(a) Short title.—This Act may be cited as the “Strategic Competition Act of 2021”.

(b) Table of contents.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Definitions.
Sec. 4. Statement of policy.
Sec. 5. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 6. Rules of construction.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is leveraging its political, diplomatic, economic, military, technological, and ideological power to become a strategic, near-peer, global competitor of the United States. The policies increasingly pursued by the PRC in these domains are contrary to the interests and values of the United States, its partners, and much of the rest of the world.

(2) The current policies being pursued by the PRC—

(A) threaten the future character of the international order and are shaping the rules, norms, and institutions that govern relations among states;

(B) will put at risk the ability of the United States to secure its national interests; and

(C) will put at risk the future peace, prosperity, and freedom of the international community in the coming decades.

(3) After normalizing diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1979, the United States actively worked to advance the PRC’s economic and social development to ensure that it participated in, and benefitted from, the free and open international order. The United States pursued these goals and contributed to the welfare of the Chinese people by—

(A) increasing the PRC’s trade relations and access to global capital markets;

(B) promoting the PRC’s accession to the World Trade Organization;

(C) providing development finance and technical assistance;

(D) promoting research collaboration;

(E) educating the PRC’s top students;

(F) permitting transfers of cutting-edge technologies and scientific knowledge; and

(G) providing intelligence and military assistance.

(4) It is now clear that the PRC has chosen to pursue state-led, mercantilist economic policies, an increasingly authoritarian governance model at home through increased restrictions on personal freedoms, and an aggressive and assertive foreign policy. These policies frequently and deliberately undermine United States interests and are contrary to core United States values and the values of other nations, both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In response to this strategic decision of the CCP, the United States has been compelled to reexamine and revise its strategy towards the PRC.

(5) The General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and the President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, has elevated the “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” as central to the domestic and foreign policy of the PRC. His program demands—

(A) strong, centralized CCP leadership;

(B) concentration of military power;

(C) a strong role for the CCP in the state and the economy;

(D) an aggressive foreign policy seeking control over broadly asserted territorial claims; and

(E) the denial of any universal values and individual rights that are deemed to threaten the CCP.

(6) The PRC views its Leninist model of governance, “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, as superior to, and at odds with, the constitutional models of the United States and other democracies. This approach to governance is lauded by the CCP as essential to securing the PRC’s status as a global leader, and to shaping the future of the world. In a 2013 speech, President Xi said, “We firmly believe that as socialism with Chinese characteristics develops further … it is … inevitable that the superiority of our socialist system will be increasingly apparent … [and] our country’s road of development will have increasingly greater influence on the world.”.

(7) The PRC’s objectives are to first establish regional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and then to use that dominant position to propel the PRC to become the “leading world power,” shaping an international order that is conducive to the CCP’s interests. Achieving these objectives requires turning the PRC into a wealthy nation under strict CCP rule by using a strong military and advanced technological capability to pursue the PRC’s objectives, regardless of other countries’ interests.

(8) The PRC is reshaping the current international order, which is built upon the rule of law and free and open ideals and principles, by conducting global information and influence operations, seeking to redefine international laws and norms to align with the objectives of the CCP, rejecting the legitimacy of internationally recognized human rights, and seeking to co-opt the leadership and agenda of multinational organizations for the benefit of the PRC and other authoritarian regimes at the expense of the interests of the United States and the international community. In December 2018, President Xi suggested that the CCP views its “historic mission” as not only to govern China, but also to profoundly influence global governance to benefit the CCP.

(9) The PRC is encouraging other countries to follow its model of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. During the 19th Party Congress in 2017, President Xi said that the PRC could serve as a model of development for other countries by utilizing “Chinese wisdom” and a “Chinese approach to solving problems”.

(10) The PRC is promoting its governance model and attempting to weaken other models of governance by—

(A) undermining democratic institutions;

(B) subverting financial institutions;

(C) coercing businesses to accommodate the policies of the PRC; and

(D) using disinformation to disguise the nature of the actions described in subparagraphs (A) through (C).

(11) The PRC is close to its goal of becoming the global leader in science and technology. In May 2018, President Xi said that for the PRC to reach “prosperity and rejuvenation”, it needs to “endeavor to be a major world center for science and innovation”. The PRC has invested the equivalent of billions of dollars into education and research and development and established joint scientific research centers and science universities.

(12) The PRC’s drive to become a “manufacturing and technological superpower” and to promote “innovation with Chinese characteristics” is coming at the expense of human rights and longstanding international rules and norms with respect to economic competition, and presents a challenge to United States national security and the security of allies and like-minded countries. In particular, the PRC advances its illiberal political and social policies through mass surveillance, social credit systems, and a significant role of the state in internet governance. Through these means, the PRC increases direct and indirect government control over its citizens’ everyday lives. Its national strategy of “civil-military fusion” mandates that civil and commercial research, which increasingly drives global innovation, is leveraged to develop new military capabilities.

(13) The PRC is using legal and illegal means to achieve its objective of becoming a manufacturing and technological superpower. The PRC uses state-directed industrial policies in anticompetitive ways to ensure the dominance of PRC companies. The CCP engages in and encourages actions that actively undermine a free and open international market, such as intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers, regulatory and financial subsidies, and mandatory CCP access to proprietary data as part of business and commercial agreements between Chinese and foreign companies.

(14) The policies referred to in paragraph (13) are designed to freeze United States and other foreign firms out of the PRC market, while eroding competition in other important markets. The heavy subsidization of Chinese companies includes potential violation of its World Trade Organization commitments. In May 2018, President Xi said that the PRC aims to keep the “initiatives of innovation and development security … in [China's] own hands”.

(15) The PRC is advancing its global objectives through a variety of avenues, including its signature initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (referred to in this section as “BRI”), which is enshrined in the Chinese Constitution and includes the Digital Silk Road and Health Silk Road. The PRC describes BRI as a straightforward and wholly beneficial plan for all countries. Eventually, it seeks to advance an economic system with the PRC at its center, making it the most concrete geographical representation of the PRC’s global ambitions. BRI increases the economic influence of state-owned Chinese firms in global markets, enhances the PRC’s political leverage with government leaders around the world, and provides greater access to strategic nodes such as ports and railways. Through BRI, the PRC seeks political deference through economic dependence.

(16) The PRC is executing a plan to establish regional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and displace the United States from the region. As a Pacific power, the United States has built and supported enduring alliances and economic partnerships that secure peace and prosperity and promote the rule of law and political pluralism in a free and open Indo-Pacific. In contrast, the PRC uses economic and military coercion in the region to secure its own interests.

(17) The PRC’s military strategy seeks to keep the United States military from operating in the Western Pacific and erodes United States security guarantees.

(18) The PRC is aggressively pursuing exclusive control of critical land routes, sea lanes, and air space in the Indo-Pacific in the hopes of eventually exercising greater influence beyond the region. This includes lanes crucial to commercial activity, energy exploration, transport, and the exercise of security operations in areas permitted under international law.

(19) The PRC seeks so-called “reunification” with Taiwan through whatever means may ultimately be required. The CCP’s insistence that so-called “reunification” is Taiwan’s only option makes this goal inherently coercive. In January 2019, President Xi stated that the PRC “make[s] no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve[s] the option of taking all necessary means”. Taiwan’s embodiment of democratic values and economic liberalism challenges President Xi’s goal of achieving national rejuvenation. The PRC plans to exploit Taiwan’s dominant strategic position in the First Island Chain and to project power into the Second Island Chain and beyond.

(20) In the South China Sea, the PRC has executed an illegal island-building campaign that threatens freedom of navigation and the free-flow of commerce, damages the environment, bolsters the PLA power projection capabilities, and coerces and intimidates other regional claimants in an effort to advance its unlawful claims and control the waters around neighboring countries. Despite President Xi’s September 2015 speech, in which he said the PRC was not militarizing the South China Sea, during the 2017 19th Party Congress, President Xi announced that “construction on islands and reefs in the South China Sea have seen steady progress”.

(21) The PRC is rapidly modernizing the PLA to attain a level of capacity and capability superior to the United States in terms of equipment and conduct of modern military operations by shifting its military doctrine from having a force “adequate [for] China’s defensive needs” to having a force “commensurate with China’s international status”. Ultimately, this transformation could enable China to impose its will in the Indo-Pacific region through the threat of military force. In 2017, President Xi established the following developmental benchmarks for the advancement of the PLA:

(A) A mechanized force with increased informatized and strategic capabilities by 2020.

(B) The complete modernization of China’s national defense by 2035.

(C) The full transformation of the PLA into a world-class force by 2050.

(22) The PRC’s strategy and supporting policies described in this section undermine United States interests, such as—

(A) upholding a free and open international order;

(B) maintaining the integrity of international institutions with liberal norms and values;

(C) preserving a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific;

(D) ensuring the defense of its allies;

(E) preserving open sea and air lanes;

(F) fostering the free flow of commerce through open and transparent markets; and

(G) promoting individual freedom and human rights.

(23) The global COVID–19 pandemic has intensified and accelerated these trends in the PRC’s behavior and therefore increased the need for United States global leadership and a competitive posture. The PRC has capitalized on the world’s focus on the COVID–19 pandemic by—

(A) moving rapidly to undermine Hong Kong’s autonomy, including imposing a so-called “national security law” on Hong Kong;

(B) aggressively imposing its will in the East and South China Seas;

(C) contributing to increased tensions with India; and

(D) engaging in a widespread and government-directed disinformation campaign to obscure the PRC Government’s efforts to cover up the seriousness of COVID–19, sow confusion about the origination of the outbreak, and discredit the United States, its allies, and global health efforts.

(24) In response to the PRC’s strategy and policies, the United States must adopt a policy of strategic competition with the PRC to protect and promote our vital interests and values.

(25) The United States policy of strategic competition with respect to the People’s Republic of China is part of a broader strategic approach to the Indo-Pacific and the world which centers with United States allies and partners to advance shared values and interests and to preserve and enhance a free, open, democratic, inclusive, rules-based, stable, and diverse region.

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(2) CCP.—The term “CCP” means the Chinese Communist Party.

(3) INDO-PACIFIC REGION.—The terms “Indo-Pacific” and “Indo-Pacific region” mean the 36 countries and the surrounding waterways that are under the area of responsibility of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. These countries are: Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, China, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, North Korea, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Vietnam.

(4) PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY; PLA.—The terms “People’s Liberation Army” and “PLA” mean the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China.

(5) PRC; CHINA.—The terms “PRC” and “China” mean the People’s Republic of China.

(a) Objectives.—It is the policy of the United States, in pursuing strategic competition with the PRC, to pursue the following objectives:

(1) The United States global leadership role is sustained and its political system and major foundations of national power are postured for long-term political, economic, technological, and military competition with the PRC.

(2) The balance of power in the Indo-Pacific remains favorable to the United States and its allies. The United States and its allies maintain unfettered access to the region, including through freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce, consistent with international law and practice, and the PRC neither dominates the region nor coerces its neighbors.

(3) The allies and partners of the United States—

(A) maintain confidence in United States leadership and its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region;

(B) can withstand and combat subversion and undue influence by the PRC; and

(C) align themselves with the United States in setting global rules, norms, and standards that benefit the international community.

(4) The combined weight of the United States and its allies and partners is strong enough to demonstrate to the PRC that the risks of attempts to dominate other states outweigh the potential benefits.

(5) The United States leads the free and open international order, which is comprised of resilient states and institutions that uphold and defend principles, including sovereignty, rule of law, individual freedom, and human rights. The international order is strengthened to defeat attempts at destabilization by illiberal and authoritarian actors.

(6) The key rules, norms, and standards of international engagement in the 21st century are maintained, including the—

(A) protection of human rights, commercial engagement and investment, and technology; and

(B) that such rules, norms, and standards are in alignment with the values and interests of the United States, its allies and partners, and the free world.

(7) Assure that the CCP does not—

(A) subvert open and democratic societies;

(B) distort global markets;

(C) manipulate the international trade system;

(D) coerce other nations via economic and military means; or

(E) use its technological advantages to undermine individual freedoms or other states’ national security interests.

(8) The United States deters military confrontation with the PRC and both nations work to reduce the risk of conflict.

