(1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating certain production facilities to locations outside the PRC;

(2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other efforts to diversify supply chains to locations outside of the PRC;

(3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other challenges in the course of the activities described in paragraphs (1) and (2); and

(4) identifying alternative markets for production or sourcing outside of the PRC, including through providing market intelligence, facilitating contact with reliable local partners as appropriate, and other services.

(1) be under the authority of the United States Chief of Mission in the country in which they are hired, in accordance with existing United States laws;

(2) coordinate with Department of State and Department of Commerce officers; and

(3) coordinate with United States missions and relevant local partners in other countries as needed to carry out the services described in subsection (a).

(1) under the foreign ownership, control, or influence of the Government of the PRC or the CCP, or other foreign adversary;

(2) determined to have beneficial ownership from foreign individuals subject to the jurisdiction, direction, or influence of foreign adversaries; and

(3) that has any contract in effect at the time of the receipt of such funds, or has had a contract within the previous one year that is no longer in effect, with—

(1) a more streamlined, shared, and coordinated approach, which leverages economies of scale with major allies, is necessary for the United States to retain its lead in defense technology;

(2) allowing for the export, re-export, or transfer of defense-related technologies and services to members of the national technology and industrial base (as defined in section 2500 of title 10, United States Code) would advance United States security interests by helping to leverage the defense-related technologies and skilled workforces of trusted allies to reduce the dependence on other countries, including countries that pose challenges to United States interests around the world, for defense-related innovation and investment; and

(3) it is in the interest of the United States to continue to increase cooperation with Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to protect critical defense-related technology and services and leverage the investments of like-minded, major ally nations in order to maximize the strategic edge afforded by defense technology innovation.

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that—

(2) FORM.—This report required under paragraph (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

(1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in which infrastructure investments are made.

(2) Anti-corruption.

(3) Rule of law.

(4) Human rights and labor rights.

(5) Fiscal and debt sustainability.

(6) Social and governance safeguards.

(7) Transparency.

(8) Environmental and energy standards.

(1) AUTHORITY.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall develop and submit a strategy to the relevant congressional committees to use the resources of Federal agencies to counteract offers of assistance and financing from the PRC to foreign governments that are of strategic importance to the United States.

(2) COMPONENTS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy shall—

(3) PARTICIPATING AGENCIES.—Participating Federal agencies should include the Department of State, Department of the Treasury, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United States International Development Finance Corporation, Millennium Challenge Corporation, United States Trade and Development Agency, Department of Commerce, and other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate.

(4) EXECUTION OF STRATEGY.—The President should issue an Executive Order to implement the strategy and make such changes in agency regulations and procedures as are necessary to put the strategy into effect.

(5) RELEVANT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—In this section, the term “relevant congressional committees” means—

(1) strengthening capacity-building programs to improve project evaluation processes, regulatory and procurement environments, and project preparation capacity of countries that are partners of the United States in such development;

(2) providing transaction advisory services and project preparation assistance to support sustainable infrastructure; and

(3) coordinating the provision of United States assistance for the development of infrastructure, including infrastructure that uses United States manufactured goods and services, and catalyzing investment led by the private sector.

(1) legal services;

(2) project preparation and feasibility studies;

(3) debt sustainability analyses;

(4) bid or proposal evaluation; and

(5) other services relevant to advancing the development of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure.

(1) IN GENERAL.—As part of the “Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network” described under subsection (c), the Secretary of State is authorized to provide support, including through the Strategic Infrastructure Fund, for technical assistance, project preparation, pipeline development, and other infrastructure project support.

(2) JOINT STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.—Funds authorized for the Strategic Infrastructure Fund should be used in coordination with the Department of Defense, the International Development Finance Corporation, like-minded donor partners, and multilateral banks, as appropriate, to support joint infrastructure projects that are in the national security interest of the United States and vulnerable to strategic competitors.

(1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted energy needs and capacities of developing countries, and analyze the presence and involvement of PRC state-owned industries and other companies incorporated in the PRC, Chinese nationals providing labor, and financing of energy projects, including direct financing by the PRC government, PRC financial institutions, or direct state support to state-owned enterprises and other companies incorporated in the PRC;

(2) pursue strategic support and investment opportunities, and diplomatic engagement on power sector reforms, to expand the development and deployment of advanced energy technologies in developing countries;

(3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants, and other financial products on terms that advance domestic economic and local employment opportunities, utilize advanced energy technologies, encourage private sector growth, and, when appropriate United States equity and sovereign lending products as alternatives to the predatory lending tools offered by Chinese financial institutions;

(4) pursue partnerships with likeminded international financial and multilateral institutions to leverage investment in advanced energy technologies in developing countries; and

(5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the cooperative development of advanced energy technologies with countries of strategic significance, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, to address the effects of energy engagement by the PRC through predatory lending or other actions that negatively impact other countries.

(1) improve energy security in allied and developing countries;

(2) create open, efficient, rules-based, and transparent energy markets;

(3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy trading relationships; and

(4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy.

(1) identifies priority countries for deepening United States engagement on energy matters, in accordance with the economic and national security interests of the United States and where deeper energy partnerships are most achievable;

(2) describes the involvement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and companies incorporated in the PRC in the development, operation, financing, or ownership of energy generation facilities, transmission infrastructure, or energy resources in the countries identified in paragraph (1);

(3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and implications for United States national interests and the interests of the countries identified in paragraph (1), with respect to the PRC’s involvement and influence in developing country energy production or transmission; and

(4) outlines current and planned efforts by the United States to partner with the countries identified in paragraph (1) on energy matters that support shared interests between the United States and such countries.

(1) A survey and comparison of the PRC’s international economic practices, which will—

(2) An evaluation of the impacts of the PRC’s trade and investment policies, including—

(1) Deepening United States trade and investment relationships in the region, especially with key allies and partners.

(2) Confirming American leadership and participation in global regional economic organizations and fora, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

(3) Leveraging bilateral and plurilateral sectoral agreements on trade and investment, as well as negotiations at the WTO to reassert United States economic leadership by writing the rules of the road on critical economic questions.

(4) Building secure and resilient supply chains for industries critical for United States national interest, including semiconductors, vaccines, and personal protective equipment.

(5) Showcasing the benefits and appeal of a market-based economic model.

(1) Enhancing United States trade and investment relationships in the region bilaterally and plurilaterally, especially with United States allies and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

(2) Reenergizing APEC as a critical component of the region’s economic architecture.

(3) Work to ensure that the United States absence from the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership do not undermine the United States’ ability to shape regional trade and investment rules.

(4) Working with allies and partners to build resilient and trusted supply chains especially for critical and emerging technologies, including semiconductors, and products and components critical for national health, including vaccines and related materials and personal protective equipment.

(5) Driving the formation and adoption of high-standards and rules for the region in the following areas:

(6) Developing roadmaps for how to counter the PRC’s unfair trade and economic practices, with a specific focus on—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

(A) making regional commerce more inclusive;

(B) fostering innovation and digitization; and

(C) addressing climate change and environmental protection;

(A) expand the participation of APEC stakeholders to include labor groups, environmental advocates, and other part of civil society;

(B) upgrade APEC’s work to empower and promote small and medium enterprises;

(C) spotlight best practices and plans to upgrade skills for the next-generation of technology jobs;

(D) advance a climate and sustainable trade and development agenda with a focus on green technologies, infrastructure and finance; and

(E) advance work on digital trade, including by expanding rules on data privacy, promoting digital inclusiveness and promoting the free flow of data; and

(1) An explanation of the means available to the United States, with the cooperation of allies, to enable a country with a smaller economy to withstand such coercion.

(2) A description of the role that the Secretary of State, acting through the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, will play in the imposition of reputational costs on the PRC for conducting economic coercion.

(3) Role clarity for the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Secretary of Defense, the head of each element of the intelligence community (as such term is defined by section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the United States International Development Finance Corporation in implementing such strategy.

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

(1) expand and increase secure Internet access and digital infrastructure;

(2) adopt policies and regulatory positions that foster and encourage open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet, equitable access, the free flow of data, multi-stakeholder models of internet governance, and pro-competitive and secure information and communications technology (ICT) policies and regulations;

(3) promote and protect human rights and counter corruption and predatory behavior throughout communications and cybersecurity policy and implementation;

(4) guard against privacy abuses, cybercrime, disinformation and misinformation, and the use of digital technology and services to carry out criminal activity or human rights violations;

(5) bolster the role of civil society in informing ICT policy and regulations;

(6) promote exports of United States ICT goods and services and increase United States company market share in target markets;

(7) promote the innovation and diversification of ICT goods and supply chain services to be less reliant on imports from the People’s Republic of China;

(8) build cybersecurity capacity, expand interoperability, and promote best practices for a national approach to cybersecurity; and

(9) enhance the security of their digital infrastructure to facilitate better information sharing with the United States and United States allies and partners, as appropriate.

(1) the appropriate congressional committees;

(2) leaders of the United States industry;

(3) civil society leaders with expertise in technology, telecommunications, cybersecurity, economic development and competitiveness, and human rights, including from the Open Technology Fund;

(4) representatives from relevant United States Government agencies; and

(5) representatives from like-minded allies and partners.

(1) the dominance of the dollar as the global reserve currency has yielded significant benefits to the United States and the American people by allowing the United States to maintain economic independence, better control its monetary policy, and finance government outlays;

(2) American global leadership has benefited from the United States monetary stability, creditworthiness, deep capital markets, and financial technology innovations;

(3) effective diplomacy and safeguarding of American national security rely on the United States role as the global financial leader, hub of global trade, and source of economic opportunity;

(4) by cracking down on dissent in the key financial center of Hong Kong, driving the creation of a technology focused stock exchange, and pushing forward a Central Bank digital currency, the People’s Republic of China is attempting to become the leading hub of finance in the world; and

(5) the United States must maintain its position as a global financial leader to continue its broader global leadership role around the world.

(1) lists and examines the benefits to American foreign policy that derive from the United States financial leadership and the dollar’s status as the world’s global reserve currency;

(2) describes the actions taken by the People’s Republic of China that could cement China’s role as the world’s leading financial center;

(3) analyzes the possible impact on American national security and foreign policy were the yuan to supplant the dollar as the world’s leading reserve currency;

(4) outlines how the United States can work diplomatically with allies, partners, and other nations to preserve a financial system that is free, open, and fair; and

(5) identifies steps the United States can take to preserve its status as the world’s leading financial center and maintain the dollar’s position as the global reserve currency.

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(2) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives;

(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(4) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

(1) Beginning in the 1990s, a wave of Chinese companies sought to raise capital and list shares on American stock markets.

(2) In 2011 and 2012, more than 100 Chinese firms were delisted from the New York Stock Exchange as a result of fraud, accounting scandals, and other corporate governance failures.

(3) Following extensive diplomatic efforts by the United States Government, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) signed a memorandum of understanding with the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the China Ministry of Finance for the production and exchange of audit documents.

(4) Despite signing the agreement, Chinese regulators continue to hinder the PCAOB’s access to relevant documents that are necessary for the PCAOB to carry out its enforcement duties.

(5) In August 2020, the Department of State sent a letter to American universities warning about national security implications related to Chinese stock holdings.

(6) In December 2020, Congress passed and the President signed the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (Public Law 116–222), which requires foreign companies listed on American stock markets to comply with PCAOB auditing rules within three years. Under the legislation, issuers not in compliance within three years will be delisted.

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the costs and benefits to the United States posed by the presence of companies incorporated in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that are listed on American stock exchanges or traded over the counter, in the form of American depository receipts.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report shall—

(3) FACTORS FOR INCLUSION OF A COMPANY.—In completing the report under paragraph (1), the President shall consider whether a company should be identified pursuant to paragraph (2)(A) because the company has—

(4) FACTORS FOR MAKING POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS.—In completing the report under paragraph (1), the President shall weigh the national security implications and consider the following factors identified pursuant to paragraph (3) (except that such report should exclude from its analysis the delisting or potential delisting of companies from United States markets as a result of failing to retain a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board-registered public accounting firm as required by section 104 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7214)):

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the diplomatic and economic implications of cross-border payment systems.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall—

(1) the United States treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific provide a unique strategic advantage to the United States and are among the Nation’s most precious assets, enabling the United States to advance its vital national interests, defend its territory, expand its economy through international trade and commerce, establish enduring cooperation with allies while seeking to establish new partnerships, prevent the domination of the Indo-Pacific and its surrounding maritime and air lanes by a hostile power or powers, and deter potential aggressors;

(2) the Governments of the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are critical allies in advancing a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific region and tackling challenges with unity of purpose, and have collaborated to advance specific efforts of shared interest in areas such as defense and security, economic prosperity, infrastructure connectivity, and fundamental freedoms;

(3) the United States greatly values other partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, including with India, Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Vietnam, as well as its trilateral and quadrilateral dialogues, and regional architecture such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, which are essential to further shared interests;

(4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific demands consistent United States and allied commitment to strengthening and advancing alliances so that they are postured to meet these challenges, and will require sustained political will, concrete partnerships, economic, commercial, technological, and security cooperation, consistent and tangible commitments, high-level and extensive consultations on matters of mutual interest, mutual and shared cooperation in the acquisition of key capabilities important to allied defenses, and unified mutual support in the face of political, economic, or military coercion;

(5) fissures in the United States alliance relationships and partnerships benefit United States adversaries and weaken the collective ability to advance shared interests;

(6) the United States must work with allies to prioritize human rights throughout the Indo-Pacific region;

(7) as the report released in August 2020 by the Expert Group of the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS), entitled “Climate and Security in the Indo-Asia Pacific” noted, the Indo-Pacific region is one of the regions most vulnerable to climate impacts, and as former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment Sherri Goodman, Secretary General of IMCCS, noted, climate shocks act as a threat multiplier in the Indo-Pacific region, increasing humanitarian response costs and impacting security throughout the region as sea levels rise, fishing patterns shift, food insecurity rises, and storms grow stronger and more frequent;

(8) the United State should continue to engage on and deepen cooperation with allies and partners of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, as laid out in the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (Public Law 115–409), in the areas of—

(9) the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, should facilitate a robust interagency Indo-Pacific climate resiliency and adaptation strategy focusing on internal and external actions needed—

(10) ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led mechanisms remain essential to the evolving institutional architecture of the Indo-Pacific region.

(1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation with and among United States allies in the Indo-Pacific, as appropriate, including through diplomatic engagement, regional development, energy security and development, scientific and health partnerships, educational and cultural exchanges, intelligence-sharing, and other diplomatic and defense-related initiatives;

(2) to uphold the United States multilateral and bilateral treaty obligations, including—

(3) to strengthen and deepen the United States’ bilateral and regional partnerships, including with India, Taiwan, ASEAN, and New Zealand;

(4) to cooperate with allies and partners to promote human rights across the Indo-Pacific region bilaterally and through regional and multilateral fora and pacts;

(5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation with regional partners, such as Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and India; and

(6) to collaborate and cooperate on the sustainable development of the Mekong River Basin, including by providing support for environmental conservation and protection initiatives in the Mekong sub-region and through assistance to Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, whose governments comprise the Mekong River Commission (MRC). United States efforts should focus on increasing MRC member countries’ capacity in the sustainable conservation and management of natural resources.

(1) as a Pacific power, the United States should continue to strengthen its cooperation with Australia, India, and Japan, (commonly referred to as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or “Quad”) to enhance and implement a shared vision to meet regional challenges and to promote a free, open, inclusive, resilient, and healthy Indo-Pacific, characterized by respect for democratic norms, rule of law, and market-driven economic growth, and that is free from undue influence and coercion;

(2) the United States should expand dialogue and cooperation through the Quad with a range of partners to support the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and territorial integrity, and to uphold peace and prosperity and strengthen democratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific;

(3) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad leaders meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to the economic and health impacts of COVID–19, including expanding safe, affordable, and effective vaccine production and equitable access, and to address shared challenges, including in cyberspace, critical technologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure investment, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as maritime domains, further advances the important cooperation among Quad nations that is so critical to the Indo-Pacific region;

(4) building upon their announced commitment to finance 1,000,000,000 or more COVID–19 vaccines by the end of 2022 for use in the Indo-Pacific region, the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the Japan International Cooperation Agency, and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, including through partnerships other multilateral development banks, should also venture to finance development and infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific region that are competitive, transparent, and sustainable;

(5) the United States should participate in the Resilient Supply Chain Initiative launched by Australia, Japan, and India in 2020, along with similar initiatives that relocate supply chains in the health, economic, and national security sectors to the United States, its Quad partners, and other like-minded countries; and

(6) the formation of a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group could—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy for bolstering engagement and cooperation with the Quad.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(1) IN GENERAL.—At such time as the governments of the Quad countries enter into a written agreement described in subsection (a) to establish a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group, there shall be established a United States Group, which shall represent the United States at the Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group.

(2) MEMBERSHIP.—

(3) MEETINGS.—

(4) CHAIRPERSON AND VICE CHAIRPERSON.—

(5) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

(6) PRIVATE SOURCES.—The United States Group may accept gifts or donations of services or property, subject to the review and approval, as appropriate, of the Committee on Ethics of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Ethics of the Senate.

(7) CERTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES.—The certificate of the chairperson of the delegation from the House of Representatives or the delegation of the Senate of the United States Group shall be final and conclusive upon the accounting officers in the auditing of the accounts of the United States Group.

(8) ANNUAL REPORT.—The United States Group shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report for each fiscal year for which an appropriation is made for the United States Group, including a description of its expenditures under such appropriation.

(A) to cease any current activities, and avoid undertaking any actions in the future, that undermine stability, or complicate or escalate disputes through the use of coercion, intimidation, or military force;

(B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals, and other features, and refrain from new efforts to militarize, including the construction of new garrisons and facilities and the relocation of additional military personnel, material, or equipment;

(C) to oppose actions by any country that prevent other countries from exercising their sovereign rights to the resources in their exclusive economic zones and continental shelves by enforcing claims to those areas in the South China Sea that lack support in international law; and

(D) to oppose unilateral declarations of administrative and military districts in contested areas in the South China Sea;

(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in the Department of State the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative (“YSEALI”) program.

(2) GOALS.—The YSEALI program shall seek to build to capacity of young leaders in Southeast Asia to—

(3) YSEALI PROGRAMS.—

(4) ACTIVITIES.—

(5) REPORTS.—

(6) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) to support the close economic, political, and security relationship between Taiwan and the United States and recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the approach to the United States Indo-Pacific;

(2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its democracy a vital national security interest of the United States;

(3) to reinforce all existing United States Government commitments to Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8), the three joint communiques, and the “Six Assurances”;

(4) to support Taiwan’s implementation of its asymmetric defense strategy, including the priorities identified in Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept;

(5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense spending in order to fully resource its defense strategy;

(6) to conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop and integrate asymmetric capabilities, such as anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and resilient command and control capabilities, into its military forces;

(7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations, including the World Health Assembly, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization, and other international bodies as appropriate;

(8) to advocate for information sharing with Taiwan in the International Agency for Research on Cancer;

(9) to promote meaningful cooperation among the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded partners;

(10) to enhance bilateral trade, including potentially through new agreements or resumption of talks under the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement;

(11) to actively engage in trade talks in pursuance of a bilateral free trade agreement;

(12) to expand bilateral economic and technological cooperation, including improving supply chain security;

(13) to support United States educational and exchange programs with Taiwan, including by promoting the study of Chinese language, culture, history, and politics in Taiwan; and

(14) to expand people-to-people exchanges between the United States and Taiwan.

(1) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN CULTURAL EXCHANGE FOUNDATION.—The Secretary of State should consider establishing an independent nonprofit entity that—

(2) PARTNER.—State and local school districts and educational institutions, including public universities, in the United States are encouraged to partner with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States to establish programs to promote an increase in educational and cultural exchanges.

(1) Pursuant to the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301(b)(1)), it is the policy of the United States to “promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan”.

(2) In May 2019, the Taiwanese counterpart to the American Institute in Taiwan, the Coordination Council for North American Affairs, was renamed the “Taiwan Council for U.S. Affairs”.

(3) It is the policy of the United States to refer to Taiwan as “Taiwan”, not “Taipei” or “Chinese Taipei”.

(4) The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office is inaptly named as it works to cultivate the extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people, organizations, and enterprises of Taiwan, not merely those in Taipei.

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(2) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION.—The term “international organization” includes United Nations funds, programs, specialized agencies, entities, and bodies, as well as other organizations outside of the United Nations system that the Secretary of State determines appropriate, in consultation with other relevant Federal departments and agencies.

(3) ONE-CHINA PRINCIPLE.—The term “One-China Principle” means only the PRC’s policy toward Taiwan.

(4) CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS.—The term “civil society organizations” means international civil society organizations that are critical to maintaining Taiwan’s international space and enabling Taiwan to play a positive and constructive role in the global community.

(5) POTENTIAL PLA CAMPAIGNS.—The term “potential PLA campaigns” means—

(1) The United States has consistently sought to advance peace and stability in East Asia as a central element of United States foreign policy toward the region.

(2) The Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), especially since the election of Tsai Ing-Wen in 2016, has conducted a coordinated campaign to weaken Taiwan diplomatically, economically, and militarily in a manner that threatens to erode United States policy and create a fait accompli on questions surrounding Taiwan’s future.

(3) In order to ensure the longevity of United States policy and preserve the ability of the people of Taiwan to determine their future independently, it is necessary to reinforce Taiwan’s diplomatic, economic, and physical space.

(4) Taiwan has provided monetary, humanitarian, and medical assistance to combat diseases such as AIDS, tuberculosis, Ebola, and dengue fever in countries around the world. During the COVID–19 pandemic, Taiwan donated millions of pieces of personal protective equipment and COVID–19 tests to countries in need.

(5) Since 2016, the Gambia, São Tomé and Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and Kiribati have severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favor of diplomatic relations with China.

(6) Taiwan was invited to participate in the World Health Assembly (WHA), the decision-making body of the World Health Organization, as an observer annually between 2009 and 2016. Since the 2016 election of President Tsai, the PRC has increasingly resisted Taiwan’s participation in the WHA. Taiwan was not invited to attend the WHA in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, or 2021.

(7) The Taipei Flight Information Region reportedly served 1,750,000 flights and 68,900,000 passengers in 2018 and is home to Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport, the 11th busiest airport in the world. Taiwan has been excluded from participating at the International Civil Aviation Organization since 2013.

(8) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971) does not address the issue of representation of Taiwan and its people at the United Nations, nor does it give the PRC the right to represent the people on Taiwan.

(1) maintain the position that peace and stability in the Western Pacific are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern; and

(2) work with allies and partners to promote peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and deter military acts or other forms of coercive behavior that would undermine regional stability.

(1) Taiwan is free, democratic, and prosperous, is home to 23,500,000 people, and is an important contributor to the global community;

(2) multiple United States Government Administrations have taken important steps to advance Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations and to enhance cooperation with Taiwan to provide global public goods, including through development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief in trilateral and multilateral fora;

(3) nonetheless, significant structural, policy, and legal barriers remain to advancing Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the international community; and

(4) efforts to share Taiwan’s expertise with other parts of the global community could be further enhanced through a systematic approach, along with greater attention from Congress and the American public to such efforts.

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of State, in consultation with other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy—

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall include—

(3) FORM.—The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified form but may include an unclassified summary.

(4) CONSULTATION.—The Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) IN GENERAL.—No later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), in consultation with the United States International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on cooperation with Taiwan on trilateral and multilateral development initiatives, through the American Institute in Taiwan as appropriate.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required in paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(3) FORM.—The strategy required in paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

(1) expanding United States economic relations with Taiwan has benefited the people of both the United States and Taiwan; and

(2) the United States should explore opportunities to deepen, and where possible expand, economic ties between Taiwan and the United States, through dialogue, and by developing the legal templates required to support potential future agreements.

(1) PRC attempts to intimidate Taiwan, including through high rates of PRC sorties into air space near Taiwan, and PRC amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan, jeopardizes the long-standing United States position that differences in cross-Strait relations must be resolved peacefully;

(2) given the potential for a cross-Strait conflict to be highly destructive and destabilizing, any increase in the risk of conflict demands attention and obligates leaders to reinforce deterrence, as the most viable means to prevent war;

(3) Taiwan should continue to implement its asymmetric defense strategy, including investing in cost-effective and resilient capabilities, while also strengthening recruitment and training of its reserve and civil defense forces, and those capabilities include, but are not limited to, coastal defense cruise missiles; and

(4) while enhancing deterrence, it is also essential to maintain open and effective crisis communication and risk reduction mechanisms, as a means to reduce the risk of misunderstanding and ultimately, conflict.

(1) IN GENERAL.—No later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a whole-of-government strategy to enhance deterrence over a cross-Strait military conflict between the PRC and Taiwan.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy shall include the following:

(3) FORM.—The strategy required in paragraph (1) shall be submitted classified form but may include an unclassified annex.

(4) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than every 180 days thereafter for 7 years, the President (or a designee), as well as representatives from the agencies and departments involved in developing the strategy required in paragraph (1), shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees regarding the development and implementation of the strategy required in this subsection. The representatives from the relevant agencies and departments shall be at the Under Secretary level or above.

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall present to the appropriate congressional committees a plan for strengthening the community of civilian defense professionals in Taiwan, facilitated through the American Institute in Taiwan as appropriate.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The plan required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(3) FORM.—The plan required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

“(10) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971) established the representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations. The resolution did not address the issue of representation of Taiwan and its people in the United Nations or any related organizations, nor did the resolution take a position on the relationship between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan or include any statement pertaining to Taiwan’s sovereignty.

“(11) The United States opposes any initiative that seeks to change Taiwan’s status without the consent of the people.”.

(1) in paragraph (2), by striking “and” after the semicolon at the end;

(2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

(1) in paragraph (2), by striking “and” after the semicolon at the end;

(2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (b) of section 5 of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (relating to strengthening ties with Taiwan) is amended by inserting before the period at the end the following: “, as well as information relating to any prior or ongoing attempts by the People’s Republic of China to undermine Taiwan’s membership or observer status in all organizations described in section (4)(1) and Taiwan’s ties and relationships with other countries in accordance with subsection (a) of this section”.

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and apply beginning with the first report required under subsection (b) of section 5 of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019, as amended by paragraph (1), that is required after such date.

(1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(2) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this section are—

(1) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(2) ESTABLISHMENT OF TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.—

(3) PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.—

(4) TAIWAN FELLOWS ON DETAIL FROM GOVERNMENT SERVICE.—

(5) GAO REPORT.—Not later than one year before the sunset of the Program pursuant to paragraph (2)(F), the Comptroller General of the United States shall transmit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that includes the following:

(6) FUNDING.—

(1) In fiscal year 2020, the Department of State allocated $1,500,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific region in bilateral and regional foreign assistance resources, including as authorized by section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409; 132 Stat. 5391), and $798,000,000 in the fiscal year 2020 diplomatic engagement budget. These amounts represent only 5 percent of the diplomatic engagement budget and only 4 percent of the total Department of State-USAID budget.

(2) Over the last 5 years the diplomatic engagement budget and personnel levels in the Indo-Pacific averaged only 5 percent of the total, while foreign assistance resources averaged only 4 percent of the total.

(3) In 2020, the Department of State began a process to realign certain positions at posts to ensure that its personnel footprint matches the demands of great-power competition, including in the Indo-Pacific.

(1) the size of the United States diplomatic corps must be sufficient to meet the current and emerging challenges of the 21st century, including those in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere;

(2) robust Chinese-language skills are necessary for the success of the United States diplomatic corps and integral to its ability to meet national security objectives;

(3) the increase must be designed to meet the objectives of an Indo-Pacific strategy focused on strengthening the good governance and sovereignty of countries that adhere to and uphold the rules-based international order; and

(4) the increase must be implemented with a focus on increased numbers of economic, political, and public diplomacy officers, representing a cumulative increase of at least 200 Foreign Service officer generalists, to—

(1) ensure Department of State funding levels and personnel footprint in the Indo-Pacific reflect the region’s high degree of importance and significance to United States political, economic, and security interests; and

(2) increase diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance funding and the quantity of personnel dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region respective to the Department of State’s total budget.

(1) Identification of requirements to advance United States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific and the personnel and budgetary resources for the Department of State needed to satisfy such objectives, assuming an unconstrained resource environment.

(2) A plan to increase the portion of the Department’s budget dedicated to the Indo-Pacific in terms of DE and FA focused on development, economic, and security assistance.

(3) A plan to increase the number of positions at posts in the Indo-Pacific region and bureaus with responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including a description of increases at each post or bureau, a breakdown of increases by cone, and a description of how such increases in personnel will advance United States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.

(4) A plan to increase the number of Chinese-language speakers and translation specialists at posts in the Indo-Pacific region and within bureau offices with responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including in INR.

(5) A description of any staffing or other training or personnel reforms that may be required to quickly increase departmental capacity to address the inter-disciplinary, interconnected opportunities and challenges presented in the Indo-Pacific, including but not limited to issues related to climate change, public health, supply chains, cybersecurity, and digital technology issues.

(6) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks that the Department will meet in implementing the action plan.

(7) A description of any barriers to implementing the action plan and recommendations to address these barriers, noting whether additional authorities or resources from Congress is needed to address these barriers.

(1) a description of United States Government efforts to gain a commitment from the Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to submit unregulated fentanyl precursors such as 4–AP to controls;

(2) a plan for future steps the United States Government will take to urge the PRC to combat illicit fentanyl production and trafficking originating in the PRC;

(3) an assessment of the intersection between illicit fentanyl trafficking originating in China and illicit environmental trade and possible relationships of trade-based money laundering; and

(4) an assessment of the intersection between illicit fentanyl trafficking originating in China and counterfeit medicines and medical supplies in the United States.

“(7) APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL CREDIT REFORM ACT OF 1990.—

(1) in paragraph (5), by striking “and” at the end;

(2) by redesignating paragraph (6) as paragraph (7); and

(3) by inserting after paragraph (5) the following:

(1) a plan to expand the Corporation’s financing to support United States national security and development priorities in critical regions; and

(2) the budgetary, staffing, and programmatic resources that would be required in order to carry out the plan required by this subsection.

(1) Manufacturing Stringent Regulatory Authorization (SRA) or World Health Organization (WHO) Emergency Use Listing COVID–19 vaccines.

(2) Manufacturing SRA or WHO Emergency Use Listing therapeutics used to treat symptoms related to COVID–19.

(3) Manufacturing critical medical supplies needed for preventing, detecting and treating COVID–19, including ventilators, personal protective equipment, oxygen, diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines.

(1) outlining the countries where DFC financing could be most impactful for vaccine manufacturing and to achieve the goal of manufacturing 1 billion COVID–19 vaccines by 2022;

(2) including a detailed explanation of the United States and partner country interests served by the United States providing support to such projects;

(3) including a detailed description of any support provided by other United States allies and partners to expand the initiatives outlined in subsection (a); and

(4) including a detailed description of any support provided by the People’s Republic of China in support of the initiatives outlined in subsection (a).

(1) not less than $50,000,000 shall be directed to a grant to Radio Free Asia language services;

(2) not less than $20,000,000 shall be made available to serve populations in China through Mandarin, Cantonese, Uyghur, and Tibetan language services; and

(3) not less than $5,500,000 shall be made available for digital media services—

(1) it is critical to understand the origins of the COVID–19 pandemic so the United States can better prepare, prevent, and respond to pandemic health threats in the future;

(2) given the impact of the COVID–19 pandemic on all Americans, the American people deserve to know what information the United States Government possesses about the origins of COVID–19, as appropriate;

(3) it is critical for independent experts to have full access to all pertinent human, animal, and environmental data, biological sample, research, and personnel involved in the early stages of the outbreak relevant to determining how this pandemic emerged;

(4) Congress shares the concerns expressed by the United States Government and 13 other foreign governments that the international team of experts dispatched to the People’s Republic of China by the World Health Organization (WHO) to study the origins of the SARS–CoV–2 virus was “significantly delayed and lacked access to complete, original data and samples”;

(5) the March 30, 2021, statement by the Director-General of the WHO, Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, further affirms that the investigative team had encountered “difficulties” in accessing necessary raw data, that “we have not yet found the source of the virus”, and that “all hypotheses remain on the table”;

(6) the G7 communique expressing support for full implementation of the International Health Regulations, including “a timely, transparent, expert-led, and science-based WHO-convened Phase 2 COVID–19 Origins study including, as recommended by the experts’ report, in China” is a valuable commitment by the United States and its allies to investigating the origins of COVID–19 in order to better prepare for future pandemics; and

(7) Congress supports the effort announced by President Biden, directing the intelligence community to conduct a 90 day review to further analyze information pointing to the origins of COVID–19.

(1) an assessment of the most likely source or origin of the SARS–CoV–2 virus, including a detailed review of all information the United States possesses that it has identified as potentially relevant to the source or origin of the SARS–CoV–2 virus, including zoonotic transmission and spillover, or other sources of origin, transmission, or spillover, based on the information the United States Government has to date;

(2) its level of confidence in its assessment; and

(3) challenges identified to its ability to make such an assessment.

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions of the Senate;

(4) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate;

(5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(6) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(7) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.

(1) the Indo-Pacific region is home to many of the world’s most dynamic democracies, economic opportunities, as well as many challenges to United States interests and values as a result of the growth in authoritarian governance in the region and by broad challenges posed by nuclear proliferation, the changing environment, and deteriorating adherence to human rights principles and obligations;

(2) the People’s Republic of China poses a particular threat as it repeatedly violates internationally recognized human rights, engages in unfair economic and trade practices, disregards international laws and norms, coerces its neighbors, engages in malign influence operations, and enables global digital authoritarianism;

(3) the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (“ARIA”) enhances the United States’ commitment in the Indo-Pacific region by—

(4) the 2019 Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report concludes that ARIA “enshrines a generational whole-of-government policy framework that demonstrates U.S. commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region”.

(1) in section 201(b), by striking “$1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023” and inserting “$2,000,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026”;

(2) in section 215(b), by striking “2023” and inserting “2026”;

(3) in section 306(a)—

(4) in section 409(a)(1), by striking “2023” and inserting “2026”;

(5) in section 410—

(6) in section 411, by striking “2023” and inserting “2026”.

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish United States strategies to promote, facilitate, and increase trade and investment and development in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.

(2) FOCUS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall focus on increasing two-way trade and investment with Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean by 200 percent in real dollar value by the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(3) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—

(1) summarizes and evaluates the implementation of United States diplomatic efforts and foreign assistance programs, projects, and activities to advance the policy objectives set forth in subsection (a)(2);

(2) describes the nature and extent of the coordination among the relevant Federal departments and agencies, including summary of activities and engagements of the Economic Diplomacy Action Group; and

(3) describes the monitoring and evaluation tools, mechanisms, and indicators to assess progress made on the policy objectives of this section.

(1) oversee the development and implementation of the strategies required by subsection (a); and

(2) coordinate developing and implementing the strategy with the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the Office of Management and Budget, and the relevant departments and agencies.

(1) to standardize the training received by United States and Foreign Commercial Service officers, economic officers of the Department of State, and economic officers of the United States Agency for International Development with respect to the programs and procedures of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the Small Business Administration, and the United States Trade and Development Agency; and

(2) to ensure that—

(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Administrator of USAID shall, in consultation with the Executive Directors and relevant department and agencies, establish an interoperable digital platform maintained by the staff of the Executive Directors to—

(2) COORDINATION.—The Executive Directors shall coordinate regularly with the leadership of relevant Federal department and agencies to—

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(2) RELEVANT FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.—The term “relevant Federal departments and agencies” includes—

(3) EARLY-STAGE LEAD.—The term “early-stage lead” means a prospective transaction which is being evaluated by DFC staff, prior to DFC holding an internal screening meeting or accepting an application.

(4) TWO-WAY TRADE AND INVESTMENT.—The term “two-way trade and investment” means United States exports to Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, United States public and private investment in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, exports from Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean to the United States, and Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean investment in the United States.

(1) monitor and combat Chinese malign influence across economic and political sectors in foreign countries; and

(2) augment the capacity of United States Government engagement with foreign countries and regional and international economic and political organizations and institutions relating to policy coordination regarding China and such Chinese malign influence.

(1) as a substitute to Confucius Institutes, the United States Government should invest heavily into alternative programs and institutions that ensure there remains a robust pipeline of Americans learning China’s many languages; and

(2) in a 21st century that will be dominated by a strategic competition between the United States and China, it is in the national security interests of the United States to ensure that Americans continue to invest in Chinese language skills, as well as Tibetan, Uyghur, and Mongolian languages, while ensuring they can do so in a context free of malign political influence from foreign state actors.

(1) be designed to advance the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States, as determined by the Secretary of State;

(2) favor funding mechanisms that can maximize the total number of United States persons given the opportunity to acquire full conversational linguistic proficiency in Mandarin and Cantonese Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, and other contemporary spoken languages of China;

(3) favor funding mechanisms that provide opportunities for such language study to areas traditionally under-served by such opportunities;

(4) be shaped by an ongoing consultative process taking into account design inputs of—

(5) favor opportunities to fund the study of Mandarin and Cantonese Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, and other contemporary spoken languages of China at Alaska Native-serving institutions, Asian American and Native American Pacific Islander-serving institutions, Hispanic-serving institutions, historically Black college or universities, Native American-serving nontribal institutions, Native Hawaiian-serving institutions, Predominantly Black institutions, Tribal Colleges or Universities.

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of appropriate Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report detailing activities and disbursements made to carry out this Act over the immediately preceding academic year.

(2) REPORT CONTENTS.—Each report required under paragraph (1) shall include details on—

(1) ALASKA NATIVE-SERVING INSTITUTION.—The term “Alaska Native-serving institution” has the meaning given such term in section 317(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059d(b)).

(2) ASIAN AMERICAN AND NATIVE AMERICAN PACIFIC ISLANDER-SERVING INSTITUTION.—The term “Asian American and Native American Pacific Islander-serving institution” has the meaning given such term in section 371(c) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(c)).

(3) HISPANIC-SERVING INSTITUTION.—The term “Hispanic-serving institution” has the meaning given such term in section 502 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1101a).

(4) HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY.—The term “historically Black college or university” means a part B institution described in section 322(2) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (22 U.S.C. 1061(2)).

(5) NATIVE AMERICAN-SERVING NONTRIBAL INSTITUTION.—The term “Native American-serving nontribal institution” has the meaning given such term in section 371(c) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(c)).

(6) NATIVE HAWAIIAN-SERVING INSTITUTION.—The term “Native Hawaiian-serving institution” has the meaning given such term in section 317(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059d(b)).

(7) PREDOMINANTLY BLACK INSTITUTION.—The term “Predominantly Black institution” has the meaning given such term in section 371(c) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(c)).

(8) TRIBAL COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY.—The term “Tribal College or University” has the meaning given such term in section 316(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059c(b)).

(1) shall be meaningfully leveraged in a manner that incentivizes other public and private donor contributions; and

(2) shall be subject to the reporting and withholding requirements under subsections (c), (d)(4)(A)(ii), (d)(4)(C), (d)(5), (d)(6), (f), and (g) of section 202 of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7622).