Bill Sponsor
Senate Bill 1325
118th Congress(2023-2024)
Western Hemisphere Partnership Act of 2023
Introduced
Introduced
Introduced in Senate on Apr 26, 2023
Overview
Text
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Multiple bills can contain the same text. This could be an identical bill in the opposite chamber or a smaller bill with a section embedded in a larger bill.
Bill Sponsor regularly scans bill texts to find sections that are contained in other bill texts. When a matching section is found, the bills containing that section can be viewed by clicking "View Bills" within the bill text section.
Bill Sponsor is currently only finding exact word-for-word section matches. In a future release, partial matches will be included.
S. 1325 (Reported-in-Senate)

Calendar No. 51

118th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1325


To establish a partnership with nations in the Western Hemisphere to promote economic competitiveness, democratic governance, and security, and for other purposes.


IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

April 26, 2023

Mr. Risch (for himself, Mr. Menendez, and Mr. Rubio) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

May 4, 2023

Reported by Mr. Menendez, with an amendment

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic]


A BILL

To establish a partnership with nations in the Western Hemisphere to promote economic competitiveness, democratic governance, and security, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. Short title.

This Act may be cited as the “Western Hemisphere Partnership Act of 2023”.

SEC. 2. United States policy in the Western Hemisphere.

It is the policy of the United States to promote economic competitiveness, democratic governance, and security in the Western Hemisphere by—

(1) encouraging stronger economic relations, respect for property rights, the rule of law, and enforceable investment rules and labor and environmental standards;

(2) advancing the principles and practices expressed in the Charter of the Organization of American States, the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, and the Inter-American Democratic Charter; and

(3) enhancing the capacity and technical capabilities of democratic partner nation government institutions, including civilian law enforcement, the judiciary, attorneys general, and security forces.

SEC. 3. Promoting security and the rule of law in the Western Hemisphere.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should strengthen security cooperation with democratic partner nations in the Western Hemisphere to promote a secure hemisphere and to address the negative impacts of transnational criminal organizations and malign external state actors.

(b) Collaborative efforts.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, should support the improvement of security conditions and the rule of law in the Western Hemisphere through collaborative efforts with democratic partners that—

(1) enhance the institutional capacity and technical capabilities of defense and security institutions in democratic partner nations to conduct national or regional security missions, including through regular bilateral and multilateral engagements, foreign military sales and financing, international military education, and training programs, and other means;

(2) provide technical assistance and material support (including, as appropriate, radars, vessels, and communications equipment) to relevant security forces to disrupt, degrade, and dismantle organizations involved in illicit narcotics trafficking, transnational criminal activities, illicit mining, and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, and other illicit activities;

(3) enhance the institutional capacity and technical capabilities of relevant civilian law enforcement, attorneys general, and judicial institutions to—

(A) strengthen the rule of law and transparent governance; and

(B) improve regional cooperation to disrupt, degrade, and dismantle transnational organized criminal networks and terrorist organizations, including through training, anticorruption initiatives, anti-money laundering programs, and strengthening cyber capabilities and resources;

(4) enhance port management and maritime security partnerships and airport management and aviation security partnerships to disrupt, degrade, and dismantle transnational criminal networks and facilitate the legitimate flow of people, goods, and services;

(5) strengthen cooperation to improve border security across the Western Hemisphere, dismantle human smuggling and trafficking networks, and increase cooperation to demonstrably strengthen migration management systems;

(6) counter the malign influence of state and non-state actors and misinformation and disinformation campaigns;

(7) disrupt illicit domestic and transnational financial networks;

(8) foster mechanisms for cooperation on emergency preparedness and rapid recovery from natural disasters, including by—

(A) supporting regional preparedness, recovery, and emergency management centers to facilitate rapid response to survey and help maintain planning on regional disaster anticipated needs and possible resources; and

(B) training disaster recovery officials on latest techniques and lessons learned from United States experiences; and

(9) foster regional mechanisms for early warning and response to pandemics in the Western Hemisphere, including through—

(A) improved cooperation with and research by the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention through regional pandemic response centers;

(B) personnel exchanges for technology transfer and skills development; and

(C) surveying and mapping of health networks to build local health capacity.

