(a) Short title.—This Act may be cited as the “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024”.

(b) Table of contents.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

In this Act:

(1) CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.—The term “congressional intelligence committees” has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

(2) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given such term in such section.

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2024 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Federal Government.

(a) Specifications of amounts.—The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the Federal Government are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act.

(b) Availability of classified Schedule of Authorizations.—

(1) AVAILABILITY.—The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President.

(2) DISTRIBUTION BY THE PRESIDENT.—Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the executive branch of the Federal Government.

(3) LIMITS ON DISCLOSURE.—The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except—

(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a));

(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or

(C) as otherwise required by law.

(a) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2024 the sum of $658,950,000.

(b) Classified authorization of appropriations.—In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2024 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).

Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund $514,000,000 for fiscal year 2024.

Section 1535(d) of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263) is amended by inserting “or of an element of the intelligence community (as that term is defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003))” after “missions of the Department”.

(a) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of human capital of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a plan for the intelligence community to recruit, train, and retain personnel who have skills and experience in financial intelligence and emerging technologies in order to improve analytic tradecraft.

(b) Elements.—The plan required by subsection (a) shall include the following elements:

(1) An assessment, including measurable benchmarks of progress, of current initiatives of the intelligence community to recruit, train, and retain personnel who have skills and experience in financial intelligence and emerging technologies.

(2) An assessment of whether personnel in the intelligence community who have such skills are currently well integrated into the analytical cadre of the relevant elements of the intelligence community that produce analyses with respect to financial intelligence and emerging technologies.

(3) An identification of challenges to hiring or compensation in the intelligence community that limit progress toward rapidly increasing the number of personnel with such skills, and an identification of hiring or other reforms to resolve such challenges.

(4) A determination of whether the National Intelligence University has the resources and expertise necessary to train existing personnel in financial intelligence and emerging technologies.

(5) A strategy, including measurable benchmarks of progress, to, by January 1, 2025, increase by 10 percent the analytical cadre of personnel with expertise and previous employment in financial intelligence and emerging technologies.

(a) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall develop and implement a policy and performance framework to ensure the timely and effective mobility of employees and contractors of the Federal Government who are transferring employment between elements of the intelligence community.

(b) Elements.—The policy and performance framework required by subsection (a) shall include processes with respect to the following:

(1) Human resources.

(2) Medical reviews.

(3) Determinations of suitability or eligibility for access to classified information in accordance with Executive Order 13467 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to reforming processes related to suitability for Government employment, fitness for contractor employees, and eligibility for access to classified national security information).

(a) In general.—Section 135(d) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1015d(d)), as amended by section 6206(a)(4) of the Foreign Service Families Act of 2021 (Public Law 117–81), is further amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking “or” after the semicolon;

(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; or”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(3) a member of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)) (other than a member of the Armed Forces of the United States) who is on active duty for a period of more than 30 days.”.

(b) Effective date.—The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect at each public institution of higher education in a State that receives assistance under the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.) for the first period of enrollment at such institution that begins after July 1, 2026.

Section 904(d)(7)(A) of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 3383(d)(7)(A)) is amended to read as follows:

“(A) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS AND SURVEYS.—To develop standards, criteria, and guidance for counterintelligence risk assessments and surveys of the vulnerability of the United States to intelligence threats, including with respect to critical infrastructure and critical technologies, in order to identify the areas, programs, and activities that require protection from such threats.”.

Section 304 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3073a) is amended—

(1) in subsection (c)(1)—

(A) by striking “A former” and inserting the following:

“(A) IN GENERAL.—A former”; and

(B) by adding at the end the following:

“(B) PRIOR DISCLOSURE TO DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.—

“(i) IN GENERAL.—In the case of a former employee who occupies a covered post-service position in violation of subsection (a), whether the former employee voluntarily notified the Director of National Intelligence of the intent of the former employee to occupy such covered post-service position before occupying such post-service position may be used in determining whether the violation was knowing and willful for purposes of subparagraph (A).

“(ii) PROCEDURES AND GUIDANCE.—The Director of National Intelligence may establish procedures and guidance relating to the submittal of notice for purposes of clause (i).”; and

(2) in subsection (d)—

(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting “the restrictions under subsection (a) and” before “the report requirements”;

(B) in paragraph (2), by striking “ceases to occupy” and inserting “occupies”; and

(C) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking “before the person ceases to occupy a covered intelligence position” and inserting “when the person occupies a covered intelligence position”.

(a) In general.—Section 904 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 3383) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsections (d) through (i) as subsections (e) through (j), respectively; and

(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:

“(d) Mission.—The mission of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall include organizing and leading strategic planning for counterintelligence activities of the United States Government by integrating instruments of national power as needed to counter foreign intelligence activities.”.

(b) Conforming amendments.—

(1) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2002.—Section 904 of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 3383) is amended—

(A) in subsection (e), as redesignated by subsection (a)(1), by striking “Subject to subsection (e)” both places it appears and inserting “Subject to subsection (f)”; and

(B) in subsection (f), as so redesignated—

(i) in paragraph (1), by striking “subsection (d)(1)” and inserting “subsection (e)(1)”; and

(ii) in paragraph (2), by striking “subsection (d)(2)” and inserting “subsection (e)(2)”.

(2) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS ACT OF 1994.—Section 811(d)(1)(B)(ii) of the Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994 (50 U.S.C. 3381(d)(1)(B)(ii)) is amended by striking “section 904(d)(2) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 3383(d)(2))” and inserting “section 904(e)(2) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 3383(e)(2))”.

(a) Definition of individual detained at Guantanamo.—In this section, the term “individual detained at Guantanamo” has the meaning given that term in section 1034(f)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92; 129 Stat. 971; 10 U.S.C. 801 note).

(b) Prohibition on chartering private or commercial aircraft to transport individuals detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.—No head of an element of the intelligence community may charter any private or commercial aircraft to transport an individual who is or was an individual detained at Guantanamo.

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;

(B) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate;

(C) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(D) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.

(2) DIRECTOR.—The term “Director” means the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy (or a designee).

(3) FOREIGN NATIONAL.—The term “foreign national” has the meaning given the term “alien” in section 101(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)).

(4) NATIONAL LABORATORY.—The term “National Laboratory” has the meaning given the term in section 2 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801).

(5) SENSITIVE COUNTRY.—The term “sensitive country” means a country to which particular consideration is given for policy reasons during the Department of Energy internal review and approval process for visits by, and assignments of, foreign nationals to National Laboratories.

(6) SENSITIVE COUNTRY NATIONAL.—The term “sensitive country national” means a foreign national who was born in, is a citizen of, or is employed by a government, employer, institution, or organization of, a sensitive country.

(7) SENSITIVE COUNTRY VISITOR OR ASSIGNEE.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The term “sensitive country visitor or assignee” means a visitor or assignee who is a sensitive country national.

(B) ASSOCIATED DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this paragraph:

(i) ASSIGNEE.—The term “assignee” means an individual who is seeking approval from, or has been approved by, a National Laboratory to access the premises, information, or technology of the National Laboratory for a period of more than 30 consecutive calendar days.

(ii) VISITOR.—The term “visitor” mans an individual who is seeking approval from, or has been approved by, a National Laboratory to access the premises, information, or technology of the National Laboratory for any period other than a period described in clause (i).

(b) Recommendations with respect to sensitive country visitors or assignees.—

(1) NOTIFICATION AND RECOMMENDATION REQUIREMENT.—On determination that a proposed sensitive country visitor or assignee poses a counterintelligence risk to a National Laboratory, the Director shall—

(A) notify the National Laboratory of the determination; and

(B) provide a recommendation to the National Laboratory on whether to grant or deny the proposed sensitive country visitor or assignee access to the premises, information, or technology of the National Laboratory.

(2) PROHIBITION.—A National Laboratory may not allow a sensitive country visitor or assignee that the Director has identified as a counterintelligence risk under paragraph (1) to have any access to the premises, information, or technology of the National Laboratory until the Director has submitted the notification and recommendation to the National Laboratory as described in paragraph (1).

(3) APPLICATION TO OTHER NATIONAL LABORATORIES.—If the Director makes a recommendation under paragraph (1) that a sensitive country visitor or assignee should not be granted access to the premises, information, or technology of a National Laboratory—

(A) the Director shall notify each National Laboratory of that recommendation; and

(B) that recommendation shall apply to each National Laboratory with respect to that sensitive country visitor or assignee.

(c) Notification to Director.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—After receiving a recommendation to deny access under subsection (b)(1)(B), a National Laboratory shall submit to the Director a notification of the decision of the National Laboratory to grant or deny access to the premises, information, or technology of the National Laboratory to the sensitive country visitor or assignee that is the subject of the recommendation.

(2) TIMING.—If a National Laboratory decides to grant access to a sensitive country visitor or assignee despite a recommendation to deny access, the notification under paragraph (1) shall be submitted to the Director before the sensitive country visitor or assignee is granted access to the premises, information, or technology of the National Laboratory.

(d) Reports to Congress.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an unclassified quarterly report listing each instance in which a National Laboratory indicates in a notification submitted under subsection (c)(1) that the National Laboratory has decided to grant a sensitive country visitor or assignee access to the premises, information, or technology of the National Laboratory.

(2) REQUIREMENT.—Each quarterly report under paragraph (1) shall include the recommendation of the Director under subsection (b)(1)(B) with respect to the applicable sensitive country visitor or assignee.

(a) Risk assessment documents and materials.—Except as provided in subsection (b), whenever an element of the intelligence community conducts a risk assessment arising from the mishandling or improper disclosure of classified information, the Director of National Intelligence shall, not later than 30 days after the date of the commencement of such risk assessment—

(1) submit to the congressional intelligence committees copies of such documents and materials as are—

(A) within the jurisdiction of such committees; and

(B) subject to the risk assessment; and

(2) provide such committees a briefing on such documents, materials, and risk assessment.

(b) Exception.—If the Director determines, with respect to a risk assessment described in subsection (a), that the documents and other materials otherwise subject to paragraph (1) of such subsection (a) are of such a volume that submittal pursuant to such paragraph would be impracticable, the Director shall—

(1) in lieu of submitting copies of such documents and materials, submit a log of such documents and materials; and

(2) pursuant to a request by the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate or the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives for a copy of a document or material included in such log, submit to such committee such copy.

(a) Review required.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall conduct a review of the actions and events, including any underlying policy direction, that served as a basis for the January 23, 2023, dissemination by the field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation located in Richmond, Virginia, of a document titled “Interest of Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists in Radical-Traditionalist Catholic Ideology Almost Certainly Presents New Mitigation Opportunities.”.

(b) Submittal to Congress.—The Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees the findings of the Inspector General with respect to the review required by subsection (a).

Section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(h) Prohibition.—

“(1) DEFINITION.—In this subsection, the term ‘United States person’ means a United States citizen, an alien known by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis to be a permanent resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by 1 or more foreign governments.

“(2) COLLECTION OF INFORMATION FROM UNITED STATES PERSONS.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis may not engage in the collection of information or intelligence targeting any United States person except as provided in subparagraph (B).

“(B) EXCEPTION.—Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to any employee, officer, or contractor of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis who is responsible for collecting information from individuals working for a State, local, or Tribal territory government or a private employer.”.

The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 15 the following new section:

Section 15(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515(b)) is amended, in the second sentence, by striking “those specified in section 1315(c)(2) of title 40, United States Code” and inserting “the maximum penalty authorized for a Class B misdemeanor under section 3559 of title 18, United States Code”.

