This Act may be cited as the “Securing Global Telecommunications Act”.

It is the sense of Congress as follows:

(a) Strategy required.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall develop and submit to the Committees on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and Energy and Commerce and the Committees on Foreign Relations and Commerce, Science, and Transportation and of the Senate a strategy, to be known as the “Strategy to Secure Global Telecommunications Infrastructure” (referred to in this Act as the “Strategy”), to promote the use of secure telecommunication infrastructure in countries other than the United States.

(b) Consultation required.—The Secretary of State shall consult with the President of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Chief Executive Officer of the Development Finance Corporation, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Director of the Trade and Development Agency, the Chair of the Federal Communications Commission, and the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, in developing the Strategy, which shall consist of an approach led by the Department of State using the policy tools, and informed by the technical expertise, of the other Federal entities so consulted to achieve the goal described in subsection (a).

(c) Elements.—The Strategy shall also include sections on each of the following:

(1) Mobile networks, including a description of efforts by countries other than the United States to—

(A) promote trusted Open RAN technologies while protecting against any security risks posed by untrusted vendors in Open RAN networks;

(B) use financing mechanisms to assist “rip-and-replace” projects and to incentivize countries to choose trusted equipment vendors;

(C) bolster multilateral cooperation, especially with developing countries and emerging economies, to promote the deployment of trusted wireless networks worldwide; and

(D) collaborate with trusted private sector companies to counter Chinese market leadership in the telecom equipment industry.

(2) Data centers, including a description of efforts to—

(A) utilize financing mechanisms to incentivize countries other than the United States to choose trusted data center providers; and

(B) bolster multilateral cooperation, especially with developing countries and emerging economies, to promote the deployment of trusted data centers worldwide.

(3) Sixth (and future) generation technologies (6G), including a description of efforts to—

(A) deepen cooperation with like-minded countries to promote United States and allied market leadership in 6G networks and technologies; and

(B) increase buy-in from developing countries and emerging countries on trusted technologies.

(4) Low-Earth orbit satellites, aerostats, and stratospheric balloons, including a description of efforts to work with trusted private sector companies to retain the ability to quickly provide internet connection in response to emergency situations.

(a) Report.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall develop and submit to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Foreign Relations and Commerce, Science, and Transportation the Senate a report on Russian and Chinese strategies and efforts—

(1) to expand the mandate of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to cover internet governance policy; and

(2) to advance other actions favorable to authoritarian interests and/or hostile to fair, industry-led processes.

(b) Elements.—The report required by subsection (a) shall also identify efforts by China and Russia—

(1) to increase the ITU’s jurisdiction over internet governance and to propose internet governance standards at the ITU;

(2) to leverage their private sector actors to advance their national interests through the ITU, including—

(A) encouraging Chinese and Russian companies to leverage their market power to pressure other member countries to deliver favorable decisions on ITU elections; and

(B) China’s efforts to leverage Huawei’s role as the primary telecommunications equipment and services provider for many developing countries to compel such countries to deliver favorable decisions on standards proposals, election victories, candidate selection, and other levers of power at the ITU; and

(3) to use the influence of Chinese and Russian nationals serving in the ITU to advantage the companies, standards decisions, and candidates that advance the CCP and Kremlin’s interests.

(c) Form.—The report required by this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the President of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Administrator for the United States Agency on International Development, the Chief Executive Officer of the Development Finance Corporation, the Chair of the Federal Communications Commission, and the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, shall develop and submit to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Energy and Commerce and of the House of Representatives and the Committees Foreign Relations and on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and of the Senate a report that identifies opportunities for greater collaboration with allies and partners to promote secure information and communications technology infrastructure in countries other than the United States, including through—