(c) Limitations on use of technologies.—Operational technologies transferred pursuant to subsection (b) to partner governments for intelligence, defense, or law enforcement purposes shall be used solely for the purposes for which the technology was intended. The United States shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the use of such operational technologies is consistent with United States law, including protections of freedom of expression, freedom of movement, and freedom of association.

SEC. 4. Promoting digitalization and cybersecurity in the Western Hemisphere.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should support digitalization and expand cybersecurity cooperation in the Western Hemisphere to promote regional economic prosperity and security.

(b) Promotion of digitalization and cybersecurity.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, should promote digitalization and cybersecurity in the Western Hemisphere through collaborative efforts with democratic partners that—

(1) promote digital connectivity and facilitate e-commerce by expanding access to information and communications technology (ICT) supply chains that adhere to high-quality security and reliability standards, including—

(A) to open market access on a national treatment, nondiscriminatory basis; and

(B) to strengthen the cybersecurity and cyber resilience of partner countries;

(2) advance the provision of digital government services (e-government) that, to the greatest extent possible, promote transparency, lower business costs, and expand citizens’ access to public services and public information; and

(3) develop robust cybersecurity partnerships to—

(A) promote the inclusion of components and architectures in information and communications technology (ICT) supply chains from participants in initiatives that adhere to high-quality security and reliability standards;

(B) share best practices to mitigate cyber threats to critical infrastructure from ICT architectures by technology providers with close ties to, or that are susceptible to pressure from, governments or security services without reliable legal checks on governmental powers;

(C) effectively respond to cybersecurity threats, including state-sponsored threats; and

(D) to strengthen resilience against cyberattacks and cybercrime.

SEC. 5. Promoting economic and commercial partnerships in the Western Hemisphere.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should enhance economic and commercial ties with democratic partners to promote prosperity in the Western Hemisphere by modernizing and strengthening trade capacity-building and trade facilitation initiatives, encouraging market-based economic reforms, strengthening labor and environmental standards, and encouraging transparency and adherence to the rule of law in investment dealings.

(b) In general.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the United States Trade Representative, the Chief Executive Officer of the Development Finance Corporation, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, should support the improvement of economic conditions in the Western Hemisphere through collaborative efforts with democratic partners that—

(1) facilitate a more open, transparent, and competitive environment for United States businesses and promote robust and comprehensive trade capacity-building and trade facilitation by—

(A) reducing trade and nontariff barriers between the countries in the region, establishing a mechanism for pursuing Mutual Recognition Agreements and Formalized Regulatory Cooperation Agreements in priority sectors of the economy;

(B) establishing a forum for discussing and evaluating technical and other assistance needs to help establish streamlined “single window” processes to facilitate movement of goods and common customs arrangements and procedures to lower costs of goods in transit and speed to destination;

(C) building relationships and exchanges between relevant regulatory bodies in the United States and democratic partners in the Western Hemisphere to promote best practices and transparency in rulemaking, implementation, and enforcement, and provide training and assistance to help improve supply chain management in the Western Hemisphere;

(D) establishing regional fora for identifying, raising, and addressing supply chain management issues, including infrastructure needs and strengthening of investment rules and regulatory frameworks;

(E) establishing a dedicated program of trade missions and reverse trade missions to increase commercial contacts and ties between the United States and Western Hemisphere partner countries; and

(F) strengthening labor and environmental standards in the region;

(2) establish frameworks or mechanisms to review and address the long-term financial sustainability and national security implications of foreign investments in strategic sectors or services;

(3) establish competitive and transparent infrastructure project selection and procurement processes that promote transparency, open competition, financial sustainability, and robust adherence to global standards and norms; and

(4) advance robust and comprehensive energy production and integration, including through a more open, transparent, and competitive environment for United States companies competing in the Western Hemisphere, including by—

(A) facilitating further development of integrated regional energy markets;

(B) improving management of grids, including technical capability to ensure the functionality, safe and responsible management, and quality of service of electricity providers, carriers, and management and distribution systems;

(C) facilitating private sector-led development of reliable and affordable power generation capacity;

(D) establishing a process for surveying grid capacity and management focused on identifying electricity service efficiencies and establishing cooperative mechanisms for providing technical assistance for—

(i) grid management, power pricing, and tariff issues;

(ii) establishing and maintaining appropriate regulatory best practices; and

(iii) proposals to establish regional power grids for the purpose of promoting the sale of excess supply to consumers across borders;

(E) assessing the viability and effectiveness of decentralizing power production and transmission and building micro-grid power networks to improve, when feasible, access to electricity, particularly in rural and underserved communities where centralized power grid connections may not be feasible in the short to medium term; and

(F) exploring opportunities to partner with the private sector and multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, to promote universal access to reliable and affordable electricity in the Western Hemisphere.