Section 3 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3503) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by striking “sections” and all that follows through “session)” and inserting “sections 3201, 3203, 3204, 3206, 3207, 3302 through 3306, 3321 through 3323, 3801 through 3808, 3069, 3134, 3841, and 4752 of title 10, United States Code” and

(2) in subsection (d), by striking “in paragraphs” and all that follows through “1947” and inserting “in sections 3201 through 3204 of title 10, United States Code, shall not be delegable. Each determination or decision required by sections 3201 through 3204, 3321 through 3323, and 3841 of title 10, United States Code”.

(a) Workplace sexual misconduct defined.—The term “workplace sexual misconduct”—

(1) means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when—

(A) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s employment;

(B) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual; or

(C) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment; and

(2) includes sexual harassment and sexual assault.

(b) Standard complaint investigation procedure.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall—

(1) establish a standard workplace sexual misconduct complaint investigation procedure;

(2) implement the standard workplace sexual misconduct complaint investigation procedure through clear workforce communication and education on the procedure; and

(3) submit the standard workplace sexual misconduct complaint investigation procedure to the congressional intelligence committees.

(c) Minimum requirements.—The procedure established pursuant to subsection (b)(1) shall, at a minimum—

(1) identify the individuals and offices of the Central Intelligence Agency to which an employee of the Agency may bring a complaint of workplace sexual misconduct;

(2) detail the steps each individual or office identified pursuant to paragraph (1) shall take upon receipt of a complaint of workplace sexual misconduct and the timeframes within which those steps shall be taken, including—

(A) documentation of the complaint;

(B) referral or notification to another individual or office;

(C) measures to document or preserve witness statements or other evidence; and

(D) preliminary investigation of the complaint;

(3) set forth standard criteria for determining whether a complaint of workplace sexual misconduct will be referred to law enforcement and the timeframe within which such a referral shall occur; and

(4) for any complaint not referred to law enforcement, set forth standard criteria for determining—

(A) whether a complaint has been substantiated; and

(B) for any substantiated complaint, the appropriate disciplinary action.

(d) Annual reports.—On or before April 30 of each year, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an annual report that includes, for the preceding calendar year, the following:

(1) The number of workplace sexual misconduct complaints brought to each individual or office of the Central Intelligence Agency identified pursuant to subsection (c)(1), disaggregated by—

(A) complaints referred to law enforcement; and

(B) complaints substantiated.

(2) For each complaint described in paragraph (1) that is substantiated, a description of the disciplinary action taken by the Director.

(a) In general.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law—

(1) the annual rate of basic pay for a staff employee of the Central Intelligence Agency with the duties described in subsection (b) shall not exceed the annual rate of basic pay for an officer of the Directorate of Operations in the Clandestine Service Trainee program of the Agency; and

(2) the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall ensure that no contract employee performing duties described in subsection (b) under an Agency contract receives an annual amount for performing such duties that exceeds the annual rate of basic pay described in paragraph (1).

(b) Duties described.—The duties described in this subsection are as follows:

(1) Developing, refining, and implementing diversity, equity, and inclusion policy.

(2) Leading working groups and councils to develop diversity, equity, and inclusion goals and objectives to measure performance and outcomes.

(3) Creating and implementing diversity, equity, and inclusion education, training courses, and workshops for staff and contract employees.

(c) Applicability to current employees.—

(1) STAFF EMPLOYEES.—Any staff employee of the Central Intelligence Agency in a position with duties described in subsection (b) receiving an annual rate of basic pay as of the date of the enactment of this Act that exceeds the rate allowed under subsection (a) shall be reassigned to another position not later than 180 days after such date.

(2) CONTRACT EMPLOYEES.—Any contract employee of the Central Intelligence Agency performing duties described in subsection (b) receiving an annual amount under an Agency contract for performing such duties as of the date of the enactment of this Act that exceeds the rate allowed under subsection (b) shall be reassigned to another position not later than 180 days after such date.

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees;

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(2) ATROCITY.—The term “atrocity”—

(A) means a crime against humanity, genocide, or a war crime; and

(B) when used with respect to the People's Republic of China, means an atrocity that is committed by an individual who is—

(i) a member of People’s Liberation Army, or the security or other defense services, including the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Public Security, and the United Front Work Department, of the People's Republic of China;

(ii) an employee of any other element of the Government of the People's Republic of China, including the regional governments of Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong;

(iii) a member of the Chinese Communist Party; or

(iv) an agent or contractor of an individual specified in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).

(3) COMMIT.—The term “commit”, with respect to an atrocity, includes the planning, committing, aiding, and abetting of such atrocity.

(4) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign person” means—

(A) any person or entity that is not a United States person; or

(B) any entity not organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States.

(5) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term “United States person” has the meaning given that term in section 105A(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3039).

(b) Intelligence community coordinator for accountability of atrocities of the People's Republic of China.—

(1) DESIGNATION.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall designate a senior official of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to serve as the intelligence community coordinator for accountability of atrocities of the People's Republic of China (in this section referred to as the “Coordinator”).

(2) DUTIES.—The Coordinator shall lead the efforts of and coordinate and collaborate with the intelligence community with respect to the following:

(A) Identifying and addressing any gaps in intelligence collection relating to atrocities of the People's Republic of China, including by recommending the modification of the priorities of the intelligence community with respect to intelligence collection and by utilizing informal processes and collaborative mechanisms with key elements of the intelligence community to increase collection on atrocities of the People's Republic of China.

(B) Prioritizing and expanding the intelligence analysis with respect to ongoing atrocities of the People's Republic of China and disseminating within the United States Government intelligence relating to the identification and activities of foreign persons suspected of being involved with or providing support to atrocities of the People's Republic of China, including genocide and forced labor practices in Xinjiang, in order to support the efforts of other Federal agencies, including the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the Department of Commerce, the Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the National Security Council, to hold the People's Republic of China accountable for such atrocities.

(C) Increasing efforts to declassify and share with the people of the United States and the international community information regarding atrocities of the People's Republic of China in order to expose such atrocities and counter the disinformation and misinformation campaign by the People's Republic of China to deny such atrocities.

(D) Documenting and storing intelligence and other unclassified information that may be relevant to preserve as evidence of atrocities of the People's Republic of China for future accountability, and ensuring that other relevant Federal agencies, including the Atrocities Early Warning Task Force, receive appropriate support from the intelligence community with respect to the collection, analysis, preservation, and, as appropriate, dissemination, of intelligence related to atrocities of the People's Republic of China, which may include the information from the annual report required by section 6504 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263).

(E) Sharing information with the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force, established under section 741 of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Implementation Act (19 U.S.C. 4681), the Department of Commerce, and the Department of the Treasury for the purposes of entity listings and sanctions.

(3) PLAN REQUIRED.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress—

(A) the name of the official designated as the Coordinator pursuant to paragraph (1); and

(B) the strategy of the intelligence community for the collection and dissemination of intelligence relating to ongoing atrocities of the People's Republic of China, including a detailed description of how the Coordinator shall support, and assist in facilitating the implementation of, such strategy.

(4) ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS.—

(A) REPORTS REQUIRED.—Not later than May 1, 2024, and annually thereafter until May 1, 2034, the Director shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report detailing, for the year covered by the report—

(i) the analytical findings, changes in collection, and other activities of the intelligence community with respect to ongoing atrocities of the People's Republic of China;

(ii) the recipients of information shared pursuant to this section for the purpose of—

(I) providing support to Federal agencies to hold the People's Republic of China accountable for such atrocities; and

(II) sharing information with the people of the United States to counter the disinformation and misinformation campaign by the People's Republic of China to deny such atrocities; and

(iii) with respect to clause (ii), the date of any such sharing.

(B) FORM.—Each report submitted under subparagraph (A) may be submitted in classified form, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

(c) Sunset.—This section shall cease to have effect on the date that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(a) Establishment.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with such heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, shall establish an interagency working group within the intelligence community to analyze the tactics and capabilities of the People’s Republic of China in Africa.

(2) ESTABLISHMENT FLEXIBILITY.—The working group established under paragraph (1) may be—

(A) independently established; or

(B) to avoid redundancy, incorporated into existing working groups or cross-intelligence efforts within the intelligence community.

(b) Report.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and twice annually thereafter, the working group established under subsection (a) shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the specific tactics and capabilities of the People’s Republic of China in Africa.

(2) ELEMENTS.—Each report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

(A) An assessment of efforts by the Government of the People's Republic of China to exploit mining and reprocessing operations in Africa.

(B) An assessment of efforts by the Government of the People's Republic of China to provide or fund technologies in Africa, including—

(i) telecommunications and energy technologies, such as advanced reactors, transportation, and other commercial products; and

(ii) by requiring that the People's Republic of China be the sole provider of such technologies.

(C) An assessment of efforts by the Government of the People's Republic of China to expand intelligence capabilities in Africa.

(D) A description of actions taken by the intelligence community to counter such efforts.

(E) An assessment of additional resources needed by the intelligence community to better counter such efforts.

(3) FORM.—Each report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if necessary.

(c) Sunset.—The requirements of this section shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Section 6503(c)(3)(D) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (division F of Public Law 117–263) is amended by striking “the top 200” and inserting “all the known”.

(a) In general.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and such other heads of elements of the intelligence community as the Assistant Secretary considers relevant, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees the following:

(1) A comprehensive assessment that identifies critical areas in the security, diplomatic, economic, financial, technological, scientific, commercial, academic, and cultural spheres in which the United States does not enjoy a reciprocal relationship with the People's Republic of China.

(2) A comprehensive assessment that describes how the lack of reciprocity between the People's Republic of China and the United States in the areas identified in the assessment required by paragraph (1) provides advantages to the People's Republic of China.

(b) Form of assessments.—

(1) CRITICAL AREAS.—The assessment required by subsection (a)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form.

(2) ADVANTAGES.—The assessment required by subsection (a)(2) shall be submitted in classified form.

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) CHINESE ENTITIES ENGAGED IN POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND INFORMATION WARFARE.—The term “Chinese entities engaged in political influence operations and information warfare” means all of the elements of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party involved in information warfare operations, such as—

(A) the Ministry of State Security;

(B) the intelligence services of the People’s Republic of China;

(C) the United Front Work Department and other united front organs;

(D) state-controlled media systems, such as the China Global Television Network (CGTN); and

(E) any entity involved in information warfare operations by demonstrably and intentionally disseminating false information and propaganda of the Government of the People’s Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party.

(2) POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPERATION.—The term “political influence operation” means a coordinated and often concealed application of disinformation, press manipulation, economic coercion, targeted investments, corruption, or academic censorship, which are often intended—

(A) to coerce and corrupt United States interests, values, institutions, or individuals; and

(B) to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions, or outcomes in the United States that support the interests of the Government of the People’s Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party.

(b) Briefing required.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter until the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Foreign Malign Influence Center shall, in collaboration with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, provide the congressional intelligence committees a classified briefing on the ways in which the relevant elements of the intelligence community are working internally and coordinating across the intelligence community to identify and mitigate the actions of Chinese entities engaged in political influence operations and information warfare against the United States, including against United States persons.

(c) Elements.—The classified briefing required by subsection (b) shall cover the following:

(1) The Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party tactics, tools, and entities that spread disinformation, misinformation, and malign information and conduct influence operations, information campaigns, or other propaganda efforts.

(2) The actions of the Foreign Malign Influence Center relating to early-warning, information sharing, and proactive risk mitigation systems, based on the list of entities identified in subsection (a)(1), to detect, expose, deter, and counter political influence operations of, and information warfare waged by, the Government of the People’s Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party, against the United States.

(3) The actions of the Foreign Malign Influence Center to conduct outreach to identify and counter tactics, tools, and entities described in paragraph (1) by sharing information with allies and partners of the United States, State and local governments, the business community, and civil society that exposes the political influence operations and information operations of the Government of the People’s Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party carried out against individuals and entities in the United States.

