standards of the United States with respect to detainee treatment and direct action counterterrorism operations outside areas of active hostilities.
(4) If the head of an element of the intelligence community receives or conducts an assessment calling into question the credibility or reliability of written assurances provided by another country to comply with applicable international law with respect to the intelligence, the head shall, within 45 days of receiving or conducting the assessment—
(c) Report to Congress.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the advisability and feasibility of incorporating the principles described in subsection (b) into regulations on the sharing of intelligence by an element of the intelligence community, including the degree to which the current practices of each element of the intelligence community for the sharing of intelligence are consistent with such principles.
(a) Budget summaries to Director of National Intelligence.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the Director of National Intelligence a complete and comprehensive summary of all budget information with respect to the element’s open-source intelligence activities.
(b) Report to Congress.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report compiling the information in the summaries submitted to the Director pursuant to subsection (a).
(a) Strategy required.—The Director of National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the heads of such Federal agencies as the Director considers appropriate, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, develop a strategy to improve the sharing between the Federal Government and private entities of information and intelligence to mitigate the threat that foreign adversary illicit activities and tactics pose to United States persons in foreign jurisdictions on projects relating to energy generation and storage, including with respect to critical minerals inputs.
(b) Elements.—The strategy required by subsection (a) shall cover——
(1) how best to assemble and transmit information to United States persons—
(A) to protect against foreign adversary illicit tactics and activities relating to critical mineral projects abroad, including foreign adversary efforts to undermine such United States projects abroad;
(c) Implementation plan required.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director completes developing the strategy pursuant to subsection (a), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), or provide such committees a briefing on, a plan for implementing the strategy, which shall include a description of risks, benefits, opportunities, and drawbacks.
(a) In general.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, representatives from the Department of Homeland Security, which shall include representatives from Customs and Border Protection, Homeland Security Investigations, and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which shall include representatives from the Threat Screening Center, shall jointly provide a briefing to the appropriate congressional committees with respect to existing policies and procedures for handling encounters with known or suspected terrorists at the borders of the United States.
(b) Elements.—The briefing required under subsection (a) shall include a description of the following:
(1) The existing processes for handling encounters with individuals at or between ports of entry, to include the difference in process for individuals encountered at and between ports of entry.
(a) Report.—Not later than 90 days after the date the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of such elements of the intelligence community as the Director determines appropriate, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report assessing the intelligence relationship between Israel and Egypt that includes an assessment of intelligence failures with respect to either country and with respect to intelligence sharing between the two countries that contributed to the attack on Israel by Hamas on October 7, 2023.
(b) Matters.—The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) An assessment of the state, strengths, and limitations of any intelligence relationship between Egypt and Israel, especially with respect to Hamas and Gaza.
(c) Form.—The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.
(a) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, in consultation with Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the heads of other elements of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the Assistant Secretary, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report assessing the economic coercion efforts by the People’s Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific region and strategies that would enhance the resilience of countries in the Indo-Pacific region to economic coercion by the People’s Republic of China.
(b) Matters.—The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) A description of recent economic coercion efforts by the People’s Republic of China against countries in the Indo-Pacific region.
(2) An analysis of the effectiveness of economic coercion efforts against countries in the Indo-Pacific region by the People’s Republic of China in achieving the stated or assumed goals of the People’s Republic of China.
(3) An assessment of measures that would dissuade the People’s Republic of China from engaging in acts of economic coercion in the Indo-Pacific region and would encourage actions supporting the economic prosperity and security of the Indo-Pacific region.
(c) Form.—The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.
(d) Definitions.—In this section:
(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(a) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council and in coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the Director, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report examining the extent to which civilian harm that occurs during counterterrorism operations informs analyses of the intelligence community on the mission success of campaigns to degrade, disrupt, or defeat foreign terrorist organizations.
(b) Matters.—The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(2) The extent to which analysts of the intelligence community apply such methodology when assessing the degree to which a terrorist group is degraded, disrupted, or defeated.
(3) A framework to enable analysts to assess, as objectively as possible, the effect that civilian harm has had on the mission of degrading, disrupting, or defeating a terrorist group, or an explanation of why such framework cannot be generated.
(c) Form.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, the report shall include an unclassified summary of key findings that is consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.
(a) In general.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the economic outlook of the People’s Republic of China, which shall include alternative analyses of the economic projections of the People’s Republic of China.
(b) Elements.—The report required under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) Assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of the economy of the People’s Republic of China, including the potential effects of debt, demographics, and China’s international relationships.