SEC. 6. Promoting transparency and democratic governance in the Western Hemisphere.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should support efforts to strengthen the capacity of democratic institutions and processes in the Western Hemisphere to promote a more transparent, democratic, and prosperous region.

(b) In general.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development and heads of other relevant Federal agencies, should support transparent, accountable, and democratic governance in the Western Hemisphere through collaborative efforts with democratic partners that—

(1) strengthen the capacity of national electoral institutions to ensure free, fair, and transparent electoral processes, including through pre-election assessment missions, technical assistance, and independent local and international election monitoring and observation missions;

(2) enhance the capabilities of democratically elected national legislatures, parliamentary bodies, and autonomous regulatory institutions to conduct oversight;

(3) strengthen the capacity of subnational government institutions to govern in a transparent, accountable, and democratic manner, including through training and technical assistance;

(4) combat corruption at local and national levels, including through trainings, cooperation agreements, and bilateral or multilateral anticorruption mechanisms that strengthen attorneys general and prosecutors' offices; and

(5) strengthen the capacity of civil society to conduct oversight of government institutions, build the capacity of independent professional journalism, facilitate substantive dialogue with government and the private sector to generate issue-based policies, and mobilize local resources to carry out such activities.

SEC. 7. Western Hemisphere defined.

In this Act, the term “Western Hemisphere” does not include Cuba, Nicaragua, or Venezuela, except for purposes of section 6.

SECTION 1. Short title.

This Act may be cited as the “Western Hemisphere Partnership Act of 2023”.

SEC. 2. United States policy in the Western Hemisphere.

It is the policy of the United States to promote economic competitiveness, democratic governance, and security in the Western Hemisphere by—

(1) encouraging stronger economic relations, respect for property rights, the rule of law, and enforceable investment rules and labor and environmental standards;

(2) advancing the principles and practices expressed in the Charter of the Organization of American States, the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, and the Inter-American Democratic Charter; and

(3) enhancing the capacity and technical capabilities of democratic partner nation government institutions, including civilian law enforcement, the judiciary, attorneys general, and security forces.

SEC. 3. Promoting security and the rule of law in the Western Hemisphere.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should strengthen security cooperation with democratic partner nations in the Western Hemisphere to promote a secure hemisphere and to address the negative impacts of transnational criminal organizations and malign external state actors.

(b) Collaborative efforts.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, should support the improvement of security conditions and the rule of law in the Western Hemisphere through collaborative efforts with democratic partners that—

(1) enhance the institutional capacity and technical capabilities of defense and security institutions in democratic partner nations to conduct national or regional security missions, including through regular bilateral and multilateral engagements, foreign military sales and financing, international military education and training programs, expanding the National Guard State Partnership Programs, and other means;

(2) provide technical assistance and material support (including, as appropriate, radars, vessels, and communications equipment) to relevant security forces to disrupt, degrade, and dismantle organizations involved in the illicit trafficking of narcotics and precursor chemicals, transnational criminal activities, illicit mining, and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, and other illicit activities;

(3) enhance the institutional capacity, legitimacy, and technical capabilities of relevant civilian law enforcement, attorneys general, and judicial institutions to—

(A) strengthen the rule of law and transparent governance;

(B) combat corruption and kleptocracy in the region; and

(C) improve regional cooperation to disrupt, degrade, and dismantle transnational organized criminal networks and terrorist organizations, including through training, anticorruption initiatives, anti-money laundering programs, and strengthening cyber capabilities and resources;

(4) enhance port management and maritime security partnerships and airport management and aviation security partnerships to disrupt, degrade, and dismantle transnational criminal networks and facilitate the legitimate flow of people, goods, and services;

(5) strengthen cooperation to improve border security across the Western Hemisphere, dismantle human smuggling and trafficking networks, and increase cooperation to demonstrably strengthen migration management systems;

(6) counter the malign influence of state and non-state actors and disinformation campaigns;

(7) disrupt illicit domestic and transnational financial networks;