(a) Definition of country of concern.—In this section, the term “country of concern” has the meaning given that term in section 1(m)(1) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a(m)(1)).

(b) Assessment.—The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with such other heads of the elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate and the Secretary of Defense, shall conduct an assessment of the threat posed to United States ports by cranes manufactured by countries of concern and commercial entities of those countries, including the Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries Co. (ZPMC).

(c) Report and briefing.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit a report and provide a briefing to Congress on the findings of the assessment required by subsection (b).

(2) ELEMENTS.—The report and briefing required by paragraph (1) shall outline the potential for the cranes described in subsection (b) to collect intelligence, disrupt operations at United States ports, and impact the national security of the United States.

(3) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(a) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and semiannually thereafter for 3 years, the Director of National Intelligence shall produce and submit to the congressional intelligence committees an assessment of the lessons learned by the intelligence community with respect to the ongoing war in Ukraine, particularly in regards to the quality and timeliness of the information and intelligence support provided by the United States to Ukraine.

(b) Form.—The assessment submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(a) National intelligence estimate required.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall produce and submit to the congressional intelligence committees a national intelligence estimate on the implications of the ongoing war in Ukraine with respect to a long-term United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization confrontation with Russia, including the continued threat to the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and other allies of the United States from the conventional and strategic military forces, the intelligence activities, and the malign influence campaigns of Russia.

(b) Elements.—The national intelligence estimate produced pursuant to subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) An assessment of the efficacy of the sanctions regime in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act that is imposed upon Russia as a result of its illegal and unjustified invasion of Ukraine, including—

(A) the effect that such sanctions have had on the economy of Russia, the defense industrial base of Russia, and the ability of Russia to maintain its war on Ukraine; and

(B) the expected effect such sanctions would have on a potential long-term confrontation between Russia and the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other allies of the United States.

(2) An updated assessment of the convergence of interests between Russia and China, an assessment of the assistance that China is providing to Russia’s economy and war effort, and an assessment of other collaboration between the two countries.

(3) An assessment of potential friction points between China and Russia.

(4) An assessment of assistance and potential assistance from other countries to Russia, including assistance from Iran and North Korea.

(5) An assessment of other significant countries that have not joined the sanctions regime against Russia, why they have not done so, and what might induce them to change this policy.

(c) Form.—The national intelligence estimate submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(a) In general.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on efforts by the Maduro regime in Venezuela to detain United States citizens and lawful permanent residents.

(b) Elements.—The report required by subsection (a) shall include, regarding the arrest, capture, detainment, or imprisonment of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents, the following:

(1) The names, positions, and institutional affiliation of Venezuelan individuals, or those acting on their behalf, who have engaged in such activities.

(2) A description of any role played by transnational criminal organizations, and an identification of such organizations.

(3) Where relevant, an assessment of whether and how United States citizens and lawful permanent residents have been lured to Venezuela.

(4) An analysis of the motive for the arrest, capture, detainment, or imprisonment of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents.

(5) The total number of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents detained or imprisoned in Venezuela as of the date on which the report is submitted.

(c) Form.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

It is the sense of Congress that the trafficking of illicit fentanyl, including precursor chemicals and manufacturing equipment associated with illicit fentanyl production and organizations that traffic or finance the trafficking of illicit fentanyl, originating from the People's Republic of China and Mexico should be among the highest priorities in the National Intelligence Priorities Framework of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) EXECUTIVE AGENCY.—The term “Executive agency” has the meaning given such term in section 105 of title 5, United States Code.

(2) OFFICE.—The term “Office” means the Office of Global Competition Analysis established under subsection (b).

(b) Establishment.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish an office for analysis of global competition.

(2) PURPOSES.—The purposes of the Office are as follows:

(A) To carry out a program of analysis relevant to United States leadership in science, technology, and innovation sectors critical to national security and economic prosperity relative to other countries, particularly those countries that are strategic competitors of the United States.

(B) To support policy development and decision making across the Federal Government to ensure United States leadership in science, technology, and innovation sectors critical to national security and economic prosperity relative to other countries, particularly those countries that are strategic competitors of the United States.

(3) DESIGNATION.—The office established under paragraph (1) shall be known as the “Office of Global Competition Analysis”.

(c) Activities.—In accordance with the priorities determined under subsection (d), the Office shall—

(1) subject to subsection (f), acquire, access, use, and handle data or other information relating to the purposes of the Office under subsection (b);

(2) conduct long- and short-term analyses regarding—

(A) United States policies that enable technological competitiveness relative to those of other countries, particularly with respect to countries that are strategic competitors of the United States;

(B) United States science and technology ecosystem elements, including regional and national research development and capacity, technology innovation, and science and engineering education and research workforce, relative to those of other countries, particularly with respect to countries that are strategic competitors of the United States;

(C) United States technology development, commercialization, and advanced manufacturing ecosystem elements, including supply chain resiliency, scale-up manufacturing testbeds, access to venture capital and financing, technical and entrepreneurial workforce, and production, relative to those of other countries, particularly with respect to countries that are strategic competitors of the United States;

(D) United States competitiveness in technology and innovation sectors critical to national security and economic prosperity relative to other countries, including the availability and scalability of United States technology in such sectors abroad, particularly with respect to countries that are strategic competitors of the United States;

(E) trends and trajectories, including rate of change in technologies, related to technology and innovation sectors critical to national security and economic prosperity;

(F) threats to United States national security interests as a result of any foreign country’s dependence on technologies of strategic competitors of the United States; and

(G) threats to United States interests based on dependencies on foreign technologies critical to national security and economic prosperity;

(3) solicit input on technology and economic trends, data, and metrics from relevant private sector stakeholders, including entities involved in financing technology development and commercialization, and engage with academia to inform the analyses under paragraph (2); and

(4) to the greatest extent practicable and as may be appropriate, ensure that versions of the analyses under paragraph (2) are unclassified and available to relevant Federal agencies and offices.

(d) Determination of priorities.—On a periodic basis, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall, in coordination with such heads of Executive agencies as the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy and such Assistants jointly consider appropriate, jointly determine the priorities of the Office with respect to subsection (b)(2)(A), considering, as may be appropriate, the strategies and reports under subtitle B of title VI of the Research and Development, Competition, and Innovation Act (Public Law 117–167).

(e) Administration.—Subject to the availability of appropriations, to carry out the purposes set forth under subsection (b)(2), the Office shall enter into an agreement with a federally funded research and development center, a university-affiliated research center, or a consortium of federally funded research and development centers and university-affiliated research centers.

(f) Acquisition, access, use, and handling of data or information.—In carrying out the activities under subsection (c), the Office—

(1) shall acquire, access, use, and handle data or information in a manner consistent with applicable provisions of law and policy, including laws and policies providing for the protection of privacy and civil liberties, and subject to any restrictions required by the source of the information;

(2) shall have access, upon written request, to all information, data, or reports of any Executive agency that the Office determines necessary to carry out the activities under subsection (c), provided that such access is—

(A) conducted in a manner consistent with applicable provisions of law and policy of the originating agency, including laws and policies providing for the protection of privacy and civil liberties; and

(B) consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters; and

(3) may obtain commercially available information that may not be publicly available.

(g) Detailee support.—Consistent with applicable law, including sections 1341, 1517, and 1535 of title 31, United States Code, and section 112 of title 3, United States Code, the head of a department or agency within the executive branch of the Federal Government may detail personnel to the Office in order to assist the Office in carrying out any activity under subsection (c), consistent with the priorities determined under subsection (d).

(h) Annual report.—Not less frequently than once each year, the Office shall submit to Congress a report on the activities of the Office under this section, including a description of the priorities under subsection (d) and any support, disaggregated by Executive agency, provided to the Office consistent with subsection (g) in order to advance those priorities.

(i) Plans.—Before establishing the Office under subsection (b)(1), the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report detailing plans for—

(1) the administrative structure of the Office, including—

(A) a detailed spending plan that includes administrative costs; and

(B) a disaggregation of costs associated with carrying out subsection (e);

(2) ensuring consistent and sufficient funding for the Office; and

(3) coordination between the Office and relevant Executive agencies and offices.

(j) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2024.

(k) Funding.—This section shall be carried out using amounts appropriated on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(a) Authority.—In order to better facilitate the sharing of actionable intelligence on foreign adversary intent, capabilities, threats, and operations that pose a threat to the interests or security of the United States, particularly as they relate to the procurement, development, and use of dual-use and emerging technologies, the Director of National Intelligence may assign or facilitate the assignment of members from across the intelligence community to serve as detailees to the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce.

(b) Assignment.—Detailees assigned pursuant to subsection (a) shall be drawn from such elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce.

(c) Expertise.—The Director shall ensure that detailees assigned pursuant to subsection (a) have subject matter expertise on countries of concern, including China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, as well as functional areas such as illicit procurement, counterproliferation, emerging and foundational technology, economic and financial intelligence, information and communications technology systems, supply chain vulnerability, and counterintelligence.

(d) Duty credit.—The detail of an employee of the intelligence community to the Department of Commerce under subsection (a) shall be without interruption or loss of civil service status or privilege.

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) COVERED TRANSACTION.—The term “covered transaction” means a transaction reviewed under authority established under Executive Order 13873, Executive Order 13984, Executive Order 14034, or any successor order.

(2) EMERGING AND FOUNDATIONAL TECHNOLOGIES.—The term “emerging and foundational technologies” means emerging and foundational technologies described in section 1758(a)(1) of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4817(a)(1)).

(3) EXECUTIVE ORDER 13873.—The term “Executive Order 13873” means Executive Order 13873 (84 Fed. Reg. 22689; relating to securing information and communications technology and services supply chain).

(4) EXECUTIVE ORDER 13984.—The term “Executive Order 13984” means Executive Order 13984 (86 Fed. Reg. 6837; relating to taking additional steps to address the national emergency with respect to significant malicious cyber-enabled activities).

(5) EXECUTIVE ORDER 14034.—The term “Executive Order 14034” means Executive Order 14034 (84 Fed. Reg. 31423; relating to protecting Americans' sensitive data from foreign adversaries).

(6) SIGNIFICANT TRANSACTION.—The term “significant transaction” means a covered transaction that—

(A) involves emerging or foundational technologies;

(B) poses an undue or unacceptable risk to national security; and

(C) involves—

(i) an individual who acts as an agent, representative, or employee, or any individual who acts in any other capacity at the order, request, or under the direction or control, of a foreign adversary or of an individual whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in majority part by a foreign adversary;

(ii) any individual, wherever located, who is a citizen or resident of a nation-state controlled by a foreign adversary;

(iii) any corporation, partnership, association, or other organization organized under the laws of a nation-state controlled by a foreign adversary; or

(iv) any corporation, partnership, association, or other organization, wherever organized or doing business, that is owned or controlled by a foreign adversary.

(b) Threat assessment by Director of National Intelligence.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of National Intelligence shall expeditiously carry out a threat assessment of each significant transaction.

(2) IDENTIFICATION OF GAPS.—Each assessment required by paragraph (1) shall include the identification of any recognized gaps in the collection of intelligence relevant to the assessment.

(3) VIEWS OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The Director of National Intelligence shall seek and incorporate into each assessment required by paragraph (1) the views of all affected or appropriate elements of the intelligence community with respect to the significant transaction or class of significant transactions.

(4) PROVISION OF ASSESSMENT.—The Director of National Intelligence shall provide an assessment required by paragraph (1) to such agency heads and committees of Congress as the Director considers appropriate, as necessary, to implement Executive Order 13873, Executive Order 13984, Executive Order 14034, or any successor order.

(c) Interaction with intelligence community.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the intelligence community remains engaged in the collection, analysis, and dissemination to such agency heads as the Director considers appropriate of any additional relevant information that may become available during the course of any investigation or review process conducted under authority established under Executive Order 13873, Executive Order 13984, Executive Order 14034, or any successor order.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The collection, analysis, and dissemination of information described in paragraph (1) shall include routine assessments of the following:

(A) The intent, capability, and operations of foreign adversaries as related to a significant transaction or class of significant transactions.

(B) Supply chains and procurement networks associated with the procurement of emerging and foundational technologies by foreign adversaries.

(C) Emerging and foundational technologies pursued by foreign adversaries, including information on prioritization, spending, and technology transfer measures.

(D) The intent, capability, and operations of the use by malicious cyber actors of infrastructure as a service (IaaS) against the United States.

(E) The impact on the intelligence community of a significant transaction or class of significant transactions.

(d) Information in civil actions.—

(1) PROTECTED INFORMATION IN CIVIL ACTIONS.—If a civil action challenging an action or finding under Executive Order 13873, Executive Order 13984, Executive Order 14034, or any successor order is brought, and the court determines that protected information in the administrative record relating to the action or finding, including classified or other information subject to privilege or protections under any provision of law, is necessary to resolve the action, that information shall be submitted ex parte and in camera to the court and the court shall maintain that information under seal. This paragraph does not confer or imply any right to judicial review.

(2) NONAPPLICABILITY OF USE OF INFORMATION PROVISIONS.—The use of information provisions of sections 106, 305, 405, and 706 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1806, 1825, 1845, and 1881e) shall not apply in a civil action described in paragraph (1).

(e) Rule of construction concerning right to access.—No provision of this section may be construed to create a right to obtain access to information in the possession of the Federal Government that was considered by the Secretary of Commerce under authority established under Executive Order 13873, Executive Order 13984, Executive Order 14034, or any successor order, including any classified information or sensitive but unclassified information.

(f) Administrative record.—The following information may be included in the administrative record relating to an action or finding described in subsection (d)(1) and shall be submitted only to the court ex parte and in camera:

(1) Sensitive security information, as defined in section 1520.5 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations.

(2) Privileged law enforcement information.

(3) Information obtained or derived from any activity authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), except that, with respect to such information, subsections (c), (e), (f), (g), and (h) of section 106 (50 U.S.C. 1806), subsections (d), (f), (g), (h), and (i) of section 305 (50 U.S.C. 1825), subsections (c), (e), (f), (g), and (h) of section 405 (50 U.S.C. 1845), and section 706 (50 U.S.C. 1881e) of that Act shall not apply.

(4) Information subject to privilege or protection under any other provision of law, including the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970 (31 U.S.C. 5311 et seq.).

(g) Treatment consistent with section.—Any information that is part of the administrative record filed ex parte and in camera under subsection (d)(1), or cited by the court in any decision in a civil action described in such subsection, shall be treated by the court consistent with the provisions of this section. In no event shall such information be released to the petitioner or as part of the public record.

(h) Inapplicability of Freedom of Information Act.—Any information submitted to the Federal Government by a party to a covered transaction in accordance with this section, as well as any information the Federal Government may create relating to review of the covered transaction, is exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the “Freedom of Information Act”).

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall revise section 802.211 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, to expand the definition of “covered real estate”, such as by treating facilities and property of elements of the intelligence community and National Laboratories (as defined in section 2 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801)) comparably to military installations.

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) EMERGING AND FOUNDATIONAL TECHNOLOGIES.—The term “emerging and foundational technologies” includes technologies identified under section 1758(a)(1) of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4817(a)(1)).

(2) FOREIGN ADVERSARY.—The term “foreign adversary” means any foreign government, foreign regime, or foreign nongovernment person determined by the Director of National Intelligence to have engaged in a long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.

(b) Collection, analysis, and dissemination required.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of National Intelligence—

(A) is authorized to collect, retain, analyze, and disseminate information or intelligence necessary to support the missions of the Department of Commerce, including with respect to the administration of export controls pursuant to the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.); and

(B) shall, through regular consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, ensure that the intelligence community is engaged in such collection, retention, analysis, and dissemination.

(2) INFORMATION TO BE COLLECTED, ANALYZED, AND DISSEMINATED.—The information to be collected, analyzed, and disseminated under subsection (a) shall include information relating to the following:

(A) The intent, capability, and operations of foreign adversaries with respect to items under consideration to be controlled pursuant to the authority provided by part I of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4811 et seq.).

(B) Attempts by foreign adversaries to circumvent controls on items imposed pursuant to that part.

(C) Supply chains and procurement networks associated with procurement and development of emerging and foundational technologies by foreign adversaries.

(D) Emerging and foundational technologies pursued by foreign adversaries, including relevant information on prioritization, spending, and technology transfer measures with respect to such technologies.

(E) The scope and application of the export control systems of foreign countries, including decisions with respect to individual export transactions.

(F) Corporate and contractual relationships, ownership, and other equity interests, including monetary capital contributions, corporate investments, and joint ventures, resulting in end uses of items that threaten the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States, as described in the policy set forth in section 1752 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4811).

(G) The effect of export controls imposed pursuant to part I of that Act (50 U.S.C. 4811 et seq.), including—

(i) the effect of actions taken and planned to be taken by the Secretary of Commerce under the authority provided by that part; and

(ii) the effectiveness of such actions in achieving the national security and foreign policy objectives of such actions.

(c) Provision of analysis to Department of Commerce.—Upon the request of the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of National Intelligence shall expeditiously—

(1) carry out analysis of any matter relating to the national security of the United States that is relevant to a mission of the Department of Commerce; and

(2) consistent with the protection of sources and methods, make such analysis available to the Secretary and such individuals as the Secretary may designate to receive such analysis.

(d) Identification of single office to support missions of Department of Commerce.—The Director of National Intelligence shall identify a single office within the intelligence community to be responsible for supporting the missions of the Department of Commerce.

(e) Treatment of classified and sensitive information.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—A civil action challenging an action or finding of the Secretary of Commerce made on the basis of any classified or sensitive information made available to officials of the Department of Commerce pursuant to this section may be brought only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

(2) CONSIDERATION AND TREATMENT IN CIVIL ACTIONS.—If a civil action described in paragraph (1) is brought, and the court determines that protected information in the administrative record, including classified or other information subject to privilege or protections under any provision of law, is necessary to resolve the civil action, that information shall be submitted ex parte and in camera to the court and the court shall maintain that information under seal. This paragraph does not confer or imply any right to judicial review.

(3) ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The following information may be included in the administrative record relating to an action or finding described in paragraph (1) and shall be submitted only to the court ex parte and in camera:

(i) Sensitive security information, as defined by section 1520.5 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations.

(ii) Privileged law enforcement information.

(iii) Information obtained or derived from any activity authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).

(iv) Information subject to privilege or protection under any other provision of law.

(B) TREATMENT CONSISTENT WITH SECTION.—Any information that is part of the administrative record filed ex parte and in camera under subparagraph (A), or cited by the court in any decision in a civil action described in paragraph (1), shall be treated by the court consistent with the provisions of this subsection. In no event shall such information be released to the petitioner or as part of the public record.

(4) NONAPPLICABILITY OF USE OF INFORMATION PROVISIONS.—The use of information provisions of sections 106, 305, 405, and 706 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1806, 1825, 1845, and 1881e) shall not apply in a civil action challenging an action or finding of the Secretary of Commerce made on the basis of information made available to officials of the Department of Commerce pursuant to this section.

(5) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION CONCERNING RIGHT TO ACCESS.—No provision of this section shall be construed to create a right to obtain access to information in the possession of the Federal Government that was considered in an action or finding of the Secretary of Commerce, including any classified information or sensitive but unclassified information.

(6) EXEMPTION FROM FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT.—Any information made available to officials of the Department of Commerce pursuant to this section is exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the “Freedom of Information Act”).

(a) Review.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall complete a review of the requirements and access to commercial information used by elements of the intelligence community for analysis of capital flows, investment security, beneficial ownership of entities, and other transactions and functions related to identifying threats, gaps, and opportunities with respect to economic competition with foreign countries, including the People’s Republic of China.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The review required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) The length and expiration of licenses for access to commercial information.

(B) The number of such licenses permitted for each element of the intelligence community.

(C) The number of such licenses permitted for Federal departments and agencies that are not elements of the intelligence community, including the Department of Commerce.

(b) Report; briefing.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the date on which the review required by subsection (a)(1) is completed, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit a report and provide a briefing to Congress on the findings of the review.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The report and briefing required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) The findings of the review required by subsection (a)(1).

(B) Recommendations of the Director on whether and how the standardization of access to commercial information, the expansion of licenses for such access, the lengthening of license terms beyond 1 year, and the issuance of Government-wide (as opposed to agency-by-agency) licenses would advance the open-source collection and analytical requirements of the intelligence community with respect to economic competition with foreign countries, including the People's Republic of China.

(C) An assessment of cost savings or increases that may result from the standardization described in subparagraph (B).

(3) FORM.—The report and briefing required by paragraph (1) may be classified.

Section 6503(c)(3) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(I) A detailed assessment, prepared in consultation with all elements of the working group—

“(i) of the investments made by the People’s Republic of China in—

“(I) artificial intelligence;

“(II) next-generation energy technologies, especially small modular reactors and advanced batteries; and

“(III) biotechnology; and

“(ii) that identifies—

“(I) competitive practices of the People’s Republic of China relating to the technologies described in clause (i);

“(II) opportunities to counter the practices described in subclause (I);

“(III) countries the People’s Republic of China is targeting for exports of civil nuclear technology;

“(IV) countries best positioned to utilize civil nuclear technologies from the United States in order to facilitate the commercial export of those technologies;

“(V) United States vulnerabilities in the supply chain of these technologies; and

“(VI) opportunities to counter the export by the People’s Republic of China of civil nuclear technologies globally.

“(J) An identification and assessment of any unmet resource or authority needs of the working group that affect the ability of the working group to carry out this section.”.

Subparagraph (B) of section 501(b)(1) of title 40, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

“(B) PUBLIC UTILITY CONTRACTS.—

“(i) IN GENERAL.—A contract for public utility services may be made—

“(I) except as provided in subclause (II), for a period of not more than 10 years; or

“(II) for an executive agency that is, or has a component that is, an element of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), for a period of not more than 30 years, if the executive agency determines the extended period is in the best interests of national security.

“(ii) PAYMENT.—The cost of a public utility services contract for any year may be paid from annual appropriations for that year.”.

(a) Assessment required.—The Director of National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the heads of such other elements of the intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, conduct an assessment of capabilities identified by the Intelligence Community Continuity Program established pursuant to section E(3) of Intelligence Community Directive 118, or any successor directive, or such other facilities or capabilities as may be determined by the Director to be critical to United States national security, that have unique energy needs—

(1) to ascertain the feasibility and advisability of using civil nuclear reactors to meet such needs; and

(2) to identify such additional resources, technologies, infrastructure, or authorities needed, or other potential obstacles, to commence use of a nuclear reactor to meet such needs.

(b) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report, which may be in classified form, on the findings of the Director with respect to the assessment conducted pursuant to subsection (a).

(a) In general.—Section 6702 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3334m) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking “subsection (b)” and inserting “subsection (c)”;

(2) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c); and

(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:

“(b) Policies.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—In carrying out subsection (a)(1), not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, shall establish the policies described in paragraph (2).