(b) Policy.—It is the policy of the United States, in pursuit of the objectives set forth in subsection (a)—

(1) to strengthen the United States domestic foundation by reinvesting in market-based economic growth, education, scientific and technological innovation, democratic institutions, and other areas that improve the United States ability to pursue its vital economic, foreign policy, and national security interests;

(2) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition with the PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic, development, military, informational, and technological realms that maximizes United States strengths and increases the costs for the PRC of harming United States interests and values of those of United States allies and partners;

(3) to lead a free, open, and secure international system characterized by freedom from coercion, rule of law, open markets and the free flow of commerce, and a shared commitment to security and peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights, and good and transparent governance;

(4) to strengthen and deepen United States alliances and partnerships, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific and Europe, by pursuing greater bilateral and multilateral cooperative initiatives that advance shared interests and values and bolster partner countries’ confidence that the United States is and will remain a strong, committed, and constant partner;

(5) to encourage and aid United States allies and partners in boosting their own capabilities and resiliency to pursue, defend, and protect shared interests and values, free from coercion and external pressure;

(6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and healthy competition in United States-China economic relations by—

(A) advancing policies that harden the United States economy against unfair and illegal commercial or trading practices and the coercion of United States businesses; and

(B) tightening United States laws and regulations as necessary to prevent the PRC’s attempts to harm United States economic competitiveness;

(7) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led growth in emerging markets around the world, including through the use of United States Government tools that—

(A) support greater private sector investment and advance capacity-building initiatives that are grounded in the rule of law;

(B) promote open markets;

(C) establish clear policy and regulatory frameworks;

(D) improve the management of key economic sectors;

(E) combat corruption; and

(F) foster and support greater collaboration with and among partner countries and the United States private sector to develop secure and sustainable infrastructure;

(8) to lead in the advancement of international rules and norms that foster free and reciprocal trade and open and integrated markets;

(9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in support of United States companies and businesses in partner countries that seek fair competition;

(10) to ensure that the United States leads in the innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such as next-generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, and biotechnology, by—

(A) providing necessary investment and concrete incentives for the private sector to accelerate development of such technologies;

(B) modernizing and harmonizing with allies and partners export controls and investment screening regimes and associated policies and regulations;

(C) enhancing United States leadership in technical standards-setting bodies and avenues for developing norms regarding the use of emerging critical technologies;

(D) reducing United States barriers and increasing incentives for collaboration with allies and partners on the research and codevelopment of critical technologies;

(E) collaborating with allies and partners to protect critical technologies by—

(i) crafting multilateral export control measures;

(ii) building capacity for defense technology security;

(iii) safeguarding chokepoints in the supply chains; and

(iv) ensuring diversification; and

(F) designing major defense capabilities for export to allies and partners;

(11) to enable the people of the United States, including the private sector, civil society, universities and other academic institutions, State and local legislators, and other relevant actors to identify and remain vigilant to the risks posed by undue influence of the CCP in the United States;

(12) to implement measures to mitigate the risks referred to in paragraph (11), while still preserving opportunities for economic engagement, academic research, and cooperation in other areas where the United States and the PRC share interests;

(13) to collaborate with advanced democracies and other willing partners to promote ideals and principles that—

(A) advance a free and open international order;

(B) strengthen democratic institutions;

(C) protect and promote human rights; and

(D) uphold a free press and fact-based reporting;

(14) to demonstrate effective leadership at the United Nations, its associated agencies, and other multilateral organizations and defend the integrity of these organizations against co-optation by illiberal and authoritarian nations;

(15) to prioritize the defense of fundamental freedoms and human rights in the United States relationship with the PRC;

(16) to cooperate with allies, partners, and multilateral organizations, leveraging their significant and growing capabilities to build a network of like-minded states that sustains and strengthens a free and open order and addresses regional and global challenges to hold the Government of the PRC accountable for—

(A) violations and abuses of human rights;

(B) restrictions on religious practices; and,

(C) undermining and abrogating treaties, other international agreements, and other international norms related to human rights;

(17) to expose the PRC’s use of corruption, repression, coercion, and other malign behavior to attain unfair economic advantage and deference of other nations to its political and strategic objectives;

(18) to maintain United States access to the Western Pacific, including by—

(A) increasing United States forward-deployed forces in the Indo-Pacific region;

(B) modernizing the United States military through investments in existing and new platforms, emerging technologies, critical in-theater force structure and enabling capabilities, joint operational concepts, and a diverse, operationally resilient and politically sustainable posture; and

(C) operating and conducting exercises with allies and partners—

(i) to mitigate the PLA’s ability to project power and establish contested zones within the First and Second Island Chains;

(ii) to diminish the ability of the PLA to coerce its neighbors;

(iii) to maintain open sea and air lanes, particularly in the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea; and

(iv) to project power from the United States and its allies and partners to demonstrate the ability to conduct contested logistics;

(19) to deter the PRC from—

(A) coercing Indo-Pacific nations, including by developing more combat-credible forces that are integrated with allies and partners in contact, blunt, and surge layers and able to defeat any PRC theory of victory in the First or Second Island Chains of the Western Pacific and beyond, as called for in the 2018 National Defense Strategy;

(B) using gray-zone tactics below the level of armed conflict; or

(C) initiating armed conflict;

(20) to strengthen United States-PRC military-to-military communication and improve de-escalation procedures to deconflict operations and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict, including through high-level visits and recurrent exchanges between civilian and military officials and other measures, in alignment with United States interests; and

(21) to cooperate with the PRC if interests align, including through bilateral or multilateral means and at the United Nations, as appropriate.

It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the policy described in section 4(b) requires the following actions:

(1) Strategic competition with the PRC will require the United States—

(A) to marshal sustained political will to protect its vital interests, promote its values, and advance its economic and national security objectives for decades to come; and

(B) to achieve this sustained political will, persuade the American people and United States allies and partners of—

(i) the challenges posed by the PRC; and

(ii) the need for long-term competition to defend shared interests and values.

(2) The United States must coordinate closely with allies and partners to compete effectively with the PRC, including to encourage allies and partners to assume, as appropriate, greater roles in balancing and checking the aggressive and assertive behavior of the PRC.

(3) The President of the United States must lead and direct the entire executive branch to make the People’s Republic of China as the greatest geopolitical and geoeconomic challenge for United States foreign policy, increasing the prioritization of strategic competition with the PRC and broader United States interests in the Indo-Pacific region in the conduct of foreign policy and assuring the allocation of appropriate resources adequate to the challenge.

(4) The head of every Federal department and agency should designate a senior official at the level of Under Secretary or above to coordinate the department’s or agency’s policies with respect to strategic competition with the PRC.

(5) The ability of the United States to execute a strategy of strategic competition with the PRC will be undermined if our attention is repeatedly diverted to challenges that are not vital to United States economic and national security interests.

(6) In the coming decades, the United States must prevent the PRC from—

(A) establishing regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific; and

(B) using that position to advance its assertive political, economic, and foreign policy goals around the world.

(7) The United States must ensure that the Federal budget is properly aligned with the strategic imperative to compete with the PRC by—

(A) ensuring sufficient levels of funding to resource all instruments of United States national power; and

(B) coherently prioritizing how such funds are used.

(8) Sustained prioritization of the challenge posed by the PRC requires—

(A) bipartisan cooperation within Congress; and

(B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful collaboration and consultation between the executive branch and Congress.

(9) The United States must ensure close integration among economic and foreign policymakers, the private sector, civil society, universities and academic institutions, and other relevant actors in free and open societies affected by the challenges posed by the PRC to enable such actors—

(A) to collaborate to advance common interests; and

(B) to identify appropriate policies—

(i) to strengthen the United States and its allies;

(ii) to promote a compelling vision of a free and open order; and

(iii) to push back against detrimental policies pursued by the CCP.

(10) The United States must ensure that all Federal departments and agencies are organized to reflect the fact that strategic competition with the PRC is the United States top foreign policy priority, including through the assigned missions and location of United States Government personnel, by—

(A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo-Pacific region, at posts around the world, and in Washington DC, with priorities directly relevant to advancing competition with the People’s Republic of China;

(B) placing greater numbers of foreign service officers, international development professionals, members of the foreign commercial service, intelligence professionals, and other United States Government personnel in the Indo-Pacific region; and

(C) ensuring that this workforce, both civilian and military, has the training in language, technical skills, and other competencies required to advance a successful competitive strategy with the PRC.

(11) The United States must place renewed emphasis on strengthening the nonmilitary instruments of national power, including diplomacy, information, technology, economics, foreign assistance and development finance, commerce, intelligence, and law enforcement, which are crucial for addressing the unique economic, political, and ideological challenges posed by the PRC.

(12) The United States must sustain resourcing for a Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which shall be aligned with the overarching political and diplomatic objectives articulated in the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (Public Law 115–409), and must prioritize the military investments necessary to achieve United States political objectives in the Indo-Pacific, including—

(A) promoting regional security in the Indo-Pacific;

(B) reassuring allies and partners while protecting them from coercion; and

(C) deterring conflict with the PRC.

(13) Competition with the PRC requires the United States skillful adaptation to the information environment of the 21st century. United States public diplomacy and messaging efforts must effectively—

(A) promote the value of partnership with the United States;

(B) highlight the risks and costs of enmeshment with the PRC; and

(C) counter CCP propaganda and disinformation.

(a) Applicability of existing restrictions on assistance to foreign security forces.—Nothing in this Act shall be construed to diminish, supplant, supersede, or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities of the United States Government under section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) or section 362 of title 10, United States Code.

(b) No authorization for the use of military force.—Nothing in this Act may be construed as authorizing the use of military force.

(a) Authorization To contract services.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized to establish a program to facilitate the contracting by United States embassies for the professional services of qualified experts, on a reimbursable fee for service basis, to assist interested United States persons and business entities with supply chain management issues related to the PRC, including—

(1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating certain production facilities to locations outside the PRC;

(2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other efforts to diversify supply chains to locations outside of the PRC;

(3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other challenges in the course of the activities described in paragraphs (1) and (2); and

(4) identifying alternative markets for production or sourcing outside of the PRC, including through providing market intelligence, facilitating contact with reliable local partners as appropriate, and other services.

(b) Chief of mission oversight.—The persons hired to perform the services described in subsection (a) shall—

(1) be under the authority of the United States Chief of Mission in the country in which they are hired, in accordance with existing United States laws;

(2) coordinate with Department of State and Department of Commerce officers; and

(3) coordinate with United States missions and relevant local partners in other countries as needed to carry out the services described in subsection (a).

(c) Prioritization of micro-, small-, and medium-Sized enterprises.—The services described in subsection (a) shall be prioritized to assisting micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises.

(d) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated $15,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2027 for the purposes of carrying out this section.

(e) Prohibition on access to assistance by foreign adversaries.—None of the funds appropriated pursuant to this section may be provided to an entity—

(1) under the foreign ownership, control, or influence of the Government of China or the Chinese Communist Party, or other foreign adversary; or

(2) determined to have beneficial ownership from foreign individuals subject to the jurisdiction, direction, or influence of foreign adversaries.

(f) Definitions.—The terms “foreign ownership, control, or influence” and “FOCI” have the meanings given those terms in the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22–M), or a successor document.

In this subtitle, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(a) Sense of congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should initiate collaboration among governments, the private sector, and civil society to encourage the adoption of the standards for quality global infrastructure development advanced by the G20 at Osaka in 2018, including with respect to the following issues:

(1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in which infrastructure investments are made.

(2) Anti-corruption.

(3) Rule of law.

(4) Human rights and labor rights.

(5) Fiscal and debt sustainability.

(6) Social and governance safeguards.

(7) Transparency.

(8) Environmental and energy standards.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should launch a series of fora around the world showcasing the commitment of the United States and partners of the United States to high-quality development cooperation, including with respect to the issues as described in subsection (a).

(a) Findings.—The Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee (GICC) was established to coordinate the efforts of the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy, the Department of Transportation, the United States Agency for International Development, the United States Trade and Development Agency, the Development Finance Corporation, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, and other agencies to catalyze private sector investments around the world and the deployment of United States Government technical assistance and development finance tools, including project preparation services and commercial advocacy.

(b) Sense of congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the world’s infrastructure needs, including in the transport, energy, and digital sectors, are vast and growing;

(2) total or partial acquisition of, or a significant financial stake or physical presence in, certain types of infrastructure, including ports, energy grids, 5G telecommunications networks, and undersea cables, can provide an advantage to countries that do not share the interests and values of the United States and its allies and partners, and could therefore be deleterious to the interests and values of the United States and its allies and partners;

(3) the United States must continue to prioritize support for infrastructure projects that are physically secure, financially viable, economically sustainable, and socially responsible;

(4) achieving the objective outlined in paragraph (3) requires the coordination of all United States Government economic tools across the interagency, so that such tools are deployed way to maximize United States interests and that of its allies and partners;

(5) the GICC represents an important and concrete step toward better communication and coordination across the United States Government of economic tools relevant to supporting infrastructure that is physically secure, financially viable, economically sustainable, and socially responsible, and should be continued; and

(6) the executive branch and Congress should have consistent consultations on United States support for strategic infrastructure projects, including how the Congress can support such initiatives in the future.