(8) foster mechanisms for cooperation on emergency preparedness and rapid recovery from natural disasters, including by—

(A) supporting regional preparedness, recovery, and emergency management centers to facilitate rapid response to survey and help maintain planning on regional disaster anticipated needs and possible resources;

(B) training disaster recovery officials on latest techniques and lessons learned from United States experiences;

(C) making available, preparing, and transferring on-hand nonlethal supplies, and providing training on the use of such supplies, for humanitarian or health purposes to respond to unforeseen emergencies; and

(D) conducting medical support operations and medical humanitarian missions, such as hospital ship deployments and base-operating services, to the extent required by the operation;

(9) foster regional mechanisms for early warning and response to pandemics in the Western Hemisphere, including through—

(A) improved cooperation with and research by the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention through regional pandemic response centers;

(B) personnel exchanges for technology transfer and skills development; and

(C) surveying and mapping of health networks to build local health capacity;

(10) promote the meaningful participation of women across all political processes, including conflict prevention and conflict resolution and post-conflict relief and recovery efforts; and

(11) hold accountable actors that violate political and civil rights.

(c) Limitations on use of technologies.—Operational technologies transferred pursuant to subsection (b) to partner governments for intelligence, defense, or law enforcement purposes shall be used solely for the purposes for which the technology was intended. The United States shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the use of such operational technologies is consistent with United States law, including protections of freedom of expression, freedom of movement, and freedom of association.

(d) Strategy.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a 5-year strategy to promote security and the rule of law in the Western Hemisphere in accordance to this Section.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

(A) A detailed assessment of the resources required to carry out such collaborative efforts.

(B) Annual benchmarks to track progress and obstacles in undertaking such collaborative efforts.

(C) A public diplomacy component to engage the people of the Western Hemisphere with the purpose of demonstrating that the security of their countries is enhanced to a greater extent through alignment with the United States and democratic values rather than with authoritarian countries such as the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

(3) BRIEFING.—Not later than 1 year after submission of the strategy required under paragraph (1), and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall provide to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a briefing on the implementation of the strategy.

SEC. 4. Promoting digitalization and cybersecurity in the Western Hemisphere.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should support digitalization and expand cybersecurity cooperation in the Western Hemisphere to promote regional economic prosperity and security.

(b) Promotion of digitalization and cybersecurity.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, should promote digitalization and cybersecurity in the Western Hemisphere through collaborative efforts with democratic partners that—

(1) promote digital connectivity and facilitate e-commerce by expanding access to information and communications technology (ICT) supply chains that adhere to high-quality security and reliability standards, including—

(A) to open market access on a national treatment, nondiscriminatory basis; and

(B) to strengthen the cybersecurity and cyber resilience of partner countries;

(2) advance the provision of digital government services (e-government) that, to the greatest extent possible, promote transparency, lower business costs, and expand citizens’ access to public services and public information; and

(3) develop robust cybersecurity partnerships to—

(A) promote the inclusion of components and architectures in information and communications technology (ICT) supply chains from participants in initiatives that adhere to high-quality security and reliability standards;

(B) share best practices to mitigate cyber threats to critical infrastructure from ICT architectures by technology providers that supply equipment and services covered under section 2 of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (47 U.S.C. 1601);

(C) effectively respond to cybersecurity threats, including state-sponsored threats; and

(D) to strengthen resilience against cyberattacks and cybercrime.

SEC. 5. Promoting economic and commercial partnerships in the Western Hemisphere.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should enhance economic and commercial ties with democratic partners to promote prosperity in the Western Hemisphere by modernizing and strengthening trade capacity-building and trade facilitation initiatives, encouraging market-based economic reforms that enable inclusive economic growth, strengthening labor and environmental standards, addressing economic disparities of women, and encouraging transparency and adherence to the rule of law in investment dealings.

(b) In general.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the United States Trade Representative, the Chief Executive Officer of the Development Finance Corporation, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, should support the improvement of economic conditions in the Western Hemisphere through collaborative efforts with democratic partners that—

(1) facilitate a more open, transparent, and competitive environment for United States businesses and promote robust and comprehensive trade capacity-building and trade facilitation by—

(A) reducing trade and nontariff barriers between the countries in the region, establishing a mechanism for pursuing Mutual Recognition Agreements and Formalized Regulatory Cooperation Agreements in priority sectors of the economy;

(B) establishing a forum for discussing and evaluating technical and other assistance needs to help establish streamlined “single window” processes to facilitate movement of goods and common customs arrangements and procedures to lower costs of goods in transit and speed to destination;

(C) building relationships and exchanges between relevant regulatory bodies in the United States and democratic partners in the Western Hemisphere to promote best practices and transparency in rulemaking, implementation, and enforcement, and provide training and assistance to help improve supply chain management in the Western Hemisphere;

(D) establishing regional fora for identifying, raising, and addressing supply chain management issues, including infrastructure needs and strengthening of investment rules and regulatory frameworks;

(E) establishing a dedicated program of trade missions and reverse trade missions to increase commercial contacts and ties between the United States and Western Hemisphere partner countries; and

(F) strengthening labor and environmental standards in the region;

(2) establish frameworks or mechanisms to review and address the long-term financial sustainability and national security implications of foreign investments in strategic sectors or services;

(3) establish competitive and transparent infrastructure project selection and procurement processes that promote transparency, open competition, financial sustainability, and robust adherence to global standards and norms; and

(4) advance robust and comprehensive energy production and integration, including through a more open, transparent, and competitive environment for United States companies competing in the Western Hemisphere, including by—

(A) facilitating further development of integrated regional energy markets;

(B) improving management of grids, including technical capability to ensure the functionality, safe and responsible management, and quality of service of electricity providers, carriers, and management and distribution systems;

(C) facilitating private sector-led development of reliable and affordable power generation capacity;

(D) establishing a process for surveying grid capacity and management focused on identifying electricity service efficiencies and establishing cooperative mechanisms for providing technical assistance for—

(i) grid management, power pricing, and tariff issues;

(ii) establishing and maintaining appropriate regulatory best practices; and

(iii) proposals to establish regional power grids for the purpose of promoting the sale of excess supply to consumers across borders;

(E) assessing the viability and effectiveness of decentralizing power production and transmission and building micro-grid power networks to improve, when feasible, access to electricity, particularly in rural and underserved communities where centralized power grid connections may not be feasible in the short to medium term; and

(F) exploring opportunities to partner with the private sector and multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, to promote universal access to reliable and affordable electricity in the Western Hemisphere.

SEC. 6. Promoting transparency and democratic governance in the Western Hemisphere.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should support efforts to strengthen the capacity and legitimacy of democratic institutions and inclusive processes in the Western Hemisphere to promote a more transparent, democratic, and prosperous region.

(b) In general.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development and heads of other relevant Federal agencies, should support transparent, accountable, and democratic governance in the Western Hemisphere through collaborative efforts with democratic partners that—

(1) strengthen the capacity of national electoral institutions to ensure free, fair, and transparent electoral processes, including through pre-election assessment missions, technical assistance, and independent local and international election monitoring and observation missions;

(2) enhance the capabilities of democratically elected national legislatures, parliamentary bodies, and autonomous regulatory institutions to conduct oversight;

(3) strengthen the capacity of subnational government institutions to govern in a transparent, accountable, and democratic manner, including through training and technical assistance;

(4) combat corruption at local and national levels, including through trainings, cooperation agreements, initiatives aimed at dismantling corrupt networks, and political support for bilateral or multilateral anticorruption mechanisms that strengthen attorneys general and prosecutors’ offices;

(5) strengthen the capacity of civil society to conduct oversight of government institutions, build the capacity of independent professional journalism, facilitate substantive dialogue with government and the private sector to generate issue-based policies, and mobilize local resources to carry out such activities;

(6) promote the meaningful and significant participation of women in democratic processes, including in national and subnational government and civil society; and

(7) support the creation of procedures for the Organization of American States (OAS) to create an annual forum for democratically elected national legislatures from OAS member States to discuss issues of hemispheric importance, as expressed in section 4 of the Organization of American States Legislative Engagement Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–343).

SEC. 7. Investment, trade, and development in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.

(a) Strategy required.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish a comprehensive United States strategy for public and private investment, trade, and development in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.

(2) FOCUS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall focus on increasing exports of United States goods and services to Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean by 200 percent in real dollar value by the date that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(3) CONSULTATIONS.—In developing the strategy required by paragraph (1), the President shall consult with—

(A) Congress;

(B) each agency that is a member of the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee;

(C) the relevant multilateral development banks, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury and the respective United States Executive Directors of such banks;

(D) each agency that participates in the Trade Policy Staff Committee established;

(E) the President’s Export Council;

(F) each of the development agencies;

(G) any other Federal agencies with responsibility for export promotion or financing and development; and

(H) the private sector, including businesses, nongovernmental organizations, and African and Latin American and Caribbean diaspora groups.

(4) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—

(A) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress the strategy required by subsection (a).

(B) PROGRESS REPORT.—Not later than 3 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the implementation of the strategy required by paragraph (1).

(b) Special Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean export strategy coordinators.—The President shall designate an individual to serve as Special Africa Export Strategy Coordinator and an individual to serve as Special Latin America and the Caribbean Export Strategy Coordinator—

(1) to oversee the development and implementation of the strategy required by subsection (a); and

(2) to coordinate developing and implementing the strategy with—

(A) the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee;

(B) the Assistant United States Trade Representative for African Affairs or the Assistant United States Trade Representative for the Western Hemisphere, as appropriate;

(C) the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs or the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, as appropriate;

(D) the Export-Import Bank of the United States;

(E) the United States International Development Finance Corporation; and

(F) the development agencies.

(c) Trade missions to Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.—It is the sense of Congress that, not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce and other high-level officials of the United States Government with responsibility for export promotion, financing, and development should conduct joint trade missions to Africa and to Latin America and the Caribbean.

(d) Training.—The President shall develop a plan—

(1) to standardize the training received by United States and Foreign Commercial Service officers, economic officers of the Department of State, and economic officers of the United States Agency for International Development with respect to the programs and procedures of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the Small Business Administration, and the United States Trade and Development Agency; and

(2) to ensure that, not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act—

(A) all United States and Foreign Commercial Service officers that are stationed overseas receive the training described in paragraph (1); and

(B) in the case of a country to which no United States and Foreign Commercial Service officer is assigned, any economic officer of the Department of State stationed in that country receives that training.

(e) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES.—The term “development agencies” means the United States Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the United States Trade and Development Agency, the United States Department of Agriculture, and relevant multilateral development banks.

(2) MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS.—The term “multilateral development banks” has the meaning given that term in section 1701(c)(4) of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)(4)) and includes the African Development Foundation.

(3) TRADE POLICY STAFF COMMITTEE.—The term “Trade Policy Staff Committee” means the Trade Policy Staff Committee established pursuant to section 2002.2 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations.

(4) TRADE PROMOTION COORDINATING COMMITTEE.—The term “Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee” means the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee established under section 2312 of the Export Enhancement Act of 1988 (15 U.S.C. 4727).

(5) UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN COMMERCIAL SERVICE.—The term “United States and Foreign Commercial Service” means the United States and Foreign Commercial Service established by section 2301 of the Export Enhancement Act of 1988 (15 U.S.C. 4721).

SEC. 8. Sense of Congress on prioritizing nomination and confirmation of qualified ambassadors.

It is the sense of Congress that it is critically important that both the President and the Senate play their respective roles to nominate and confirm qualified ambassadors as quickly as possible, especially for countries in the Western Hemisphere.

SEC. 9. Western Hemisphere defined.

In this Act, the term “Western Hemisphere” does not include Cuba, Nicaragua, or Venezuela.

SEC. 10. Report on efforts to capture and detain united states citizens as hostages.

(a) In general.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report on efforts by the Maduro regime of Venezuela to detain United States citizens and lawful permanent residents.

(b) Elements.—The report required by subsection (a) shall include, regarding the arrest, capture, detainment, and imprisonment of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents—

(1) the names, positions, and institutional affiliation of Venezuelan individuals, or those acting on their behalf, who have engaged in such activities;

(2) a description of any role played by transnational criminal organizations, and an identification of such organizations; and

(3) where relevant, an assessment of whether and how United States citizens and lawful permanent residents have been lured to Venezuela.

(c) Form.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but shall include a classified annex, which shall include a list of the total number of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents detained or imprisoned in Venezuela as of the date on which the report is submitted.


Calendar No. 51

118th CONGRESS
     1st Session
S. 1325

A BILL
To establish a partnership with nations in the Western Hemisphere to promote economic competitiveness, democratic governance, and security, and for other purposes.

May 4, 2023
Reported with an amendment