Section 5522 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 2152) is repealed.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the intelligence community and the broader United States Government require professionals with advanced training in geomatics and geodesy and that the preservation of these skillsets is crucial to advancing geospatial intelligence tradecraft for the United States for national security and military operations;
(2) the intelligence community should use existing authorities to engage in novel ways with academic and industry partners to ensure the intelligence community’s demand signal for geomatics and geodesy professionals is received by the largest possible number of United States citizens while also seeking to foster a culture of academic excellence and research to propel the field of geomatics forward at the pace of innovation;
(3) by engaging with academic and industry partners the intelligence community can help speed the reversal of the current trend wherein the United States not only produces fewer geomatics scientists and engineers compared to its global competitors and potential adversaries, but such competitors and adversaries also provide them with training and expertise that could be used against the United States;
(4) there is abundant opportunity for the intelligence community to advance its growing need for geomatics and geodesy professionals by partnering with American universities and researchers with proven experience in diverse fields who can lead the way to solving the United States most vexing geomatics challenges; and
(a) In general.—Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
Ҥ 430c. Senior Intelligence Oversight Official
“(a) Establishment.—The Secretary of Defense, or a designee of the Secretary determined by regulations prescribed by the Secretary, shall designate a civilian employee of the Department of Defense in the Senior Executive Service to serve as the Senior Intelligence Oversight Official.
“(b) Responsibilities.—The Senior Intelligence Oversight Official shall exercise independent oversight of all intelligence, intelligence-related, and sensitive activities of the Department of Defense, including activities involving—
“(c) Access.—The Senior Intelligence Oversight Official shall have—
“(1) complete and unrestricted access to all information concerning any intelligence, intelligence-related, or sensitive activity of the Department of Defense regardless of classification or compartmentalization, including special access programs, from any personnel or organizational entity of the Department of Defense, to the extent necessary to carry out the responsibilities and functions of the Senior Intelligence Oversight Official; and
Section 1057 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 1593) is amended—
(a) In general.—Section 7377 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—
(1) in the section heading, by inserting “and Army Counterintelligence Command” before the colon; and
(2) by amending subsection (b) to read as follows:
“(b) Agents to have authority.—Subsection (a) applies to any employee of the Department of the Army who is—
(b) Clerical amendment.—The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 747 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to section 7377 and inserting the following new item:
“7377. Civilian special agents of the Criminal Investigation Command and Army Counterintelligence Command: authority to execute warrants and make arrests.”.
Section 1055 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 10 U.S.C. 113 note) is amended—
(1) in subsection (b)—
(2) in subsection (c)—
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking “defense sensitive support defined” and inserting “definitions”;
(B) by striking “, the term ‘defense sensitive support’ means support provided by the Department of Defense to a non-Department of Defense Federal department or agency that requires special protection from disclosure.” and inserting a colon; and
(a) Extension of authority.—Section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking “December 31, 2024” and inserting “December 31, 2027”.
Not later than January 31, 2025, the Secretary of Defense shall issue guidance on the governance and oversight of the contracts of the Department of Defense that support or enable sensitive activities.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the National Reconnaissance Office and the United States Space Force jointly benefit from a robust United States Space Force military and civilian acquisition workforce that includes contracting officers, acquisition program managers, engineers, and program control and finance professionals;
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives is concerned that the United States Space Force’s uneven emphasis on developing space operators and making fewer acquisition professionals available for assignments at the National Reconnaissance Office can negatively affect the procurement goals of the National Reconnaissance Office, particularly in support of United States Space Force requirements; and
(3) a robust United States Space Force acquisition workforce, that encourages assignment opportunities at the National Reconnaissance Office, both benefits the procurement goals of the National Reconnaissance Office and provides valuable experience that acquisition professionals can apply to future United States Space Force assignments.
Section 32(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3533(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following: “No individual appointed as the Special Victim Investigator may, at the time of such appointment, be a current employee of the Central Intelligence Agency.”.
Section 504(a)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3094(a)(2)) is amended by inserting “and, not later than 10 days after the date of the obligation or expenditure of such funds, of the activity requiring such obligation or expenditure” before the semicolon.
(a) Requirement.—The Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct a study on the impacts of the Central Intelligence Agency’s modernization initiative.
(b) Elements.—The study required under subsection (a) may include the following:
(1) An assessment of the Agency’s implementation of changes pursuant to the modernization initiative, including organizational changes and changes to Agency activities.