“(2) POLICIES DESCRIBED.—The policies described in this paragraph are policies for the acquisition, adoption, development, use, coordination, and maintenance of artificial intelligence capabilities that—

“(A) establish a lexicon relating to the use of machine learning and artificial intelligence developed or acquired by elements of the intelligence community;

“(B) establish guidelines for evaluating the performance of models developed or acquired by elements of the intelligence community, such as by—

“(i) specifying conditions for the continuous monitoring of artificial intelligence capabilities for performance, including the conditions for retraining or retiring models based on performance;

“(ii) documenting performance objectives, including specifying how performance objectives shall be developed and contractually enforced for capabilities procured from third parties;

“(iii) specifying the manner in which models should be audited, as necessary, including the types of documentation that should be provided to any auditor; and

“(iv) specifying conditions under which models used by elements of the intelligence community should be subject to testing and evaluation for vulnerabilities to techniques meant to undermine the availability, integrity, or privacy of an artificial intelligence capability;

“(C) establish guidelines for tracking dependencies in adjacent systems, capabilities, or processes impacted by the retraining or sunsetting of any model described in subparagraph (B);

“(D) establish documentation requirements for capabilities procured from third parties, aligning such requirements, as necessary, with existing documentation requirements applicable to capabilities developed by elements of the intelligence community and, to the greatest extent possible, with industry standards;

“(E) establish standards for the documentation of imputed, augmented, or synthetic data used to train any model developed, procured, or used by an element of the intelligence community; and

“(F) provide guidance on the acquisition and usage of models that have previously been trained by a third party for subsequent modification and usage by such an element.

“(3) POLICY REVIEW AND REVISION.—The Director of National Intelligence shall periodically review and revise each policy established under paragraph (1).”.

(b) Conforming amendment.—Section 6712(b)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3024 note) is amended by striking “section 6702(b)” and inserting “section 6702(c)”.

(a) Findings.—Congress finds the following:

(1) Artificial intelligence systems demonstrate increased capabilities in the generation of synthetic media and computer programming code, and in areas such as object recognition, natural language processing, biological design, and workflow orchestration.

(2) The growing capabilities of artificial intelligence systems in the areas described in paragraph (1), as well as the greater accessibility of large-scale artificial intelligence models to individuals, businesses, and governments, have dramatically increased the adoption of artificial intelligence products in the United States and globally.

(3) The advanced capabilities of the systems described in paragraph (1), and their accessibility to a wide range of users, have increased the likelihood and effect of misuse or malfunction of these systems, such as to generate synthetic media for disinformation campaigns, develop or refine malware for computer network exploitation activity, design or develop dual-use biological entities such as toxic small molecules, proteins, or pathogenic organisms, enhance surveillance capabilities in ways that undermine the privacy of citizens of the United States, and increase the risk of exploitation or malfunction of information technology systems incorporating artificial intelligence systems in mission-critical fields such as health care, critical infrastructure, and transportation.

(b) Strategy required.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish a strategy by which vendors and commercial users of artificial intelligence systems, as well as independent researchers and other third parties, may effectively notify appropriate elements of the United States Government of—

(1) information security risks emanating from artificial intelligence systems, such as the use of an artificial intelligence system to develop or refine malicious software;

(2) information security risks such as indications of compromise or other threat information indicating a compromise to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an artificial intelligence system, or to the supply chain of an artificial intelligence system, including training or test data, frameworks, computing environments, or other components necessary for the training, management, or maintenance of an artificial intelligence system;

(3) biosecurity risks emanating from artificial intelligence systems, such as the use of an artificial intelligence system to design, develop, or acquire dual-use biological entities such as putatively toxic small molecules, proteins, or pathogenic organisms;

(4) suspected foreign malign influence (as defined by section 119C of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3059(f))) activity that appears to be facilitated by an artificial intelligence system; and

(5) any other unlawful activity facilitated by, or directed at, an artificial intelligence system.

(c) Elements.—The strategy established pursuant to subsection (b) shall include the following:

(1) An outline of a plan for Federal agencies to engage in industry outreach and public education on the risks posed by, and directed at, artificial intelligence systems.

(2) Use of research and development, stakeholder outreach, and risk management frameworks established pursuant to provisions of law in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act or Federal agency guidelines.

(a) Amendments to chapter 4 of title 5.—

(1) APPOINTMENT OF SECURITY OFFICERS.—Section 416 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(i) Appointment of security officers.—Each Inspector General under this section, including the designees of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense pursuant to subsection (b)(3), shall appoint within their offices security officers to provide, on a permanent basis, confidential, security-related guidance and direction to an employee of their respective establishment, an employee assigned or detailed to such establishment, or an employee of a contractor of such establishment who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information, so that such employee can obtain direction on how to report to Congress in accordance with appropriate security practices.”.

(2) PROCEDURES.—Subsection (e) of such section is amended—

(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting “or any other committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of Representatives” after “either or both of the intelligence committees”;

(B) by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:

“(2) LIMITATION.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the employee may contact an intelligence committee or another committee of jurisdiction directly as described in paragraph (1) of this subsection or in subsection (b)(4) only if the employee—

“(i) before making such a contact, furnishes to the head of the establishment, through the Inspector General (or designee), a statement of the employee’s complaint or information and notice of the employee’s intent to contact an intelligence committee or another committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of Representatives directly; and

“(ii) (I) obtains and follows, from the head of the establishment, through the Inspector General (or designee), procedural direction on how to contact an intelligence committee or another committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of Representatives in accordance with appropriate security practices; or

“(II) obtains and follows such procedural direction from the applicable security officer appointed under subsection (i).

“(B) LACK OF PROCEDURAL DIRECTION.—If an employee seeks procedural direction under subparagraph (A)(ii) and does not receive such procedural direction within 30 days, or receives insufficient direction to report to Congress a complaint or information, the employee may contact an intelligence committee or any other committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of Representatives directly without obtaining or following the procedural direction otherwise required under such subparagraph.”; and

(C) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and

(D) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:

“(3) COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND STAFF.—An employee of an element of the intelligence community who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information may report such complaint or information to the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking Member, as the case may be, of an intelligence committee or another committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of Representatives, a nonpartisan member of the committee staff designated for purposes of receiving complaints or information under this section, or a member of the majority staff and a member of the minority staff of the committee.”.

(3) CLARIFICATION OF RIGHT TO REPORT DIRECTLY TO CONGRESS.—Subsection (b) of such section is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(4) CLARIFICATION OF RIGHT TO REPORT DIRECTLY TO CONGRESS.—Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (e), an employee of an element of the intelligence community who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information may report such complaint or information directly to Congress, regardless of whether the complaint or information is with respect to an urgent concern—

“(A) in lieu of reporting such complaint or information under paragraph (1); or

“(B) in addition to reporting such complaint or information under paragraph (1).”.

(b) Amendments to National Security Act of 1947.—

(1) APPOINTMENT OF SECURITY OFFICERS.—Section 103H(j) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(j)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(5) The Inspector General shall appoint within the Office of the Inspector General security officers as required by section 416(i) of title 5, United States Code.”.

(2) PROCEDURES.—Subparagraph (D) of section 103H(k)(5) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)) is amended—

(A) in clause (i), by inserting “or any other committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of Representatives” after “either or both of the congressional intelligence committees”;

(B) by amending clause (ii) to read as follows:

“(ii) (I) Except as provided in subclause (II), an employee may contact a congressional intelligence committee or another committee of jurisdiction directly as described in clause (i) only if the employee—

“(aa) before making such a contact, furnishes to the Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of the employee’s complaint or information and notice of the employee’s intent to contact a congressional intelligence committee or another committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of Representatives directly; and

“(bb)(AA) obtains and follows, from the Director, through the Inspector General, procedural direction on how to contact a congressional intelligence committee or another committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of Representatives in accordance with appropriate security practices; or

“(BB) obtains and follows such procedural direction from the applicable security officer appointed under section 416(i) of title 5, United States Code.

“(II) If an employee seeks procedural direction under subclause (I)(bb) and does not receive such procedural direction within 30 days, or receives insufficient direction to report to Congress a complaint or information, the employee may contact a congressional intelligence committee or any other committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of Representatives directly without obtaining or following the procedural direction otherwise required under such subclause.”;

(C) by redesignating clause (iii) as clause (iv); and

(D) by inserting after clause (ii) the following:

“(iii) An employee of an element of the intelligence community who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information may report such complaint or information to the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking Member, as the case may be, of a congressional intelligence committee or another committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of Representatives, a nonpartisan member of the committee staff designated for purposes of receiving complaints or information under this section, or a member of the majority staff and a member of the minority staff of the committee.”.

(3) CLARIFICATION OF RIGHT TO REPORT DIRECTLY TO CONGRESS.—Subparagraph (A) of such section is amended—

(A) by inserting “(i)” before “An employee of”; and

(B) by adding at the end the following:

“(ii) Subject to clauses (ii) and (iii) of subparagraph (D), an employee of an element of the intelligence community who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information may report such complaint or information directly to Congress, regardless of whether the complaint or information is with respect to an urgent concern—

“(I) in lieu of reporting such complaint or information under clause (i); or

“(II) in addition to reporting such complaint or information under clause (i).”.

(c) Amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.—

(1) APPOINTMENT OF SECURITY OFFICERS.—Section 17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(I) The Inspector General shall appoint within the Office of the Inspector General security officers as required by section 416(i) of title 5, United States Code.”.

(2) PROCEDURES.—Subparagraph (D) of such section is amended—

(A) in clause (i), by inserting “or any other committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of Representatives” after “either or both of the intelligence committees”;

(B) by amending clause (ii) to read as follows:

“(ii) (I) Except as provided in subclause (II), an employee may contact an intelligence committee or another committee of jurisdiction directly as described in clause (i) only if the employee—

“(aa) before making such a contact, furnishes to the Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of the employee’s complaint or information and notice of the employee’s intent to contact an intelligence committee or another committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of Representatives directly; and

“(bb)(AA) obtains and follows, from the Director, through the Inspector General, procedural direction on how to contact an intelligence committee or another committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of Representatives in accordance with appropriate security practices; or

“(BB) obtains and follows such procedural direction from the applicable security officer appointed under section 416(i) of title 5, United States Code.

“(II) If an employee seeks procedural direction under subclause (I)(bb) and does not receive such procedural direction within 30 days, or receives insufficient direction to report to Congress a complaint or information, the employee may contact an intelligence committee or another committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of Representatives directly without obtaining or following the procedural direction otherwise required under such subclause.”;

(C) by redesignating clause (iii) as clause (iv); and

(D) by inserting after clause (ii) the following:

“(iii) An employee of the Agency who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information may report such complaint or information to the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking Member, as the case may be, of an intelligence committee or another committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House of Representatives, a nonpartisan member of the committee staff designated for purposes of receiving complaints or information under this section, or a member of the majority staff and a member of the minority staff of the committee.”.

(3) CLARIFICATION OF RIGHT TO REPORT DIRECTLY TO CONGRESS.—Subparagraph (A) of such section is amended—

(A) by inserting “(i)” before “An employee of”; and

(B) by adding at the end the following:

“(ii) Subject to clauses (ii) and (iii) of subparagraph (D), an employee of the Agency who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information may report such complaint or information directly to Congress, regardless of whether the complaint or information is with respect to an urgent concern—

“(I) in lieu of reporting such complaint or information under clause (i); or

“(II) in addition to reporting such complaint or information under clause (i).”.

(d) Rule of construction.—Nothing in this section or an amendment made by this section shall be construed to revoke or diminish any right of an individual provided by section 2303 of title 5, United States Code.

(a) In general.—Section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)(3) of such section—

(A) in subparagraph (I), by striking “; or” and inserting a semicolon;

(B) by redesignating subparagraph (J) as subparagraph (K); and

(C) by inserting after subparagraph (I) the following:

“(J) a knowing and willful disclosure revealing the identity or other personally identifiable information of an employee or contractor employee so as to identify the employee or contractor employee as an employee or contractor employee who has made a lawful disclosure described in subsection (b) or (c); or”;

(2) by redesignating subsections (f) and (g) as subsections (g) and (h), respectively; and

(3) by inserting after subsection (e) the following:

“(f) Personnel actions involving disclosure of whistleblower identity.—A personnel action described in subsection (a)(3)(J) shall not be considered to be in violation of subsection (b) or (c) under the following circumstances:

“(1) The personnel action was taken with the express consent of the employee or contractor employee.

“(2) An Inspector General with oversight responsibility for a covered intelligence community element determines that—

“(A) the personnel action was unavoidable under section 103H(g)(3)(A) of this Act (50 U.S.C. 3033(g)(3)(A)), section 17(e)(3)(A) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(e)(3)(A)), section 407(b) of title 5, United States Code, or section 420(b)(2)(B) of such title;

“(B) the personnel action was made to an official of the Department of Justice responsible for determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken; or

“(C) the personnel action was required by statute or an order from a court of competent jurisdiction.”.

(b) Applicability to detailees.—Subsection (a) of section 1104 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3234) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(5) EMPLOYEE.—The term ‘employee’, with respect to an agency or a covered intelligence community element, includes an individual who has been detailed to such agency or covered intelligence community element.”.

(c) Private right of action for unlawful disclosure of whistleblower identity.—Subsection (g) of such section, as redesignated by subsection (a)(2) of this section, is amended to read as follows:

“(g) Enforcement.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the President shall provide for the enforcement of this section.

“(2) HARMONIZATION WITH OTHER ENFORCEMENT.—To the fullest extent possible, the President shall provide for enforcement of this section in a manner that is consistent with the enforcement of section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, especially with respect to policies and procedures used to adjudicate alleged violations of such section.

“(3) PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR DISCLOSURES OF WHISTLEBLOWER IDENTITY IN VIOLATION OF PROHIBITION AGAINST REPRISALS.—Subject to paragraph (4), in a case in which an employee of an agency takes a personnel action described in subsection (a)(3)(J) against an employee of a covered intelligence community element as a reprisal in violation of subsection (b) or in a case in which an employee or contractor employee takes a personnel action described in subsection (a)(3)(J) against another contractor employee as a reprisal in violation of subsection (c), the employee or contractor employee against whom the personnel action was taken may, consistent with section 1221 of title 5, United States Code, bring a private action for all appropriate remedies, including injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages, in an amount not to exceed $250,000, against the agency of the employee or contracting agency of the contractor employee who took the personnel action, in a Federal district court of competent jurisdiction.

“(4) REQUIREMENTS.—

“(A) REVIEW BY INSPECTOR GENERAL AND BY EXTERNAL REVIEW PANEL.—Before the employee or contractor employee may bring a private action under paragraph (3), the employee or contractor employee shall exhaust administrative remedies by—

“(i) first, obtaining a disposition of their claim by requesting review by the appropriate inspector general; and

“(ii) second, if the review under clause (i) does not substantiate reprisal, by submitting to the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community a request for a review of the claim by an external review panel under section 1106.

“(B) PERIOD TO BRING ACTION.—The employee or contractor employee may bring a private right of action under paragraph (3) during the 180-day period beginning on the date on which the employee or contractor employee is notified of the final disposition of their claim under section 1106.”.

Subparagraph (C) of section 3001(j)(4) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(4)) is amended to read as follows:

“(C) CONTRIBUTING FACTOR.—

“(i) IN GENERAL.—Subject to clause (iii), in determining whether the adverse security clearance or access determination violated paragraph (1), the agency shall find that paragraph (1) was violated if the individual has demonstrated that a disclosure described in paragraph (1) was a contributing factor in the adverse security clearance or access determination taken against the individual.

“(ii) CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.—An individual under clause (i) may demonstrate that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the adverse security clearance or access determination taken against the individual through circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that—

“(I) the official making the determination knew of the disclosure; and

“(II) the determination occurred within a period such that a reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the determination.

“(iii) DEFENSE.—In determining whether the adverse security clearance or access determination violated paragraph (1), the agency shall not find that paragraph (1) was violated if, after a finding that a disclosure was a contributing factor, the agency demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the same security clearance or access determination in the absence of such disclosure.”.

Section 3001(j)(4)(B) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(4)(B)) is amended, in the second sentence, by striking “not to exceed $300,000”.

(a) Modification of frequency of whistleblower notifications to Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.—Section 5334(a) of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 50 U.S.C. 3033 note) is amended by striking “in real time” and inserting “monthly”.

(b) Repeal of requirement for Inspectors General reviews of enhanced personnel security programs.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 11001 of title 5, United States Code, is amended—

(A) by striking subsection (d); and

(B) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (d).

(2) TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.—Subsection (d) of section 11001 of such title, as redesignated by paragraph (1)(B), is amended—

(A) in paragraph (3), by adding “and” after the semicolon at the end; and

(B) in paragraph (4), by striking “; and” and inserting a period.

This subtitle may be cited as the “Classification Reform Act of 2023”.

Title VIII of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3161 et seq.) is amended—

(1) in the title heading by striking “Access to classified information procedures” and inserting “Protection of national security information”;

(2) in the matter before section 801, by inserting the following:

(3) by striking section 805.

Title VIII of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3161 et seq.), as amended by section 702, is further amended by adding at the end the following:

Subtitle C of title VIII of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3161 et seq.), as added by section 711, is further amended by adding at the end the following:

Subtitle C of title VIII of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3161 et seq.), as added by section 711 and amended by section 712, is further amended by adding at the end the following:

Subtitle C of title VIII of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3161 et seq.), as added by section 711 and amended by sections 712 and 713, is further amended by adding at the end the following:

(a) In general.—Title VIII of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by chapter 2 of this subtitle, is further amended by adding at the end the following:

(b) Conforming amendment to FOIA.—Section 552(b)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

“(1) (A) specifically authorized to be classified under the title VIII of the National Security Act of 1947, or specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national security; and

“(B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to that title or Executive order;”.

(c) Effective date.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 821 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), and the amendment made by subsection (b), shall take effect on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) RELATION TO PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES.—Presidential directives regarding classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information, including Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified national security information), or successor order, in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, as well as procedures issued pursuant to such Presidential directives, shall remain in effect until superseded by procedures issues pursuant to section 821 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a).

Subtitle D of title VIII of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by section 721, is amended by adding at the end the following:

Section 1062(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee–1(a)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (3), by striking “; and” and inserting a semicolon;

(2) in paragraph (4)(C), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”;

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(5) assist the head of such department, agency, or element and other officials of such department, agency, or element in identifying records of significant public interest and prioritizing appropriate review of such records in order to facilitate the public disclosure of such records in redacted or unredacted form.”;

(4) in paragraph (4), by redesignating subparagraphs (A) through (C) as clauses (i) through (iii), respectively, and indenting such clauses 2 ems to the right;

(5) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (5) as subparagraphs (A) through (E), respectively, and indenting such subparagraphs 2 ems to the right;

(6) in the matter before subparagraph (A), as redesignated by paragraph (5), by striking “The Attorney General” and inserting the following:

“(1) IN GENERAL.—The Attorney General”; and

(7) by adding at the end the following:

“(2) DETERMINING PUBLIC INTEREST IN DISCLOSURE.—In assisting the head of a department, agency, or element and other officials of such department, agency, or element in identifying records of significant public interest under subparagraph (E) of paragraph (1), a senior officer designated under such paragraph shall consider—

“(A) whether or not disclosure of the information would better enable United States citizens to hold Federal Government officials accountable for their actions and policies;

“(B) whether or not disclosure of the information would assist the United States criminal justice system in holding persons responsible for criminal acts or acts contrary to the Constitution;

“(C) whether or not disclosure of the information would assist Congress, or any committee or subcommittee thereof, in carrying out its oversight responsibilities with regard to the executive branch or in adequately informing itself of executive branch policies and activities in order to carry out its legislative responsibilities;

“(D) whether the disclosure of the information would assist Congress or the public in understanding the interpretation of the Federal Government of a provision of law, including Federal regulations, Presidential directives, statutes, case law, and the Constitution of the United States; or

“(E) whether or not disclosure of the information would bring about any other significant benefit, including an increase in public awareness or understanding of Government activities or an enhancement of Federal Government efficiency.”.

Title VIII of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by chapters 2 and 3 of this subtitle, is further amended by adding at the end the following:

(a) In general.—Subtitle E of title VIII of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by section 731, is amended by adding at the end the following:

(b) Prospective application.—Section 832 of such Act, as added by subsection (a), shall apply to incidents of mishandling or unauthorized disclosure of classified information (as defined in such section) detected on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(a) Definitions.—In this section, the terms “agency” and “classified information” have the meanings given such terms in section 800 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by section 702 of this subtitle.

(b) Establishment of insider threat programs.—Each head of an agency with access to classified information shall establish an insider threat program to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure.

(c) Minimum standards.—In carrying out an insider threat program established by the head of an agency pursuant to subsection (b), the head of the agency shall—

(1) designate a senior official of the agency who shall be responsible for management of the program;

(2) monitor user activity on all classified networks in order to detect activity indicative of insider threat behavior;

(3) build and maintain an insider threat analytic and response capability to review, assess, and respond to information obtained pursuant to paragraph (2); and

(4) provide insider threat awareness training to all cleared employees within 30 days of entry on duty or granting of access to classified information and annually thereafter.

(d) Annual reports.—Not less frequently that once each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall, serving as the Security Executive Agent under section 803 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3162a), submit to Congress an annual report on the compliance of agencies with respect to the requirements of this section.

(a) Withholding information from congress.—Nothing in this subtitle or an amendment made by this subtitle shall be construed to authorize the withholding of information from Congress.

(b) Judicial review.—Except in the case of the amendment to section 552 of title 5, United States Code, made by section 721(b), no person may seek or obtain judicial review of any provision of this subtitle or any action taken under a provision of this subtitle.

Section 804 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3163) is amended by striking “this title” and inserting “sections 801 and 802”.

The table of contents for the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by striking the items relating to title VIII and inserting the following:

This subtitle may be cited as the “Sensible Classification Act of 2023”.

In this subtitle:

(1) AGENCY.—The term “agency” has the meaning given the term “Executive agency” in section 105 of title 5, United States Code.

(2) CLASSIFICATION.—The term “classification” means the act or process by which information is determined to be classified information.

(3) CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.—The term “classified information” means information that has been determined pursuant to Executive Order 12958 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified national security information), or successor order, to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and is marked to indicate its classified status when in documentary form.

(4) DECLASSIFICATION.—The term “declassification” means the authorized change in the status of information from classified information to unclassified information.

(5) DOCUMENT.—The term “document” means any recorded information, regardless of the nature of the medium or the method or circumstances of recording.

(6) DOWNGRADE.—The term “downgrade” means a determination by a declassification authority that information classified and safeguarded at a specified level shall be classified and safeguarded at a lower level.

(7) INFORMATION.—The term “information” means any knowledge that can be communicated or documentary material, regardless of its physical form or characteristics, that is owned by, is produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government.

(8) ORIGINATE, ORIGINATING, AND ORIGINATED.—The term “originate”, “originating”, and “originated”, with respect to classified information and an authority, means the authority that classified the information in the first instance.

(9) RECORDS.—The term “records” means the records of an agency and Presidential papers or Presidential records, as those terms are defined in title 44, United States Code, including those created or maintained by a government contractor, licensee, certificate holder, or grantee that are subject to the sponsoring agency’s control under the terms of the contract, license, certificate, or grant.

(10) SECURITY CLEARANCE.—The term “security clearance” means an authorization to access classified information.

(11) UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE.—The term “unauthorized disclosure” means a communication or physical transfer of classified information to an unauthorized recipient.

(12) UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION.—The term “unclassified information” means information that is not classified information.

(a) Findings.—The Senate makes the following findings:

(1) According to a report released by the Office of the Director of Intelligence in 2020 titled “Fiscal Year 2019 Annual Report on Security Clearance Determinations”, more than 4,000,000 individuals have been granted eligibility for a security clearance.

(2) At least 1,300,000 of such individuals have been granted access to information classified at the Top Secret level.

(b) Sense of the Senate.—It is the sense of the Senate that—

(1) the classification system of the Federal Government is in urgent need of reform;

(2) the number of people with access to classified information is exceedingly high and must be justified or reduced;

(3) reforms are necessary to reestablish trust between the Federal Government and the people of the United States; and

(4) classification should be limited to the minimum necessary to protect national security while balancing the public’s interest in disclosure.

(a) In general.—The authority to classify information originally may be exercised only by—

(1) the President and, in the performance of executive duties, the Vice President;

(2) the head of an agency or an official of any agency authorized by the President pursuant to a designation of such authority in the Federal Register; and

(3) an official of the Federal Government to whom authority to classify information originally has been delegated pursuant to subsection (c).

(b) Scope of authority.—An individual authorized by this section to classify information originally at a specified level may also classify the information originally at a lower level.

(c) Delegation of original classification authority.—An official of the Federal Government may be delegated original classification authority subject to the following:

(1) Delegation of original classification authority shall be limited to the minimum required to administer this section. Agency heads shall be responsible for ensuring that designated subordinate officials have a demonstrable and continuing need to exercise this authority.

(2) Authority to originally classify information at the level designated as “Top Secret” may be delegated only by the President, in the performance of executive duties, the Vice President, or an agency head or official designated pursuant to subsection (a)(2).

(3) Authority to originally classify information at the level designated as “Secret” or “Confidential” may be delegated only by the President, in the performance of executive duties, the Vice President, or an agency head or official designated pursuant to subsection (a)(2), or the senior agency official described in section 5.4(d) of Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified national security information), or successor order, provided that official has been delegated “Top Secret” original classification authority by the agency head.

(4) Each delegation of original classification authority shall be in writing and the authority shall not be redelegated except as provided by paragraphs (1), (2), and (3). Each delegation shall identify the official by name or position title.

(d) Training required.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—An individual may not be delegated original classification authority under this section unless the individual has first received training described in paragraph (2).

(2) TRAINING DESCRIBED.—Training described in this paragraph is training on original classification that includes instruction on the proper safeguarding of classified information and of the criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions that may be brought against an individual who fails to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure.

(e) Exceptional cases.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—When an employee, contractor, licensee, certificate holder, or grantee of an agency who does not have original classification authority originates information believed by that employee, contractor, licensee, certificate holder, or grantee to require classification, the information shall be protected in a manner consistent with Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified national security information), or successor order.

(2) TRANSMITTAL.—An employee, contractor, licensee, certificate holder, or grantee described in paragraph (1), who originates information described in such paragraph, shall promptly transmit such information to—

(A) the agency that has appropriate subject matter interest and classification authority with respect to this information; or

(B) if it is not clear which agency has appropriate subject matter interest and classification authority with respect to the information, the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office.

(3) AGENCY DECISIONS.—An agency that receives information pursuant to paragraph (2)(A) or (4) shall decide within 30 days whether to classify this information.

(4) INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE ACTION.—If the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office receives information under paragraph (2)(B), the Director shall determine the agency having appropriate subject matter interest and classification authority and forward the information, with appropriate recommendations, to that agency for a classification determination.

(a) In general.—Whenever an agency is processing a request pursuant to section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly known as the “Freedom of Information Act”) or the mandatory declassification review provisions of Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified national security information), or successor order, and identifies responsive classified records that are more than 25 years of age as of December 31 of the year in which the request is received, the head of the agency shall review the record and process the record for declassification and release by the National Declassification Center of the National Archives and Records Administration.

(b) Application.—Subsection (a) shall apply—

(1) regardless of whether or not the record described in such subsection is in the legal custody of the National Archives and Records Administration; and

(2) without regard for any other provisions of law or existing agreements or practices between agencies.

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) OVER-CLASSIFICATION.—The term “over-classification” means classification at a level that exceeds the minimum level of classification that is sufficient to protect the national security of the United States.

(2) SENSIBLE CLASSIFICATION.—The term “sensible classification” means classification at a level that is the minimum level of classification that is sufficient to protect the national security of the United States.

(b) Training required.—Each head of an agency with classification authority shall conduct training for employees of the agency with classification authority to discourage over-classification and to promote sensible classification.

Section 703 of the Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000 (50 U.S.C. 3355a) is amended—

(1) in subsection (c), by adding at the end the following:

“(5) A member of the Board whose term has expired may continue to serve until a successor is appointed and sworn in.”; and

(2) in subsection (f)—

(A) by inserting “(1)” before “Any employee”; and

(B) by adding at the end the following:

“(2) (A) In addition to any employees detailed to the Board under paragraph (1), the Board may hire not more than 12 staff members.

“(B) There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out subparagraph (A) such sums as are necessary for fiscal year 2024 and each fiscal year thereafter.”.

(a) In general.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Office of Electronic Government (in this section referred to as the “Administrator”) shall, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of National Intelligence, the Public Interest Declassification Board, the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, and the head of the National Declassification Center of the National Archives and Records Administration—

(1) research a technology-based solution—

(A) utilizing machine learning and artificial intelligence to support efficient and effective systems for classification and declassification; and

(B) to be implemented on an interoperable and federated basis across the Federal Government; and

(2) submit to the President a recommendation regarding a technology-based solution described in paragraph (1) that should be adopted by the Federal Government.

(b) Staff.—The Administrator may hire sufficient staff to carry out subsection (a).

(c) Report.—Not later than 540 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a classified report on the technology-based solution recommended by the Administrator under subsection (a)(2) and the President’s decision regarding its adoption.

(a) Agency studies on necessity of security clearances.—

(1) STUDIES REQUIRED.—The head of each agency that grants security clearances to personnel of such agency shall conduct a study on the necessity of such clearances.

(2) REPORTS REQUIRED.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, each head of an agency that conducts a study under paragraph (1) shall submit to Congress a report on the findings of the agency head with respect to such study, which the agency head may classify as appropriate.

(B) REQUIRED ELEMENTS.—Each report submitted by the head of an agency under subparagraph (A) shall include, for such agency, the following:

(i) The number of personnel eligible for access to information up to the “Top Secret” level.

(ii) The number of personnel eligible for access to information up to the “Secret” level.

(iii) Information on any reduction in the number of personnel eligible for access to classified information based on the study conducted under paragraph (1).

(iv) A description of how the agency head will ensure that the number of security clearances granted by such agency will be kept to the minimum required for the conduct of agency functions, commensurate with the size, needs, and mission of the agency.

(3) INDUSTRY.—This subsection shall apply to the Secretary of Defense in the Secretary's capacity as the Executive Agent for the National Industrial Security Program, and the Secretary shall treat contractors, licensees, and grantees as personnel of the Department of Defense for purposes of the studies and reports required by this subsection.

(b) Director of National Intelligence review of sensitive compartmented information.—The Director of National Intelligence shall—

(1) review the number of personnel eligible for access to sensitive compartmented information; and

(2) submit to Congress a report on how the Director will ensure that the number of such personnel is limited to the minimum required.

(c) Agency review of special access programs.—Each head of an agency who is authorized to establish a special access program by Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified national security information), or successor order, shall—

(1) review the number of personnel of the agency eligible for access to such special access programs; and

(2) submit to Congress a report on how the agency head will ensure that the number of such personnel is limited to the minimum required.

(d) Secretary of Energy review of Q and L clearances.—The Secretary of Energy shall—

(1) review the number of personnel of the Department of Energy granted Q and L access; and

(2) submit to Congress a report on how the Secretary will ensure that the number of such personnel is limited to the minimum required

(e) Independent reviews.—Not later than 180 days after the date on which a study is completed under subsection (a) or a review is completed under subsections (b) through (d), the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office of the National Archives and Records Administration, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Public Interest Declassification Board shall each review the study or review, as the case may be.

Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a review of the extent to which the intelligence community can use information technology services shared among the intelligence community for purposes of personnel vetting, including with respect to human resources, suitability, and security.

(a) Timeliness standard.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall, acting through the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent, establish and publish in the Federal Register new timeliness performance standards for processing personnel vetting trust determinations in accordance with the Federal personnel vetting performance management standards.

(2) QUINQUENNIAL REVIEWS.—Not less frequently than once every 5 years, the President shall, acting through the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent—

(A) review the standards established pursuant to paragraph (1); and

(B) pursuant to such review—

(i) update such standards as the President considers appropriate; and

(ii) publish in the Federal Register such updates as may be made pursuant to clause (i).

(3) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341) is amended by striking subsection (g).

(b) Quarterly reports on implementation.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not less frequently than quarterly, the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall jointly make available to the public a quarterly report on the compliance of Executive agencies (as defined in section 105 of title 5, United States Code) with the standards established pursuant to subsection (a).

(2) DISAGGREGATION.—Each report made available pursuant to paragraph (1) shall disaggregate data by appropriate category of personnel risk and between Government and contractor personnel.

(c) Complementary standards for intelligence community.—The Director of National Intelligence may, in consultation with the Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability Council established pursuant to Executive Order 13467 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to reforming processes related to suitability for Government employment, fitness for contractor employees, and eligibility for access to classified national security information) establish for the intelligence community standards complementary to those established pursuant to subsection (a).

(a) Definition of personnel vetting trust determination.—In this section, the term “personnel vetting trust determination” means any determination made by an executive branch agency as to whether an individual can be trusted to perform job functions or to be granted access necessary for a position.

(b) Annual report.—Not later than March 30, 2024, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Director of National Intelligence, acting as the Security Executive Agent, and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, acting as the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent, in coordination with the Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability Council, shall jointly make available to the public a report on specific types of personnel vetting trust determinations made during the fiscal year preceding the fiscal year in which the report is made available, disaggregated by the following:

(1) Determinations of eligibility for national security-sensitive positions, separately noting—

(A) the number of individuals granted access to national security information; and

(B) the number of individuals determined to be eligible for but not granted access to national security information.

(2) Determinations of suitability or fitness for a public trust position.

(3) Status as a Government employee, a contractor employee, or other category.

(c) Elimination of report requirement.—Section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341) is amended by striking subsection (h).

Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and once every 2 years thereafter until 2029, the Comptroller General of the United States shall administer a survey to such sample of Federal agencies, Federal contractors, and other persons that require security clearances to access classified information as the Comptroller General considers appropriate to assess—

(1) the strengths and weaknesses of the implementation of the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative; and

(2) the effectiveness of vetting Federal personnel while managing risk during the onboarding of such personnel.

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) CANNABIS.—The term “cannabis” has the meaning given the term “marihuana” in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802).

(2) ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.—The term “eligibility for access to classified information” has the meaning given the term in the procedures established pursuant to section 801(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3161(a)).

(b) Prohibition.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the head of an element of the intelligence community may not make a determination to deny eligibility for access to classified information to an individual based solely on the use of cannabis by the individual prior to the submission of the application for a security clearance by the individual.

Section 19A(d) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b(d)) is amended by striking paragraph (3) and inserting the following new paragraph:

“(3) FUNDING.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—Payment under paragraph (2) in a fiscal year may be made using any funds—

“(i) appropriated in advance specifically for payments under such paragraph; or

“(ii) reprogrammed in accordance with section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3094).

“(B) BUDGET.—For each fiscal year, the Director shall include with the budget justification materials submitted to Congress in support of the budget of the President for that fiscal year pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, an estimate of the funds required in that fiscal year to make payments under paragraph (2).”.

(a) In general.—Section 19A(d) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b(d)) is amended by adding at the end of paragraph (5) the following new sentence: “A covered dependent, covered employee, or covered individual shall not be required to seek any other benefit furnished by the United States Government to be eligible for the payment authorized under paragraph (2).”.

(b) Regulations.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall—

(1) revise the regulations of the Expanded Care Program of the Central Intelligence Agency to conform with the amendment made by subsection (a); and

(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees copies of such regulations, as revised pursuant to paragraph (1).

(a) Regulations.—Except as provided in subsection (c), not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, each head of an element of the intelligence community that has not already done so shall—

(1) issue regulations and procedures to implement the authorities provided by section 19A(d) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b(d)) and section 901(i) of title IX of division J of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (22 U.S.C. 2680b(i)) to provide payments under such sections, to the degree that such authorities are applicable to the head of the element; and

(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees copies of such regulations.

(b) Reporting.—Not later than 210 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, each head of an element of the intelligence community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on—

(1) the estimated number of individuals associated with their element that may be eligible for payment under the authorities described in subsection (a)(1);

(2) an estimate of the obligation that the head of the intelligence community element expects to incur in fiscal year 2025 as a result of establishing the regulations pursuant to subsection (a)(1); and

(3) any perceived barriers or concerns in implementing such authorities.

(c) Alternative reporting.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, each head of an element of the intelligence community (other than the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency) who believes that the authorities described in subsection (a)(1) are not currently relevant for individuals associated with their element, or who are not otherwise in position to issue the regulations and procedures required by subsection (a)(1) shall provide written and detailed justification to the congressional intelligence committees to explain this position.

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) AGENCY.—The term “Agency” means the Central Intelligence Agency.

(2) QUALIFYING INJURY.—The term “qualifying injury” has the meaning given such term in section 19A(d)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b(d)(1)).

(b) In general.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the handling of anomalous health incidents by the Agency.

(c) Contents.—The report required by subsection (b) shall include the following:

(1) HAVANA ACT IMPLEMENTATION.—

(A) An explanation of how the Agency determines whether a reported anomalous health incident resulted in a qualifying injury or a qualifying injury to the brain.

(B) The number of participants of the Expanded Care Program of the Central Intelligence Agency who—

(i) have a certified qualifying injury or a certified qualifying injury to the brain; and

(ii) as of September 30, 2023, applied to the Expanded Care Program due to a reported anomalous health incident.

(C) A comparison of the number of anomalous health incidents reported by applicants to the Expanded Care Program that occurred in the United States and that occurred in a foreign country.

(D) The specific reason each applicant was approved or denied for payment under the Expanded Care Program.

(E) The number of applicants who were initially denied payment but were later approved on appeal.

(F) The average length of time, from the time of application, for an applicant to receive a determination from the Expanded Care Program, aggregated by qualifying injuries and qualifying injuries to the brain.

(2) PRIORITY CASES.—

(A) A detailed list of priority cases of anomalous health incidents, including, for each incident, locations, dates, times, and circumstances.

(B) For each priority case listed in accordance with subparagraph (A), a detailed explanation of each credible alternative explanation that the Agency assigned to the incident, including—

(i) how the incident was discovered;

(ii) how the incident was assigned within the Agency; and

(iii) whether an individual affected by the incident is provided an opportunity to appeal the credible alternative explanation.

(C) For each priority case of an anomalous health incident determined to be largely consistent with the definition of “anomalous health incident” established by the National Academy of Sciences and for which the Agency does not have a credible alternative explanation, a detailed description of such case.

(3) ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENT SENSORS.—

(A) A list of all types of sensors that the Agency has developed or deployed with respect to reports of anomalous health incidents, including, for each type of sensor, the deployment location, the date and the duration of the employment of such type of sensor, and, if applicable, the reason for removal.

(B) A list of entities to which the Agency has provided unrestricted access to data associated with anomalous health incidents.

(C) A list of requests for support the Agency has received from elements of the Federal Government regarding sensor development, testing, or deployment, and a description of the support provided in each case.

(D) A description of all emitter signatures obtained by sensors associated with anomalous health incidents in Agency holdings since 2016, including—

(i) the identification of any of such emitters that the Agency prioritizes as a threat; and

(ii) an explanation of such prioritization.

(d) Additional submissions.—Concurrent with the submission of the report required by subsection (b), the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees—

(1) a template of each form required to apply for the Expanded Care Program, including with respect to payments for a qualifying injury or a qualifying injury to the brain;

(2) copies of internal guidance used by the Agency to adjudicate claims for the Expanded Care Program, including with respect to payments for a qualifying injury to the brain;

(3) the case file of each applicant to the Expanded Care Program who applied due to a reported anomalous health incident, including supporting medical documentation, with name and other identifying information redacted;

(4) copies of all informational and instructional materials provided to employees of and other individuals affiliated with the Agency with respect to applying for the Expanded Care Program; and

(5) copies of Agency guidance provided to employees of and other individuals affiliated with the Agency with respect to reporting and responding to a suspected anomalous health incident, and the roles and responsibilities of each element of the Agency tasked with responding to a report of an anomalous health incident.

(e) Briefing.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall brief the congressional intelligence committees on the report.

(a) Short title.—This section may be cited as the “Strengthening Election Cybersecurity to Uphold Respect for Elections through Independent Testing Act of 2023” or the “SECURE IT Act of 2023”.

(b) Requiring penetration testing as part of the testing and certification of voting systems.—Section 231 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20971) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(e) Required penetration testing.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, the Commission shall provide for the conduct of penetration testing as part of the testing, certification, decertification, and recertification of voting system hardware and software by accredited laboratories under this section.

“(2) ACCREDITATION.—The Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology shall recommend to the Commission entities the Director proposes be accredited to carry out penetration testing under this subsection and certify compliance with the penetration testing-related guidelines required by this subsection. The Commission shall vote on the accreditation of any entity recommended. The requirements for such accreditation shall be a subset of the requirements for accreditation of laboratories under subsection (b) and shall only be based on consideration of an entity's competence to conduct penetration testing under this subsection.”.

(c) Independent security testing and coordinated cybersecurity vulnerability disclosure program for election systems.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subtitle D of title II of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new part:

(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents of such Act is amended by adding at the end of the items relating to subtitle D of title II the following:

(a) Short title.—This section may be cited as the “Protecting Ballot Measures from Foreign Influence Act of 2023”.

(b) In general.—Section 319(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30121(a)(1)(A)) is amended by inserting “, or a State or local ballot initiative or ballot referendum” after “election”.

(c) Effective date.—The amendment made by subsection (b) shall apply with respect to contributions and donations made on or after the date of enactment of this Act.

Section 1683(k)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373(k)(1)), as amended by section 6802(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263), is amended—

(1) in the heading, by striking “Director of National Intelligence and Secretary of Defense” and inserting “All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office”; and

(2) in subparagraph (A), by striking “Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly” and inserting “Director of the Office shall”.

(a) Modification of when notification is required.—Paragraph (3) of section 1055(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 10 U.S.C. 113 note) is amended—

(1) in the paragraph heading, by inserting “and extraordinary security protections” after “support”;

(2) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by inserting “or requires extraordinary security protections” after “time-sensitive”;

(3) in subparagraph (A), by inserting “or after the activity supported concludes” after “providing the support”; and

(4) in subparagraph (B)—

(A) by inserting “or after the activity supported concludes” after “providing such support”; and

(B) by inserting “or after the activity supported concludes” after “providing the support”.

(b) Exemption.—Such section is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(6) EXEMPTION.—The requirements of this subsection shall not apply to the provision of defense sensitive support for travel of the following:

“(A) The Director of National Intelligence.

“(B) The Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.

“(C) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

“(D) The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.”.

Section 3236 of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2426) is amended—

(1) by striking “congressional defense committees” each place it appears and inserting “appropriate congressional committees”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following subsection:

“(g) Appropriate congressional committees defined.—In this section, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means—

“(1) the congressional defense committees;

“(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

“(3) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.”.

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(2) CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP.—The term “congressional leadership” means—

(A) the majority leader of the Senate;

(B) the minority leader of the Senate;

(C) the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and

(D) the minority leader of the House of Representatives.

(3) DIRECTOR.—The term “Director” means the Director of the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office.

(4) UNIDENTIFIED ANOMALOUS PHENOMENA.—The term “unidentified anomalous phenomena” has the meaning given such term in section 1683(n) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373(n)), as amended by section 6802(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263).

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that, due to the increasing potential for technology surprise from foreign adversaries and to ensure sufficient integration across the United States industrial base and avoid technology and security stovepipes—

(1) the United States industrial base must retain its global lead in critical advanced technologies; and

(2) the Federal Government must expand awareness about any historical exotic technology antecedents previously provided by the Federal Government for research and development purposes.

(c) Limitations.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—No amount authorized to be appropriated or appropriated by this Act or any other Act may be obligated or expended, directly or indirectly, in part or in whole, for, on, in relation to, or in support of activities involving unidentified anomalous phenomena protected under any form of special access or restricted access limitations that have not been formally, officially, explicitly, and specifically described, explained, and justified to the appropriate committees of Congress, congressional leadership, and the Director, including for any activities relating to the following:

(A) Recruiting, employing, training, equipping, and operations of, and providing security for, government or contractor personnel with a primary, secondary, or contingency mission of capturing, recovering, and securing unidentified anomalous phenomena craft or pieces and components of such craft.

(B) Analyzing such craft or pieces or components thereof, including for the purpose of determining properties, material composition, method of manufacture, origin, characteristics, usage and application, performance, operational modalities, or reverse engineering of such craft or component technology.

(C) Managing and providing security for protecting activities and information relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena from disclosure or compromise.

(D) Actions relating to reverse engineering or replicating unidentified anomalous phenomena technology or performance based on analysis of materials or sensor and observational information associated with unidentified anomalous phenomena.

(E) The development of propulsion technology, or aerospace craft that uses propulsion technology, systems, or subsystems, that is based on or derived from or inspired by inspection, analysis, or reverse engineering of recovered unidentified anomalous phenomena craft or materials.

(F) Any aerospace craft that uses propulsion technology other than chemical propellants, solar power, or electric ion thrust.

(2) FUTURE APPROPRIATIONS.—Paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to an amount appropriated after the date of the enactment of this Act, unless such paragraph is specifically waived for such amount, or such amount is specifically exempted from such paragraph, by an Act enacted after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(d) Notification and reporting.—Any person currently or formerly under contract with the Federal Government that has in their possession material or information provided by or derived from the Federal Government relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena that formerly or currently is protected by any form of special access or restricted access shall—

(1) not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, notify the Director of such possession; and

(2) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, make available to the Director for assessment, analysis, and inspection—

(A) all such material and information; and

(B) a comprehensive list of all non-earth origin or exotic unidentified anomalous phenomena material.

(e) Liability.—No criminal or civil action may lie or be maintained in any Federal or State court against any person for receiving material or information described in subsection (d) if that person complies with the notification and reporting provisions described in such subsection.

(f) Limitation regarding independent research and development.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Consistent with Department of Defense Instruction Number 3204.01 (dated August 20, 2014, incorporating change 2, dated July 9, 2020; relating to Department policy for oversight of independent research and development), independent research and development funding relating to material or information described in subsection (c) shall not be allowable as indirect expenses for purposes of contracts covered by such instruction, unless such material and information is made available to the Director in accordance with subsection (d).

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE AND APPLICABILITY.—Paragraph (1) shall take effect on the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply with respect to funding from amounts appropriated before, on, or after such date.

(g) Notice to Congress.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director has received a notification under paragraph (1) of subsection (d) or information or material under paragraph (2) of such subsection, the Director shall provide written notification of such receipt to the appropriate committees of Congress and congressional leadership.