(c) Reporting requirement.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and semi-annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with other Federal agencies that participate in the GICC, and, as appropriate, the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that identifies—

(1) current and pending or future infrastructure projects, particularly in the transport, energy, and digital sectors, that the United States is supporting or will support through financing, foreign assistance, technical assistance, or other means;

(2) a detailed explanation of the United States and partner country interests served by the United States providing support to such projects; and

(3) a detailed description of any support provided by other United States allies and partners to such projects.

(d) Form of report.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

(a) Authority.—The Secretary of State is authorized to establish a program, to be known as the “Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network”, under which the Secretary of State, in consultation with other relevant Federal agencies, including those represented on the Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, may advance the development of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure, in the Indo-Pacific region by—

(1) strengthening capacity-building programs to improve project evaluation processes, regulatory and procurement environments, and project preparation capacity of countries that are partners of the United States in such development;

(2) providing transaction advisory services and project preparation assistance to support sustainable infrastructure; and

(3) coordinating the provision of United States assistance for the development of infrastructure, including infrastructure that utilizes United States-manufactured goods and services, and catalyzing investment led by the private sector.

(b) Transaction Advisory Fund.—As part of the “Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network” described under subsection (a), the Secretary of State is authorized to provide support, including through flexible financing mechanisms such as the Transaction Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help boost the capacity of partner countries to evaluate contracts and assess the financial and environmental impacts of potential infrastructure projects, including through providing services such as—

(1) legal services;

(2) pre-feasibility studies;

(3) debt sustainability analyses;

(4) bid or proposal evaluation; and

(5) other services relevant to advancing the development of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure.

(c) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated $75,000,000 to the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network, of which $20,000,000 is to be provided for the Transaction Advisory Fund.

(a) In general.—The President shall direct a comprehensive, multi-year, whole of government effort, in consultation with the private sector, to counter predatory lending and financing by the Government of China, including support to companies incorporated in the PRC that engage in such activities, in the energy sectors of developing countries.

(b) Policy.—It is the policy of the United States to—

(1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted energy needs and capacities of developing countries and analyze the presence and involvement of PRC state-owned industries and other companies incorporated in the PRC, Chinese nationals providing labor, and financing of energy projects, including direct financing by the Government of China, PRC financial institutions, or direct state support to state-owned enterprises and other companies incorporated in the PRC;

(2) pursue strategic support and investment opportunities, and diplomatic engagement on power sector reforms, to expand the development and deployment of advanced energy technologies in developing countries;

(3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants, and other financial products on terms that advance domestic economic and local employment opportunities, utilize advanced energy technologies, encourage private sector growth, and when appropriate United States equity and sovereign lending products as alternative to the predatory lending tools offered by Chinese international finance institutions;

(4) pursue partnerships with likeminded international financing and multilateral institutions to leverage investment in advanced energy technologies in developing countries; and

(5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the cooperative development of advanced energy technologies with countries of strategic significance, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, to address the effects of energy engagement by the PRC through predatory lending or other actions that negatively impact other countries.

(c) Advanced energy technologies exports.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, shall establish a United States Government strategy to increase United States exports of advanced energy technologies to—

(1) improve energy security in allied and developing countries;

(2) create open, efficient, rule-based, and transparent energy markets;

(3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy trading relationships; and

(4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy.

(a) In general.—No later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for five years, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary for Energy Resources, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that—

(1) identifies priority countries for deepening United States engagement on energy matters, in accordance with the economic and national security interests of the United States and where deeper energy partnerships are most achievable;

(2) describes the involvement of the PRC government and companies incorporated in the PRC in the development, operation, financing, or ownership of energy generation facilities, transmission infrastructure or energy resources in the countries identified in paragraph (1);

(3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and implications for United States national interests and the interests of the countries identified in paragraph (1), with respect to the PRC’s involvement and influence in developing country energy production or transmission; and

(4) outlines current and planned efforts by the United States to partner with the countries identified in paragraph (1) on energy matters that support shared interests between the United States and such countries.

(b) Transmittal.—The assessment required in subsection (a) shall be published on the United States Agency for International Development's website and transmitted to the appropriate committees of Congress, the Secretary of State, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation.

(a) Statement of policy on leadership in international standards setting.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States must lead in international standard-setting bodies that set the governance norms and rules for critical digitally enabled technologies in order to ensure that these technologies operate within a free, secure, interoperable, and stable digital domain.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States, along with allies and partners, should lead an international effort that utilizes all of the economic and diplomatic tools at its disposal to combat the expanding use of information and communications technology products and services to surveil, repress, and manipulate populations (also known as “digital authoritarianism”).

(c) Negotiations for digital trade agreement.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States Trade Representative should negotiate bilateral and plurilateral agreements relating to digital goods with the European Union, Japan, Taiwan, the member countries of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance, and other nations, as appropriate.

(d) Freedom of information in the digital age.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should lead a global effort to ensure that freedom of information, including the ability to safely consume or publish information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained as the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral mechanism for communication.

(e) Efforts to ensure technological development does not threaten democratic governance or human rights.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should lead a global effort to develop and adopt a set of common principles and standards for critical technologies to ensure that the such technologies cannot be abused by malign actors, whether they are governments or other entities, and that they do not threaten democratic governance or human rights.

(f) Formation of digital technology trade alliance.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should examine opportunities for diplomatic negotiations regarding the formation of mutually beneficial alliances relating to digitally enabled technologies and services.

(a) Digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnership.—The Secretary of State is authorized to establish a program, to be known as the “Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership” to help foreign countries—

(1) expand and increase secure Internet access and digital infrastructure in emerging markets;

(2) protect technological assets, including data;

(3) adopt policies and regulatory positions that foster and encourage open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet, the free flow of data, multi-stakeholder models of internet governance, and pro-competitive and security information communications technology policies and regulations;

(4) promote exports of United States information and communications technology (ICT) goods and services and increase United States company market share in target markets;

(5) promote the diversification of ICT goods and supply chain services to be less reliant on Chinese imports; and

(6) build cybersecurity capacity, expand interoperability, and promote best practices for a national approach to cybersecurity.

(b) Implementation plan.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an implementation plan for the coming year to advance the goals identified in subsection (a).

(c) Consultation.—In developing the strategy required by subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall consult with—

(1) leaders of the United States industry;

(2) other relevant technology experts, including the Open Technology Fund;

(3) representatives from relevant United States Government agencies; and

(4) representatives from like-minded allies and partners.

(d) Semiannual briefing requirement.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State shall provide to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a briefing on the implementation of the plan required by subsection (b).

(e) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated $100,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026.

This subtitle may be cited as the “Countering Chinese Communist Party Malign Influence Act”.

(a) Countering chinese influence fund.—There is authorized to be appropriated $300,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the Countering Chinese Influence Fund to counter the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party globally. Amounts appropriated pursuant to this authorization are authorized to remain available until expended and shall supplement, not supplant, amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated to counter such influence.

(b) Consultation required.—The obligation of funds appropriated or otherwise made available to counter the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party globally, including pursuant to the authorization under subsection (a), shall be subject to prior consultation with, and consistent with section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1), the regular notification procedures of—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(c) Policy guidance, coordination, and approval.—

(1) COORDINATOR.—The Secretary of State shall designate an existing senior official of the Department at the rank of Assistant Secretary or above to provide policy guidance, coordination, and approval for the obligation of funds authorized pursuant to subsection (a).

(2) DUTIES.—The senior official designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be responsible for—

(A) on an annual basis, the identification of specific strategic priorities for using the funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a), such as geographic areas of focus or functional categories of programming that funds are to be concentrated within, consistent with the national interests of the United States and the purposes of this Act;

(B) the coordination and approval of all programming conducted using the funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a), based on a determination that such programming directly counters the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party, including specific activities or policies advanced by the Chinese Communist Party, pursuant to the strategic objectives of the United States, as established in the 2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and other relevant national and regional strategies as appropriate;

(C) ensuring that all programming approved bears a sufficiently direct nexus to such acts by the Chinese Communist Party described in subsection (d) and adheres to the requirements outlined in subsection (e); and

(D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and evaluation of the effectiveness of all programming conducted using the funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) to ensure that it advances United States interests and degrades the ability of the Chinese Communist Party, to advance activities that align with subsection (d) of this section.

(3) INTERAGENCY COORDINATION.—The senior official designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall, in coordinating and approving programming pursuant to paragraph (2), seek to—

(A) conduct appropriate interagency consultation; and

(B) ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that all approved programming functions in concert with other Federal activities to counter the malign influence and activities of the Chinese Communist Party.

(4) ASSISTANT COORDINATOR.—The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall designate a senior official at the rank of Assistant Administrator or above to assist and consult the senior official designated pursuant to paragraph (1).

(d) Malign influence.—In this section, the term “malign influence” with respect to the Chinese Communist Party should be construed to include acts conducted by the Chinese Communist Party or entities acting on its behalf that—

(1) undermine a free and open international order;

(2) advance an alternative, repressive international order that bolsters the Chinese Communist Party’s hegemonic ambitions and is characterized by coercion and dependency;

(3) undermine the national security or sovereignty of the United States or other countries; or

(4) undermine the economic security of the United States or other countries, including by promoting corruption.

(e) Countering malign influence.—In this section countering malign influence through the use of funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) shall include efforts to—

(1) promote transparency and accountability, and reduce corruption, including in governance structures targeted by the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party;

(2) support civil society and independent media to raise awareness of and increase transparency regarding the negative impact of activities related to the Belt and Road Initiative;

(3) counter transnational criminal networks that benefit, or benefit from, the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party;

(4) encourage economic development structures that help protect against predatory lending schemes, including support for market-based alternatives in key economic sectors, such as digital economy, energy, and infrastructure;

(5) counter activities that provide undue influence to the security forces of the People’s Republic of China;

(6) expose misinformation and disinformation of the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda, including through programs carried out by the Global Engagement Center; and

(7) counter efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to legitimize or promote authoritarian ideology and governance models.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) In the report to Congress required under section 1261(b) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115–232), the President laid out a broad range of malign activities conducted by the Government of China and its agents and entities, including—

(A) propaganda and disinformation, in which “Beijing communicates its narrative through state-run television, print, radio, and online organizations whose presence is proliferating in the United States and around the world”;

(B) malign political influence operations, in which “front organizations and agents which target businesses, universities, think tanks, scholars, journalists, and local state and Federal officials in the United States and around the world, attempting to influence discourse”; and

(C) malign financial influence operations, characterized as “misappropriation of technology and intellectual property, failure to appropriately disclose relationships with foreign government sponsored entities, breaches of contract and confidentiality, and manipulation of processes for fair and merit-based allocation of Federal research and development funding”.

(2) Chinese information warfare and malign influence operations are ongoing. In January 2019, the Director of National Intelligence, Dan Coats, stated, “China will continue to use legal, political, and economic levers—such as the lure of Chinese markets—to shape the information environment. It is also capable of using cyber attacks against systems in the United States to censor or suppress viewpoints it deems politically sensitive.”.

(3) In February 2020, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray, testified to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives that the People’s Republic of China has “very active [malign] foreign influence efforts in this country,” with the goal of “trying to shift our policy and our public opinion to be more pro-China on a variety of issues”.

(4) The People’s Republic of China’s information warfare and malign influence operations continue to adopt new tactics and evolve in sophistication. In May 2020, the Special Envoy and Coordinator of the Global Engagement Center (GEC), Lea Gabrielle, stated that there was a convergence of Russian and Chinese narratives surrounding COVID–19 and that the GEC had “uncovered a new network of inauthentic Twitter accounts” that it assessed was “created with the intent to amplify Chinese propaganda and disinformation”. In June 2020, Google reported that Chinese hackers attempted to access email accounts of the campaign staff of a presidential candidate.

(5) Chinese information warfare and malign influence operations are a threat to the national security, democracy and the economic systems of the United States, its allies and partners. In October 2018, Vice President Mike Pence warned that “Beijing is employing a whole-of-government approach, using political, economic, and military tools, as well as propaganda, to advance its influence and benefit its interests in the United States.”.

(6) In February 2018, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray, testified to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that the People’s Republic of China is taking advantage of and exploiting the open research and development environments of United States institutions of higher education to utilize “professors, scientists and students” as “nontraditional collectors” of information.

(b) Presidential duties.—The President shall—

(1) protect our democratic institutions and processes from malign influence from the People’s Republic of China and other foreign adversaries; and

(2) consistent with the policy specified in paragraph (1), direct the heads of the appropriate Federal departments and agencies to implement Acts of Congress to counter and deter Chinese and other foreign information warfare and malign influence operations without delay, including—

(A) section 1043 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115–232), which authorizes a coordinator position within the National Security Council for countering malign foreign influence operations and campaigns;

(B) section 228 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92), which authorizes additional research of foreign malign influence operations on social media platforms;

(C) section 847 of such Act, which requires the Secretary of Defense to modify contracting regulations regarding vetting for foreign ownership, control and influence in order to mitigate risks from malign foreign influence;

(D) section 1239 of such Act, which requires an update of the comprehensive strategy to counter the threat of malign influence to include the People’s Republic of China;

(E) section 5323 of such Act, which authorizes the Director of National Intelligence to facilitate the establishment of Social Media Data and Threat Analysis Center to detect and study information warfare and malign influence operations across social media platforms; and

(F) section 119C of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3059), which authorizes the establishment of a Foreign Malign Influence Response Center inside the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

There are authorized to be appropriated, for the 6-year period beginning on September 30, 2021, $105,500,000, which shall be expended to promote education, training, research, and foreign language skills through the Fulbright-Hays Program, in accordance with section 102(b) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)).

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Since the onset of the COVID–19 pandemic, crimes and discrimination against Asians and those of Asian descent have risen dramatically worldwide. In May 2020, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said “the pandemic continues to unleash a tsunami of hate and xenophobia, scapegoating and scare-mongering” and urged governments to “act now to strengthen the immunity of our societies against the virus of hate”.

(2) Asian American and Pacific Island (AAPI) workers make up a large portion of the essential workers on the frontlines of the COVID–19 pandemic, making up 8.5 percent of all essential healthcare workers in the United States. AAPI workers also make up a large share—between 6 percent and 12 percent based on sector—of the biomedical field.

(3) The United States Census notes that Americans of Asian descent alone made up nearly 5.9 percent of the United States population in 2019, and that Asian Americans are the fastest-growing racial group in the United States, projected to represent 14 percent of the United States population by 2065.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the reprehensible attacks on people of Asian descent and concerning increase in anti-Asian sentiment and racism in the United States and around the world have no place in a peaceful, civilized, and tolerant world;

(2) the United States is a diverse nation with a proud tradition of immigration, and the strength and vibrancy of the United States is enhanced by the diverse ethnic backgrounds and tolerance of its citizens, including Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders;

(3) the United States Government should encourage other foreign governments to use the official and scientific names for the COVID–19 pandemic, as recommended by the World Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; and

(4) the United States Government and other governments around the world must actively oppose racism and intolerance, and use available and appropriate tools to combat the spread of anti-Asian racism and discrimination.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) China is increasing its spending on public diplomacy including influence campaigns, advertising, and investments into state-sponsored media publications outside of China. These include, for example, more than $10,000,000,000 in foreign direct investment in communications infrastructure, platforms, and properties, as well as bringing journalists to China for training programs.

(2) The PRC, through the Voice of China, the United Front Work Department, and UFWD’s many affiliates and proxies, has obtained unfettered access to radio, television, and digital dissemination platforms in numerous languages targeted at citizens in other regions where China has an interest in promoting public sentiment in support of the Chinese Communist Party and expanding the reach of its misleading narratives and propaganda.

(3) Even in Western countries, China spends extensively on influence operations, such as a $500,000,000 advertising campaign to attract cable viewers in Australia and a more than $20,000,000 campaign to influence United States public opinion via the China Daily newspaper supplement.

(b) The united states agency for global media.—The United States Agency for Global Media (USAGM) and affiliate Federal and non-Federal entities shall undertake the following actions to support independent journalism, countering disinformation, and breaking the firewall and combatting surveillance in countries where the Chinese Communist Party and other malign actors are promoting disinformation, propaganda, and manipulated media markets:

(1) Radio Free Asia shall expand domestic coverage and digital programming for all RFA China services and other affiliate language broadcasting services.

(2) USAGM shall increase funding for Radio Free Asia’s Mandarin, Tibetan, Uyghur, and Cantonese language services.

(3) Voice of America shall establish a real-time disinformation tracking tool similar to Polygraph for Russian language propaganda and misinformation.

(4) USAGM shall expand existing training and partnership programs that promote journalistic standards, investigative reporting, cybersecurity, and digital analytics to help expose and counter false CCP narratives.

(5) The Open Technology Fund shall continue and expand work to support tools and technology to circumvent censorship and surveillance by the CCP, both inside China as well as abroad where China has exported censorship technology, and increase secure peer to peer connectivity and privacy tools.

(c) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the United States Agency for Global Media, $100,000,000 for ongoing and new programs to support local media, build independent media, combat Chinese disinformation inside and outside of China, invest in technology to subvert censorship, and monitor and evaluate these programs.

(d) Support for local media.—The Secretary of State, acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall support and train journalists on investigative techniques necessary to ensure public accountability related to the Belt and Road Initiative, the PRC’s surveillance and digital export of technology, and other influence operations abroad direct or directly supported by the Communist Party or the Chinese government.

(e) Internet freedom programs.—The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor shall continue to support internet freedom programs.

(f) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, $170,000,000 for ongoing and new programs in support of press freedom, training, and protection of journalists.

(a) Finding.—Congress established the Global Engagement Center to “direct, lead, and coordinate efforts” of the Federal Government to “recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation globally”.

(b) Extension.—Section 1287(j) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended by striking “the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment of this Act” and inserting “December 31, 2027”.

(c) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the Global Engagement Center should expand its coordinating capacity through the exchange of liaison officers with Federal departments and agencies that manage aspects of identifying and countering foreign disinformation, including the National Counterterrorism Center at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and from combatant commands.

(d) Hiring authority.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of State, during the five year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and solely to carry out functions of the Global Engagement Center, may—

(1) appoint employees without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, regarding appointments in the competitive service; and

(2) fix the basic compensation of such employees without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title regarding classification and General Schedule pay rates.

(a) Amendments to Defense Production Act of 1950.—

(1) DEFINITION OF COVERED TRANSACTION.—Subsection (a)(4) of section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565) is amended—

(A) in subparagraph (A)—

(i) in clause (i), by striking “; and” and inserting a semicolon;

(ii) in clause (ii), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”; and

(iii) by adding at the end the following:

“(iii) any transaction described in subparagraph (B)(vi) proposed or pending after the date of the enactment of the Strategic Competition Act of 2021.”;

(B) in subparagraph (B), by adding at the end the following:

“(vi) Any gift to an institution of higher education from a foreign person, or the entry into a contract by such an institution with a foreign person, if—

“(I) (aa) the value of the gift or contract equals or exceeds $1,000,000; or

“(bb) the institution receives, directly or indirectly, more than one gift from or enters into more than one contract, directly or indirectly, with the same foreign person for the same purpose the aggregate value of which, during the period of 2 consecutive calendar years, equals or exceeds $1,000,000; and

“(II) the gift or contract—

“(aa) relates to research, development, or production of critical technologies and provides the foreign person potential access to any material nonpublic technical information (as defined in subparagraph (D)(ii)) in the possession of the institution; or

“(bb) is a restricted or conditional gift or contract (as defined in section 117(h) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 2011f(h))) that establishes control.”; and

(C) by adding at the end the following:

“(G) FOREIGN GIFTS TO AND CONTRACTS WITH INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION.—For purposes of subparagraph (B)(vi):

“(i) CONTRACT.—The term ‘contract’ means any agreement for the acquisition by purchase, lease, or barter of property or services by a foreign person, for the direct benefit or use of either of the parties.

“(ii) GIFT.—The term ‘gift’ means any gift of money or property.

“(iii) INSTITUTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION.—The term ‘institution of higher education’ means any institution, public or private, or, if a multicampus institution, any single campus of such institution, in any State—

“(I) that is legally authorized within such State to provide a program of education beyond secondary school;

“(II) that provides a program for which the institution awards a bachelor's degree (or provides not less than a 2-year program which is acceptable for full credit toward such a degree) or a more advanced degree;

“(III) that is accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting agency or association; and

“(IV) to which the Federal Government extends Federal financial assistance (directly or indirectly through another entity or person), or that receives support from the extension of Federal financial assistance to any of the institution's subunits.”.

(2) MANDATORY DECLARATIONS.—Subsection (b)(1)(C)(v)(IV)(aa) of such section is amended by adding at the end the following: “Such regulations shall require a declaration under this subclause with respect to a covered transaction described in subsection (a)(4)(B)(vi)(II)(aa).”.

(3) FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED.—Subsection (f) of such section is amended—

(A) in paragraph (10), by striking “; and” and inserting a semicolon;

(B) by redesignating paragraph (11) as paragraph (12); and

(C) by inserting after paragraph (10) the following:

“(11) as appropriate, and particularly with respect to covered transactions described in subsection (a)(4)(B)(vi), the importance of academic freedom at institutions of higher education in the United States; and”.

(4) MEMBERSHIP OF CFIUS.—Subsection (k)(2) of such section is amended—

(A) by redesignating subparagraphs (H), (I), and (J) as subparagraphs (I), (J), and (K), respectively; and

(B) by inserting after subparagraph (G) the following:

“(G) In the case of a covered transaction involving an institution of higher education (as defined in subsection (a)(4)(G)), the Secretary of Education.”.

(5) CONTENTS OF ANNUAL REPORT RELATING TO CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES.—Subsection (m)(3) of such section is amended—

(A) in subparagraph (B), by striking “; and” and inserting a semicolon;

(B) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and

(C) by adding at the end the following:

“(D) an evaluation of whether there are foreign malign influence or espionage activities directed or directly assisted by foreign governments against institutions of higher education (as defined in subsection (a)(4)(G)) aimed at obtaining research and development methods or secrets related to critical technologies; and

“(E) an evaluation of, and recommendation for any changes to, reviews conducted under this section that relate to institutions of higher education, based on an analysis of disclosure reports submitted to the chairperson under section 117(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1011f(a)).”.

(b) Inclusion of CFIUS in reporting on foreign gifts under Higher Education Act of 1965.—Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1011f) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by inserting after “the Secretary” the following: “and the Secretary of the Treasury (in the capacity of the Secretary as the chairperson of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States under section 721(k)(3) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565(k)(3)))”; and

(2) in subsection (d)—

(A) in paragraph (1)—

(i) by striking “with the Secretary” and inserting “with the Secretary and the Secretary of the Treasury”; and

(ii) by striking “to the Secretary” and inserting “to each such Secretary”; and

(B) in paragraph (2), by striking “with the Secretary” and inserting “with the Secretary and the Secretary of the Treasury”.

(c) Effective date; applicability.—The amendments made by subsection (a) shall—

(1) take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, subject to the requirements of subsections (d) and (e); and

(2) apply with respect to any covered transaction the review or investigation of which is initiated under section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 on or after that date.

(d) Regulations.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, which shall include the Secretary of Education for purposes of this subsection, shall prescribe regulations as necessary and appropriate to implement the amendments made by subsection (a).

(2) ELEMENTS.—The regulations prescribed under paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) regulations accounting for the burden on institutions of higher education likely to result from compliance with the amendments made by subsection (a), structuring penalties and filing fees to reduce such burdens, and implementing any procedures necessary to protect academic freedom; and

(B) guidance with respect to the meaning of “control”, as defined in section 721(a) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565(a)), as that term applies to covered transactions described in clause (vi) of paragraph (4)(B) of that section, as added by subsection (a)(1).

(3) ISSUANCE OF FINAL RULE.—The Committee shall issue a final rule to carry out the amendments made by subsection (a) after assessing the findings of the pilot program required by subsection (e).

(e) Pilot program.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Beginning on the date that is 30 days after the publication in the Federal Register of the matter required by paragraph (2) and ending on the date that is 570 days thereafter, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States shall conduct a pilot program to assess methods for implementing the review of covered transactions described in clause (vi) of section 721(a)(4)(B) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as added by subsection (a)(1).

(2) PROPOSED DETERMINATION.—Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Committee shall, in consultation with the Secretary of Education, publish in the Federal Register—

(A) a proposed determination of the scope of and procedures for the pilot program required by paragraph (1);

(B) an assessment of the burden on institutions of higher education likely to result from compliance with the pilot program;

(C) recommendations for addressing any such burdens, including structuring penalties and filing fees to reduce such burdens; and

(D) any procedures necessary to ensure that the pilot program does not infringe upon academic freedom.

In this subtitle, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific provide a unique strategic advantage to the United States and are among the Nation’s most precious assets, enabling the United States to advance its vital national interests, defend its territory, expand its economy through international trade and commerce, establish enduring cooperation among like-minded countries, prevent the domination of the Indo-Pacific and its surrounding maritime and air lanes by a hostile power or powers, and deter potential aggressors;

(2) the Governments of the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand are critical allies in advancing a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific region and tackling challenges with unity purpose, and have collaborated to advance specific efforts of shared interest in areas such as defense and security, economic prosperity, infrastructure connectivity, and fundamental freedoms;

(3) the United States greatly values other partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, including with India, Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Vietnam as well as regional architecture such as the Quad, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC), which are essential to further shared interests;

(4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific demands consistent United States and allied commitment to strengthening and advancing our alliances so that they are postured to meet these challenges, and will require sustained political will, concrete partnerships, economic, commercial, and technological cooperation, consistent and tangible commitments, high-level and extensive consultations on matters of mutual interest, mutual and shared cooperation in the acquisition of key capabilities important to allied defenses, and unified mutual support in the face of political, economic, or military coercion;

(5) fissures in the United States alliance relationships and partnerships benefit United States adversaries and weaken collective ability to advance shared interests; and

(6) the United States will work with allies to prioritize promoting human rights throughout the region.

(b) Statement of policy.—It shall be the policy of the United States—

(1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation between and among the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, including through diplomatic engagement, regional development, energy security and development, scientific and health partnerships, educational and cultural exchanges, missile defense, intelligence-sharing, space, cyber, and other diplomatic and defense-related initiatives;

(2) to uphold our multilateral and bilateral treaty obligations, including—

(A) defending Japan, including all areas under the administration of Japan, under article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan;

(B) defending the Republic of Korea under article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea;

(C) defending the Philippines under article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines;

(D) defending Thailand under the 1954 Manila Pact and the Thanat-Rusk communique of 1962; and

(E) defending Australia under article IV of the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty;

(3) to strengthen and deepen our bilateral and regional partnerships, including with India, Taiwan, ASEAN, and New Zealand;

(4) to cooperate with Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia to promote human rights bilaterally and through regional and multilateral fora and pacts; and

(5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation with regional partners, such as Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and India.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States should reaffirm our commitment to quadrilateral cooperation among Australia, India, Japan, and the United States (the “Quad”) to enhance and implement a shared vision to meet shared regional challenges and to promote a free, open, inclusive, resilient, and healthy Indo-Pacific that is characterized by democracy, rule-of-law, and market-driven economic growth and is free from undue influence and coercion;

(2) the United States should seek to expand sustained dialogue and cooperation through the Quad with a range of partners to support the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and territorial integrity, and to uphold peace and prosperity and strengthen democratic resilience;

(3) the United States should seek to expand avenues of cooperation with the Quad, including more regular military-to-military dialogues, joint exercises, and coordinated policies related to shared interests such as protecting cyberspace and advancing maritime security; and

(4) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad leaders meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to the economic and health impacts of COVID–19, including expanding safe, affordable, and effective vaccine production and equitable access, and to address shared challenges, including in cyberspace, critical technologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure investment, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as maritime domains, further advances the important cooperation among Quad nations that is so critical to the Indo-Pacific region.

It is the policy of the United States to—

(1) stand with the nations of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond to COVID–19 and support greater cooperation in building capacity to prepare for and respond to pandemics and other public health challenges;

(2) support high-level United States participation in the annual ASEAN Summit held each November;

(3) reaffirm the importance of United States-ASEAN economic engagement, including the elimination of barriers to cross-border commerce, and support the ASEAN Economic Community’s (AEC) goals, including strong, inclusive, and sustainable long-term economic growth and cooperation with the United States that focuses on innovation and capacity-building efforts in technology, education, disaster management, food security, human rights, and trade facilitation, particularly for ASEAN’s poorest countries;

(4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater integration and unity within the ASEAN community, as well as to foster greater integration and unity with non-ASEAN economic, political, and security partners, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the European Union, Taiwan, and India;

(5) recognize the value of strategic economic initiatives like United States-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrates a commitment to ASEAN and the AEC and builds upon economic relationships in the region;

(6) support ASEAN nations in addressing maritime and territorial disputes in a constructive manner and in pursuing claims through peaceful, diplomatic, and, as necessary, legitimate regional and international arbitration mechanisms, consistent with international law, including through the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea that represents the interests of all parties and promotes peace and stability in the region;

(7) urge all parties involved in the maritime and territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region, including the Government of China—

(A) to cease any current activities, and avoid undertaking any actions in the future, that undermine stability, or complicate or escalate disputes through the use of coercion, intimidation, or military force;

(B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals, and other features, and refrain from new efforts to militarize, including the construction of new garrisons and facilities and the relocation of additional military personnel, material, or equipment;

(C) to oppose actions by any country that prevent other countries from exercising their sovereign rights to the resources in their exclusive economic zones and continental shelves by enforcing claims to those areas in the South China Sea that lack support in international law; and

(D) to oppose unilateral declarations of administrative and military districts in contested areas in the South China Sea;

(8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral actions that cause permanent physical damage to the marine environment and support the efforts of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address the illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the region;

(9) urge ASEAN member states to develop a common approach to reaffirm the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s 2016 ruling in favor of the Republic of the Philippines in the case against the People’s Republic of China’s excessive maritime claims;

(10) reaffirm the commitment of the United States to continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt human smuggling and trafficking in persons and urge ASEAN to create and strengthen regional mechanisms to provide assistance and support to refugees and migrants;

(11) support the Lower Mekong Initiative;

(12) support newly created initiatives with ASEAN countries, including the Mekong-United States partnership, the United States-ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership, the ASEAN Policy Implementation Project, the United States-ASEAN Innovation Circle, and the United States-ASEAN Health Futures;

(13) encourage the President to communicate to ASEAN leaders the importance of promoting the rule of law and open and transparent government, strengthening civil society, and protecting human rights, including releasing political prisoners, ceasing politically motivated prosecutions and arbitrary killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech and expression;

(14) support efforts by organizations in ASEAN that address corruption in the public and private sectors, enhance anti-bribery compliance, enforce bribery criminalization in the private sector, and build beneficial ownership transparency through the ASEAN-USAID PROSPECT project partnered with the South East Asia Parties Against Corruption (SEA-PAC);

(15) support the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative as an example of a people-to-people partnership that provides skills, networks, and leadership training to a new generation that will create and fill jobs, foster cross-border cooperation and partnerships, and rise to solve the regional and global challenges of the future;

(16) support creating initiatives similar to the Young Southeast Asian Leaders for other parts of the Indo-Pacific to foster people-to-people partnerships with an emphasis on civil society leaders;

(17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments that have fully upheld and implemented all United Nations Security Council resolutions and international agreements with respect to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs and encourage all other ASEAN governments to do the same; and

(18) allocate appropriate resources across the United States Government to articulate and implement an Indo-Pacific strategy that respects and supports ASEAN centrality and supports ASEAN as a source of well-functioning and problem-solving regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific community.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States and ASEAN should complete a joint analysis on risks of overreliance on Chinese equipment critical to strategic technologies and critical infrastructure;

(2) the United States and ASEAN should share information about and collaborate on screening Chinese investments in strategic technology and critical infrastructure;

(3) the United States and ASEAN should work together on appropriate import restriction regimes regarding Chinese exports of surveillance technologies;

(4) the United States should urge ASEAN to adopt its March 2019 proposed sanctions regime targeting cyber attacks;

(5) the United States should urge ASEAN to commit to the September 2019 principles signed by 28 countries regarding “Advancing Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace”, a set of commitments that support the “rules-based international order, affirm the applicability of international law to state-on-state behavior, adherence to voluntary norms of responsible state behavior in peacetime, and the development and implementation of practical confidence building measures to help reduce the risk of conflict stemming from cyber incidents”; and

(6) the United States and ASEAN should explore how Chinese investments in critical technology, including artificial intelligence, will impact Indo-Pacific security over the coming decades.

(a) Report required.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report on the expanded influence of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party in international organizations.

(b) Contents.—The report required by subsection (a) shall include analysis of the following:

(1) The influence of the PRC and Chinese Communist Party in international organizations and how that influence has expanded over the last 10 years, including—

(A) tracking countries’ voting patterns that align with Chinese government voting patterns;

(B) the number of PRC nationals in leadership positions at the D–1 level or higher;

(C) changes in PRC voluntary and mandatory funding by organization;

(D) adoption of Chinese Communist Party phrases and initiatives in international organization language and programming;

(E) efforts by the PRC to secure legitimacy for its own foreign policy initiatives, including the Belt and Road Initiative;

(F) the number of Junior Professional Officers that the Government of China has funded by organization;

(G) tactics used by the Government of China or the CCP to manipulate secret or otherwise non-public voting measures, voting bodies, or votes;

(H) the extent to which technology companies incorporated in the PRC, or which have PRC or CCP ownership interests, provide equipment and services to international organizations; and

(I) efforts by China’s United Nations Mission to generate criticism of the United States in the United Nations, including any efforts to highlight delayed United States payments or to misrepresent total United States voluntary and assessed financial contributions to the United Nations and its specialized agencies and programs.

(2) The purpose and ultimate goals of the expanded influence of the PRC and the Chinese Communist Party in international organizations, including an analysis of PRC Government- and Chinese Communist Party strategic documents and rhetoric.

(3) The tactics and means employed by the PRC and the Chinese Communist Party to achieve expanded influence in international organizations, including—

(A) incentive programs for PRC nationals to join and run for leadership positions in international organizations;

(B) coercive economic and other practices against other members in the organization; and

(C) economic or other incentives provided to international organizations, including donations of technologies or goods.

(4) The successes and failures of PRC and CCP influence efforts in international organizations.

(c) Form.—The report submitted under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(d) Definition.—In this section, the term “international organizations” means the following:

(1) The African Development Bank.

(2) The Asian Development Bank.

(3) The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation.

(4) The Bank of International Settlements.

(5) The Caribbean Development Bank.

(6) The Food and Agriculture Organization.

(7) The International Atomic Energy Agency.

(8) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

(9) The International Bureau of Weights and Measures.

(10) The International Chamber of Commerce.

(11) The International Civil Aviation Organization.

(12) The International Criminal Police Organization.

(13) The International Finance Corporation.

(14) The International Fund for Agricultural Development.

(15) The International Hydrographic Organization.

(16) The International Labor Organization.

(17) The International Maritime Organization.

(18) The International Monetary Fund.

(19) The International Olympic Committee.

(20) The International Organization for Migration.

(21) The International Organization for Standardization.

(22) The International Renewable Energy Agency.

(23) The International Telecommunications Union.

(24) The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

(25) The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

(26) The United Nations.

(27) The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

(28) The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.

(29) The United Nations Industrial Development Organization.

(30) The United Nations Institute for Training and Research.

(31) The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.

(32) The Universal Postal Union.

(33) The World Customs Organization.

(34) The World Health Organization.

(35) The World Intellectual Property Organization.

(36) The World Meteorological Organization.

(37) The World Organization for Animal Health.

(38) The World Tourism Organization.

(39) The World Trade Organization.

(40) The World Bank Group.

(a) In general.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other participating executive branch agencies, shall establish and develop a program to facilitate and encourage regular dialogues between United States Government regulatory and technical agencies and their counterpart organizations in allied and partner countries, both bilaterally and in relevant multilateral institutions and organizations—

(1) to promote best practices in regulatory formation and implementation;

(2) to collaborate to achieve optimal regulatory outcomes based on scientific, technical, and other relevant principles;

(3) to seek better harmonization and alignment of regulations and regulatory practices;

(4) to build consensus around industry and technical standards in emerging sectors that will drive future global economic growth and commerce; and

(5) to promote United States standards regarding environmental, labor, and other relevant protections in regulatory formation and implementation, in keeping with the values of free and open societies, including the rule of law.

(b) Prioritization of activities.—In facilitating expert exchanges under subsection (a), the Secretary shall prioritize—

(1) bilateral coordination and collaboration with countries where greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of standards, or communication and dialogue between technical agencies is achievable and best advances the economic and national security interests of the United States;

(2) multilateral coordination and coordination where greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of standards, or dialogue on other relevant regulatory matters is achievable and best advances the economic and national security interests of the United States, including with—

(A) the European Union;

(B) the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation;

(C) the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN);

(D) the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); and

(E) multilateral development banks; and

(3) regulatory practices and standards setting bodies focused on key economic sectors and emerging technologies.

(c) Participation by non-Governmental entities.—With regard to the program described in subsection (a), the Secretary may facilitate, including through the use of amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (e), the participation of private sector representatives, and other relevant organizations and individuals with relevant expertise, as appropriate and to the extent that such participation advances the goals of such program.

(d) Delegation of authority by the Secretary.—The Secretary of State is authorized to delegate the responsibilities described in this section to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment.

(e) Authorization of appropriations.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated $2,500,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this section.

(2) USE OF FUNDS.—The Secretary may obligate amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) in a manner that—

(A) facilities participation by representatives from technical agencies within the United States Government and their counterparts; and

(B) complies with applicable procedural requirements under the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a et seq.) and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.).

(a) Statement of policy.—It shall be the policy of the United States to lead new technology policy partnerships focused on the shared interests of the world’s technology-leading democracies.

(b) Establishment.—The Secretary of State shall establish an interagency-staffed Technology Partnership Office (referred to in this section as the “Office”), which shall be housed in the Department of State.

(c) Leadership.—

(1) AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE.—The Office shall be headed by an Ambassador-at-Large for Technology, who shall—

(A) be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate;

(B) have the rank and status of ambassador; and

(C) report to the Secretary of State, unless otherwise directed.

(2) OFFICE LIAISONS.—The Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Treasury shall each appoint, from within their respective departments at the level of GS–14 or higher, liaisons between the Office and the Department of Commerce or the Department of the Treasury, as applicable, to perform the following duties:

(A) Collaborate with the Department of State on relevant technology initiatives and partnerships.

(B) Provide technical and other relevant expertise to the Office, as appropriate.

(d) Membership.—In addition to the liaisons referred to in subsection (c), the Office shall include a representative or expert detailee from key Federal agencies, as determined by the Ambassador-at-Large for Technology.

(e) Purposes.—The purposes of the Office shall include responsibilities such as—

(1) creating, overseeing, and carrying out technology partnerships with countries and relevant political and economic unions that are committed to—

(A) the rule of law, freedom of speech, and respect for an promotion of human rights;

(B) the safe and responsible development and use of new and emerging technologies and the establishment of related norms and standards;

(C) a secure internet architecture governed by a multi-stakeholder model instead of centralized government control;

(D) robust international cooperation to promote an open internet and interoperable technological products and services that are necessary to freedom, innovation, transparency, and privacy; and

(E) multilateral coordination, including through diplomatic initiatives, information sharing, and other activities, to defend the principles described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) against efforts by state and non-state actors to undermine them;

(2) harmonizing technology governance regimes with partners, coordinating on basic and pre-competitive research and development initiatives, and collaborating to pursue such opportunities in key technologies, including—

(A) artificial intelligence and machine learning;

(B) 5G telecommunications and other advanced wireless networking technologies;

(C) semiconductor manufacturing;

(D) biotechnology;

(E) quantum computing;

(F) surveillance technologies, including facial recognition technologies and censorship software; and

(G) fiber optic cables;

(3) coordinating with such countries regarding shared technology strategies, including technology controls and standards, as well as strategies with respect to the development and acquisition of key technologies to provide alternatives for those countries utilizing systems supported by authoritarian regimes;

(4) supporting and expanding adherence to international treaties and frameworks governing the responsible use of new and emerging technologies;

(5) coordinating the adoption of shared data privacy, data sharing, and data archiving standards among the United States and partner countries and relevant economic and political unions, including complementary data protection regulations;

(6) coordinating with other technology partners on export control policies, including as appropriate through the Wassenaar Arrangement On Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, done at The Hague December 1995, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime; supply chain security; and investment in or licensing of critical infrastructure and dual-use technologies;

(7) coordinating with members of technology partnerships on other policies for the use and control of emerging and foundational technologies through appropriate restrictions, investment screening, and appropriate measures with respect to technology transfers;

(8) coordinating policies, in coordination with the Department of Commerce, around the resiliency of supply chains in critical technology areas and explore possible diversification of supply chain components to countries involved in technology partnerships with the United States, while also maintaining transparency surrounding subsidies and product origins;

(9) sharing information regarding the technology transfer threat posed by authoritarian governments and the ways in which autocratic regimes are utilizing technology to erode individual freedoms and other foundations of open, democratic societies;

(10) administering the establishment of—

(A) the common funding mechanism for development and adoption of measurably secure semiconductors and measurably secure semiconductors supply chains created in and in accordance with the requirements of section 9905 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283); and

(B) the multilateral telecommunications security fund created in and in accordance with the requirements of section 9202 of such Act; and

(11) collaborating with private companies, trade associations, and think tanks to realize the purposes of paragraphs (1) through (10).

(f) Special hiring authorities.—The Secretary of State may—

(1) appoint employees without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, regarding appointments in the competitive service; and

(2) fix the basic compensation of such employees without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title regarding classification and General Schedule pay rates.

(g) Report.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the next three years, the Secretary of State shall submit an unclassified report to the appropriate congressional committees, with a classified index, if necessary, about the activities of the Office, including any cooperative initiatives and partnerships pursued with United States allies and partners, and the results of those activities, initiatives, and partnerships.

(h) Sense of Congress on establishing international technology partnership.—It is the sense of Congress that the Ambassador-at-Large for Technology should seek to establish an International Technology Partnership for the purposes described in this section with foreign countries that have—

(1) democratic national government and a strong commitment to democratic values, including an adherence to the rule of law, freedom of speech, and respect for and promotion of human rights;

(2) an economy with advanced technology sectors; and

(3) a demonstrated record of trust or an expressed interest in international cooperation and coordination with the United States on important defense and intelligence issues.

(a) Short title.—This section may be cited as the “Promoting United States International Leadership in 5G Act of 2021”.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States and its allies and partners should maintain participation and leadership at international standards-setting bodies for 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure;

(2) the United States should work with its allies and partners to encourage and facilitate the development of secure supply chains and networks for 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure; and

(3) the maintenance of a high standard of security in telecommunications and cyberspace between the United States and its allies and partners is a national security interest of the United States.

(c) Enhancing representation and leadership of United States at international standards-setting bodies.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall—

(A) establish an interagency working group to provide assistance and technical expertise to enhance the representation and leadership of the United States at international bodies that set standards for equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined networks that support 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure, such as the International Telecommunication Union and the 3rd Generation Partnership Project; and

(B) work with allies, partners, and the private sector to increase productive engagement.

(2) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.—The interagency working group described in paragraph (1)—

(A) shall be chaired by the Secretary of State or a designee of the Secretary of State; and

(B) shall consist of the head (or designee) of each Federal department or agency the President determines appropriate.

(3) BRIEFINGS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and subsequently thereafter as provided under subparagraph (B), the interagency working group described in paragraph (1) shall provide a strategy to the appropriate congressional committees that addresses—

(i) promotion of United States leadership at international standards-setting bodies for equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined networks relevant to 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure, taking into account the different processes followed by the various international standard-setting bodies;

(ii) diplomatic engagement with allies and partners to share security risk information and findings pertaining to equipment that supports or is used in 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure and cooperation on mitigating such risks;

(iii) China’s presence and activities at international standards-setting bodies relevant to 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure, including information on the differences in the scope and scale of China’s engagement at such bodies compared to engagement by the United States or its allies and partners and the security risks raised by Chinese proposals in such standards-setting bodies; and

(iv) engagement with private sector communications and information service providers, equipment developers, academia, Federally funded research and development centers, and other private-sector stakeholders to propose and develop secure standards for equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined networks that support 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure.

(B) SUBSEQUENT BRIEFINGS.—Upon receiving a request from the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, or as determined appropriate by the chair of the interagency working group established pursuant to paragraph (1), the interagency working group shall provide the requesting committee an updated briefing that covers the matters described in clauses (i) through (iv) of subparagraph (A).

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Sanctions and other restrictions, when used as part of a coordinated and comprehensive strategy, are a powerful tool to advance United States foreign policy and national security interests.

(2) Congress has authorized and mandated broad range of sanctions and other restrictions to address malign behavior and incentivize behavior change by individuals and entities in the PRC.

(3) The sanctions and other restrictions authorized and mandated by Congress address a range of malign PRC behavior, including—

(A) intellectual property theft;

(B) cyber-related economic espionage;

(C) repression of ethnic minorities;

(D) other human rights abuses;

(E) abuses of the international trading system;

(F) illicit assistance to and trade with the Government of North Korea; and

(G) drug trafficking, including trafficking in fentanyl and other opioids;

(4) The sanctions and other restrictions described in this section include the following:

(A) The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).

(B) Section 1637 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (50 U.S.C. 1708).

(C) The Fentanyl Sanctions Act (21 U.S.C. 2301 et seq.).

(D) The Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public Law 116–149; 22 U.S.C. 5701 note).

(E) Section 7 of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 (Public Law 116–76; 22 U.S.C. 5701 note).

(F) Section 6 of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note).

(G) The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.).

(H) Export control measures required to be maintained with respect to entities in the telecommunications sector of the People’s Republic of China, including under section 1260I of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92).

(I) Section 311 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–44; 131 Stat. 942).

(5) Full implementation of the authorities described in paragraph (4) is required under the respective laws described therein and pursuant to the Take Care Clause of the Constitution (article II, section 3).

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the executive branch has not fully implemented the sanctions and other restrictions described in subsection (a)(4) despite the statutory and constitutional requirements to do so; and

(2) the President’s full implementation and execution of the those authorities is a necessary and essential component to the success of the United States in the strategic competition with China.

(a) In general.—It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting through the Secretary of State, should initiate an agenda with G7 countries on matters relevant to economic and democratic freedoms, including the following:

(1) Trade and investment issues and enforcement.

(2) Building support for international infrastructure standards, including those agreed to at the G20 summit in Osaka in 2018.

(3) The erosion of democracy and human rights.

(4) The security of 5G telecommunications.

(5) Anti-competitive behavior, such as intellectual property theft, massive subsidization of companies, and other policies and practices.

(6) Predatory international sovereign lending that is inconsistent with OECD and Paris Club principles.

(7) International influence campaigns.

(8) Environmental standards.

(9) Coordination with like-minded regional partners that are not in the G7.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the United States Indo-Pacific strategy;

(2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its democracy as key elements for the continued peace and stability of the greater Indo-Pacific region, and a vital national security interest of the United States;

(3) to reinforce its commitments to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8) and the “Six Assurances” and in accordance with the United States “One China” policy;

(4) to support Taiwan’s implementation of its asymmetric defense strategy, including the priorities identified in Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept;

(5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense spending in order to fully resource its defense strategy;

(6) to conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop and integrate asymmetric capabilities, including anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, undersea warfare, advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and resilient command and control capabilities, into its military forces;

(7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the United Nations, the World Health Assembly, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization, and other international bodies as appropriate; and

(8) to promote meaningful cooperation among the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded partners.

(a) In general.—The Department of State and other United States Government agencies shall engage with the democratically elected government of Taiwan on the same basis, and using the same nomenclature and protocol, as the United States Government engages with other foreign governments. Notwithstanding the continued supporting role of the American Institute in Taiwan in carrying out United States foreign policy and protecting United States interests in Taiwan, the United States Government shall not place any restrictions on the ability of officials of the Department of State and other United States Government agencies to interact directly and routinely with counterparts in the Taiwan government.

(b) Rule of construction.—Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as entailing restoration of diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) or altering the United States Government’s position on Taiwan’s international status.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) it is critical to understand the origins of the COVID–19 pandemic so the United States can better prepare, prevent, and respond to pandemic health threats in the future;

(2) given the impact of the COVID–19 pandemic on all Americans, the American people deserve to know what information the United States Government possesses about the origins of COVID–19, as appropriate;

(3) Congress shares the concerns expressed by the United States Government and 13 other foreign governments that the international team of experts dispatched to the People’s Republic of China by the World Health Organization (WHO) to study the origins of the SARS–CoV–2 virus was “significantly delayed and lacked access to complete, original data and samples”;

(4) the March 30, 2021, statement by the Director-General of the WHO, Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, further affirms that the investigative team had encountered “difficulties” in accessing necessary raw data, that “we have not yet found the source of the virus,” and that “all hypotheses remain on the table”; and

(5) it is critical for independent experts to have full access to all pertinent human, animal, and environmental data, live virus samples, research, and personnel involved in the early stages of the outbreak relevant to determining how this pandemic emerged.

(b) Report required.—Not later than 180 days after enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Energy, and other relevant executive departments, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report consisting of—

(1) an assessment of the most likely source or origin of the SARS–CoV–2 virus, including a detailed review of all information the United States possesses that it has identified as potentially relevant to the source or origin of the SARS–CoV–2 virus, including zoonotic transmission and spillover, the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), or other sources of origin, transmission, or spillover, based on the information the United States Government has to date;

(2) an identification of the leading credible theories of the etiology of the SARS–CoV–2 virus by the United States Government, the steps the United States has taken to validate those theories, and any variance in assessment or dissent among or between United States intelligence agencies, executive agencies, and executive offices of the most likely source or origin of the SARS–CoV–2 virus, and the basis for such variance or dissent;

(3) a description of all steps the United States Government has taken to identify and investigate the source of the SARS–CoV–2 virus, including a timeline of such efforts;

(4) a detailed description of the data to which the United States and the WHO have requested and have access to in order to determine the origin of the source of the SARS–CoV–2 virus;

(5) an account of efforts by the PRC to cooperate with, impede, or obstruct any inquiry or investigation to determine the source and transmission of SARS–CoV–2 virus, including into a possible lab leak, or to create or spread misinformation or disinformation regarding the source and transmission of SARS–CoV–2 virus by the PRC or CCP, including by national and local governmental and health entities;

(6) a detailed account of information known to the United States Government regarding the WIV and associated facilities, including research activities on coronaviruses and gain-of-function research, any reported illnesses of persons associated with the laboratory with symptoms consistent with COVID–19 and the ultimate diagnosis, and a timeline of research relevant to coronaviruses;

(7) a list of any known obligations on the PRC that require disclosure and cooperation in the event of a viral outbreak like SARS–CoV–2; and

(8) an overview of United States engagement with the PRC with respect to coronaviruses that includes—

(A) a detailed accounting of United States engagement with the WIV and similar labs in the PRC specific to coronaviruses, including a detailed accounting United States Government-sponsored research and funding and diplomatic engagements such as “track 1.5” and “track 2” engagements; and

(B) an assessment of any additional scrutiny of United States Government funding to support gain-of-function research in the PRC after the moratorium on such funding was lifted in 2017, and whether United States Government funding was used to support gain-of-function research in China, during the moratorium on gain-of-function research (2014–2017).

(c) Form.—The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

(d) Appropriate committees of Congress defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions of the Senate;

(4) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;

(5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(6) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;

(7) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives; and

(8) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

(a) Authority.—The Secretary of State and Secretary of Commerce are authorized to hire Locally Employed Staff in Pacific island countries for the purpose of providing increased diplomatic support and promoting increased economic and commercial engagement between the United States and Pacific Island countries.

(b) Availability of funds.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State and the Department of Commerce for fiscal year 2022, not more than $10,000,000 , respectively, shall be available to carry out the purposes of this section.

(2) TERMINATION.—The availability of funds in paragraph (1) shall expire on December 31, 2026.

(c) Report.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce shall provide to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the activities of the Department of State and Department of Commerce Locally Employed Staff in Pacific island countries, which shall include—

(1) a detailed description of the additional diplomatic, economic, and commercial engagement and activities in the Pacific island countries provided by Locally Employed Staff; and

(2) an assessment of the impact of the activities with respect to the diplomatic, economic, and security interests of the United States.

(d) Exception for American Samoa.—The Secretary of State may, as appropriate, treat the territory of American Samoa as a foreign country for purposes of carrying out this section.

(e) Appropriate committees of Congress defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Natural Resources, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) In fiscal year 2020, the Department of State allocated $1,500,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific region in bilateral and regional foreign assistance (FA) resources and $798,000,000 in the fiscal year 2020 diplomatic engagement (DE) budget. These amounts represent only 5 percent of the DE budget and only 4 percent of the total Department of State-USAID budget.

(2) Over the last 5 years the DE budget and personnel levels in the Indo-Pacific averaged only 5 percent of the total, while FA resources averaged only 4 percent of the total.

(3) In 2020, the Department of State began a process to realign certain positions at posts to ensure that its personnel footprint matches the demands of great-power competition, including in the Indo-Pacific.

(b) Statement of policy.—

(1) It shall be the policy of the United States to ensure Department of State funding levels and personnel footprint in the Indo-Pacific reflect the region’s high degree of importance and significance to United States political, economic, and security interests.

(2) It shall be the policy of the United States to increase DE and FA funding and the quantity of personnel dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region respective to the Department of State’s total budget.

(3) It shall be the policy of the United States to increase the number of Defense attaches in the Indo-Pacific region number of to assure coverage of all appropriate Posts.

(c) Action plan.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide to the appropriate committees of Congress an action plan with the following elements:

(1) Identification of requirements and the personnel budgetary resources needed to meet them, assuming an unconstrained resource environment.

(2) A plan to increase the portion of the Department’s budget dedicated to the Indo-Pacific in terms of DE and FA focused on development, economic, and security assistance.

(3) A plan to increase the number of positions at posts in the Indo-Pacific region and bureaus with responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including a description of increases at each post or bureau, a breakdown of increases by cone, and a description of what each new officer will do to advance United States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.

(4) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks that the Department will meet in implementing the action plan.

(5) A description of any barriers to implementing the action plan.

(d) Updates to report and briefing.—Every 90 days after the submission of the action plan described in subsection (c), the Secretary shall submit an update and brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the implementation of such action plan, with supporting data and including a detailed assessment of benchmarks reached.

(e) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated $2,000,000,000 in bilateral and regional foreign assistance resources to the Indo-Pacific region and $1,250,000,000 in diplomatic engagement resources to the Indo-Pacific region.

(f) Secretary of State certification.—Not later than two years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall certify whether or not the benchmarks described in the action plan in subsection (c) have been met. This certification is non-delegable.

(g) Appropriate committees of Congress defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(a) Establishment.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall establish, within the Bureau of International Organization Affairs of the Department of State, a Special Representative for Advancing United States Leadership in the United Nations (referred to in this section as the “Special Representative”). The Special Representative shall serve concurrently as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs of the Department of State. The Special Representative shall report directly to the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, in coordination and consultation with the Representative of the United States to the United Nations.

(b) Responsibilities.—The Special Representative shall assume responsibility for—

(1) promoting United States leadership and participation in the United Nations system, with a focus on issue areas where authoritarian nations are exercising increased influence in and determining the agenda of the United Nations system;

(2) highlighting how investments in the United Nations advance United States interests and enable stronger coalitions to hold authoritarian regimes to account;

(3) ensuring United States emphasis on the need for United Nations employees to uphold the principals of impartiality enshrined in the United Nations charter, rules, and regulations;

(4) monitoring and developing and implementing plans to counter undue influence, especially by authoritarian nations, within the United Nations system;

(5) assessing how United States decisions to withdraw from United Nations bodies impacts United States influence at the United Nations and multilateral global initiatives;

(6) promoting participation and inclusion of Taiwan in the United Nations system;

(7) monitoring the pipeline of United Nations jobs and identifying qualified Americans and other qualified nationals to promote for these positions;

(8) tracking leadership changes in United Nations secretariat, funds, programs and agencies, and developing strategies to ensure that coalitions of like-minded states are assembled to ensure leadership races are not won by countries that do not share United States interests; and

(9) advancing other priorities deemed relevant by the Secretary of State to ensuring the integrity of the United Nations system.

(c) Support.—The Secretary of State shall make any necessary adjustments to the current structure of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, including the respective roles and responsibilities of offices in that Bureau, to ensure appropriate support for the mission and work of the Special Representative.

(d) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated not less than $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 and for each subsequent fiscal year to carry out the responsibilities under subsection (b).

In this subtitle:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(2) COMPANY.—The term “company” means any corporation, company, limited liability company, limited partnership, business trust, business association, or other similar entity.

(3) OTHER SECURITY FORCES.—The term “other security forces”—

(A) includes national security forces that conduct maritime security; and

(B) does not include self-described militias or paramilitary organizations.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The People’s Republic of China aims to use its growing military might in concert with other instruments of its national power to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific and establish hegemony over the region.

(2) The military balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region is growing increasingly unfavorable to the United States because—

(A) the PRC is rapidly modernizing and expanding the capabilities of the PLA to project power and create contested areas across the entire Indo-Pacific region;

(B) PLA modernization has largely focused on areas where it possesses operational advantages and can exploit weaknesses in the United States suite of capabilities; and

(C) current United States force structure and presence do not sufficiently counter threats in the Indo-Pacific, as United States allies, bases, and forces at sea in the Indo-Pacific region are concentrated in large bases that are highly vulnerable to the PRC’s strike capabilities.

(3) This shift in the regional military balance and erosion of conventional deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region—

(A) presents a substantial and imminent risk to the security of the United States; and

(B) left unchecked, could embolden the PRC to take actions, including the use of military force, to change the status quo before the United States can mount an effective response.

(4) The PRC sees an opportunity to diminish confidence among United States allies and partners in the strength of United States commitments, even to the extent that these nations feel compelled to bandwagon with the PRC to protect their interests. The PRC is closely monitoring the United States reaction to PRC pressure and coercion of United States allies, searching for indicators of United States resolve.

(5) Achieving so-called “reunification” of Taiwan to mainland China is a key step for the PRC to achieve its regional hegemonic ambitions. The PRC has increased the frequency and scope of its exercises and operations targeting Taiwan, such as amphibious assault and live-fire exercises in the Taiwan Strait, PLA Air Force flights that encircle Taiwan, and flights across the unofficial median line in the Taiwan Strait. The Government of the PRC’s full submission of Hong Kong potentially accelerates the timeline of a Taiwan scenario, and makes the defense of Taiwan an even more urgent priority.

(6) The defense of Taiwan is critical to—

(A) defending the people of Taiwan;

(B) limiting the PLA’s ability to project power beyond the First Island Chain, including to United States territory, such as Guam and Hawaii;

(C) defending the territorial integrity of Japan;

(D) preventing the PLA from diverting military planning, resources, and personnel to broader military ambitions; and

(E) retaining the United States credibility as a defender of the democratic values and free-market principles embodied by Taiwan’s people and government;

(7) The PRC capitalized on the world’s attention to COVID–19 to advance its military objectives in the South China Sea, intensifying and accelerating trends already underway. The PRC has sent militarized survey vessels into the Malaysian Exclusive Economic Zone, announced the establishment of an administrative district in the Spratly and Paracel Islands under the Chinese local government of Sansha, aimed a fire control radar at a Philippine navy ship, encroached on Indonesia’s fishing grounds, sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat, announced new “research stations” on Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef, landed special military aircraft on Fiery Cross Reef to routinize such deployments, and sent a flotilla of over 200 militia vessels to Whitsun Reef, a feature within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines.

(8) On July 13, 2020, the Department of State clarified United States policy on the South China Sea and stated that “Beijing’s claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are completely unlawful”.

(9) These actions in the South China Sea enable the PLA to exert influence and project power deeper into Oceania and the Indian Ocean. As Admiral Phil Davidson, Commander of Indo-Pacific Command, testified in 2019, “In short, China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States.”.

(10) The PLA also continues to advance its claims in the East China Sea, including through a high number of surface combatant patrols and frequent entry into the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands, over which the United States recognizes Japan’s administrative control. In April 2014, President Barack Obama stated, “Our commitment to Japan’s security is absolute and article five [of the U.S.-Japan security treaty] covers all territory under Japan’s administration, including the Senkaku islands.”.

(11) On March 1, 2019, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo stated, “As the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations under Article 4 of our Mutual Defense Treaty.”.

(12) The PLA is modernizing and gaining critical capability in every branch and every domain, including—

(A) positioning the PLA Navy to become a great maritime power or “blue-water” navy that can completely control all activity within the First Island Chain and project power beyond it with a fleet of 425 battle force ships by 2030;

(B) increasing the size and range of its strike capabilities, including approximately 1,900 ground-launched short- and intermediate-range missiles capable of targeting United States allies and partners in the First and Second Island chains, United States bases in the Indo-Pacific, and United States forces at sea;

(C) boosting capabilities for air warfare, including with Russian-origin Su–35 fighters and S–400 air defense systems, new J–20 5th generation stealth fighters, advanced H–6 bomber variants, a long-range stealth bomber, and Y–20 heavy lift aircraft; and

(D) making critical investments in new domains of warfare, such as cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and space warfare.