(2) An assessment of how any new administrative requirements made pursuant to the modernization initiative have affected Agency activities.
(3) An evaluation of whether the Agency’s implementation of changes pursuant to the modernization initiative have affected the Agency’s ability to anticipate and respond to emerging issues.
(4) An assessment of the extent to which the Agency’s implementation of changes pursuant to the modernization initiative have—
(A) fostered an organizational climate and structure that allows personnel in analytic and operational fields to take professional risks;
(c) Briefing; report.—
(1) BRIEFING.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the preliminary findings of the study conducted under subsection (a) at a time that is mutually agreed upon by the appropriate congressional committees and the Comptroller General.
(2) REPORT REQUIREMENT.—
(A) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the results of the study conducted under subsection (a).
(a) In general.—The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security shall, not later than December 31, 2029—
(1) assign responsibility to the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency for the accreditation of sensitive compartmented information facilities for all components of the Department of Defense, including the military departments, except with respect to the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and
(b) Notification with respect to resource requirements.—The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security shall notify the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional defense committees with respect to the resource requirements for the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency to carry out the accreditation responsibility under subsection (a).
(c) Submission of report to Congress.—The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security shall, in consultation with the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report not later than December 31, 2027, on the feasibility of the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency assuming accreditation responsibility with respect to sensitive compartmented information facilities for the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency by December 31, 2029.
(a) Study.—The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct a study on preventing intelligence community research grant funding from improperly benefiting foreign countries of concern.
(b) Elements.—The study under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) An evaluation of the intelligence community’s current research security practices, including with respect to the requirements under section 121 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3061).
(2) An evaluation of the feasibility and effects of prohibiting the award of an intelligence community grant for research to any individual or institution if the head of the relevant element of the intelligence community cannot verify that such grantee does not partner, formally or informally, with individuals from institutions located in any country of concern, or with institutions or entities from or located in any country of concern, subject to a waiver of such prohibition, on a case by case basis, by the head or deputy of the element of the intelligence community.
(3) Recommendations for the operational implementation of the prohibition described in paragraph (2).
(c) Report.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the results of the study conducted under subsection (a) and the recommendations required under subsection (b)(3).
(2) FORM.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(d) Country of concern defined.—For purposes of this section, the term “country of concern” has the meaning given that term in section 1(m)(1) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a(m)(1)).
(a) Reporting requirement.—Not later than June 30, 2025, the head of each covered element of the intelligence community shall submit a separate report to the congressional intelligence committees with respect to biotechnology threats and intelligence activities related to biotechnology threats.
(b) Matters included.—Each report under subsection (a) shall include, with respect to each covered element of the intelligence community, the following:
(1) A description of any gaps that exist with respect to intelligence activities that impede such element from fully targeting, collecting, and analyzing intelligence related to biotechnology threats.
Section 7702 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (50 U.S.C. 3352h) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
“(d) Data with respect to timeliness of security clearance determinations.—
“(1) IN GENERAL.—With respect to each report on compliance with timeliness standards for rendering determinations of trust for personnel vetting prepared pursuant to subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence shall make available to the congressional intelligence committees as soon as practicable the raw data with respect to the timeliness of security clearance determinations used to prepare each such report in machine-readable format for each element of the intelligence community that collects such data.
“(2) FORM AND CLASSIFICATION JUSTIFICATION.—The data provided to the congressional intelligence committees under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form to the greatest extent possible and shall contain a justification for the classification of any such data provided, which shall include citations to the applicable classification guide which explain the reason any such data is classified.”.
Section 7702 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (50 U.S.C. 3352h), as amended by section 704, is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
“(e) Data with respect to timeliness of polygraph examinations.—
“(1) IN GENERAL.—With respect to each report on compliance with timeliness standards for rendering determinations of trust for personnel vetting prepared pursuant to subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence shall make available to the congressional intelligence committees as soon as practicable the raw data with respect to the timeliness of polygraph examinations used to prepare each such report in machine-readable format for each element of the intelligence community that collects such data.
“(2) FORM AND CLASSIFICATION JUSTIFICATION.—The data provided to the congressional intelligence committees under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form to the greatest extent possible and shall contain a justification for the classification of any such data provided, which shall include citations to the applicable classification guide which explain the reason any such data is classified.”.
Union Calendar No. 558 | |||||
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[Report No. 118–662] | |||||
A BILL | |||||
To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2025 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. | |||||
September 11, 2024 | |||||
Reported with an amendment, committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed |