(a) Short title.—This Act may be cited as the “Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act” or the “EAGLE Act”.

(b) Table of contents.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Statement of policy.
Sec. 4. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 5. Rules of construction.

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—Unless otherwise defined, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(2) CCP.—The term “CCP” means the Chinese Communist Party.

(3) PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY; PLA.—The terms “People’s Liberation Army” and “PLA” mean the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China.

(4) PRC; CHINA.—The terms “PRC” and “China” mean the People’s Republic of China.

(a) Objectives.—It is the policy of the United States to pursue the following objectives:

(1) The United States global leadership role is sustained and its political system and major foundations of national power are secured for the long-term in the political, economic, technological, and military domains.

(2) The United States position as an indispensable power in the Indo-Pacific and globally is sustained through diplomacy, multilateralism, and engagement.

(3) The United States deters military confrontation with the PRC and both nations work to reduce the risk of conflict.

(4) The United States and its allies maintain a stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific with China. The United States and its allies maintain unfettered access to the region, including through freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce, consistent with international law and practice.

(5) The allies and partners of the United States—

(A) maintain confidence in United States leadership and its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region;

(B) can withstand and combat subversion by the PRC; and

(C) work closely with the United States in setting global rules, norms, and standards that benefit the international community.

(6) The combined weight of the United States and its allies and partners is strong enough to demonstrate to the PRC that the risks of attempts to dominate other states outweigh the potential benefits.

(7) The United States leads the free and open international order, which comprises resilient states and institutions that uphold and defend principles, such as sovereignty, rule of law, individual freedom, and human rights. The international order is strengthened to withstand attempts at destabilization by illiberal and authoritarian actors.

(8) The key rules, norms, and standards of international engagement in the 21st century are maintained, including—

(A) the protection of human rights, commercial engagement and investment, and technology; and

(B) that such rules, norms, and standards are in alignment with the values and interests of the United States, its allies and partners, and other stakeholders in the liberal international order.

(9) The United States counters attempts by the PRC to—

(A) undermine open and democratic societies;

(B) distort global markets;

(C) manipulate the international trade system;

(D) coerce other nations via economic and military means; or

(E) use its technological advantages to undermine individual freedoms or other states’ national security interests.

(10) The United States deters military confrontation with the PRC and both nations work to reduce the risk of conflict.

(b) Policy.—It is the policy of the United States, in pursuit of the objectives set forth in subsection (a)—

(1) to strengthen the United States domestic foundation by reinvesting in market-based economic growth, education, scientific and technological innovation, democratic institutions, and other areas that improve the ability of the United States to pursue its vital economic, foreign policy, and national security interests;

(2) to maximize the United States strengths in the political, diplomatic, economic, development, military, informational, and technological realms in order to safeguard United States interests and the values of United States allies and partners, and to strengthen incentives for the PRC to collaborate in addressing common global and regional challenges;

(3) to lead a free, open, and secure international system characterized by the rule of law, open markets and the free flow of commerce, and a shared commitment to security and peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights, good and transparent governance, and freedom from coercion;

(4) to strengthen and deepen United States alliances and partnerships by pursuing greater bilateral and multilateral cooperative initiatives that advance shared interests and values and bolster partner countries’ confidence that the United States is and will remain a strong, committed, and reliable partner that respects the views and interests of its allies and friends;

(5) to encourage and collaborate with United States allies and partners in boosting their own capabilities and resiliency to pursue, defend, and protect shared interests and values, free from coercion and external pressure;

(6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and healthy, constructive competition in United States-China economic relations by—

(A) advancing policies that harden the United States economy against unfair and illegal commercial or trading practices and the coercion of United States businesses; and

(B) improving United States laws and regulations as necessary to prevent any PRC attempts to harm United States economic competitiveness;

(7) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led growth in emerging markets around the world, including through the use of United States Government tools that—

(A) support greater private sector investment and advance capacity-building initiatives that are grounded in the rule of law;

(B) promote open markets;

(C) establish clear policy and regulatory frameworks;

(D) improve the management of key economic sectors;

(E) combat corruption; and

(F) foster and support greater collaboration with and among partner countries and the United States private sector to develop secure and sustainable infrastructure;

(8) to play a leading role in advancing international rules and norms that foster free and reciprocal trade and open and integrated markets;

(9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in support of United States companies and businesses in partner countries that seek fair competition;

(10) to ensure that the United States is second to none in the innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such as next-generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, and biotechnology, by—

(A) providing necessary investment and concrete incentives for the private sector to accelerate development of such technologies;

(B) modernizing export controls and investment screening regimes and associated policies and regulations;

(C) enhancing the role of the United States in technical standards-setting bodies and avenues for developing norms regarding the use of emerging critical technologies;

(D) reducing United States barriers and increasing incentives for collaboration with allies and partners on the research and co-development of critical technologies;

(E) collaborating with allies and partners to protect critical technologies by—

(i) coordinating and aligning export control measures;

(ii) building capacity for defense technology security;

(iii) safeguarding chokepoints in strategically critical supply chains; and

(iv) ensuring diversification; and

(F) designing major defense capabilities for export to vetted allies and partners;

(11) to collaborate with like-minded democracies and other willing partners to promote ideals and principles that—

(A) advance a free and open international order;

(B) strengthen democratic institutions;

(C) protect and promote human rights; and

(D) uphold a free press and fact-based reporting;

(12) to develop comprehensive strategies and policies to counter PRC disinformation campaigns;

(13) to demonstrate effective leadership at the United Nations, its associated agencies, and other multilateral organizations and ensure the integrity and effectiveness of these organizations in facilitating solutions to global challenges;

(14) to advocate for the defense of fundamental freedoms and human rights in the United States relationship with the PRC;

(15) to cooperate with allies, partners, and multilateral organizations that sustain and strengthen a free and open order and address regional and global challenges posed by the Government of the PRC regarding—

(A) violations and abuses of human rights;

(B) restrictions on religious practices; and

(C) the undermining and abrogation of treaties, other international agreements, and other international norms related to human rights;

(16) to expose the PRC’s use of corruption, repression, and coercion to attain unfair economic advantages or compel other nations to defer to its political and strategic objectives in ways that threaten the United States or its allies and partners;

(17) to maintain United States access to the Western Pacific, including through necessary investments in United States military capabilities, policies, and concepts in the Indo-Pacific, as well as robust cooperation, exercises, and interoperability with allies and partners;

(18) to deter the PRC from—

(A) initiating armed conflict;

(B) coercing nations; or

(C) using malign grey-zone tactics to achieve national goals;

(19) to attempt to strengthen United States-PRC military-to-military communication and improve both military and civilian crisis avoidance and management procedures to de-conflict operations and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict; and

(20) to strengthen stability and reduce suspicions, cooperate with the PRC when interests align, including through bilateral or multilateral means and at the United Nations, as appropriate, and especially in the following areas—

(A) global fight against climate change;

(B) nuclear security; and

(C) global financial stability.

It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the policy described in section 3(b) requires the following actions:

(1) Revitalizing American leadership globally and in the Indo-Pacific will require the United States—

(A) to marshal sustained political will to protect its vital interests, promote its values, and advance its economic and national security objectives; and

(B) to achieve this sustained political will, persuade the American people and United States allies and partners of—

(i) the current challenges facing the international rules based order; and

(ii) the need for long-term investments and engagement to defend shared interests and values.

(2) The United States must coordinate closely with allies and partners to compete effectively with the PRC, including to encourage allies and partners to assume, as appropriate, greater roles in balancing and checking aggressive PRC behavior.

(3) Effective United States strategy toward China requires—

(A) bipartisan cooperation within Congress; and

(B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful collaboration and consultation between the executive branch and Congress.

(4) The United States must ensure close integration among economic and foreign policymakers and provide support to the private sector, civil society, universities and academic institutions, and other relevant actors in free and open societies to enable such actors—

(A) to collaborate to advance common interests; and

(B) to identify appropriate policies—

(i) to strengthen the United States and its allies; and

(ii) to promote a compelling vision of a free and open order.

(5) The United States must ensure that all Federal departments, agencies, and overseas missions are organized and resourced to effectively defend and advance United States interests, by—

(A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo-Pacific region, at posts around the world, and in Washington, DC;

(B) placing greater numbers of foreign service officers, international development professionals, members of the foreign commercial service, intelligence professionals, and other United States Government personnel in the Indo-Pacific region; and

(C) ensuring that this workforce has the training, demonstrated proficiency in language and culture, technical skills, and other competencies required to advance a successful strategy in relation to the PRC.

(6) The United States must place renewed priority and emphasis on strengthening the nonmilitary instruments of national power, including diplomacy, information, technology, economics, foreign assistance and development finance, commerce, intelligence, and law enforcement, which are crucial for addressing the challenges posed by the PRC.

(7) The United States must sustain military capabilities necessary to achieve United States political objectives in the Indo-Pacific, including—

(A) promoting regional security in the Indo-Pacific;

(B) reassuring allies and partners while protecting them from coercion; and

(C) deterring PRC aggression and preventing unwanted conflict.

(8) Competition with the PRC requires skillful adaptation to the information environment of the 21st century. United States public diplomacy and messaging efforts must effectively—

(A) promote the value of partnership with the United States; and

(B) counter CCP propaganda and disinformation that threatens United States interests.

(a) Applicability of existing restrictions on assistance to foreign security forces.—Nothing in this Act shall be construed to diminish, supplant, supersede, or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities of the United States Government under section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) or section 362 of title 10, United States Code.

(b) No authorization for the use of military force.—Nothing in this Act may be construed as authorizing the use of military force.

(a) Authorization To contract services.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized to establish a program to facilitate the contracting by the Department of State for the professional services of qualified experts, on a reimbursable fee for service basis, to assist interested United States persons and business entities with supply chain management issues related to the PRC, including—

(1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating certain production facilities to locations outside the PRC;

(2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other efforts to diversify supply chains to locations outside of the PRC;

(3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other challenges in the course of the activities described in paragraphs (1) and (2); and

(4) identifying alternative markets for production or sourcing outside of the PRC, including through providing market intelligence, facilitating contact with reliable local partners as appropriate, and other services.

(b) Chief of mission oversight.—The persons hired to perform the services described in subsection (a) shall—

(1) be under the authority of the United States Chief of Mission in the country in which they are hired, in accordance with existing United States laws;

(2) coordinate with Department of State and Department of Commerce officers; and

(3) coordinate with United States missions and relevant local partners in other countries as needed to carry out the services described in subsection (a).

(c) Prioritization of micro-, small-, and medium-Sized enterprises.—The services described in subsection (a) shall be prioritized for assisting micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises with regard to the matters described in subsection (a).

(d) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated $15,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the purposes of carrying out this section.

(e) Prohibition on access to assistance by foreign adversaries.—None of the funds appropriated pursuant to this section may be provided to an entity—

(1) under the foreign ownership, control, or influence of the Government of the People’s Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party, or other foreign adversary;

(2) determined to have beneficial ownership from foreign individuals subject to the jurisdiction, direction, or influence of foreign adversaries; and

(3) that has any contract in effect at the time of the receipt of such funds, or has had a contract within the previous one year that is no longer in effect, with—

(A) the Government of the People’s Republic of China;

(B) the Chinese Communist Party;

(C) the Chinese military;

(D) an entity majority-owned, majority-controlled, or majority-financed by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the CCP, or the Chinese military; or

(E) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of an entity described in subparagraph (D).

(f) Definitions.—The terms “foreign ownership, control, or influence” and “FOCI” have the meanings given to those terms in the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22–M), or a successor document.

In this subtitle, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should initiate collaboration among governments, the private sector, and civil society to encourage the adoption of the standards for quality global infrastructure development advanced by the G20 at Osaka in 2018, including with respect to the following issues:

(1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in which infrastructure investments are made.

(2) Anti-corruption.

(3) Rule of law.

(4) Human rights and labor rights.

(5) Fiscal and debt sustainability.

(6) Social and governance safeguards.

(7) Transparency.

(8) Environmental and energy standards.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should launch a series of fora around the world showcasing the commitment of the United States and partners of the United States to high-quality development cooperation, including with respect to the issues described in subsection (a).

(a) Findings.—It is in the national interest of the United States to establish a coordinated interagency strategy to marshal the resources of the United States Government to provide foreign countries with financing that strengthens independent economic capacity and therefore reduce a foreign government’s need to enter into agreements with China, including support from its Belt and Road Initiative.

(b) Strategy.—

(1) AUTHORITY.—Within 180 days of enactment of this Act, the President should develop and submit a strategy to the relevant congressional committees to utilize the resources of Federal agencies to counteract offers of assistance and financing from China to foreign governments that are of strategic importance to the United States.

(2) COMPONENTS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy should—

(A) identify primary sectors where the United States could provide a competitive advantage to increase a country’s economic independence;

(B) select countries with corresponding economic needs, with priority given to those who are vulnerable to Chinese economic influence;

(C) identify any corresponding existing financing available from United States Government entities to prioritize and devise specific financing tailored to the needs of such foreign governments if none are currently available;

(D) identify any cooperative and complementary assistance and financing from friendly foreign governments, including coordinated assistance and co-financing;

(E) create a streamlined decision-making process, directed by the National Security Council, to devise financing and make agency decisions and commitments on a timely basis to support United States competitive offers;

(F) establish a formal G7+European Commission Working Group to develop a comprehensive strategy to develop alternatives to the People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road Initiative for development finance; and

(G) integrate existing efforts into the strategy, including efforts to address the Government of the People’s Republic of China’s use of the United Nations to advance the Belt and Road Initiative, including the proliferation of memoranda of understanding between the People’s Republic of China and United Nations funds and programs regarding the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative.

(3) PARTICIPATING AGENCIES.—Participating Federal agencies should include the Department of State, Department of the Treasury, USAID, DFC, MCC, USTDA, Department of Commerce, and other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate.

(4) EXECUTION OF STRATEGY.—The President should issue an Executive order to implement the strategy and make such changes in agency regulations and procedures as are necessary to put the strategy into effect.

(5) RELEVANT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—For the purposes of this subsection, the phrase “relevant congressional committees” shall mean the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the House Committee on Financial Services, and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

(c) Authority.—The Secretary of State in coordination with the USAID Administrator is authorized to establish or continue an initiative, to be known as the “Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network”, under which the Secretary of State, in consultation with other relevant Federal agencies, including those represented on the Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, may carry out various programs to advance the development of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure worldwide in the Indo-Pacific region by—

(1) strengthening capacity-building programs to improve project evaluation processes, regulatory and procurement environments, and project preparation capacity of countries that are partners of the United States in such development;

(2) providing transaction advisory services and project preparation assistance to support sustainable infrastructure; and

(3) coordinating the provision of United States assistance for the development of infrastructure, including infrastructure that utilizes United States manufactured goods and services, and catalyzing investment led by the private sector.

(d) Transaction Advisory Fund.—As part of the “Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network” described under subsection (c), the Secretary of State is authorized to provide support, including through the Transaction Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help boost the capacity of partner countries to evaluate contracts and assess the financial and environmental impacts of potential infrastructure projects, including through providing services such as—

(1) legal services;

(2) project preparation and feasibility studies;

(3) debt sustainability analyses;

(4) bid or proposal evaluation; and

(5) other services relevant to advancing the development of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure.

(e) Strategic Infrastructure Fund.——

(1) IN GENERAL.—As part of the “Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network” described under subsection (c), the Secretary of State is authorized to provide support, including through the Strategic Infrastructure Fund, for technical assistance, project preparation, pipeline development, and other infrastructure project support.

(2) JOINT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.—Funds authorized for the Strategic Infrastructure Fund should be used in coordination with the Department of Defense, the International Development Finance Corporation, like-minded donor partners, and multilateral banks, as appropriate, to support joint infrastructure projects.

(3) STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.—Funds authorized for the Strategic Infrastructure Fund should be used to support strategic infrastructure projects that are in the national security interest of the United States and vulnerable to strategic competitors.

(f) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 to 2026, $75,000,000 to the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network, of which $20,000,000 should be provided for the Transaction Advisory Fund.

(a) In general.—The President shall direct a comprehensive, multi-year, whole of government effort, in consultation with the private sector, to counter predatory lending and financing by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, including support to companies incorporated in the PRC that engage in such activities, in the energy sectors of developing countries.

(b) Policy.—It is the policy of the United States to—

(1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted energy needs and capacities of developing countries, and analyze the presence and involvement of PRC state-owned industries and other companies incorporated in the PRC, Chinese nationals providing labor, and financing of energy projects, including direct financing by the PRC government, PRC financial institutions, or direct state support to state-owned enterprises and other companies incorporated in the PRC;

(2) pursue strategic support and investment opportunities, and diplomatic engagement on power sector reforms, to expand the development and deployment of advanced energy technologies in developing countries;

(3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants, and other financial products on terms that advance domestic economic and local employment opportunities, utilize advanced energy technologies, encourage private sector growth, and, when appropriate United States equity and sovereign lending products as alternatives to the predatory lending tools offered by Chinese financial institutions;

(4) pursue partnerships with likeminded international financial and multilateral institutions to leverage investment in advanced energy technologies in developing countries; and

(5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the cooperative development of advanced energy technologies with countries of strategic significance, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, to address the effects of energy engagement by the PRC through predatory lending or other actions that negatively impact other countries.

(c) Advanced energy technologies exports.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a United States Government strategy to increase United States exports of advanced energy technologies to—

(1) improve energy security in allied and developing countries;

(2) create open, efficient, rules-based, and transparent energy markets;

(3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy trading relationships; and

(4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy.

(a) In general.—No later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that—

(1) identifies priority countries for deepening United States engagement on energy matters, in accordance with the economic and national security interests of the United States and where deeper energy partnerships are most achievable;

(2) describes the involvement of the PRC government and companies incorporated in the PRC in the development, operation, financing, or ownership of energy generation facilities, transmission infrastructure, or energy resources in the countries identified in paragraph (1);

(3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and implications for United States national interests and the interests of the countries identified in paragraph (1), with respect to the PRC’s involvement and influence in developing country energy production or transmission; and

(4) outlines current and planned efforts by the United States to partner with the countries identified in paragraph (1) on energy matters that support shared interests between the United States and such countries.

(b) Publication.—The assessment required in subsection (a) shall be published on the Department of State’s website.

(a) In general.—

(1) When establishing the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), Congress sought to facilitate the participation of private sector capital and skills in the economic development of countries with low- or lower-middle-income economies and countries transitioning from nonmarket to market economies in order to complement United States assistance and foreign policy objectives.

(2) The priority for such support has been and remains intended for less developed countries with a low-income economy or a lower-middle-income economy; however, using income as a discriminator for which countries merit investment will not often capture other important factors, such as the wealth disparity within a country, vulnerability to external shocks including from natural disasters, and United States foreign policy and national security concerns. For this reason, Congress has currently authorized DFC investment in less developed countries with an upper-middle-income economy where the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such support furthers the national economic or foreign policy interests of the United States and such support is designed to produce significant developmental outcomes or provide developmental benefits to the poorest population of that country.

(3) It is the intent of Congress that this flexibility in DFC directed assistance be made available to all countries, including those with so-called high-income economies such as the Bahamas, Barbados, Chile, Trinidad and Tobago, and other allies and partners exceeding the Gross National Income per Capita definition threshold for high-income country. Otherwise, previously eligible partner countries find themselves now ineligible.

(4) The United States already provides a similar national security interest exception for high income countries under the European Energy Security and Diversification Act of 2019, which gives the DFC the authority to work in Europe and Eurasia on energy and energy related investments regardless of the income status of the countries.

(5) While continuing to prioritize DFC investment in low and lower-middle income countries, it is the sense of Congress that the DFC should support investments in certain projects in both upper-middle income and high-income countries that address key national security and economic interests. The DFC is authorized to and should support projects in any country regardless of income status when not doing so would damage the United States interest or those of its allies and partners vis-à-vis its global strategic competitors.

(b) Amendment.—To address the objectives in paragraph (1) above, section 1412 of Public Law 115–254 pertaining to the United States International Development Finance Corporation is amended, replacing the text under section 1412(c) with the following: by striking subsection (c) and inserting the following:

“(c) Support in upper-Middle-Income and high-Income countries/The less developed country focus.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation shall prioritize the provision of support under title II in less developed countries with a low-income economy or a lower-middle-income economy.

“(2) SUPPORT IN UPPER-MIDDLE-INCOME AND HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES.—The Corporation shall restrict the provision of support under title II in countries with an upper-middle-income or high-income economy unless—

“(A) the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such support furthers the national economic, foreign policy, or development interests of the United States; and

“(B) such support is designed to produce significant developmental outcomes or provide developmental benefits to the poorest, marginalized, or equity-disadvantaged population groups of that country.”.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States played a leadership role in constructing the architecture, rules, and norms governing the international economic order following the Second World War, yielding decades of domestic economic and geopolitical prosperity and stability.

(2) In 2017, the United States withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an economic pact that was negotiated by 12 countries that covered 40 percent of the world economy, leading the 11 remaining Asia-Pacific countries to sign the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) the following year, setting high-standard rules for regional economic engagement.

(3) In 2020, the 10 countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations along with South Korea, China, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world’s biggest trade deal in terms of GDP.

(4) Reduced United States economic engagement has led United States allies and partners to question the United States commitment to the Indo-Pacific region. Despite its distortive and unfair trade practices, the People’s Republic of China is taking advantage of this vacuum by deepening its partnerships in the region and promoting its own state-led economic model.

(5) The United States is increasingly on the outside looking in with regards to economic pacts in the Indo-Pacific. United States absence from these agreements puts it at both a strategic and competitive disadvantage in the region and allows competitors to expand their economic influence at the United States expense.

(6) Given that these partnerships and agreements will define the rules and norms that will govern regional commerce over the coming decades, the United States is currently not well positioned to shape the coming economic landscape.

(7) It is in the United States vital interest to upgrade its economic engagement and leadership in the Indo-Pacific and develop concrete steps to strengthen its commercial diplomacy to fully participle in the region’s economic dynamism.

(a) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the Department of Commerce, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes the PRC’s global trade and investment diplomacy and engagement over the past decade, including any bilateral or plurilateral trade and investment agreements it has signed, and their impact on the United States economy, American companies and workers, as well as on the countries that have entered into agreements with the PRC and the global economy as a whole.

(b) Matters To be included.—The report shall include the following:

(1) A Survey and Comparison of China’s international economic practices, which will—

(A) provide an overview of the PRC’s distortive trade policies;

(B) list the PRC’s trade and investment agreements globally, both agreements it has signed or entered into and any ongoing negotiations it has with individual countries or groups of countries;

(C) detail the other mechanisms the PRC uses to advance its international economic objectives, including economic and commercial dialogues and BRI related activities;

(D) compare the United States and Chinese approaches and priorities on trade and investment with major global economies, United States allies, and for each region of the world; and

(E) outline what further steps China may take in the Indo-Pacific region to bolster its economic position and influence.

(2) An evaluation of the impacts of China’s trade and investment policies, including—

(A) the impact of these trade and investment agreements on China’s economy, with a focus on its trade and investment profile, the impact on China’s economic growth and per-capita income; and the impact on the profitability and market share of Chinese companies and SOEs;

(B) the impact of these agreements on China’s political and diplomatic relations with the countries it entered into agreements with and by region; and

(C) the impact of China’s trade and investment relationships with other countries on the market share of United States companies.

(a) Sense of congress.—It is the sense of Congress that United States national interests and the primacy of United States power in the Indo-Pacific are intimately tied to the following economic objectives:

(1) Deepening United States trade and investment relationships in the region, especially with key allies and partners.

(2) Confirming American leadership and participation in global regional economic organizations and fora, including APEC and the WTO.

(3) Leveraging bilateral and plurilateral sectoral agreements on trade and investment, as well as negotiations at the WTO to reassert United States economic leadership by writing the rules of the road on critical economic questions.

(4) Building secure and resilient supply chains for industries critical for United States national interest, including semiconductors and vaccines and PPE.

(5) Showcasing the benefits and appeal of a market-based economic model.

(b) Reporting.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the Department of Commerce, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that presents the steps the United States is taking and plans to take to achieve the objectives outlined in subsection (a) above and includes specific action plans for the following:

(1) Enhancing American trade and investment relationships in the region bilaterally and plurilaterally, especially with American allies and ASEAN.

(2) Reenergizing APEC as a critical component of the region’s economic architecture.

(3) Work to ensure that the United States absence from CPTPP and RCEP do not undermine the United States ability to shape regional trade and investment rules.

(4) Working with allies and partners to build resilient and trusted supply chains especially for critical and emerging technologies, including semiconductors, and products and components critical for national health, including vaccines and related materials, and PPE.

(5) Driving the formation and adoption of high-standards and rules for the region in the following areas:

(A) Advanced technologies and the digital sphere.

(B) Labor practices and environmental standards.

(C) Intellectual property rights.

(6) Developing roadmaps for how to counter the PRC’s unfair trade and economic practices, with a specific focus on—

(A) subsidies and unfair competition by state-owned enterprises; and

(B) corruption and politicized infrastructure.

(c) Appropriate committees of congress defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States has benefitted from the regional economic integration agenda of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum since its inception in 1989;

(2) APEC is a hub of trade and commerce for 21 member economies that, as of 2018, accounted for 60 percent of global GDP and 48 percent of global trade;

(3) APEC has contributed to the reduction in trade barriers, harmonization of regulations, and enhanced access to global value chains, while raising the profile of critical topics such as fair trade, sustainability, gender parity, and inclusive growth;

(4) it is in the United States interest to engage and lead at APEC to push for an open and inclusive regional economy that benefits United States workers, consumers, and businesses and better integrates the United States economy with others in the region;

(5) when the United States last hosted APEC in 2011, it was able to promote United States interests, while reassuring allies and partners about its strong commitment to the region in the economic arena;

(6) today, APEC can again be used as a forum to make progress on several United States priorities, that are shared by United States allies and partners, including—

(A) making regional commerce more inclusive;

(B) fostering innovation and digitization; and

(C) addressing climate change and environmental protection;

(7) hosting APEC would provide a tremendous opportunity to leverage American leadership to shape the regional economic agenda;

(8) hosting APEC would allow the United States to advance several of its own priorities in the region, including to—

(A) expand the participation of APEC stakeholders to include labor groups, environmental advocates, and other part of civil society;

(B) upgrade APEC’s work to empower and promote small and medium enterprises;

(C) spotlight best practices and plans to upgrade skills for the next-generation of technology jobs;

(D) advance a climate and sustainable trade and development agenda with a focus on green technologies, infrastructure and finance; and

(E) advance work on digital trade, including by expanding rules on data privacy, promoting digital inclusiveness and promoting the free flow of data; and

(9) with no host confirmed for 2023, the United States should immediately announce its interest to host APEC in 2023 and work with the APEC Secretariat and like-minded APEC members to build support.

(a) Leadership in international standards setting.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States must lead in international bodies that set the governance norms and rules for critical digitally enabled technologies in order to ensure that these technologies operate within a free, secure, interoperable, and stable digital domain.

(b) Countering digital authoritarianism.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States, along with allies and partners, should lead an international effort that utilizes all of the economic and diplomatic tools at its disposal to combat the expanding use of information and communications technology products and services to surveil, repress, and manipulate populations (also known as “digital authoritarianism”).

(c) Freedom of information in the digital age.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should lead a global effort to ensure that freedom of information, including the ability to safely consume or publish information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained as the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral mechanism for communication.

(d) Efforts To ensure technological development does not threaten democratic governance or human rights.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should lead a global effort to develop and adopt a set of common principles and standards for critical technologies to ensure that the use of such technologies cannot be abused by malign actors, whether they are governments or other entities, and that they do not threaten democratic governance or human rights.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) as the COVID–19 pandemic accelerated our dependence on digital tools, international rules around digital governance and trade have remained largely piecemeal;

(2) the People’s Republic of China is operating under and advancing a set of digital rules that are contrary to United States values and interests, and those of United States allies and partners;

(3) a patchwork of plurilateral, trilateral, and bilateral digital trade agreements, including the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the Singapore-Australia Digital Trade Agreement, and the Singapore-New Zealand-Chile Digital Economy Partnership Agreement have emerged, creating a set of rules that the United States should be driving;

(4) the United States has already underscored the need for such agreements by signing the U.S.-Japan Digital Trade Agreement in October 2019 and including a robust digital trade or e-commerce chapter in the USMCA;

(5) a regional deal on digital governance and trade would allow the United States to unite a group of like-minded economies around common standards and norms, including the principles of openness, inclusiveness, fairness, transparency, and the free flow of data with trust, that are increasingly vital for the global economy;

(6) such an agreement would facilitate the creation of common rules and standards that govern cross-border data flows, the protection of privacy, and cybersecurity at a time of growing digital vulnerabilities for individuals, businesses, and institutions around the world;

(7) such an agreement would facilitate the participation of SMEs in the global economy through trade facilitation measures, including e-marketing, e-invoicing and e-payment; and

(8) the United States Trade Representative, in consultation with the Coordinator for Cyber Diplomacy at the Department of State should negotiate bilateral and plurilateral agreements or arrangements relating to digital trade with the like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region, the European Union, the member countries of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance, and other partners and allies, as appropriate.

(a) Digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnership.—The President is authorized to establish a program, to be known as the “Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership” to help foreign countries—

(1) expand and increase secure Internet access and digital infrastructure in emerging markets;

(2) adopt policies and regulatory positions that foster and encourage open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet, the free flow of data, multi-stakeholder models of internet governance, and pro-competitive and secure information and communications technology (ICT) policies and regulations;

(3) promote exports of United States ICT goods and services and increase United States company market share in target markets;

(4) promote the diversification of ICT goods and supply chain services to be less reliant on PRC imports; and

(5) build cybersecurity capacity, expand interoperability, and promote best practices for a national approach to cybersecurity.

(b) Implementation plan.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an implementation plan for the coming three years to advance the goals identified in subsection (a).

(c) Consultation.—In developing the action plan required by subsection (b), the Secretary of State and USAID Administrator shall consult with—

(1) the appropriate congressional committees;

(2) leaders of the United States industry;

(3) other relevant technology experts, including the Open Technology Fund;

(4) representatives from relevant United States Government agencies; and

(5) representatives from like-minded allies and partners.

(d) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as necessary for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this section.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The People’s Republic of China operates a system of state-owned financial institutions including retail banks, investment banks, asset managers, and insurers which are given favorable treatment under Chinese law while foreign financial institutions have strict restrictions on their ability to operate in China.

(2) On October 24, 2020, Chinese billionaire Jack Ma referred to “pawnshop mentality” of state-owned banks. Shortly thereafter, the initial public offering of his firm Ant Financial was canceled by Chinese regulators.

(3) In order to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the Chinese Government committed to opening the credit card payment business to foreign firms by 2006.

(4) After years of China refusing to open its payment market, the United States brought a case against China before the WTO. In 2012, the WTO mandated China to open its card payment market to global competitors.

(5) Even after the WTO’s ruling, the PRC Government refused to comply with the ruling and maintained a rule that required all yuan-denominated payment cards to utilize China’s Union Pay network. Only in 2020, after the Chinese payment market had grown to $27 trillion, did the PRC Government approve the application of foreign firms to enter the market.

(6) The PRC continues to maintain aggressive capital controls, limiting access to the Chinese market to foreign investors while hamstringing its own citizens ability to control their money.

(7) On November 5, 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that China would launch a technology innovation stock exchange. The Shanghai Stock Exchange STAR Market launched on July 22, 2019.

(8) The PRC Government is pioneering the use a fully digitized yuan, which is set to be the world’s first central bank backed digital currency, and the People’s Bank of China and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority have already begun testing the cross-border functionality of the digital currency.

(a) Sense of congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the dominance of the dollar as the global reserve currency has yielded significant benefits to the United States and the American people by allowing the United States to maintain economic independence, better control its monetary policy, and finance government outlays;

(2) American global leadership has benefited from the United States monetary stability, creditworthiness, deep capital markets, and financial technology innovations;

(3) effective diplomacy and safeguarding of American national security rely on the United States role as the global financial leader, hub of global trade, and source of economic opportunity;

(4) by cracking down on dissent in the key financial center of Hong Kong, driving the creation of a technology focused stock exchange, and pushing forward a Central Bank digital currency, the People’s Republic of China is attempting to become the leading hub of finance in the world; and

(5) the United States must maintain its position as a global financial leader to continue its broader global leadership role around the world.

(b) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that—

(1) lists and examines the benefits to American foreign policy that derive from the United States financial leadership and the dollar’s status as the world’s global reserve currency;

(2) describes the actions taken by the People’s Republic of China that could cement China’s role as the world’s leading financial center;

(3) analyzes the possible impact on American national security and foreign policy were the yuan to supplant the dollar as the world’s leading reserve currency;

(4) outlines how the United States can work diplomatically with allies, partners, and other nations to preserve a financial system that is free, open, and fair; and

(5) identifies steps the United States can take to preserve its status as the world’s leading financial center and maintain the dollar’s position as the global reserve currency.

(c) Appropriate committees of congress defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(2) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives;

(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(4) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.

(a) Report.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes the costs and benefits to the United States posed by the presence of companies incorporated in the PRC that are listed on American stock exchanges or traded over the counter in the form of American depository receipts.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report shall—

(A) identify companies incorporated in the PRC that—

(i) are listed or traded on one or several stock exchanges within the United States, including over-the-counter market and “A Shares” added to indexes and exchange-traded funds out of mainland exchanges in the PRC; and

(ii) based on the factors for consideration described in paragraph (3), have knowingly and materially contributed to—

(I) activities that undermine United States national security;

(II) serious abuses of internationally recognized human rights; or

(III) a substantially increased financial risk exposure for United States-based investors;

(B) describe the activities of the companies identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and their implications for the United States; and

(C) develop policy recommendations for the United States Government, State governments, United States financial institutions, United States equity and debt exchanges, and other relevant stakeholders to address the risks posed by the presence in United States capital markets of the companies identified pursuant to subparagraph (A).

(3) FACTORS FOR INCLUSION OF A COMPANY.—In completing the report under paragraph (1), the President shall consider whether a company identified pursuant to paragraph (2)(A)—

(A) has materially contributed to the development or manufacture, or sold or facilitated procurement by the PLA, of lethal military equipment or component parts of such equipment;

(B) has contributed to the construction and militarization of features in the South China Sea;

(C) has been sanctioned by the United States or has been determined to have conducted business with sanctioned entities;

(D) has engaged in an act or a series of acts of intellectual property theft;

(E) has engaged in corporate or economic espionage;

(F) has contributed to the proliferation of nuclear or missile technology in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions or United States sanctions;

(G) has contributed to the repression of religious and ethnic minorities within the PRC, including in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or Tibet Autonomous Region;

(H) has contributed to the development of technologies that enable censorship directed or directly supported by the Government of the PRC; and

(I) has contributed to other activities or behavior determined to be relevant by the President.

(4) FACTORS FOR MAKING POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS.—In completing the report under paragraph (1), the President shall weigh the national security implications considering the following factors identified pursuant to paragraph (3)—

(A) the possibility that banning or delisting companies from our markets could lead to an outflow of companies to list in the PRC;

(B) the possibility that banning or delisting companies from our markets could impact United States leadership in the asset management industry, particularly vis-à-vis the PRC;

(C) the possibility that banning or delisting companies from our markets could impact the impact the United States status as the world’s leading capital markets center, particularly vis-à-vis the PRC; and

(D) the impact on American foreign policy and national security if United States leadership in capital markets was weakened vis-à-vis the PRC.

(b) Report form.—The report required under subsection (b)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form.

(c) Publication.—The unclassified portion of the report under subsection (b)(1) shall be made accessible to the public online through relevant United States Government websites.

(a) Report.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees on the diplomatic and economic implications of cross-border payment systems.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report shall—

(A) assess the extent to which American diplomacy and global leadership hinge upon the current infrastructure and existing ecosystem of cross-border payment and financial messaging systems;

(B) examine the durability of the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication cooperative;

(C) review and analyze ways in which the Cross Border Interbank Payment Systems (CIPS), cryptocurrencies, and central bank digital currencies could erode this system; and

(D) analyze how changes to global cross-border payment systems could undermine United States national security interests including impacts on the efficacy of sanctions, the countering of terrorist finance, and the enforcement of anti-money laundering provisions.

(b) Report form.—The report required under subsection (a)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form.

(c) Publication.—The unclassified portion of the report under subsection (a)(1) shall be made accessible to the public online through relevant United States Government websites.

In this subtitle, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific provide a unique strategic advantage to the United States and are among the Nation’s most precious assets, enabling the United States to advance its vital national interests, defend its territory, expand its economy through international trade and commerce, establish enduring cooperation with allies while seeking to establish new partnerships, prevent the domination of the Indo-Pacific and its surrounding maritime and air lanes by a hostile power or powers, and deter potential aggressors;

(2) the Governments of the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are critical allies in advancing a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific region and tackling challenges with unity of purpose, and have collaborated to advance specific efforts of shared interest in areas such as defense and security, economic prosperity, infrastructure connectivity, and fundamental freedoms;

(3) the United States greatly values other partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, including with India, Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Vietnam as well as its trilateral and quadrilateral dialogues, and regional architecture such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC), which are essential to further shared interests;

(4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific demands consistent United States and allied commitment to strengthening and advancing alliances so that they are postured to meet these challenges, and will require sustained political will, concrete partnerships, economic, commercial, technological, and security cooperation, consistent and tangible commitments, high-level and extensive consultations on matters of mutual interest, mutual and shared cooperation in the acquisition of key capabilities important to allied defenses, and unified mutual support in the face of political, economic, or military coercion;

(5) fissures in the United States alliance relationships and partnerships benefit United States adversaries and weaken the collective ability to advance shared interests;

(6) the United States must work with allies to prioritize human rights throughout the Indo-Pacific region;

(7) as the report released in August 2020 by the Expert Group of the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS), titled “Climate and Security in the Indo-Asia Pacific” noted, the Indo-Pacific region is one of the regions most vulnerable to climate impacts and as former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment Sherri Goodman, Secretary General of IMCCS, noted, climate shocks act as a threat multiplier in the Indo-Pacific region, increasing humanitarian response costs and impacting security throughout the region as sea levels rise, fishing patterns shift, food insecurity rises, and storms grow stronger and more frequent;

(8) the United State should continue to engage on and deepen cooperation with allies and partners of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, as laid out in the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (Public Law 115–409), in the areas of—

(A) forecasting environmental challenges;

(B) assisting with transnational cooperation on sustainable uses of forest and water resources with the goal of preserving biodiversity and access to safe drinking water;

(C) fisheries and marine resource conservation; and

(D) meeting environmental challenges and developing resilience;

(9) the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, should facilitate a robust interagency Indo-Pacific climate resiliency and adaptation strategy focusing on internal and external actions needed—

(A) to facilitate regional early recovery, risk reduction, and resilience to weather-related impacts on strategic interests of the United States and partners and allies of the United States in the region; and

(B) to address humanitarian and food security impacts of weather-related changes in the region; and

(10) ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led mechanisms remain essential to the evolving institutional architecture of the Indo-Pacific region.

(b) Statement of policy.—It shall be the policy of the United States—

(1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation between and among the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, as appropriate, including through diplomatic engagement, regional development, energy security and development, scientific and health partnerships, educational and cultural exchanges, intelligence-sharing, and other diplomatic and defense-related initiatives;

(2) to uphold the United States multilateral and bilateral treaty obligations, including—

(A) defending Japan consistent with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan, done at Washington, January 19, 1960, and all related and subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of enactment of this Act;

(B) defending the Republic of Korea consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, done at Washington, October 1, 1953, and all related and subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of enactment of this Act;

(C) defending the Philippines consistent with article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, done at Washington, August 30, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of enactment of this Act;

(D) defending Thailand consistent with the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (“Manila Pact”), done at Manila, September 8, 1954, understanding thereto the Thanat-Rusk communique of 1962, and all related and subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of enactment of this Act; and

(E) defending Australia consistent with the Security Treaty Between Australia and the United States of America, done at San Francisco, September 1, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of enactment of this Act;

(3) to strengthen and deepen the United States bilateral and regional partnerships, including with India, Taiwan, ASEAN, and New Zealand;

(4) to cooperate with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand to promote human rights bilaterally and through regional and multilateral fora and pacts; and

(5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation with regional partners, such as Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and India.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) as a Pacific power, the United States should continue to strengthen its cooperation with Australia, India, and Japan, (through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or “Quad”) to enhance and implement a shared vision to meet regional challenges and to promote a free, open, inclusive, resilient, and healthy Indo-Pacific, characterized by respect for democratic norms, rule of law, and market-driven economic growth, and is free from undue influence and coercion;

(2) the United States should expand dialogue and cooperation through the Quad with a range of partners to support the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and territorial integrity, and to uphold peace and prosperity and strengthen democratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific;

(3) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad leaders meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to the economic and health impacts of COVID–19, including expanding safe, affordable, and effective vaccine production and equitable access, and to address shared challenges, including in cyberspace, critical technologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure investment, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as maritime domains, further advances the important cooperation among Quad nations that is so critical to the Indo-Pacific region;

(4) building upon their announced commitment to finance 1,000,000,000 or more COVID–19 vaccines by the end of 2022 for use in the Indo-Pacific region, the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the Japan International Cooperation Agency, and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, including through partnerships other multilateral development banks, should also venture to finance development and infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific region that are competitive, transparent, and sustainable;

(5) the United States should participate in the Resilient Supply Chain Initiative launched by Australia, Japan, and India in 2020, along with similar initiatives that relocate supply chains in the health, economic, and national security sectors to the United States, its Quad partners, and other like-minded countries; and

(6) the formation of a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group could—

(A) sustain and deepen engagement between senior officials of the Quad countries on a full spectrum of issues; and

(B) be modeled on the successful and long-standing bilateral intra-parliamentary groups between the United States and Mexico, Canada, and the United Kingdom, as well as other formal and informal parliamentary exchanges.

(b) Reporting requirement.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall develop and submit a comprehensive strategy for bolstering engagement and cooperation with the Quad and submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees laying out the strategy.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(A) A description of how the United States intends to demonstrate democratic leadership in the Indo-Pacific through quadrilateral engagement with India, Japan, and Australia on shared interests and common challenges.

(B) A summary of—

(i) current and past Quad initiatives across the whole of the United States Government, including to promote broad based and inclusive economic growth, trade, investment, and to advance technology cooperation, energy innovation, climate mitigation and adaptation, physical and digital infrastructure development, education, disaster management, and global health security;

(ii) proposals shared among Quad nations to deepen existing security cooperation, intelligence sharing, economic partnerships, and multilateral coordination; and

(iii) initiatives and agreements undertaken jointly with Quad nations plus other like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific on areas of shared interest.

(C) A description of efforts to jointly—

(i) expand ongoing COVID–19 cooperation to prepare for the next pandemic by focusing on medium-term vaccine and medical supply production and building a broader dialogue on global public health;

(ii) combat economic coercion, deepen regional economic engagement and integration, and strengthen regional rules and standards around trade and investment;

(iii) strengthen climate actions on mitigation, adaptation, resilience, technology, capacity-building, and climate finance;

(iv) facilitate the development of quality infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific through joint financing, investment, technical assistance, and standards setting;

(v) enhance joint maritime security and maritime domain awareness initiatives to protecting the maritime commons and supporting international law and freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific; and

(vi) develop international technology standards and share or co-develop new innovative technologies of the future.

(a) Establishment.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall seek to enter into negotiations with the governments of Japan, Australia, and India (collectively, with the United States, known as the “Quad”) with the goal of reaching a written agreement to establish a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group for the purpose of acting on the recommendations of the Quad Working Groups described in section 203(6) and to facilitate closer cooperation on shared interests and values.

(b) United States Group.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—At such time as the governments of the Quad countries enter into a written agreement described in subsection (a), there shall be established a United States Group, which shall represent the United States at the Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group.

(2) MEMBERSHIP.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The United States Group shall be comprised of not more than 24 Members of Congress.

(B) APPOINTMENT.—Of the Members of Congress appointed to the United States Group under subparagraph (A)—

(i) half shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives from among Members of the House, not less than 4 of whom shall be members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs; and

(ii) half shall be appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate, based on recommendations of the majority leader and minority leader of the Senate, from among Members of the Senate, not less than 4 of whom shall be members of the Committee on Foreign Relations (unless the majority leader and minority leader determine otherwise).

(3) MEETINGS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The United States Group shall seek to meet not less frequently than annually with representatives and appropriate staff of the legislatures of Japan, Australia, and India, and any other country invited by mutual agreement of the Quad countries.

(B) LIMITATION.—A meeting described in subparagraph (A) may be held—

(i) in the United States;

(ii) in another Quad country during periods when Congress is not in session; or

(iii) virtually.

(4) CHAIRPERSON AND VICE CHAIRPERSON.—

(A) HOUSE DELEGATION.—The Speaker of the House of Representatives shall designate the chairperson or vice chairperson of the delegation of the United States Group from the House from among members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

(B) SENATE DELEGATION.—The President pro tempore of the Senate shall designate the chairperson or vice chairperson of the delegation of the United States Group from the Senate from among members of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

(5) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated $1,000,000 for each fiscal year 2022 through 2025 for the United States Group.

(B) DISTRIBUTION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—For each fiscal year for which an appropriation is made for the United States Group, half of the amount appropriated shall be available to the delegation from the House of Representatives and half of the amount shall be available to the delegation from the Senate.

(ii) METHOD OF DISTRIBUTION.—The amounts available to the delegations of the House of Representatives and the Senate under clause (i) shall be disbursed on vouchers to be approved by the chairperson of the delegation from the House of Representatives and the chairperson of the delegation from the Senate, respectively.

(6) PRIVATE SOURCES.—The United States Group may accept gifts or donations of services or property, subject to the review and approval, as appropriate, of the Committee on Ethics of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Ethics of the Senate.

(7) CERTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES.—The certificate of the chairperson of the delegation from the House of Representatives or the delegation of the Senate of the United States Group shall be final and conclusive upon the accounting officers in the auditing of the accounts of the United States Group.

(8) ANNUAL REPORT.—The United States Group shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report for each fiscal year for which an appropriation is made for the United States Group, which shall include a description of its expenditures under such appropriation.

It is the policy of the United States to—

(1) stand with the nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond to COVID–19 and support greater cooperation in building capacity to prepare for and respond to pandemics and other public health challenges;

(2) support high-level United States participation in the annual ASEAN Summit held each year;

(3) reaffirm the importance of United States-ASEAN economic engagement, including the elimination of barriers to cross-border commerce, and support the ASEAN Economic Community’s (AEC) goals, including strong, inclusive, and sustainable long-term economic growth and cooperation with the United States that focuses on innovation and capacity-building efforts in technology, education, disaster management, food security, human rights, and trade facilitation, particularly for ASEAN’s poorest countries;

(4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater integration and unity within the ASEAN community, as well as to foster greater integration and unity with non-ASEAN economic, political, and security partners, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the European Union, and India;

(5) recognize the value of strategic economic initiatives like United States-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrates a commitment to ASEAN and the AEC and builds upon economic relationships in the region;

(6) support ASEAN nations in addressing maritime and territorial disputes in a constructive manner and in pursuing claims through peaceful, diplomatic, and, as necessary, legitimate regional and international arbitration mechanisms, consistent with international law, including through the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea that represents the interests of all parties and promotes peace and stability in the region;

(7) urge all parties involved in the maritime and territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region, including the Government of the People’s Republic of China—

(A) to cease any current activities, and avoid undertaking any actions in the future, that undermine stability, or complicate or escalate disputes through the use of coercion, intimidation, or military force;

(B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals, and other features, and refrain from new efforts to militarize, including the construction of new garrisons and facilities and the relocation of additional military personnel, material, or equipment;

(C) to oppose actions by any country that prevent other countries from exercising their sovereign rights to the resources in their exclusive economic zones and continental shelves by enforcing claims to those areas in the South China Sea that lack support in international law; and

(D) to oppose unilateral declarations of administrative and military districts in contested areas in the South China Sea;

(8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral actions that cause permanent physical damage to the marine environment and support the efforts of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address the illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the region;

(9) urge ASEAN member states to develop a common approach to encourage China and the Philippines to comply with the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s 2016 ruling in favor of the Republic of the Philippines in the case against the People’s Republic of China’s excessive maritime claims;

(10) reaffirm the commitment of the United States to continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt human smuggling and trafficking in persons and urge ASEAN to create and strengthen regional mechanisms to provide assistance and support to refugees and migrants;

(11) support the Mekong-United States Partnership;

(12) support newly created initiatives with ASEAN countries, including the United States-ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership, the ASEAN Policy Implementation Project, the United States-ASEAN Innovation Circle, and the United States-ASEAN Health Futures;

(13) encourage the President to communicate to ASEAN leaders the importance of promoting the rule of law and open and transparent government, strengthening civil society, and protecting human rights, including releasing political prisoners, ceasing politically motivated prosecutions and arbitrary killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech and expression;

(14) support efforts by organizations in ASEAN that address corruption in the public and private sectors, enhance anti-bribery compliance, enforce bribery criminalization in the private sector, and build beneficial ownership transparency through the ASEAN-USAID PROSPECT project partnered with the South East Asia Parties Against Corruption (SEA-PAC);

(15) support the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative as an example of a people-to-people partnership that provides skills, networks, and leadership training to a new generation that will create and fill jobs, foster cross-border cooperation and partnerships, and rise to address the regional and global challenges of the future;

(16) support the creation of initiatives similar to the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative for other parts of the Indo-Pacific to foster people-to-people partnerships with an emphasis on civil society leaders;

(17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments that have fully upheld and implemented all United Nations Security Council resolutions and international agreements with respect to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs and encourage all other ASEAN governments to do the same; and

(18) allocate appropriate resources across the United States Government to articulate and implement an Indo-Pacific strategy that respects and supports the crucial role of ASEAN and supports ASEAN as a source of well-functioning and problem-solving regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific community.

(a) Short title.—This section may be cited as the “Promoting United States International Leadership in 5G Act of 2021”.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States and its allies and partners should maintain participation and leadership at international standards-setting bodies for 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure;

(2) the United States should work with its allies and partners to encourage and facilitate the development of secure supply chains and networks for 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure; and

(3) the maintenance of a high standard of security in telecommunications and cyberspace between the United States and its allies and partners is a national security interest of the United States.

(c) Enhancing representation and leadership of United States at international standards-Setting bodies.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall—

(A) establish an interagency working group to provide assistance and technical expertise to enhance the representation and leadership of the United States at international bodies that set standards for equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined networks that support 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure, such as the International Telecommunication Union and the 3rd Generation Partnership Project; and

(B) work with allies, partners, and the private sector to increase productive engagement.

(2) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.—The interagency working group described in paragraph (1)—

(A) shall be chaired by the Secretary of State or a designee of the Secretary of State; and

(B) shall consist of the head (or designee) of each Federal department or agency the President determines appropriate.

(3) BRIEFINGS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and subsequently thereafter as provided under subparagraph (B), the interagency working group described in paragraph (1) shall provide a strategy to the appropriate congressional committees that addresses—

(i) promotion of United States leadership at international standards-setting bodies for equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined networks relevant to 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure, taking into account the different processes followed by the various international standard-setting bodies;

(ii) diplomatic engagement with allies and partners to share security risk information and findings pertaining to equipment that supports or is used in 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure and cooperation on mitigating such risks;

(iii) China’s presence and activities at international standards-setting bodies relevant to 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure, including information on the differences in the scope and scale of China’s engagement at such bodies compared to engagement by the United States or its allies and partners and the security risks raised by Chinese proposals in such standards-setting bodies; and

(iv) engagement with private sector communications and information service providers, equipment developers, academia, federally funded research and development centers, and other private-sector stakeholders to propose and develop secure standards for equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined networks that support 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure.

(B) SUBSEQUENT BRIEFINGS.—Upon receiving a request from the appropriate congressional committees, or as determined appropriate by the chair of the interagency working group established pursuant to paragraph (1), the interagency working group shall provide such committees an updated briefing that covers the matters described in clauses (i) through (iv) of subparagraph (A).

(a) In general.—It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting through the Secretary of State, should initiate an agenda with G7 and G20 countries on matters relevant to economic and democratic freedoms, including the following:

(1) Trade and investment issues and enforcement.

(2) Building support for international infrastructure standards, including those agreed to at the G20 summit in Osaka in 2018.

(3) The erosion of democracy and human rights.

(4) The security of 5G telecommunications.

(5) Anti-competitive behavior, such as intellectual property theft, massive subsidization of companies, and other policies and practices.

(6) Predatory international sovereign lending that is inconsistent with Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Paris Club principles.

(7) International influence campaigns.

(8) Environmental standards.

(9) Coordination with like-minded regional partners that are not in the G7 and G20.

(a) Statement of policy.—It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to support the close economic, political, and security relationship between Taiwan and the United States and recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the approach to the United States Indo-Pacific;

(2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its democracy a vital national security interest of the United States;

(3) to reinforce all existing United States Government commitments to Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8), the three joint communiques, and the “Six Assurances”;

(4) to support Taiwan’s implementation of its asymmetric defense strategy, including the priorities identified in Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept;

(5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense spending in order to fully resource its defense strategy;

(6) to conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop and integrate asymmetric capabilities, such as anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and resilient command and control capabilities, into its military forces;

(7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations, including the World Health Assembly, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization, and other international bodies as appropriate;

(8) to advocate for information sharing with Taiwan in the International Agency for Research on Cancer;

(9) to promote meaningful cooperation among the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded partners;

(10) to enhance bilateral trade, including potentially through new agreements or resumption of talks under the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement;

(11) to actively engage in trade talks in pursuance of a bilateral free trade agreement;

(12) to expand bilateral economic and technological cooperation, including improving supply chain security;

(13) to support United States educational and exchange programs with Taiwan, including by promoting the study of Chinese language, culture, history, and politics in Taiwan; and

(14) to expand people-to-people exchanges between the United States and Taiwan.

(b) Supporting United States educational and exchange programs with Taiwan.—

(1) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN CULTURAL EXCHANGE FOUNDATION.—The Secretary of State should consider establishing an independent nonprofit that—

(A) is dedicated to deepening ties between the future leaders of Taiwan and the United States; and

(B) works with State and local school districts and educational institutions to send high school and university students to Taiwan to study the Chinese language, culture, history, politics, and other relevant subjects.

(2) PARTNER.—State and local school districts and educational institutions, including public universities, are encouraged to partner with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States to establish programs to promote an increase in educational and cultural exchanges.

(a) Short title.—This section may be cited as the “Taiwan Fellowship Act”.

(b) Findings; purposes.—

(1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(A) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) affirmed United States policy “to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area”.

(B) Consistent with the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409), the United States has grown its strategic partnership with Taiwan’s vibrant democracy of 23,000,000 people.

(C) Despite a concerted campaign by the People’s Republic of China to isolate Taiwan from its diplomatic partners and from international organizations, including the World Health Organization, Taiwan has emerged as a global leader in the coronavirus global pandemic response, including by donating more than 2,000,000 surgical masks and other medical equipment to the United States.

(D) The creation of a United States fellowship program with Taiwan would support—

(i) a key priority of expanding people-to-people exchanges, which was outlined in President Donald J. Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy;

(ii) President Joseph R. Biden’s commitment to Taiwan, “a leading democracy and a critical economic and security partner”, as expressed in his March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance; and

(iii) April 2021 guidance from the Department of State based on a review required under the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 (subtitle B of title III of division FF of Public Law 116–260) to “encourage U.S. government engagement with Taiwan that reflects our deepening unofficial relationship”.

(2) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this Act are—

(A) to further strengthen the United States-Taiwan strategic relationship and broaden understanding of the Indo-Pacific region by temporarily assigning officials of agencies of the United States Government to Taiwan for intensive study in Mandarin Chinese and placement as Fellows with the governing authorities on Taiwan or a Taiwanese civic institution;

(B) to expand United States Government expertise in Mandarin Chinese language skills and understanding of the politics, history, and culture of Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific region by providing eligible United States personnel the opportunity to acquire such skills and understanding through the Taiwan Fellowship Program established under subsection (c); and

(C) to better position the United States to advance its economic, security, and human rights interests and values in the Indo-Pacific region.

(c) Taiwan fellowship program.—

(1) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(A) AGENCY HEAD.—The term “agency head” means, in the case of the executive branch of United States Government, or in the case of a legislative branch agency specified in subparagraph (B), the head of the respective agency.

(B) AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.—The term “agency of the United States Government” includes the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research Service, and the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission of the legislative branch, as well as any agency of the executive branch.

(C) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(i) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(ii) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(iii) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives;

(iv) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(v) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

(D) DETAILEE.—The term “detailee” means an employee of an agency of the United States Government on loan to the American Institute in Taiwan, without a change of position from the agency at which such employee is employed.

(E) IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—The term “implementing partner” means any United States organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from tax under section 501(a) of such Code that—

(i) is selected through a competitive process;

(ii) performs logistical, administrative, and other functions, as determined by the Department of State and the American Institute of Taiwan, in support of the Taiwan Fellowship Program; and

(iii) enters into a cooperative agreement with the American Institute in Taiwan to administer the Taiwan Fellowship Program.

(2) ESTABLISHMENT OF TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.—

(A) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State shall establish the “Taiwan Fellowship Program” (hereafter referred to in this section as the “Program”) to provide a fellowship opportunity in Taiwan of up to two years for eligible United States citizens through the cooperative agreement established in subparagraph (B). The Department of State, in consultation with the American Institute in Taiwan and the implementing partner, may modify the name of the Program.

(B) COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The American Institute in Taiwan shall use amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to paragraph (6)(A) to enter into an annual or multi-year cooperative agreement with an appropriate implementing partner.

(ii) FELLOWSHIPS.—The Department of State, in consultation with the American Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing partner, shall award to eligible United States citizens, subject to available funding—

(I) not fewer than five fellowships during the first two years of the Program; and

(II) not fewer than ten fellowships during each of the remaining years of the Program.

(C) INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the American Institute in Taiwan, in consultation with the Department of State, shall—

(i) begin negotiations with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office, or with another appropriate entity, for the purpose of entering into an agreement to facilitate the placement of fellows in an agency of the governing authorities on Taiwan; and

(ii) begin the process of selecting an implementing partner, which—

(I) shall agree to meet all of the legal requirements required to operate in Taiwan; and

(II) shall be composed of staff who demonstrate significant experience managing exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region.

(D) CURRICULUM.—

(i) FIRST YEAR.—During the first year of each fellowship under this subsection, each fellow should study—

(I) the Mandarin Chinese language;

(II) the people, history, and political climate on Taiwan; and

(III) the issues affecting the relationship between the United States and the Indo-Pacific region.

(ii) SECOND YEAR.—During the second year of each fellowship under this section, each fellow, subject to the approval of the Department of State, the American Institute in Taiwan, and the implementing partner, and in accordance with the purposes of this Act, shall work in—

(I) a parliamentary office, ministry, or other agency of the governing authorities on Taiwan; or

(II) an organization outside of the governing authorities on Taiwan, whose interests are associated with the interests of the fellow and the agency of the United States Government from which the fellow had been employed.

(E) FLEXIBLE FELLOWSHIP DURATION.—Notwithstanding any requirement under this section, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the American Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing partner, may award fellowships that have a duration of between nine months and two years, and may alter the curriculum requirements under subparagraph (D) for such purposes.

(F) SUNSET.—The Program shall terminate ten years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(3) PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.—

(A) ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS.—A United States citizen is eligible for a fellowship under this section if he or she—

(i) is an employee of the United States Government;

(ii) has received at least one exemplary performance review in his or her current United States Government role within at least the last three years prior to the beginning the fellowship;

(iii) has at least two years of experience in any branch of the United States Government;

(iv) has a demonstrated professional or educational background in the relationship between the United States and countries in the Indo-Pacific region; and

(v) has demonstrated his or her commitment to further service in the United States Government.

(B) RESPONSIBILITIES OF FELLOWS.—Each recipient of a fellowship under this section shall agree, as a condition of such fellowship—

(i) to maintain satisfactory progress in language training and appropriate behavior in Taiwan, as determined by the Department of State, the American Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, its implementing partner;

(ii) to refrain from engaging in any intelligence or intelligence-related activity on behalf of the United States Government; and

(iii) to continue Federal Government employment for a period of not less than four years after the conclusion of the fellowship or for not less than two years for a fellowship that is one year or shorter.

(C) RESPONSIBILITIES OF IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—

(i) SELECTION OF FELLOWS.—The implementing partner, in close coordination with the Department of State and the American Institute in Taiwan, shall—

(I) make efforts to recruit fellowship candidates who reflect the diversity of the United States;

(II) select fellows for the Program based solely on merit, with appropriate supervision from the Department of State and the American Institute in Taiwan; and

(III) prioritize the selection of candidates willing to serve a fellowship lasting one year or longer.

(ii) FIRST YEAR.—The implementing partner should provide each fellow in the first year (or shorter duration, as jointly determined by the Department of State and the American Institute in Taiwan for those who are not serving a two-year fellowship) with—

(I) intensive Mandarin Chinese language training; and

(II) courses in the politic, culture, and history of Taiwan, China, and the broader Indo-Pacific.

(iii) WAIVER OF REQUIRED TRAINING.—The Department of State, in coordination with the American Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing partner, may waive any of the training required under clause (ii) to the extent that a fellow has Mandarin Chinese language skills, knowledge of the topic described in clause (ii)(II), or for other related reasons approved by the Department of State and the American Institute in Taiwan. If any of the training requirements are waived for a fellow serving a two-year fellowship, the training portion of his or her fellowship may be shortened to the extent appropriate.

(iv) OFFICE; STAFFING.—The implementing partner, in consultation with the Department of State and the American Institute in Taiwan, shall maintain an office and at least one full-time staff member in Taiwan—

(I) to liaise with the American Institute in Taiwan and the governing authorities on Taiwan; and

(II) to serve as the primary in-country point of contact for the recipients of fellowships under this section and their dependents.

(v) OTHER FUNCTIONS.—The implementing partner should perform other functions in association in support of the Program, including logistical and administrative functions, as prescribed by the Department of State and the American Institute in Taiwan.

(D) NONCOMPLIANCE.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—Any fellow who fails to comply with the requirements under this section shall reimburse the American Institute in Taiwan for—

(I) the Federal funds expended for the fellow’s participation in the fellowship, as set forth in clauses (ii) and (iii); and

(II) interest accrued on such funds (calculated at the prevailing rate).

(ii) FULL REIMBURSEMENT.—Any fellow who violates clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (B) shall reimburse the American Institute in Taiwan in an amount equal to the sum of—

(I) all of the Federal funds expended for the fellow’s participation in the fellowship; and

(II) interest on the amount specified in subclause (I), which shall be calculated at the prevailing rate.

(iii) PRO RATA REIMBURSEMENT.—Any fellow who violates subparagraph (B)(iii) shall reimburse the American Institute in Taiwan in an amount equal to the difference between—

(I) the amount specified in clause (ii); and

(II) the product of—

(aa) the amount the fellow received in compensation during the final year of the fellowship, including the value of any allowances and benefits received by the fellow; multiplied by

(bb) the percentage of the period specified in subparagraph (B)(iii) during which the fellow did not remain employed by the United States Government.

(E) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the selection of the first class of fellows under this Act, and annually thereafter for 10 years, the Department of State shall offer to brief the appropriate congressional committees regarding the following issues:

(i) An assessment of the performance of the implementing partner in fulfilling the purposes of this section.

(ii) The number of applicants each year, the number of applicants willing to serve a fellowship lasting one year or longer, and the number of such applicants selected for the fellowship.

(iii) The names and sponsoring agencies of the fellows selected by the implementing partner and the extent to which such fellows represent the diversity of the United States.

(iv) The names of the parliamentary offices, ministries, other agencies of the governing authorities on Taiwan, and nongovernmental institutions to which each fellow was assigned.

(v) Any recommendations, as appropriate, to improve the implementation of the Program, including added flexibilities in the administration of the program.

(vi) An assessment of the Program’s value upon the relationship between the United States and Taiwan or the United States and Asian countries.

(F) ANNUAL FINANCIAL AUDIT.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The financial records of any implementing partner shall be audited annually in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards by independent certified public accountants or independent licensed public accountants who are certified or licensed by a regulatory authority of a State or another political subdivision of the United States.

(ii) LOCATION.—Each audit under clause (i) shall be conducted at the place or places where the financial records of the implementing partner are normally kept.

(iii) ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS.—The implementing partner shall make available to the accountants conducting an audit under clause (i)—

(I) all books, financial records, files, other papers, things, and property belonging to, or in use by, the implementing partner that are necessary to facilitate the audit; and

(II) full facilities for verifying transactions with the balances or securities held by depositories, fiscal agents, and custodians.

(iv) REPORT.—

(I) IN GENERAL.—Not later than six months after the end of each fiscal year, the implementing partner shall provide a report of the audit conducted for such fiscal year under clause (i) to the Department of State and the American Institute in Taiwan.

(II) CONTENTS.—Each audit report shall—

(aa) set forth the scope of the audit;

(bb) include such statements, along with the auditor’s opinion of those statements, as may be necessary to present fairly the implementing partner’s assets and liabilities, surplus or deficit, with reasonable detail;

(cc) include a statement of the implementing partner’s income and expenses during the year; and

(dd) include a schedule of—

(AA) all contracts and cooperative agreements requiring payments greater than $5,000; and

(BB) any payments of compensation, salaries, or fees at a rate greater than $5,000 per year.

(III) COPIES.—Each audit report shall be produced in sufficient copies for distribution to the public.

(4) TAIWAN FELLOWS ON DETAIL FROM GOVERNMENT SERVICE.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—

(i) DETAIL AUTHORIZED.—With the approval of the Secretary of State, an agency head may detail, for a period of not more than two years, an employee of the agency of the United States Government who has been awarded a fellowship under this Act, to the American Institute in Taiwan for the purpose of assignment to the governing authorities on Taiwan or an organization described in paragraph (2)(D)(ii)(II).

(ii) AGREEMENT.—Each detailee shall enter into a written agreement with the Federal Government before receiving a fellowship, in which the fellow shall agree—

(I) to continue in the service of the sponsoring agency at the end of fellowship for a period of at least four years (or at least two years if the fellowship duration is one year or shorter) unless such detailee is involuntarily separated from the service of such agency; and

(II) to pay to the American Institute in Taiwan any additional expenses incurred by the United States Government in connection with the fellowship if the detailee voluntarily separates from service with the sponsoring agency before the end of the period for which the detailee has agreed to continue in the service of such agency.

(iii) EXCEPTION.—The payment agreed to under clause (ii)(II) may not be required of a detailee who leaves the service of the sponsoring agency to enter into the service of another agency of the United States Government unless the head of the sponsoring agency notifies the detailee before the effective date of entry into the service of the other agency that payment will be required under this subsection.

(B) STATUS AS GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE.—A detailee—

(i) is deemed, for the purpose of preserving allowances, privileges, rights, seniority, and other benefits, to be an employee of the sponsoring agency;

(ii) is entitled to pay, allowances, and benefits from funds available to such agency, which is deemed to comply with section 5536 of title 5, United States Code; and

(iii) may be assigned to a position with an entity described in paragraph (2)(D)(ii)(I) if acceptance of such position does not involve—

(I) the taking of an oath of allegiance to another government; or

(II) the acceptance of compensation or other benefits from any foreign government by such detailee.

(C) RESPONSIBILITIES OF SPONSORING AGENCY.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The agency of the United States Government from which a detailee is detailed should provide the fellow allowances and benefits that are consistent with Department of State Standardized Regulations or other applicable rules and regulations, including—

(I) a living quarters allowance to cover the cost of housing in Taiwan;

(II) a cost of living allowance to cover any possible higher costs of living in Taiwan;

(III) a temporary quarters subsistence allowance for up to seven days if the fellow is unable to find housing immediately upon arriving in Taiwan;

(IV) an education allowance to assist parents in providing the fellow’s minor children with educational services ordinarily provided without charge by public schools in the United States;

(V) moving expenses to transport personal belongings of the fellow and his or her family in their move to Taiwan, which is comparable to the allowance given for American Institute in Taiwan employees assigned to Taiwan; and

(VI) an economy-class airline ticket to and from Taiwan for each fellow and the fellow’s immediate family.

(ii) MODIFICATION OF BENEFITS.—The American Institute in Taiwan and its implementing partner, with the approval of the Department of State, may modify the benefits set forth in clause (i) if such modification is warranted by fiscal circumstances.

(D) NO FINANCIAL LIABILITY.—The American Institute in Taiwan, the implementing partner, and any governing authorities on Taiwan or nongovernmental entities in Taiwan at which a fellow is detailed during the second year of the fellowship may not be held responsible for the pay, allowances, or any other benefit normally provided to the detailee.

(E) REIMBURSEMENT.—Fellows may be detailed under clause (A)(ii) without reimbursement to the United States by the American Institute in Taiwan.

(F) ALLOWANCES AND BENEFITS.—Detailees may be paid by the American Institute in Taiwan for the allowances and benefits listed in subparagraph (C).

(5) GAO REPORT.—Not later than one year prior to the sunset of the Program pursuant to paragraph (2)(F), the Comptroller General of the United States shall transmit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that includes the following:

(A) An analysis of United States Government participants in the Program, including the number of applicants and the number of fellowships undertaken, the places of employment.

(B) An assessment of the costs and benefits for participants in the Program and for the United States Government of such fellowships.

(C) An analysis of the financial impact of the fellowship on United States Government offices that have detailed fellows to participate in the Program.

(D) Recommendations, if any, on how to improve the Program.

(6) FUNDING.—

(A) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the American Institute in Taiwan—

(i) for fiscal year 2022, $2,900,000, of which $500,000 should be used by an appropriate implementing partner to launch the Program; and

(ii) for fiscal year 2023, and each succeeding fiscal year, $2,400,000.

(B) PRIVATE SOURCES.—The implementing partner selected to implement the Program may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donations of services or property in carrying out such program, subject to the review and approval of the American Institute in Taiwan.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) In fiscal year 2020, the Department of State allocated $1,500,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific region in bilateral and regional foreign assistance (FA) resources, including as authorized by section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409; 132 Stat. 5391), and $798,000,000 in the fiscal year 2020 diplomatic engagement (DE) budget. These amounts represent only 5 percent of the DE budget and only 4 percent of the total Department of State-USAID budget.

(2) Over the last 5 years the DE budget and personnel levels in the Indo-Pacific averaged only 5 percent of the total, while FA resources averaged only 4 percent of the total.

(3) In 2020, the Department of State began a process to realign certain positions at posts to ensure that its personnel footprint matches the demands of great-power competition, including in the Indo-Pacific.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the size of the United States diplomatic corps must be sufficient to meet the current and emerging challenges of the 21st century, including those in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere;

(2) the increase must be designed to meet the objectives of an Indo-Pacific strategy focused on strengthening the good governance and sovereignty of states that adhere to and uphold the rules-based international order; and

(3) the increase must be implemented with a focus on increased numbers of economic, political, and public diplomacy officers, representing a cumulative increase of at least 200 foreign service officer generalists, to—

(A) advance free, fair, and reciprocal trade and open investment environments for United States companies, and engaged in increased commercial diplomacy in key markets;

(B) better articulate and explain United States policies, strengthen civil society and democratic principles, enhance reporting on global activities, promote people-to-people exchanges, and advance United States influence; and

(C) increase capacity at small- and medium-sized embassies and consulates in the Indo-Pacific and other regions around the world, as necessary.

(c) Statement of policy.—

(1) It shall be the policy of the United States to ensure Department of State funding levels and personnel footprint in the Indo-Pacific reflect the region’s high degree of importance and significance to United States political, economic, and security interests.

(2) It shall be the policy of the United States to increase DE and FA funding and the quantity of personnel dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region respective to the Department of State’s total budget.

(d) Action plan.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide to the appropriate committees of Congress an action plan with the following elements:

(1) Identification of requirements to advance United States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific and the personnel and budgetary resources for the Department of State needed to meet them, assuming an unconstrained resource environment.

(2) A plan to increase the portion of the Department’s budget dedicated to the Indo-Pacific in terms of DE and FA focused on development, economic, and security assistance.

(3) A plan to increase the number of positions at posts in the Indo-Pacific region and bureaus with responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including a description of increases at each post or bureau, a breakdown of increases by cone, and a description of how such increases in personnel will advance United States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.

(4) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks that the Department will meet in implementing the action plan.

(5) A description of any barriers to implementing the action plan.

(e) Updates to report and briefing.—Every 180 days after the submission of the action plan described in subsection (c) for no more than 3 years, the Secretary shall submit an update and brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the implementation of such action plan, with supporting data and including a detailed assessment of benchmarks reached.

(f) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated, for fiscal year 2022, $2,000,000,000, under titles III and IV of the Foreign Assistance Act for the Indo-Pacific region and $1,250,000,000 in diplomatic engagement resources to the Indo-Pacific region.

(g) Inclusion of amounts appropriated pursuant to Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated under subsection (f) include funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409).

(h) Secretary of State.—Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State should report on the extent to which the benchmarks described in the action plan in subsection (c) have been met or progress has been made.

(a) Appropriate committees of Congress defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(b) Statement of policy.—In order to deter the use of force by the People’s Republic of China to change the status quo on Taiwan, the United States should coordinate with allies and partners to identify and develop significant economic and diplomatic measures to deter and impose costs on any such action by the People’s Republic of China.

(a) China’s class scheduling of fentanyl and synthetic opioid precursors.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a written report—

(1) detailing a description of United States Government efforts to gain a commitment from the Chinese Government to submit unregulated fentanyl precursors such as 4–AP to controls; and

(2) detailing a plan for future steps the United States Government will take to urge China to combat illicit fentanyl production and trafficking originating in China.

(b) Form of report.—The report required under subsection (c) shall be unclassified with a classified annex.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that support provided under section 1421(c)(1) of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9621(c)(1)) should be considered to be a Federal credit program that is subject to the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661 et seq.) for purposes of applying the requirements of such Act to such support.

(b) Maximum contingent liability.—Section 1433 of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9633) is amended by striking “$60,000,000,000” and inserting “$100,000,000,000”.

(a) In general.—The Development Finance Corporation is authorized to provide financing to entities in India and in other less developed countries to increase vaccine manufacturing capacity for the following purposes—

(1) manufacturing of Stringent Regulatory Authorization (SRA) or World Health Organization (WHO) Emergency Use Listing COVID–19 vaccines;

(2) manufacturing of SRA or WHO Emergency Use Listing therapeutics used to treat symptoms related to COVID–19; and

(3) manufacturing of critical medical supplies needed for preventing, detecting and treating COVID–19, including ventilators, personal protective equipment (PPE), oxygen, diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines.

(b) Reporting requirement.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of the Development Finance Corporation, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall provide a report to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) outlining the countries where DFC financing could be most impactful for vaccine manufacturing and to achieve the goal of manufacturing 1 billion COVID–19 vaccines by 2022;

(2) a detailed explanation of the United States and partner country interests served by the United States providing support to such projects;

(3) a detailed description of any support provided by other United States allies and partners to expand the initiatives outlined in subsection (a); and

(4) a detailed description of any support provided by China in support of the initiatives outlined in subsection (a).

(c) Form of report.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form with a classified annex if necessary.

(a) Statement of policy.—

(1) With 276 embassies and other representative offices globally, China now has more diplomatic posts around the world than any other country, including the United States. Many of Beijing’s new missions can be found in countries that recently broke ties with Taiwan (Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, the Gambia, and Sao Tome and Principe) or do not have any United States diplomatic physical presence despite these countries asking for increased United States engagement and investment (Antigua and Barbuda and Dominica).

(2) It is the sense of Congress, that the Department of State conduct an assessment of all United States diplomatic posts to verify that they align with its United States national security and economic interests, as well as ensuring that these locations position the United States appropriately with its strategic competitors to advance the national interest in every country worldwide, including those countries currently lacking any physical United States diplomatic presence whether an embassy, consulate general, or principal officer post.

(b) Reporting.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and biennially thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report assessing the number, location, and objectives of each of its diplomatic missions and posts worldwide, including an assessment of any gaps that exist compared to other country strategic competitors. The Secretary of State shall coordinate with other Department and Agency heads having an overseas presence at any and all United States diplomatic missions to ensure this assessment reflects all Federal Government equities and viewpoints, and then certify in writing the findings of this assessment.

There are authorized to be appropriated, for the 5-year period beginning on October 1, 2021, $105,500,000, to promote education, training, research, and foreign language skills through the Fulbright-Hays Program, in accordance with section 102(b) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)).

(a) Authorization of USAGM appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the United States Agency for Global Media, $100,000,000 for ongoing and new programs to support local media, build independent media, combat PRC disinformation inside and outside of China, invest in technology to subvert censorship, and monitor and evaluate these programs.

(b) Support for local media.—The Secretary of State, acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, acting through the Assistant Administrator for Development, Democracy, and Innovation, shall support and train journalists on investigative techniques necessary to ensure public accountability, promote transparency, fight corruption, and support the ability of the public to develop informed opinions about pressing issues facing their countries.

(c) Internet freedom programs.—The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor shall continue to support internet freedom programs.

(d) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State and United States Agency for International Development, for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, $170,000,000 for ongoing and new programs in support of press freedom, training, and protection of journalists. Amounts appropriated pursuant to this authorization are authorized to remain available until expended and shall be in addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated to support press freedom, training, and protection of journalists.

(a) Finding.—Congress established the Global Engagement Center to “direct, lead, and coordinate efforts” of the Federal Government to “recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation globally”.

(b) Extension.—Section 1287(j) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended by striking “the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment of this Act” and inserting “December 31, 2027”.

(c) Sense of congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the Global Engagement Center should expand its coordinating capacity of diplomatic messaging through the exchange of liaison officers with Federal departments and agencies that manage aspects of identifying and countering foreign disinformation, including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Special Operations Command’s Joint MISO Web Operations Center.

(d) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated $150,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 for the Global Engagement Center to counter foreign state and non-state sponsored propaganda and disinformation.

In this subtitle:

(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(2) COMPANY.—The term “company” means any corporation, company, limited liability company, limited partnership, business trust, business association, or other similar entity.

(3) OTHER SECURITY FORCES.—The term “other security forces”—

(A) includes national security forces that conduct maritime security; and

(B) does not include self-described militias or paramilitary organizations.

There is authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2022 through fiscal year 2026 for the Department of State, out of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.) (relating to international military education and training (IMET) assistance), $45,000,000 for activities in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with this Act.

(a) Sense of congress.—Congress—

(1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or the use of force to impede freedom of navigation operations in international airspace by military or civilian aircraft, to alter the status quo, or to destabilize the Indo-Pacific region;

(2) urges the Government of the People’s Republic of China to refrain from implementing the declared East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South China Sea, where contrary to freedom of overflight in international airspace, and to refrain from taking similar provocative actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region;

(3) reaffirms that the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration decision is final and legally binding on both parties and that the People’s Republic of China’s claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are unlawful; and

(4) condemns the People’s Republic of China for failing to abide by the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling, despite the PRC’s obligations as a state party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

(b) Statement of policy.—It shall be the policy of the United States to—

(1) reaffirm its commitment and support for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including to the mutual defense treaties with Indo-Pacific allies as referenced elsewhere in this Act;

(2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and lawful use of the sea, or the airspace above it, that are available to all nations, and oppose the militarization of new and reclaimed land features in the South China Sea;

(3) continue certain policies with respect to the PRC claims in the South China Sea, namely—

(A) that PRC claims in the South China Sea, including to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea, are unlawful;

(B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a maritime claim vis-à-vis the Philippines in areas that the Permanent Court of Arbitration found to be in the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf;

(C) to reject any PRC claim to waters beyond a 12 nautical mile territorial sea derived from islands it claims in the Spratly Islands; and

(D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial or maritime claim to James Shoal;

(4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in destabilizing activities, including environmentally harmful and provocative land reclamation;

(5) ensure that disputes are managed without intimidation, coercion, or force;

(6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust claims in accordance with international law;

(7) uphold the principle that territorial and maritime claims, including territorial waters or territorial seas, must derive from land features and otherwise comport with international law;

(8) oppose the imposition of new fishing regulations covering disputed areas in the South China Sea, regulations which have raised tensions in the region;

(9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if that Code of Conduct reflects the interests of Southeast Asian claimant states and does not serve as a vehicle for the People’s Republic of China to advance its unlawful maritime claims;

(10) reaffirm that an existing body of international rules and guidelines, including the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation between the United States Armed Forces and the forces of other countries, including the People’s Republic of China;

(11) support the development of regional institutions and bodies, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation in the region and reinforce the role of international law;

(12) encourage the deepening of partnerships with other countries in the region for maritime domain awareness and capacity building, as well as efforts by the United States Government to explore the development of appropriate multilateral mechanisms for a “common operating picture” in the South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries that would serve to help countries avoid destabilizing behavior and deter risky and dangerous activities;

(13) oppose actions by any country to prevent any other country from exercising its sovereign rights to the resources of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf by making claims to those areas in the South China Sea that have no support in international law; and

(14) assure the continuity of operations by the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, including, when appropriate, in cooperation with partners and allies, to reaffirm freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Secretary of State should expand and strengthen existing measures under the United States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy to provide capabilities to allies and partners consistent with agreed-on division of responsibility for alliance roles, missions and capabilities, prioritizing allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with United States strategic imperatives;

(2) the United States should design for export to Indo-Pacific allies and partners capabilities critical to maintaining a favorable military balance in the region, including long-range precision fires, air and missile defense systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, land attack cruise missiles, conventional hypersonic systems, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and command and control systems consistent with law, regulation, policy, and international commitments;

(3) the United States should pursue, to the maximum extent possible, anticipatory technology security and foreign disclosure policy on the systems described in paragraph (2); and

(4) the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, should—

(A) urge allies and partners to invest in sufficient quantities of munitions to meet contingency requirements and avoid the need for accessing United States stocks in wartime; and

(B) cooperate with allies to deliver such munitions, or when necessary, to increase allies’ capacity to produce such munitions.

(b) Appropriate committees of Congress.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(c) Report.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that describes United States priorities for building more capable security partners in the Indo-Pacific region.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall—

(A) provide a priority list of defense and military capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and partners must possess for the United States to be able to achieve its military objectives in the Indo-Pacific region;

(B) identify, from the list referred to in subparagraph (A), the capabilities that are best provided, or can only be provided, by the United States;

(C) identify—

(i) actions required to expedite fielding the capabilities identified in subparagraph (B); and

(ii) steps needed to fully account for and a plan to integrate all means of United States foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, security assistance, and all applicable authorities of the Department of State and the Department of Defense;

(D) assess the requirements for United States security assistance, including International Military Education and Training, in the Indo-Pacific region, as a part of the means to deliver critical partner capability requirements identified in subparagraph (B);

(E) assess the resources necessary to meet the requirements for United States security assistance, and identify resource gaps;

(F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling requirements for United States security assistance in the Indo-Pacific region, including resources and personnel limits, foreign legislative and policy barriers, and factors related to specific partner countries;

(G) identify limitations on the ability of the United States to provide such capabilities, including those identified under subparagraph (B), because of existing United States treaty obligations, United States policies, or other regulations;

(H) recommend improvements to the process for developing requirements for United States partner capabilities; and

(I) identify required jointly agreed recommendations for infrastructure and posture, based on any ongoing mutual dialogues.

(3) FORM.—The report required under this subsection shall be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

Congress finds the following:

(1) Every UN member state is legally required to finance the UN’s core budget in order to ensure that these missions are properly resourced, and assessment rates are renegotiated every three years by the UN General Assembly.

(2) While the United States is the largest single financial contributor to the UN system, the current model is beneficial because it requires all UN member states, no matter how big or small, to help shoulder the UN’s regular and peacekeeping budgets at specified levels.

(3) Failing to meet our financial commitments to the UN also empowers the PRC, which has raised our annual shortfalls to claim we are not a reliable partner and is seeking to leverage its own contributions to the regular budget and peacekeeping in ways that run counter to United States interests and values.

(4) The People’s Republic of China is now the second largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping, having gone from an assessment rate of just 3 percent in 2008 to more than 15 percent today, and is the ninth largest troop-contributor to UN missions, providing more personnel than the other four permanent members of the Security Council combined.

(5) With greater engagement comes greater influence, and PRC diplomats have sought to use their expanded clout to push back against the human rights, civilian protection, and gender-based violence aspects of UN peacekeeping mandates, using United States funding shortfalls as a pretext.

(6) The PRC has also used its growing clout to fill key posts at UN agencies: Chinese nationals currently occupy the top posts of four of the UN’s 15 specialized agencies, while the United States occupies only one.

(7) From 2021 to 2022, there will be 15 elections for the heads of UN specialized agencies and five for major UN funds and programs. With the exception of the World Food Programme, none are currently led by Americans.

(8) A 2020 Department of State Inspector General Inspection found that the Bureau for International Organizations did not have a standard operating procedure for tracking and promoting the employment of American Citizens in the UN system, and their recommendation to the department to establish one remains open.

It is the policy of the United States that—

(1) the Special Representative of the United States to the United Nations serves as a standing member of the cabinet;

(2) assessed dues to multilateral organizations be paid in full in a timely fashion;

(3) Federal agencies utilize all the authorities under section 3343 of title 5, United States Code, and subpart C of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations: Detail and Transfer of Federal Employees to International Organizations to detail or transfer employees to relevant international organizations;

(4) the Secretary of State shall assist the Department of State and other Federal agencies in carrying out paragraph (3) to the fullest extent;

(5) the Secretary of State shall support qualified American candidates in their bid to win election to UN-related leadership positions; and

(6) the Secretary of State shall support the placement of Junior Professional Officers (JPOs) sponsored by the United States in UN-affiliated agencies.

(a) Establishment.—The Secretary of State is authorized to establish within the Department of State’s Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO) an Office for American Citizens.

(b) Duties.—The office established under subsection (a) of this section will be responsible for—

(1) advocating for the employment of American citizens by all international organizations of which the United States is a member, including the United Nations and any of its agencies, offices, and other affiliated entities;

(2) coordinating the interagency support of non-American candidates for leadership roles within all international organizations of which the United States is a member, including the United Nations and any of its agencies, offices, and other affiliated entities, when—

(A) no American candidate has been nominated for election; and

(B) it is determined that providing such support is in the interest of the United States;

(3) establishing and implementing a standard operating procedure for the promotion and efficient tracking of United States citizen employment at the United Nations and other international organizations that includes Mission Geneva;

(4) monitoring the pipeline of United Nations jobs and identifying qualified Americans and other qualified nationals to promote for these positions;

(5) tracking leadership changes in United Nations secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies, and developing strategies to ensure that coalitions of likeminded states are assembled to ensure leadership races are not won by countries that do not share United States interests;

(6) eliminating current barriers to the employment of United States nationals in the United Nations Secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies; and

(7) increasing the number of qualified United States candidates for leadership and oversight positions at the United Nations Secretariat, funds, programs, agencies, and at other international organizations.

(a) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on how many Federal employees are currently detailed or transferred to an international organization during the immediately preceding 12-month period and a one-time strategy for increasing the number of Federal employees so detailed or transferred.

(b) Matters To be included.—Each report required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) The number of Federal employees detailed or transferred to an international organization under section 3343 of title 5, United States Code, and subpart C of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations: Detail and Transfer of Federal Employees to International Organizations, and—

(A) an identification of the Federal agency from which such employees were detailed or transferred; and

(B) an identification of the international organizations to and from which such employees have been detailed or transferred.

(2) A list of international organizations to and from which the United States previously detailed or transferred Federal employees.

(c) Appropriate congressional committees defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(2) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to strengthen alliances and partnerships with like-minded countries around the globe; and

(2) to work in collaboration with such allies and partners—

(A) to address significant diplomatic, economic, and military challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China;

(B) to deter the People’s Republic of China from pursuing military aggression;

(C) to promote the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in accordance with international law;

(D) to promote private sector-led long-term economic development while countering efforts by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to leverage predatory economic practices as a means of political and economic coercion in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond;

(E) to promote the values of democracy and human rights, including through efforts to end the repression by the People’s Republic of China of political dissidents, Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities, Tibetan Buddhists, Christians, and other ethnic minorities;

(F) to respond to the crackdown by the People’s Republic of China, in contravention of the commitments made under the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 and the Basic Law of Hong Kong, on the legitimate aspirations of the people of Hong Kong; and

(G) to counter the Chinese Government’s efforts to spread disinformation in China and beyond with respect to its response to COVID–19.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States and Canada have a unique relationship based on shared geography, extensive personal connections, deep economic ties, mutual defense commitments, and a shared vision to uphold democracy, human rights, and the rules based international order established after World War II;

(2) the United States and Canada can better address the People’s Republic of China’s economic, political, and security influence through closer cooperation on counternarcotics, environmental stewardship, transparent practices in public procurement and infrastructure planning, the Arctic, energy and connectivity issues, trade and commercial relations, bilateral legal matters, and support for democracy, good governance, and human rights;

(3) amidst the COVID–19 pandemic, the United States and Canada should maintain joint initiatives to address border management, commercial and trade relations and infrastructure, a shared approach with respect to the People’s Republic of China, and transnational challenges, including pandemics, energy security, and environmental stewardship;

(4) the United States and Canada should enhance cooperation to counter Chinese disinformation, influence operations, economic espionage, and propaganda efforts;

(5) the People’s Republic of China’s infrastructure investments, particularly in 5G telecommunications technology, extraction of natural resources, and port infrastructure, pose national security risks for the United States and Canada;

(6) the United States should share, as appropriate, intelligence gathered regarding—

(A) Huawei’s 5G capabilities; and

(B) the PRC government’s intentions with respect to 5G expansion;

(7) the United States and Canada should continue to advance collaborative initiatives to implement the January 9, 2020, United States-Canada Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals Development Collaboration; and

(8) the United States and Canada must prioritize cooperation on continental defense and in the Arctic, including by modernizing the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) sensor architecture to provide effective warning and tracking of threats by peer competitors, including long-range missiles and high-precision weapons, to the Northern Hemisphere.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Government of the People’s Republic of China’s apparent arbitrary detention and abusive treatment of Canadian nationals Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig in apparent retaliation for the Government of Canada’s arrest of Meng Wanzhou is deeply concerning;

(2) the Government of Canada has shown international leadership by—

(A) upholding the rule of law and complying with its international legal obligations, including those pursuant to the Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and Canada, signed at Washington December 3, 1971; and

(B) launching the Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations, which has been endorsed by 57 countries and the European Union, and reaffirms well-established prohibitions under international human rights conventions against the arbitrary detention of foreign nationals to be used as leverage in state-to-state relations; and

(3) the United States continues to join the Government of Canada in calling for the immediate release of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig and for due process for Canadian national Robert Schellenberg.

(a) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President should submit a strategy to the appropriate congressional committees, and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, that describes how the United States will enhance cooperation with the Government of Canada in managing relations with the PRC government.

(b) Elements.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall—

(1) identify key policy points of convergence and divergence between the United States and Canada in managing relations with the People’s Republic of China in the areas of technology, trade, economic practices, cyber security, secure supply chains and critical minerals, and illicit narcotics;

(2) include a description of United States development and coordination efforts with Canadian counterparts to enhance the cooperation between the United States and Canada with respect to—

(A) managing economic relations with the People’s Republic of China;

(B) democracy and human rights in the People’s Republic of China;

(C) technology issues involving the People’s Republic of China;

(D) defense issues involving the People’s Republic of China; and

(E) international law enforcement and transnational organized crime issues.

(3) detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to work with Canada to counter the PRC’s projection of an authoritarian governing model around the world;

(4) detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence cooperation to date and future plans to support Canadian efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to Huawei’s 5G technology;

(5) detail diplomatic and defense collaboration—

(A) to advance joint United States-Canadian priorities for responsible stewardship in the Arctic Region; and

(B) to counter the PRC’s efforts to project political, economic, and military influence into the Arctic Region; and

(6) detail diplomatic efforts to work with Canada to track and counter the PRC’s attempts to exert influence across the multilateral system.

(c) Form.—The strategy required under this section shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the public, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.

(d) Consultation.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than every 180 days thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees, and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, regarding the development and implementation of the strategy required under this section.

(a) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation, as appropriate, with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of USAID, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, shall submit a multi-year strategy for increasing United States economic competitiveness and promoting good governance, human rights, and the rule of law in Latin American and Caribbean countries, particularly in the areas of investment, equitable, inclusive, and sustainable development, commercial relations, anti-corruption activities, and infrastructure projects, to—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Committee on Finance of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(5) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives; and

(6) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(b) Additional elements.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include a plan of action, including benchmarks to achieve measurable progress, to—

(1) enhance the technical capacity of countries in the region to advance the sustainable and inclusive development of equitable economies;

(2) reduce trade and non-tariff barriers between the countries of the Americas;

(3) facilitate a more open, transparent, and competitive environment for United States businesses in the region;

(4) establish frameworks or mechanisms to review long term financial sustainability and security implications of foreign investments in strategic sectors or services, including transportation, communications, natural resources, and energy;

(5) establish competitive, transparent, and inclusive infrastructure project selection and procurement processes that promote transparency, supplier diversity, open competition, financial sustainability, adherence to robust global standards, and the employment of a diverse local workforce and management;

(6) strengthen legal structures critical to robust democratic governance, fair competition, combatting corruption, and ending impunity; and

(7) enhance transparent, affordable, and equitable access to the internet and digital infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere.

(c) Briefing requirement.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, and the leadership of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, shall brief the congressional committees listed in subsection (a) regarding the implementation of this part, including examples of successes and challenges.

(a) Appropriate committees of congress defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;

(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(6) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

(b) Reporting requirement.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that assesses the nature, intent, and impact to United States strategic interests of Chinese diplomatic activity aimed at influencing the decisions, procedures, and programs of multilateral organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean, including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Organization of American States, and the Inter-American Development Bank.

(2) DEFENSE SECTOR.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall include an assessment of the nature, intent, and impact on United States strategic interests of Chinese military activity in Latin America and the Caribbean, including military education and training programs, weapons sales, and space-related activities in the military or civilian spheres, such as—

(A) the satellite and space control station the People’s Republic of China constructed in Argentina; and

(B) defense and security cooperation carried out by the People’s Republic of China in Latin America and the Caribbean, including sales of surveillance and monitoring technology to governments in the region such as Venezuela, Cuba, Ecuador, and Colombia, and the potential use of such technologies as tools of Chinese intelligence services.

(3) FORM.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form and shall include classified annexes.

(a) In general.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State $13,500,000 for the International Military Education and Training Program for Latin America and the Caribbean for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026.

(b) Modernization.—The Secretary of State shall take steps to modernize and strengthen the programs receiving funding under subsection (a) to ensure that such programs are vigorous, substantive, and the preeminent choice for international military education and training for Latin American and Caribbean partners.

(c) Required elements.—The programs referred to in subsection (a) shall—

(1) provide training and capacity-building opportunities to Latin American and Caribbean security services;

(2) provide practical skills and frameworks for—

(A) improving the functioning and organization of security services in Latin America and the Caribbean;

(B) creating a better understanding of the United States and its values; and

(C) using technology for maximum efficiency and organization; and

(3) promote and ensure that security services in Latin America and the Caribbean respect civilian authority and operate in compliance with international norms, standards, and rules of engagement, including a respect for human rights, and full compliance with Leahy Law requirements.

(d) Limitation.—Security assistance under this section is subject to limitations as enshrined in the requirements of section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d).

(a) Sense of congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Government of the People’s Republic of China is exporting its model for internal security and state control of society through advanced technology and artificial intelligence; and

(2) the inclusion of communication networks and communications supply chains with equipment and services from companies with close ties to or that are susceptible to pressure from governments or security services without reliable legal checks on governmental powers can lead to breaches of citizens’ private information, increased censorship, violations of human rights, and harassment of political opponents.

(b) Diplomatic engagement.—The Secretary of State shall conduct diplomatic engagement with governments and civil society organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean to—

(1) help identify and mitigate the risks to civil liberties posed by technologies and services described in subsection (a); and

(2) offer recommendations on ways to mitigate such risks.

(c) Internet freedom programs.—The Chief Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media, who may work through the Open Technology Fund, and the Secretary of State, working through the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s Internet Freedom and Business and Human Rights Section, shall expand and prioritize efforts to provide anti-censorship technology and services to journalists in Latin America and the Caribbean, in order to enhance their ability to safely access or share digital news and information.

(d) Support for civil society.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall work through nongovernmental organizations to—

(1) support and promote programs that support internet freedom and the free flow of information online in Latin America and the Caribbean;

(2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reliable access to internet in Latin America and the Caribbean;

(3) provide integrated support to civil society for technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy, and applied research programs in Latin America and the Caribbean;

(4) train journalists and civil society leaders in Latin America and the Caribbean on investigative techniques necessary to ensure public accountability and prevent government overreach in the digital sphere;

(5) assist independent media outlets and journalists in Latin America and the Caribbean to build their own capacity and develop high-impact, in-depth news reports covering governance and human rights topics;

(6) provide training for journalists and civil society leaders on investigative techniques necessary to improve transparency and accountability in government and the private sector;

(7) provide training on investigative reporting of incidents of corruption and unfair trade, business and commercial practices;

(8) assist nongovernmental organizations to strengthen their capacity to monitor the activities described in paragraph (7); and

(9) identify local resources to support the preponderance of activities that would be carried out under this subsection.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The countries of the Caribbean are heavily reliant upon imported oil to provide for approximately 90 percent of their energy production.

(2) The level of dependence is even higher including—

(A) Jamaica, which relies on oil for 95.9 percent of its electricity;

(B) Barbados, which relies on oil for 96 percent of its electricity;

(C) the Virgin Islands, which relies on oil for nearly 100 percent of its electricity; and

(D) St. Lucia, which relies on oil for 100 percent of its electricity.

(3) Overreliance on imported fossil fuels has had a detrimental effect on economic development, growth, and competitiveness in the Caribbean.

(4) Since 1970, more than 80 percent of Caribbean coral reefs have been lost due to coastal development and pollution. Soot particulates and climate change caused by burning fossil fuels have seriously damaged coral reefs, which are a significant source of tourism dollars, fishing, biodiversity, and natural beauty.

(5) Air pollution caused by burning oil for electricity—

(A) has serious health impacts in the form of higher rates of asthma and other lung ailments; and

(B) can also exacerbate climate change.

(6) The Caribbean region is particularly vulnerable to sea level rise and stronger storms.

(7) Between 2005 and 2018, the dependence of the countries of the Caribbean on oil was perpetuated by the Venezuelan-led Petrocaribe oil alliance, which—

(A) offered preferential terms for oil sales; and

(B) supplies some countries with up to 40 percent of their energy production needs.

(8) The ongoing domestic economic crisis and political turmoil in Venezuela has forced the Government of Venezuela to retract its commitments to the Petrocaribe oil alliance and step away as a regional power. Only Cuba still receives preferential Petrocaribe pricing on fuel exports from Venezuela, while other Petrocaribe member countries are experiencing a destabilized flow of oil.

(9) China has spent more than $244,000,000,000 on energy projects worldwide since 2000, 25 percent of which was spent in Latin America and the Caribbean. Although the majority of this spending was for oil, gas, and coal, China has also been the largest investor in clean energy globally for almost a decade.

(10) The World Bank estimates that the Caribbean will need $12,000,000,000 in power investments through 2035.

(11) Renewable energy technology costs have decreased dramatically in recent years, offering a more viable economic alternative for energy production. Solar energy prices have fallen by 80 percent since 2008, causing significant market growth, and according to data released by the International Renewable Energy Agency, ¹⁄3 of global power capacity is based in renewable energy.

(12) In 2016, the International Monetary Fund estimated that transportation accounted for 36 percent of the total primary energy consumed in the Caribbean subregion.

(13) According to the United Nations Environment Programme, Latin America and the Caribbean could achieve annual savings of $621,000,000,000 and a reduction of 1,100,000,000 tons of CO₂ by 2050 if the region’s energy and transport sectors reach net zero emissions.

(14) The Caribbean has an abundance of onshore and offshore resources needed for renewable energy, including sun, wind, geothermal, and some hydropower production capacity.

(15) The United States Government is deeply engaged in providing technical and policy assistance to countries of the Caribbean on energy issues through—

(A) the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas;

(B) Connecting the Americas 2022; and

(C) bilateral assistance programs.

(16) On February 19, 2014, at the North American Leaders’ Summit, President Barack Obama, Prime Minister Stephen Harper of Canada, and President Enrique Peña Nieto of Mexico reaffirmed their commitment to bring affordable, reliable, and increasingly renewable power to the Caribbean, while opening wider markets for clean energy and green technology.

(17) On June 19, 2015, President Barack Obama announced the Caribbean Energy Security Initiative, which would partner with individual countries—

(A) to transform its energy sector;

(B) to work to increase access to finance, good governance, and diversification; and

(C) to maximize the impact of existing donor effects.

(18) On May 4, 2016, at the United States-Caribbean-Central American Energy Summit, the energy security task force formally launched the Caribbean Sustainable Energy Roadmap and Strategy (C–SERMS) as a mechanism to manage regional coordination and action on energy security and agreed to expand the regional market and transmission system.

(19) The United States has an important opportunity—

(A) to deepen this engagement;

(B) to work as a partner with Caribbean countries on a more regional and coordinated basis;

(C) to help ease the region’s dependence on imported oil; and

(D) to promote affordable alternative sources of energy.

(b) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES.—The term “Caribbean countries” means countries in the Caribbean region, but does not including Cuba or Venezuela.

(2) CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS.—The term “Caribbean governments” means the national governments of the Caribbean countries.

(c) Statement of policy.—It is the policy of the United States to help Caribbean countries—

(1) achieve greater energy security and improve domestic energy resource mobilization;

(2) lower their dependence on imported fuels;

(3) eliminate the use of diesel, heavy fuel oil, other petroleum products, and coal for the generation of electricity;

(4) increase production of renewable energy; and

(5) meet the greenhouse gas mitigation goals of their national determined contributions to the Paris Agreement.

(d) Strategy.—

(1) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of USAID, shall submit a multi-year strategy to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that describes how the Department of State will promote regional cooperation with Caribbean countries—

(A) to lower dependence on imported fuels, grow domestic clean energy production in the region, strengthen regional energy security, and lower energy sector greenhouse gas emissions;

(B) to decrease dependence on oil in the transportation sector;

(C) to increase energy efficiency, energy conservation, and investment in alternatives to imported fuels;

(D) to improve grid reliability and modernize electricity transmission networks;

(E) to advance deployment of innovative solutions to expand community and individuals’ access to electricity;

(F) to help reform energy markets to encourage good regulatory governance and to promote a climate of private sector investment; and

(G) to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions from the energy and transportation sector.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include—

(A) a thorough review and inventory of United States Government activities that are being carried out bilaterally, regionally, and in coordination with multilateral institutions—

(i) to promote energy and climate security in the Caribbean region; and

(ii) to reduce the region’s reliance on oil for electricity generation;

(B) opportunities for marshaling regional cooperation—

(i) to overcome market barriers resulting from the small size of Caribbean energy markets;

(ii) to address the high transportation and infrastructure costs faced by Caribbean countries;

(iii) to ensure greater donor coordination between governments, multilateral institutions, multilateral banks, and private investors; and

(iv) to expand regional financing opportunities to allow for lower cost energy entrepreneurship;

(C) measures to ensure that each Caribbean government has—

(i) an independent utility regulator or equivalent;

(ii) affordable access by third party investors to its electrical grid with minimal regulatory interference;

(iii) effective energy efficiency and energy conservation;

(iv) programs to address technical and nontechnical issues;

(v) a plan to eliminate major market distortions;

(vi) cost-reflective tariffs; and

(vii) no tariffs or other taxes on clean energy solutions; and

(D) recommendations for how United States policy, technical, and economic assistance can be used in the Caribbean region—

(i) to advance renewable energy development and the incorporation of renewable technologies into existing energy grids and the development and deployment of micro-grids where appropriate and feasible to boost energy security and reliability, particularly to underserved communities;

(ii) to increase the generation of clean energy sufficiently to replace and allow for the retirement of obsolete fossil fuel energy generation units in Caribbean countries;

(iii) to create regional financing opportunities to allow for lower cost energy entrepreneurship;

(iv) to deploy transaction advisors in the region to help attract private investment and break down any market or regulatory barriers; and

(v) to establish a mechanism for each host government to have access to independent legal advice—

(I) to speed the development of energy-related contracts; and

(II) to better protect the interests of Caribbean governments and citizens.

(3) CONSULTATION.—In devising the strategy under this subsection, the Secretary of State shall work with the Secretary of Energy and shall consult with—

(A) the Secretary of the Interior;

(B) the Secretary of Commerce;

(C) the Secretary of the Treasury;

(D) the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of the United States;

(E) the Board of Directors of the Development Finance Corporation;

(F) the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development;

(G) the Caribbean governments;

(H) the Inter-American Development Bank;

(I) the World Bank Group; and

(J) the Caribbean Electric Utility Services Corporation.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States shares with the Caribbean a collective vulnerability to natural disasters, which affects the lives and the economies of our citizens.

(2) The April 9, 2021, eruption of the La Soufriere volcano is another reminder of the devastation caused by the many natural disasters the Caribbean confronts each year and the region’s vulnerability to external shocks. Hurricane Dorian, the largest storm to hit the region, wiped out large parts of the northern Bahamas in 2019, and Hurricanes Maria and Irma devastated multiple islands across the region in 2017, including Puerto Rico. According to IMF research, of the 511 plus disasters worldwide to hit small states since 1950, around two-thirds (324) have been in the Caribbean.

(3) This region is seven times more likely to experience a natural disaster than elsewhere. And, when one occurs, it will incur as much as six times more damage.

(4) Extreme weather events and other environmental impacts will only worsen over the coming years, and if not addressed, we will see only increasing economic shocks on these countries, driving irregular migration.

(5) While the United States has considerable expertise and capacity in assisting countries with disaster response, there remains a need for stronger partnerships that build regional resilience through efficient and interoperable platforms, protecting people and speeding recovery.

(6) The People’s Republic of China has dramatically increased its engagement in the Caribbean in the past five years, including offering loans and grants related to disaster response and resilience and sought to acquire property rights in the Caribbean that would be detrimental to United States national security interests.

(7) In 2019, the United States launched a new U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership to deepen cooperation and investment to strengthen our disaster resilience throughout the Caribbean region, including—

(A) to streamline early warning response networks and formalize communication channels;

(B) to enhance, encourage, and work collaboratively on further developing aviation disaster resilience plans and partnerships;

(C) to prioritize regional technical exchange in energy planning, risk reduction, and resilience;

(D) to increase communications network interoperability between Caribbean partners and the United States;

(E) to utilize storm surge mapping data and share real-time information in preparation for potential damage resulting from tropical cyclones and tsunamis;

(F) to use meteorological services to strengthen and deepen physical and communications infrastructure, data collection networks, and human and technical capacity throughout the region, as well as interactions with the public;

(G) to understand that while the use of international and military and civil defense assets in disaster response may only be considered as a last resort, when local, national, and international civilian capabilities are overwhelmed, civil-military coordination should occur, in support of the affected nation;

(H) to develop a framework that would govern the deployment of international military and civil defense assets in disaster response when local, national, and international civilian capabilities are overwhelmed, in support of the affected nation;

(I) to seek common mechanisms for ensuring rapid disaster response and recovery, including waiving or expediting diplomatic clearances, waiving of or reducing customs fees, streamlining overflight and airspace clearance, and ensuring that the first responders have the ability to rapidly respond to disasters in other countries;

(J) to promote the integration and coordination of regional response mechanisms in the Caribbean, including through the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency, the Regional Security System, United States Government Agencies, and allies in ways that facilitate more effective and efficient planning, mitigation, response, and resilience to natural disasters;

(K) to share best practices in improved building codes with national disaster organizations, including building better programs, at regional, national and community levels; and

(L) to promote community-based disaster preparedness and mitigation activities, particularly in underserved communities, with the aim of increasing broad public participation and resilience.

(b) Policy.—It is the policy of the United States to help Caribbean countries—

(1) increase their resilience and adapt to natural disasters and the impacts of severe weather events and a changing environment;

(2) partner with United States Federal, State, and local agencies and engage in technical cooperation, dialogue, and assistance activities;

(3) harmonize standards and practices related to paragraphs (1) and (2) to promote increased investment and integration;

(4) increase investment from United States companies in the Caribbean on resilience-building, adaptation, and climate-related mitigation efforts;

(5) promote regional cooperation and ensure efforts by the United States, Caribbean countries, and international partners complement each other; and

(6) further assist with the efforts listed under subsection (a)(7) above.

(c) Strategy.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State in coordination with other departments and agencies shall submit a multi-year strategy to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that describes how the Department of State will achieve the policy described in subsection (b) above.

(d) Appropriations.—There are authorized to be appropriated for U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership activities, programs, technical assistance, and engagement the following:

(1) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2022.

(2) $25,000,000 for fiscal year 2023.

(3) $30,000,000 for fiscal year 2024 and thereafter.

(e) Reporting and monitoring.—

(1) Of the appropriated amount each fiscal year, at least five percent of all programming funding allocation must support and be directed toward reporting, monitoring, and assessment of effectiveness.

(2) The Department of State will ensure that at least 20 percent of appropriations for the U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership directly support the training of, engagement with, collaboration with, and exchange of expertise on resilience between United States Federal, State, and local officials and their Caribbean government counterparts. Funding should also support as appropriate increased academic, civil society, media, and private sector engagement in the fields of resilience-building, adaptation, and mitigation.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States, European Union, and European countries are close partners, sharing values grounded in democracy, human rights, transparency, and the rules-based international order established after World War II;

(2) without a common approach by the United States, European Union, and European countries on connectivity, trade, transnational problems, and support for democracy and human rights, the People’s Republic of China will continue to increase its economic, political, and security leverage in Europe;

(3) the People’s Republic of China’s deployment of assistance to European countries following the COVID–19 outbreak showcased a coercive approach to aid, but it also highlighted Europe’s deep economic ties to the People’s Republic of China;

(4) as European states seek to recover from the economic toll of the COVID–19 outbreak, the United States must stand in partnership with Europe to support our collective economic recovery, reinforce our collective national security, and defend shared values;

(5) the United States, European Union, and European countries should coordinate on joint strategies to diversify reliance on supply chains away from the People’s Republic of China, especially in the medical and pharmaceutical sectors;

(6) the United States, European Union, and European countries should leverage their respective economic innovation capabilities to support the global economic recovery from the COVID–19 recession and draw a contrast with the centralized economy of the People’s Republic of China;

(7) the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union should accelerate efforts to de-escalate their trade disputes, including negotiating a United States-European Union trade agreement that benefits workers and the broader economy in both the United States and European Union;

(8) the United States, European Union, and Japan should continue trilateral efforts to address economic challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China;

(9) the United States, European Union, and countries of Europe should enhance cooperation to counter PRC disinformation, influence operations, and propaganda efforts;

(10) the United States and European nations share serious concerns with the repressions being supported and executed by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, and should continue implementing measures to address the Government of the People’s Republic of China’s specific abuses in Tibet, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang, and should build joint mechanisms and programs to prevent the export of China’s authoritarian governance model to countries around the world;

(11) the United States and European nations should remain united in their shared values against attempts by the Government of the People’s Republic of China at the United Nations and other multilateral organizations to promote efforts that erode the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, like the “community of a shared future for mankind” and “democratization of international relations”;

(12) the People’s Republic of China’s infrastructure investments around the world, particularly in 5G telecommunications technology and port infrastructure, could threaten democracy across Europe and the national security of key countries;

(13) as appropriate, the United States should share intelligence with European allies and partners on Huawei’s 5G capabilities and the intentions of the Government of the People’s Republic of China with respect to 5G expansion in Europe;

(14) the European Union’s Investment Screening Regulation, which came into force in October 2020, is a welcome development, and member states should closely scrutinize PRC investments in their countries through their own national investment screening measures;

(15) the President should actively engage the European Union on the implementation of the Export Control Reform Act regulations and to better harmonize United States and European Union policies with respect to export controls;

(16) the President should strongly advocate for the listing of more items and technologies to restrict dual use exports controlled at the National Security and above level to the People’s Republic of China under the Wassenaar Arrangement;

(17) the United States should explore the value of establishing a body akin to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) that would specifically coordinate United States and European Union export control policies with respect to limiting exports of sensitive technologies to the People’s Republic of China; and

(18) the United States should work with counterparts in Europe to—

(A) evaluate United States and European overreliance on goods originating in the People’s Republic of China, including in the medical and pharmaceutical sectors, and develop joint strategies to diversify supply chains;

(B) counter PRC efforts to use COVID–19-related assistance as a coercive tool to pressure developing countries by offering relevant United States and European expertise and assistance; and

(C) leverage the United States and European private sectors to advance the post-COVID–19 economic recovery.

(a) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall brief the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives on a strategy for how the United States will enhance cooperation with the European Union, NATO, and European partner countries with respect to the People’s Republic of China.

(b) Elements.—The briefing required by subsection (a) shall do the following:

(1) Identify the senior Senate-confirmed Department of State official that leads United States efforts to cooperate with the European Union, NATO, and European partner countries to advance a shared approach with respect to the People’s Republic of China.

(2) Identify key policy points of convergence and divergence between the United States and European partners with respect to the People’s Republic of China in the areas of technology, trade, and economic practices.

(3) Describe efforts to advance shared interests with European counterparts on—

(A) economic challenges with respect to the People’s Republic of China;

(B) democracy and human rights challenges with respect to the People’s Republic of China;

(C) technology issues with respect to the People’s Republic of China;

(D) defense issues with respect to the People’s Republic of China; and

(E) developing a comprehensive strategy to respond to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) established by the Government of the People’s Republic of China.

(4) Describe the coordination mechanisms among key regional and functional bureaus within the Department of State and Department of Defense tasked with engaging with European partners on the People’s Republic of China.

(5) Detail diplomatic efforts up to the date of the briefing and future plans to work with European partners to counter the Government of the People’s Republic of China’s advancement of an authoritarian governance model around the world.

(6) Detail the diplomatic efforts made up to the date of the briefing and future plans to support European efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to Huawei’s 5G technology.

(7) Detail how United States public diplomacy tools, including the Global Engagement Center of the Department of State, will coordinate efforts with counterpart entities within the European Union to counter Chinese propaganda.

(8) Describe the staffing and budget resources the Department of State dedicates to engagement between the United States and the European Union on the People’s Republic of China and provide an assessment of out-year resource needs to execute the strategy.

(9) Detail diplomatic efforts to work with European partners to track and counter Chinese attempts to exert influence across multilateral fora, including at the World Health Organization.

(c) Form.—The briefing required by section (a) shall be classified.

(d) Consultation.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees regarding the development and implementation of the elements described in subsection (b).

(a) In general.—The President should work with transatlantic partners to build on the agreement among the Development Finance Corporation, FinDev Canada, and the European Development Finance Institutions (called the DFI Alliance) to enhance coordination on shared objectives to foster private sector-led development and provide market-based alternatives to state-directed financing in emerging markets, particularly as related to the People’s Republic of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including by integrating efforts such as—

(1) the European Union Strategy on Connecting Europe and Asia;

(2) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas Initiative Fund;

(3) the Blue Dot Network among the United States, Japan, and Australia; and

(4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has leveraged $65,000,000,000 for infrastructure projects and emphasizes transparency standards.

(b) Standards.—The United States and the European Union should coordinate and develop a strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation with the OECD and the Paris Club on ensuring the highest possible standards for Belt and Road Initiative contracts and terms with developing countries.

(a) Appropriate committees of Congress defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(b) Report and briefing required.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and such other heads of Federal agencies as the Director considers appropriate, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report and brief the appropriate committees of Congress on cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Iran and between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation.

(2) CONTENTS.—The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

(A) An identification of major areas of diplomatic energy, infrastructure, banking, financial, economic, military, and space cooperation—

(i) between the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Iran; and

(ii) between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation.

(B) An assessment of the effect of the COVID–19 pandemic on such cooperation.

(C) An assessment of the effect that United States compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) starting in January 14, 2016, and United States withdrawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, had on the cooperation described in subparagraph (A)(i).

(D) An assessment of the effect on the cooperation described in subparagraph (A)(i) that would be had by the United States reentering compliance with the JCPOA or a successor agreement and the effect of the United States not reentering compliance with the JCPOA or reaching a successor agreement.

(3) FORM.—The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(c) Sense of congress on sharing with allies and partners.—It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies should share the findings of the report submitted under subsection (b) with important allies and partners of the United States, as appropriate.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States should continue to stand with friends and partners, while also working to establish new partners in South and Central Asia as they contend with efforts by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to interfere in their respective political systems and encroach upon their sovereign territory; and

(2) the United States should reaffirm its commitment to the Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership with India and further deepen bilateral defense consultations and collaboration with India commensurate with its status as a major defense partner.

(a) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a strategy for how the United States will engage with the countries of South and Central Asia, including through the C5+1 mechanism, with respect to the People’s Republic of China.

(b) Elements.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include the following elements:

(1) A detailed description of the security and economic challenges that the People’s Republic of China poses to the countries of South and Central Asia, including border disputes with South and Central Asian countries that border the People’s Republic of China, PRC investments in land and sea ports, transportation infrastructure, and energy projects across the region.

(2) A detailed description of United States efforts to provide alternatives to PRC investment in infrastructure and other sectors in South and Central Asia.

(3) A detailed description of bilateral and regional efforts to work with countries in South Asia on strategies to build resilience against PRC efforts to interfere in their political systems and economies.

(4) A detailed description of United States diplomatic efforts to work with the Government of Afghanistan on addressing the challenges posed by PRC investment in the Afghan mineral sector.

(5) A detailed description of United States diplomatic efforts with the Government of Pakistan with respect to matters relevant to the People’s Republic of China, including investments by the People’s Republic of China in Pakistan through the Belt and Road Initiative.

(6) In close consultation with the Government of India, identification of areas where the United States Government can provide diplomatic and other support as appropriate for India’s efforts to address economic and security challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China in the region.

(7) A description of the coordination mechanisms among key regional and functional bureaus within the Department of State and Department of Defense tasked with engaging with the countries of South and Central Asia on issues relating to the People’s Republic of China.

(8) A description of the efforts being made by Federal departments and agencies, including the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, and the Office of the United States Trade Representative, to help the nations of South and Central Asia develop trade and commerce links that will help those nations diversify their trade away from the People’s Republic of China.

(9) A detailed description of United States diplomatic efforts with Central Asian countries, Turkey, and any other countries with significant populations of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities fleeing persecution in the People’s Republic of China to press those countries to refrain from deporting ethnic minorities to the People’s Republic of China, protect ethnic minorities from intimidation by Chinese government authorities, and protect the right to the freedoms of assembly and expression.

(c) Form.—The strategy required under section (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the public, but may include a classified annex as necessary.

(d) Consultation.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less than annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall consult with the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee of Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives regarding the development and implementation of the strategy required under subsection (a).

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Indian Ocean region is a vitally important part of the Indo-Pacific where the United States has political, economic, and security interests.

(2) The United States has an interest in working with partners in the Indo-Pacific, including India, Japan, and Australia, to address regional governance, economic connectivity, and security challenges including threats to freedom of navigation.

(b) Statement of policy.—As a part of the United States engagement in the Indo-Pacific, it shall be the policy of the United States to strengthen engagement with the countries in the Indian Ocean region, including with governments, civil society, and private sectors in such countries to—

(1) promote United States political engagement with such region, including through active participation in regional organizations, and strengthened diplomatic relations with United States partners in such region;

(2) enhance United States economic connectivity and commercial exchange with such region;

(3) defend freedom of navigation in such region from security challenges, including related to piracy;

(4) support the ability of governments and organizations in such region to respond to natural disasters;

(5) support and facilitate the role of regional allies and partners as net providers of security to such region and as partners to the United States in addressing security challenges in such region, including through assistance to such allies and partners to build capacity in maritime security and maritime domain awareness;

(6) continue to build the United States-India relationship in order to regularize security cooperation through the negotiation of agreements concerning access, communication, and navigation, including through foundational agreements; and

(7) promote cooperation with United States allies in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan and Australia, and major defense partners, including India, and NATO allies, including the United Kingdom and France, to support a rules-based order in such region.

(c) Strategy.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a multi-year strategy for United States engagement to support United States interests in the Indian Ocean region. Such strategy shall—

(A) define United States political, economic, and security interests in the Indian Ocean region;

(B) outline challenges to the interests of the United States in such region;

(C) outline efforts to improve cooperation between the United States and members of the Quad, including India, Japan, and Australia, through coordination in diplomacy and development priorities, joint military exercises and operations, and other activities that promote United States political, economic, and security interests;

(D) outline efforts to support economic connectivity in such region, including through the United States-India-Japan Trilateral Infrastructure Working Group, the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, and other efforts to expand and enhance connectivity across the Indo-Pacific, including with the countries of Southeast Asia, that maintain high standards of investment and support for civil society and people-to-people connectivity;

(E) describe how the United States can engage with regional intergovernmental organizations and entities, including the Indian Ocean Rim Association, to promote United States political, economic, and security interests in such region;

(F) review the United States diplomatic posture in such region, including an assessment of United States diplomatic engagement in countries without a permanent United States embassy or diplomatic mission, and an assessment of ways to improve the cooperation with the Maldives, the Seychelles, and Comoros;

(G) review United States diplomatic agreements with countries in such region that facilitate United States military operations in such region, including bilateral and multilateral agreements, and describe efforts to expand United States cooperation with such countries through the negotiation of additional agreements; and

(H) include a security assistance strategy for such region that outlines priorities, objectives, and actions for United States security assistance efforts to governments of countries in such region to promote United States political, economic, and security interests in such region.

(2) INCLUSION.—The strategy required under paragraph (1) may be submitted as a part of any other strategy relating to the Indo-Pacific.

(3) REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than one year after the submission of the strategy required under paragraph (1) and one year thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on progress made toward implementing such strategy.

(d) United states-China economic and security review commission.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subparagraph (E) of section 1238(c)(2) of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (22 U.S.C. 7002(c)(2)) is amended—

(A) by inserting “, including in the Indian Ocean region” after “deployments of the People’s Republic of China military”; and

(B) by adding at the end the following new sentence: “In this subparagraph, the term ‘Indian Ocean region’ means the Indian Ocean, including the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and the littoral areas surrounding the Indian Ocean.”.

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by paragraph (1) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and apply beginning with the first report required under section 1238 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (as amended by such paragraph) that is submitted after such date.

(e) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(2) INDIAN OCEAN REGION.—The term “Indian Ocean region” means the Indian Ocean, including the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and the littoral areas surrounding the Indian Ocean.

(a) Appropriate committees of Congress defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(b) Intelligence assessment.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that assesses the nature and impact of the People’s Republic of China’s political, economic, sociocultural, and security sector activity in Africa, and its impact on United States strategic interests, including—

(1) the amount and impact of direct investment, loans, development financing, oil-for-loans deals, and other preferential trading arrangements;

(2) the involvement of PRC state-owned enterprises in Africa;

(3) the amount of African debt held by the People’s Republic of China;

(4) the involvement of PRC private security, technology and media companies in Africa;

(5) the scale and impact of PRC arms sales to African countries;

(6) the scope of Chinese investment in and control of African energy resources and minerals critical for emerging and foundational technologies;

(7) an analysis on the linkages between Beijing’s aid and assistance to African countries and African countries supporting PRC geopolitical goals in international fora;

(8) the methods, tools, and tactics used to facilitate illegal and corrupt activity, including trade in counterfeit and illicit goods, to include smuggled extractive resources and wildlife products, between Africa and China;

(9) the methods and techniques that the People’s Republic of China uses to exert undue influence on African governments and facilitate corrupt activity in Africa, including through the CCP's party-to-party training program, and to influence African multilateral organizations; and

(10) an analysis of the soft power, cultural and educational activities undertaken by the PRC and CCP to seek to expand its influence in Africa.

(a) Appropriate committees of Congress defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

(b) Strategy requirement.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the leadership of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report setting forth a multi-year strategy for increasing United States economic competitiveness and promoting improvements in the investment climate in Africa, including through support for democratic institutions, the rule of law, including property rights, and for improved transparency, anti-corruption and governance.

(c) Elements.—The strategy submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall include—

(1) a description and assessment of barriers to United States investment in Africa for United States businesses, including a clear identification of the different barriers facing small-sized and medium-sized businesses, and an assessment of whether existing programs effectively address such barriers;

(2) a description and assessment of barriers to African diaspora investment in Africa, and recommendations to overcome such barriers;

(3) an identification of the economic sectors in the United States that have a comparative advantage in African markets;

(4) a determination of priority African countries for promoting two-way trade and investment and an assessment of additional foreign assistance needs, including democracy and governance and rule of law support, to promote a conducive operating environment in priority countries;

(5) an identification of opportunities for strategic cooperation with European allies on trade and investment in Africa, and for establishing a dialogue on trade, security, development, and environmental issues of mutual interest; and

(6) a plan to regularly host a United States-Africa Leaders Summit to promote two-way trade and investment, strategic engagement, and security in Africa.

(d) Assessment of united states government human resources capacity.—The Comptroller General of the United States shall—

(1) conduct a review of the number of Foreign Commercial Service Officers and Department of State Economic Officers at United States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa; and

(2) develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees an assessment of whether human resource capacity in such embassies is adequate to meet the goals of the various trade and economic programs and initiatives in Africa, including the African Growth and Opportunity Act and Prosper Africa.

(a) Appropriate committees of Congress defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(b) Interagency working group To counter PRC cyber aggression in Africa.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish an interagency Working Group, which shall include representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and such other agencies of the United States Government as the President considers appropriate, on means to counter PRC cyber aggression with respect to Africa.

(2) DUTIES.—The Working Group established pursuant to this subsection shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a set of recommendations such as for—

(A) bolstering the capacity of governments in Africa to ensure the integrity of their data networks and critical infrastructure where applicable;

(B) providing alternatives to Huawei;

(C) an action plan for United States embassies in Africa to provide assistance to host-country governments with respect to protecting their vital digital networks and infrastructure from PRC espionage, including an assessment of staffing resources needed to implement the action plan in embassies in Africa;

(D) utilizing interagency resources to counter PRC disinformation and propaganda in traditional and digital media targeted to African audiences; and

(E) helping civil society in Africa counter digital authoritarianism and identifying tools and assistance to enhance and promote digital democracy.

The Secretary of State may station on a permanent basis Department of State personnel at such United States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa as the Secretary considers appropriate focused on the activities, policies and investments of the People’s Republic of China in Africa.

(a) Finding.—Congress finds that youth in Africa can have a positive impact on efforts to foster economic growth, improve public sector transparency and governance, and counter extremism, and should be an area of focus for United States outreach on the continent.

(b) Policy.—It is the policy of the United States, in cooperation and collaboration with private sector companies, civic organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and national and regional public sector entities, to commit resources to enhancing the entrepreneurship and leadership skills of African youth with the objective of enhancing their ability to serve as leaders in the public and private sectors in order to help them spur growth and prosperity, strengthen democratic governance, and enhance peace and security in their respective countries of origin and across Africa.

(c) Young african leaders initiative.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There is hereby established the Young African Leaders Initiative, to be carried out by the Secretary of State.

(2) FELLOWSHIPS.—The Secretary is authorized to continue to support the participation in the Initiative established under this paragraph, in the United States, of fellows from Africa each year for such education and training in leadership and professional development through the Department of State as the Secretary of State considers appropriate. The Secretary shall establish and publish criteria for eligibility for participation as such a fellow, and for selection of fellows among eligible applicants for a fellowship.

(3) RECIPROCAL EXCHANGES.—Under the Initiative, United States citizens may engage in such reciprocal exchanges in connection with and collaboration on projects with fellows under paragraph (1) as the Secretary considers appropriate.

(4) NETWORKS.—The Secretary is authorized to continue to maintain an online network that provides information and online courses for young leaders in Africa on topics related to entrepreneurship and leadership.

(5) REGIONAL CENTERS.—The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development is authorized to establish regional centers in Africa to provide in-person and online training throughout the year in business and entrepreneurship, civic leadership, and public management.

(d) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State should increase the number of fellows from Africa participating in the Mandela Washington Fellowship above the current 700 projected for fiscal year 2021.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the CEO of the United States Agency for Global Media shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the resources and timeline needed to establish within the Agency an organization whose mission shall be to promote democratic values and institutions in Africa by providing objective, accurate, and relevant news and information to the people of Africa and counter disinformation from malign actors, especially in countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established, about the region, the world, and the United States through uncensored news, responsible discussion, and open debate.

(a) Promotion of and support for private investment opportunities.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The United States International Development Corporation (in this section referred to as the “Corporation”) shall carry out feasibility studies for the planning, development, and management of, and procurement for, potential bilateral and multilateral development projects eligible for support under title II of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9621 et seq.) in sub-Saharan Africa in accordance with the provisions described in section 1421(e) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 9621(e)).

(2) INAPPLICABILITY OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO COSTS REQUIREMENT.—The requirements relating to contributions of costs described in paragraph (2) of section 1421(e) of such Act shall not apply with respect to any person receiving funds under the authorities of paragraph (1).

(b) Special projects and programs.—The Corporation shall administer and manage special projects and programs in support of specific transactions undertaken by the Corporation or others in sub-Saharan Africa in accordance with the provisions described in section 1421(f) of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9621(f)).

(c) Engagement with investors.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation, acting through the Chief Development Officer, shall, in cooperation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, carry out the activities described in paragraphs (1) through (5) of section 1445(a) of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9655(a)) with respect to sub-Saharan Africa.

(2) ASSISTANCE.—To achieve the goals described in paragraph (1), the Corporation shall carry out the activities described in paragraphs (1) through (10) of section 1445(b) with respect to sub-Saharan Africa.

(3) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.—The Corporation shall coordinate with the United States Agency for International Development and other agencies and departments, as necessary, on projects and programs supported by the Corporation that include technical assistance with respect to sub-Saharan Africa.

(d) Employees stationed in sub-Saharan Africa.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to the availability of appropriations, the Corporation shall take steps to ensure that at least 6 full-time employees of the Corporation, which may include personnel detailed to the Corporation from other Federal agencies, are stationed in sub-Saharan Africa and whose sole duties are to support the functions of the Corporation as described in subsections (a), (b), and (c) or under any provision of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 with respect to sub-Saharan Africa.

(2) PROHIBITION ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.—The Corporation may not hire or retain any contractor or subcontractor to support the functions of the Corporation as described in paragraph (1) if the contractor or subcontractor has any equity or other financial interest in any specific transactions undertaken by the Corporation or others in sub-Saharan Africa as described in this section.

(e) Definitions.—In this section, the term “sub-Saharan Africa” has the meaning given that term in section 107 of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (19 U.S.C. 3706).

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the People’s Republic of China is upgrading its influence in the Middle East and North Africa through its energy and infrastructure investments, technology transfer, and arms sales;

(2) the People’s Republic of China seeks to establish military or dual use facilities in geographically strategic locations in the Middle East and North Africa to further its Belt and Road Initiative at the expense of United States national security interests; and

(3) the export of certain communications infrastructure from the People’s Republic of China degrades the security of partner networks, exposes intellectual property to theft, threatens the ability of the United States to conduct security cooperation with compromised regional partners, and furthers China’s authoritarian surveillance model.

(b) Strategy required.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall jointly develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a strategy for countering and limiting the PRC’s influence in, and access to, the Middle East and North Africa.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) an assessment of the People’s Republic of China’s intent with regards to increased cooperation with Middle East and North African countries and how these activities fit into its broader global strategic objectives;

(B) an assessment of how governments across the region are responding to the People’s Republic of China’s efforts to increase its military presence in their countries;

(C) efforts to improve regional cooperation through foreign military sales, financing, and efforts to build partner capacity and increase interoperability with the United States;

(D) an assessment of the People’s Republic of China’s joint research and development with the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on the United States national security interests, and recommended steps to mitigate the People’s Republic of China’s influence in this area;

(E) an assessment of arms sales and weapons technology transfers from the People’s Republic of China to the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on United States national security interests, and recommended steps to mitigate the People’s Republic of China’s influence in this area;

(F) an assessment of the People’s Republic of China’s military sales to the region including lethal and non-lethal unmanned aerial systems;

(G) an assessment of People’s Republic of China military basing and dual-use facility initiatives across the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on United States national security interests, and recommended steps to mitigate the People’s Republic of China’s influence in this area;

(H) efforts to improve regional security cooperation with United States allies and partners with a focus on—

(i) maritime security in the Arabian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean;

(ii) integrated air and missile defense;

(iii) cyber security;

(iv) border security; and

(v) critical infrastructure security, to include energy security;

(I) increased support for government-to-government engagement on critical infrastructure development projects including ports and water infrastructure;

(J) efforts to encourage United States private sector and public-private partnerships in healthcare technology and foreign direct investment in non-energy sectors;

(K) efforts to expand youth engagement and professional education exchanges with key partner countries;

(L) specific steps to counter increased investment from the People’s Republic of China in telecommunications infrastructure and diplomatic efforts to stress the political, economic, and social benefits of a free and open internet;

(M) efforts to promote United States private sector engagement in and public-private partnerships on renewable energy development;

(N) the expansion of public-private partnership efforts on water, desalination, and irrigation projects; and

(O) efforts to warn United States partners in the Middle East and North Africa of the risks associated with the People’s Republic of China’s telecommunications infrastructure and provide alternative “clean paths” to the People’s Republic of China’s technology.

(c) Form.—The strategy required under section (b) shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the public, but may include a classified annex as necessary.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States and the international community have long-term interests in the stability, security, and prosperity of the people of the Middle East and North Africa.

(2) In addition to and apart from military and security efforts, the United States should harness a whole of government approach, including bilateral and multilateral statecraft, economic lines of effort, and public diplomacy to compete with and counter PRC influence.

(3) A clearly articulated positive narrative of United States engagement, transparent governance structures, and active civil society engagement help counter predatory foreign investment and influence efforts.

(b) Statement of policy.—It is the policy of the United States that the United States and the international community should continue diplomatic and economic efforts throughout the Middle East and North Africa that support reform efforts to—

(1) promote greater economic opportunity;

(2) foster private sector development;

(3) strengthen civil society; and

(4) promote transparent and democratic governance and the rule of law.

(a) Sense of Congress on Arctic security.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment—

(A) creates new national and regional security challenges due to increased military activity in the Arctic;

(B) heightens the risk of the Arctic emerging as a major theater of conflict in ongoing strategic competition;

(C) threatens maritime safety as Arctic littoral nations have inadequate capacity to patrol the increased vessel traffic in this remote region, which is a result of diminished annual levels of sea ice;

(D) impacts public safety due to increased human activity in the Arctic region where search and rescue capacity remains very limited; and

(E) threatens the health of the Arctic’s fragile and pristine environment and the unique and highly sensitive species found in the Arctic’s marine and terrestrial ecosystems; and

(2) the United States should reduce the consequences outlined in paragraph (1) by—

(A) carefully evaluating the wide variety and dynamic set of security and safety risks unfolding in the Arctic;

(B) developing policies and making preparations to mitigate and respond to threats and risks in the Arctic, including by continuing to work with allies and partners in the Arctic region to deter potential aggressive activities and build Arctic competencies;

(C) adequately funding the National Earth System Prediction Capability to substantively improve weather, ocean, and ice predictions on the time scales necessary to ensure regional security and trans-Arctic shipping;

(D) investing in resources, including a significantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure that the United States has adequate capacity to prevent and respond to security threats in the Arctic region; and

(E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with all states in the Arctic region to reach an agreement for—

(i) maintaining peace and stability in the Arctic region;

(ii) fostering cooperation on stewardship and safety initiatives in the Arctic region;

(iii) ensuring safe and efficient management of commercial maritime traffic in the Arctic;

(iv) promoting responsible natural resource management and economic development;

(v) countering China's Polar Silk Road initiative;

(vi) examining the possibility of reconvening the Arctic Chiefs of Defense Forum; and

(vii) reducing black carbon and methane emissions in the Artic Region, including by working with observers of the Arctic Council, including India and the PRC, to adopt mitigation plans consistent with the findings and recommendations of the Arctic Council’s Framework for Action on Black Carbon and Methane.

(b) Statement of policy.—It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to recognize only the states enumerated in subsection (c)(1) as Arctic states, and to reject all other claims to this status; and

(2) that the militarization of the Arctic poses a serious threat to Arctic peace and stability, and the interests of United States allies and partners.

(c) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) ARCTIC STATES.—The term “Arctic states” means Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway, Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Sweden, and Iceland.

(2) ARCTIC REGION.—The term “Arctic Region” means the geographic region north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude north of the equator.

(d) Designation of ambassador at large for arctic affairs.—There is established within the Department of State an Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs (referred to in this section as the “Ambassador”), appointed in accordance with paragraph (1).

(1) APPOINTMENT.—The Ambassador shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(2) DUTIES.—

(A) DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION.—Subject to the direction of the President and the Secretary of State, the Ambassador is authorized to represent the United States in matters and cases relevant to the Arctic Region in—

(i) contacts with foreign governments, intergovernmental organizations, and specialized agencies of the United Nations, the Arctic Council, and other international organizations of which the United States is a member; and

(ii) multilateral conferences and meetings relating to Arctic affairs.

(B) CHAIR OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL.—The Ambassador shall serve as the Chair of the Arctic Council when the United States holds the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council.

(3) POLICIES AND PROCEDURES.—The Ambassador shall coordinate United States policies related to the Arctic Region, including—

(A) meeting national security, economic, and commercial needs pertaining to Arctic affairs;

(B) protecting the Arctic environment and conserving its biological resources;

(C) promoting environmentally sustainable natural resource management and economic development;

(D) strengthening institutions for cooperation among the Arctic Nations;

(E) involving Arctic indigenous people in decisions that affect them;

(F) enhancing scientific monitoring and research on local, regional, and global environmental issues;

(G) integrating scientific data on the current and projected effects of climate change in the Arctic Region and ensure that such data is applied to the development of security strategies for the Arctic Region;

(H) making available the methods and approaches on the integration of climate science to other regional security planning programs in the Department of State to better ensure that broader decision-making processes may more adequately account for the effects of climate change; and

(I) reducing black carbon and methane emissions in the Arctic Region.

(e) Arctic region security policy.—Arctic Region Security Policy shall assess, develop, budget for, and implement plans, policies, and actions—

(1) to bolster the diplomatic presence of the United States in Arctic states, including through enhancements to diplomatic missions and facilities, participation in regional and bilateral dialogues related to Arctic security, and coordination of United States initiatives and assistance programs across agencies to protect the national security of the United States and its allies and partners;

(2) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic states to the effects of environmental change and increased civilian and military activity by Arctic states and other states that may result from increased accessibility of the Arctic Region;

(3) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic Region and Arctic states that—

(A) are vulnerable to the changing Arctic environment; and

(B) are strategically significant to the United States;

(4) to coordinate the integration of environmental change and national security risk and vulnerability assessments into the decision-making process on foreign assistance awards with Greenland;

(5) to advance principles of good governance by encouraging and cooperating with Arctic states on collaborative approaches—

(A) to responsibly manage natural resources in the Arctic Region;

(B) to share the burden of ensuring maritime safety in the Arctic Region;

(C) to prevent the escalation of security tensions by mitigating against the militarization of the Arctic Region;

(D) to develop mutually agreed upon multilateral policies among Arctic states on the management of maritime transit routes through the Arctic Region and work cooperatively on the transit policies for access to and transit in the Arctic Region by non-Arctic states; and

(E) to facilitate the development of Arctic Region Security Action Plans to ensure stability and public safety in disaster situations in a humane and responsible fashion;

(6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, survivability, and resiliency of United States interests and non-defense assets in the Arctic Region; and

(7) to reduce black carbon and methane emissions in the Arctic.

It shall be the policy of the United States—

(1) to elevate the countries of Oceania as a strategic national security and economic priority of the United States Government;

(2) to promote civil society, the rule of law, and democratic governance across Oceania as part of a free and open Indo-Pacific region;

(3) to broaden and deepen relationships with the Freely Associated States of the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia through robust defense, diplomatic, economic, and development exchanges that promote the goals of individual states and the entire region;

(4) to work with the governments of Australia, New Zealand, and Japan to advance shared alliance goals of the Oceania region concerning health, environmental protection, disaster resilience and preparedness, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, maritime security, and economic development;

(5) to participate, wherever possible and appropriate, in existing regional organizations and international structures to promote the national security and economic goals of the United States and countries of the Oceania region;

(6) to invest in a whole-of-government United States strategy that will enhance youth engagement and advance long-term growth and development throughout the region, especially as it relates to protecting marine resources that are critical to livelihoods and strengthening the resilience of the countries of the Oceania region against current and future threats resulting from extreme weather and severe changes in the environment;

(7) to deter and combat acts of malign foreign influence and corruption aimed at undermining the political, environmental, social, and economic stability of the people and governments of the countries of Oceania;

(8) to improve the local capacity of the countries of Oceania to address public health challenges and improve global health security;

(9) to help the countries of Oceania access market-based private sector investments that adhere to best practices regarding transparency, debt sustainability, and environmental and social safeguards as an alternative to state-directed investments by authoritarian governments;

(10) to ensure the people and communities of Oceania remain safe from the risks of old and degrading munitions hazards and other debris that threaten health and livelihoods;

(11) to cooperate with Taiwan by offering United States support for maintaining Taiwan’s diplomatic partners in Oceania; and

(12) to work cooperatively with all governments in Oceania to promote the dignified return of the remains of members of the United States Armed Forces that are missing in action from previous conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region.

(a) Oceania strategic roadmap.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategic roadmap for strengthening United States engagement with the countries of Oceania, including an analysis of opportunities to cooperate with Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, to address shared concerns and promote shared goals in pursuit of security and resiliency in the countries of Oceania.

(b) Elements.—The strategic roadmap required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) A description of United States regional goals and concerns with respect to Oceania and increasing engagement with the countries of Oceania.

(2) An assessment, based on paragraph (1), of United States regional goals and concerns that are shared by Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, including a review of issues related to anticorruption, maritime and other security issues, environmental protection, fisheries management, economic growth and development, and disaster resilience and preparedness.

(3) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives by the governments of the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan in pursuit of those shared regional goals and concerns, including with respect to the issues described in paragraph (1).

(4) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives by regional organizations and other related intergovernmental structures aimed at addressing the issues described in paragraph (1).

(5) A plan for aligning United States programs and resources in pursuit of those shared regional goals and concerns, as appropriate.

(6) Recommendations for additional United States authorities, personnel, programs, or resources necessary to execute the strategic roadmap.

(7) Any other elements the Secretary considers appropriate.

(a) In general.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the feasibility and advisability of establishing a United States-based public-private sponsored security dialogue (to be known as the “Oceania Security Dialogue”) among the countries of Oceania for the purposes of jointly exploring and discussing issues affecting the economic, diplomatic, and national security of the Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania.

(b) Report required.—The briefing required by subsection (a) shall, at a minimum, include the following:

(1) A review of the ability of the Department of State to participate in a public-private sponsored security dialogue.

(2) An assessment of the potential locations for conducting an Oceania Security Dialogue in the jurisdiction of the United States.

(3) Consideration of dates for conducting an Oceania Security Dialogue that would maximize participation of representatives from the Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania.

(4) A review of the funding modalities available to the Department of State to help finance an Oceania Security Dialogue, including grant-making authorities available to the Department of State.

(5) An assessment of any administrative, statutory, or other legal limitations that would prevent the establishment of an Oceania Security Dialogue with participation and support of the Department of State as described in subsection (a).

(6) An analysis of how an Oceania Security Dialogue could help to advance the Boe Declaration on Regional Security, including its emphasis on the changing environment as the greatest existential threat to countries of Oceania.

(7) An evaluation of how an Oceania Security Dialogue could help amplify the issues and work of existing regional structures and organizations dedicated to the security of the Oceania region, such as the Pacific Island Forum and Pacific Environmental Security Forum.

(8) An analysis of how an Oceania Security Dialogue would help with implementation of the strategic roadmap required by section 292 and advance the National Security Strategy of the United States.

(c) Interagency consultation.—To the extent practicable, the Secretary of State may consult with the Secretary of Defense and, where appropriate, evaluate the lessons learned of the Regional Centers for Security Studies of the Department of Defense to determine the feasibility and advisability of establishing the Oceania Security Dialogue.

(a) In general.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace Corps shall submit to Congress a report on strategies for to reasonably and safely expand the number of Peace Corps volunteers in Oceania, with the goals of—

(1) expanding the presence of the Peace Corps to all currently feasible locations in Oceania; and

(2) working with regional and international partners of the United States to expand the presence of Peace Corps volunteers in low-income Oceania communities in support of climate resilience initiatives.

(b) Elements.—The report required by subsection (a) shall—

(1) assess the factors contributing to the current absence of the Peace Corps and its volunteers in Oceania;

(2) examine potential remedies that include working with United States Government agencies and regional governments, including governments of United States allies—

(A) to increase the health infrastructure and medical evacuation capabilities of the countries of Oceania to better support the safety of Peace Corps volunteers while in those countries;

(B) to address physical safety concerns that have decreased the ability of the Peace Corps to operate in Oceania; and

(C) to increase transportation infrastructure in the countries of Oceania to better support the travel of Peace Corps volunteers and their access to necessary facilities;

(3) evaluate the potential to expand the deployment of Peace Corps Response volunteers to help the countries of Oceania address social, economic, and development needs of their communities that require specific professional expertise; and

(4) explore potential new operational models to address safety and security needs of Peace Corps volunteers in the countries of Oceania, including—

(A) changes to volunteer deployment durations; and

(B) scheduled redeployment of volunteers to regional or United States-based healthcare facilities for routine physical and behavioral health evaluation.

(c) Volunteers in low-Income oceania communities.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—In examining the potential to expand the presence of Peace Corps volunteers in low-income Oceania communities under subsection (a)(2), the Director of the Peace Corps shall consider the development of initiatives described in paragraph (2).

(2) INITIATIVES DESCRIBED.—Initiatives described in this paragraph are volunteer initiatives that help the countries of Oceania address social, economic, and development needs of their communities, including by—

(A) addressing, through appropriate resilience-based interventions, the vulnerability that communities in Oceania face as result of extreme weather, severe environmental change, and other climate related trends; and

(B) improving, through smart infrastructure principles, access to transportation and connectivity infrastructure that will help address the economic and social challenges that communities in Oceania confront as a result of poor or nonexistent infrastructure.

(d) Oceania defined.—In this section, the term “Oceania” includes the following:

(1) Easter Island of Chile.

(2) Fiji.

(3) French Polynesia of France.

(4) Kiribati.

(5) New Caledonia of France.

(6) Nieu of New Zealand.

(7) Papua New Guinea.

(8) Samoa.

(9) Vanuatu.

(10) The Ashmore and Cartier Islands of Australia.

(11) The Cook Islands of New Zealand.

(12) The Coral Islands of Australia.

(13) The Federated States of Micronesia.

(14) The Norfolk Island of Australia.

(15) The Pitcairn Islands of the United Kingdom.

(16) The Republic of the Marshal Islands.

(17) The Republic of Palau.

(18) The Solomon Islands.

(19) Tokelau of New Zealand.

(20) Tonga.

(21) Tuvalu.

(22) Wallis and Futuna of France.

This part may be cited as the “Boosting Long-term U.S. Engagement in the Pacific Act” or the “BLUE Pacific Act”.

Congress finds the following:

(1) The Pacific Islands—

(A) are home to roughly 10 million residents, including over 8.6 million in Papua New Guinea, constituting diverse and dynamic cultures and peoples;

(B) are spread across an expanse of the Pacific Ocean equivalent to 15 percent of the Earth’s surface, including the three sub-regions of Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia; and

(C) face shared challenges in development that have distinct local contexts, including climate change and rising sea levels, geographic distances from major markets, and vulnerability to external shocks such as natural disasters.

(2) The United States is a Pacific country with longstanding ties and shared values and interests with the Pacific Islands, including through the Compacts of Free Association with the Freely Associated States, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau.

(3) The United States has vital national security interests in the Pacific Islands, including—

(A) protecting regional peace and security that fully respects the sovereignty of all nations;

(B) advancing economic prosperity free from coercion through trade and sustainable development; and

(C) supporting democracy, good governance, the rule of law, and human rights and fundamental freedoms.

(4) Successive United States administrations have recognized the importance of the Pacific region, including the Pacific Islands, in high-level strategic documents, including the following:

(A) The 2015 National Security Strategy, which first declared the rebalance to Asia and the Pacific, affirmed the United States as a Pacific nation, and paved the way for subsequent United States engagement with the Pacific Islands, including several new policies focused on conservation and resilience to climate change announced in September 2016.

(B) The 2017 National Security Strategy, which includes a commitment to “shore up fragile partner states in the Pacific Islands region to reduce their vulnerability to economic fluctuations and natural disasters”.

(C) The 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, which identified the Pacific Islands as “critical to U.S. strategy because of our shared values, interests, and commitments” and committed the United States to “building capacity and resilience to address maritime security; Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing; drug trafficking; and resilience to address climate change and disaster response”.

(5) The United States has deepened its diplomatic engagement with the Pacific Islands through several recent initiatives, including—

(A) the Pacific Pledge, which provided an additional $100,000,000 in 2019 and $200,000,000 in 2020, on top of the approximately $350,000,000 that the United States provides annually to the region to support shared priorities in economic and human development, climate change, and more; and

(B) the Small and Less Populous Island Economies (SALPIE) Initiative launched in March 2021 to strengthen United States collaboration with island countries and territories, including in the Pacific Islands, on COVID-19 economic challenges, long-term economic development, climate change, and other shared interests.

(6) The Boe Declaration on Regional Security, signed by leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum in 2018, affirmed that climate change “remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security, and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific” and asserted “the sovereign right of every Member to conduct its national affairs free of external interference and coercion”.

(7) The Asian Development Bank has estimated that the Pacific Islands region needs upwards of $2.8 billion a year in investment needs through 2030, in addition to $300 million a year for climate mitigation and adaptation over the same period.

(8) The Pacific Islands swiftly enacted effective policies to prevent and contain the spread of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (commonly referred to as “COVID–19”) pandemic to their populations. The United States has provided over $130,000,000 in assistance to the Pacific Islands for their COVID-19 response. However, priorities must be met to ensure continued success in preventing the spread of the COVID–19 pandemic, achieving swift and widespread vaccinations, and pursuing long-term economic recovery in the Pacific Islands, including through—

(A) expanding testing capacity and acquisition of needed medical supplies, including available COVID-19 vaccines and supporting vaccination efforts, through a reliable supply chain;

(B) planning for lifting of lockdowns and reopening of economic and social activities; and

(C) mitigating and recovering from the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the health system and the reliance on food and energy imports as well as lost tourism revenue and other economic and food security damages caused by the pandemic.

(9) Since 1966, thousands of Peace Corps volunteers have proudly served in the Pacific Islands, building strong people-to-people relationships and demonstrating the United States commitment to peace and development in the region. Prior to the COVID–19 pandemic, the Peace Corps maintained presence in four countries of the Pacific Islands. Peace Corps volunteers continue to be in high demand in the Pacific Islands and have been requested across the region.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to develop and commit to a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy in the Pacific Islands that—

(A) promotes peace, security, and prosperity for all countries through a rules-based regional order that respects the sovereignty and political independence of all nations;

(B) preserves the Pacific Ocean as an open and vibrant corridor for international maritime trade and promotes trade and sustainable development that supports inclusive economic growth and autonomy for all nations and addresses socioeconomic challenges related to public health, education, renewable energy, digital connectivity, and more;

(C) supports regional efforts to address the challenges posed by climate change, including by strengthening resilience to natural disasters and through responsible stewardship of natural resources;

(D) improves civil society, strengthens democratic governance and the rule of law, and promotes human rights and the preservation of the region’s unique cultural heritages;

(E) assists the Pacific Islands in preventing and containing the spread of the COVID–19 pandemic and in pursuing long-term economic recovery; and

(F) supports existing regional architecture and international norms;

(2) to support the vision, values, and objectives of existing regional multilateral institutions and frameworks, such as the Pacific Islands Forum and the Pacific Community, including—

(A) the 2014 Framework for Pacific Regionalism;

(B) the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security; and

(C) the Boe Declaration Action Plan;

(3) to extend and renew the provisions of the Compacts of Free Association and related United States law that will expire in 2023 for the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia and in 2024 for the Republic of Palau unless they are extended and renewed; and

(4) to work closely with United States allies and partners with existing relationships and interests in the Pacific Islands, including Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Taiwan, in advancing common goals.