(13) The PRC is pursuing this modernization through all means at its disposal, including its Military-Civil Fusion initiative, which enlists the whole of PRC society in developing and acquiring technology with military applications to pursue technological advantage over the United States in artificial intelligence, hypersonic glide vehicles, directed energy weapons, electromagnetic railguns, counter-space weapons, and other emerging capabilities.

(14) The United States lead in the development of science and technology relevant to defense is eroding in the face of competition from the PRC. United States research and development spending on defense capabilities has declined sharply as a share of global research and development. The commercial sector’s leading role in innovation presents certain unique challenges to the Department of Defense’s reliance on technology for battlefield advantage.

(15) The PRC has vastly increased domestic research and development expenditures, supported the growth of new cutting-edge industries and tapped into a large workforce to invest in fostering science and engineering talent.

(16) The PRC is increasing exports of defense and security capabilities to build its defense technology and industrial base and improve its own military capabilities, as well as its influence with countries that purchase and become dependent on its military systems.

It is the Sense of Congress that steps to bolster United States security partnership in the Indo-Pacific must include—

(1) supporting Japan in its development of long-range precision fires, munitions, air and missile defense capacity, interoperability across all domains, maritime security, and intelligence, and surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities;

(2) launching a United States-Japan national security innovation fund to solicit and support private sector cooperation for new technologies that could benefit the United States and Japan’s mutual security objectives;

(3) promoting a deeper defense relationship between Japan and Australia, including supporting reciprocal access agreements and trilateral United States-Japan-Australia intelligence sharing;

(4) encouraging and facilitating Taiwan’s accelerated acquisition of asymmetric defense capabilities, which are crucial to defending the islands of Taiwan from invasion, including long-range precision fires, munitions, anti-ship missiles, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, undersea warfare, advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and resilient command and control capabilities, and increasing the conduct of relevant and practical training and exercises with Taiwan’s defense forces; and

(5) prioritizing building the capacity of United States allies and partners to protect defense technology.

It shall be the policy of the United States to—

(1) prioritize the Indo-Pacific region in United States foreign policy, and prioritize resources for achieving United States political and military objectives in the region;

(2) exercise freedom of operations in the international waters and airspace in the Indo-Pacific maritime domains, which are critical to the prosperity, stability, and security of the Indo-Pacific region;

(3) maintain forward-deployed forces in the Indo-Pacific region, including a rotational bomber presence, integrated missile defense capabilities, long-range precision fires, undersea warfare capabilities, and diversified and resilient basing and rotational presence, including support for pre-positioning strategies;

(4) strengthen and deepen the alliances and partnerships of the United States to build capacity and capabilities, increase multilateral partnerships, modernize communications architecture, address anti-access and area denial challenges, and increase joint exercises and security cooperation efforts;

(5) reaffirm the commitment and support of the United States for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including longstanding United States policy regarding—

(A) Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, signed at Washington January 19, 1960;

(B) Article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea, signed at Washington October 1, 1953;

(C) Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, signed at Washington August 30, 1951, including that, as the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations under Article IV of our mutual defense treaty;

(D) Article IV of the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty, done at San Francisco September 1, 1951; and

(E) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, done at Manila September 8, 1954, together with the Thanat-Rusk Communique of 1962; and

(6) collaborate with United States treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific to foster greater multilateral security and defense cooperation with other regional partners;

(7) ensure the continuity of operations by the United States Armed Forces in the Indo-Pacific region, including, as appropriate, in cooperation with partners and allies, in order to reaffirm the principle of freedom of operations in international waters and airspace in accordance with established principles and practices of international law;

(8) sustain the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.);

(9) sustain the“Six Assurances” provided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 as the foundations for United States-Taiwan relations, and to deepen, to the fullest extent possible, the extensive, close, and friendly relations of the United States and Taiwan, including cooperation to support the development of capable, ready, and modern forces necessary for the defense of Taiwan;

(10) enhance security partnerships with India, across Southeast Asia, and with other nations of the Indo-Pacific;

(11) deter acts of aggression or coercion by the PRC against United States and allies’ interests, especially along the First Island Chain and in the Western Pacific, by showing PRC leaders that the United States can and is willing to deny them the ability to achieve their objectives, including by—

(A) consistently demonstrating the political will of the United States to deepening existing treaty alliances and growing new partnerships as a durable, asymmetric, and unmatched strategic advantage to the PRC’s growing military capabilities and reach;

(B) maintaining a system of forward-deployed bases in the Indo-Pacific region as the most visible sign of United States resolve and commitment to the region, and as platforms to ensure United States operational readiness and advance interoperability with allies and partners;

(C) adopting a more dispersed force posture throughout the region, particularly the Western Pacific, and pursuing maximum access for United States mobile and relocatable launchers for long-range cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic weapons throughout the Indo-Pacific region;

(D) fielding long-range, precision-strike networks to United States and allied forces, including ground-launched cruise missiles, undersea and naval capabilities, and integrated air and missile defense in the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain, in order to deter and prevent PRC coercion and aggression, and to maximize the United States ability to operate;

(E) strengthening extended deterrence to ensure that escalation against key United States interests would be costly, risky, and self-defeating; and

(F) collaborating with allies and partners to accelerate their roles in more equitably sharing the burdens of mutual defense, including through the acquisition and fielding of advanced capabilities and training that will better enable them to repel PRC aggression or coercion; and

(12) maintain the capacity of the United States to impose prohibitive diplomatic, economic, financial, reputational, and military costs on the PRC for acts of coercion or aggression, including to defend itself and its allies regardless of the point of origin of attacks against them.

(a) Foreign Military Financing funding.—In addition to any amount appropriated pursuant to section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) (relating to foreign military financing assistance), there is authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2022 through fiscal year 2026 for activities in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with this section—

(1) $110,000,000 for fiscal year 2022;

(2) $125,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;

(3) $130,000,000 for fiscal year 2024;

(4) $140,000,000 for fiscal year 2025; and

(5) $150,000,000 for fiscal year 2026.

(b) Southeast Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative.—There is authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the Department of State for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) for the support of the Southeast Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative.

(c) Diplomatic outreach activities.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State, $1,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, which shall be used—

(1) to conduct, in coordination with the Department of Defense, outreach activities, including conferences and symposia, to familiarize partner countries, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, with the United States interpretation of international law relating to freedom of the seas; and

(2) to work with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region to better align respective interpretations of international law relating to freedom of the seas, including on the matters of operations by military ships in exclusive economic zones, innocent passage through territorial seas, and transits through international straits.

(d) Program authorization and purpose.—Using amounts appropriate pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, is authorized to provide assistance, for the purpose of increasing maritime security and domain awareness for countries in the Indo-Pacific region—

(1) to provide assistance to national military or other security forces of such countries that have maritime security missions among their functional responsibilities;

(2) to provide training to ministry, agency, and headquarters level organizations for such forces; and

(3) to provide assistance to and training to other relevant foreign affairs, maritime, or security-related ministries, agencies, departments, or offices that manage and oversee maritime activities and policy that the Secretary of State may so designate.

(e) Designation of assistance.—Assistance provided by the Secretary of State under this section shall be known as the “Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative” (in this section referred to as the “Initiative”).

(f) Program objectives.—Assistance provided through the Initiative may be used to accomplish the following objectives:

(1) Retaining unhindered access to and use of international waterways in the Indo-Pacific region that are critical to ensuring the security and free flow of commerce and achieving United States national security objectives.

(2) Improving maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific region.

(3) Countering piracy in the Indo-Pacific region.

(4) Disrupting illicit maritime trafficking activities and other forms of maritime trafficking activity in the Indo-Pacific that directly benefit organizations that have been determined to be a security threat to the United States.

(5) Enhancing the maritime capabilities of a country or regional organization to respond to emerging threats to maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region.

(6) Strengthening United States alliances and partnerships in Southeast Asia and other parts of the Indo-Pacific region.

(g) Authorization of appropriations.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Of the amount appropriated pursuant to subsection(a) and section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) (relating to foreign military financing assistance), there is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State for the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative and other related regional programs exactly—

(A) $70,000,000 for fiscal year 2022;

(B) $80,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;

(C) $90,000,000 for fiscal year 2024;

(D) $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2025; and

(E) $110,000,000 for fiscal year 2026.

(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—The “Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative” and funds authorized for the Initiative shall include existing regional programs related to maritime security, including the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative.

(h) Eligibility and priorities for assistance.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall use the following considerations when selecting which countries in the Indo-Pacific region should receive assistance pursuant to the Initiative:

(A) Assistance may be provided to a country in the Indo-Pacific region to enhance the capabilities of that country according to the objectives outlined in (f), or of a regional organization that includes that country, to conduct—

(i) maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;

(ii) littoral and port security;

(iii) Coast Guard operations;

(iv) command and control; and

(v) management and oversight of maritime activities.

(B) Priority shall be placed on assistance to enhance the maritime security capabilities of the military or security forces of countries in the Indo-Pacific region that have maritime missions and the government agencies responsible for such forces.

(2) TYPES OF ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING.—

(A) AUTHORIZED ELEMENTS OF ASSISTANCE.—Assistance provided under paragraph (1)(A) may include the provision of equipment, training, and small-scale military construction.

(B) REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING.—Assistance and training provided under subparagraph (A) shall include elements that promote—

(i) the observance of and respect for human rights; and

(ii) respect for legitimate civilian authority within the country to which the assistance is provided.

(i) Joint task force.—The Department of Defense shall establish a joint, interagency task force to assess, respond to, and coordinate with allies and partners in response to the use of grey zone tactics by state and non-state actors in the Indo-Pacific maritime domain, including—

(1) conducting domain awareness operations, intelligence fusion, and multi-sensor correlation to detect, monitor, and hand off suspected grey zone activities;

(2) promoting security, cooperation, and capacity building; and

(3) coordinating country team and partner nation initiatives in order to counter the use of grey zone tactics by adversaries.

(j) Annual report.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress each year a report on the status of the provision of equipment, training, supplies, or other services provided pursuant to the Initiative during the preceding 12 months.

(k) Notice to Congress on assistance and training.—Not later than 15 days before exercising the authority under subsection (a) with respect to a recipient foreign country, the Secretary of State shall submit a notification in writing to the appropriate committees of Congress.

(a) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated $20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 and 2023 for the creation of a pilot program for foreign military financing compacts.

(b) Assistance.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is authorized to create a pilot program, for a duration of two years, with an assessment for any additional or permanent programming, to provide assistance under this section for each country that enters into an FMF Challenge Compact with the United States pursuant to subsection (d) to support policies and programs that advance the progress of the country in achieving lasting security and civilian-military governance through respect for human rights, good governance (including transparency and free and fair elections), and cooperation with United States and international counter-terrorism, anti-trafficking, and counter-crime efforts and programs.

(2) FORM OF ASSISTANCE.—Assistance under this subsection may be provided in the form of grants, cooperative agreements, contracts, or no-interest loans to the government of an eligible country described in subsection (c).

(c) Eligible countries.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—A country shall be a candidate country for purposes of eligibility for assistance for fiscal year 2022 and 2023 if—

(A) the country is classified as a lower middle income country in the then most recent edition of the World Development Report for Reconstruction and Development published by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and has an income greater than the historical ceiling for International Development Association eligibility for the fiscal year involved; and

(B) the Secretary of State determines that the country is committed to seeking just and democratic governance, including with a demonstrated commitment to—

(i) the promotion of political pluralism, equality, and the rule of law;

(ii) respect for human and civil rights;

(iii) protection of private property rights;

(iv) transparency and accountability of government;

(v) anti-corruption; and

(vi) the institution of effective civilian control, professionalization, respect for human rights by, and accountability of the armed forces.

(2) IDENTIFICATION OF ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES.—Not later than 90 days prior to the date on which the Secretary of State determines eligible countries for an FMF Challenge Compact, the Secretary—

(A) shall prepare and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains a list of all eligible countries identified that have met the requirements under paragraph (1) for the fiscal year; and

(B) shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees on the extent to which such countries meet the criteria described in paragraph (1).

(d) FMF challenge compact.—

(1) COMPACT.—The Secretary of State may provide assistance for an eligible country only if the country enters into an agreement with the United States, to be known as an “FMF Challenge Compact” (in this subsection referred to as a“Compact”) that establishes a multi-year plan for achieving shared security objectives in furtherance of the purposes of this title.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The elements of the Compact shall be those listed in subsection (c)(1)(B) for determining eligibility, and be designed to significantly advance the performance of those commitments during the period of the Compact.

(3) IN GENERAL.—The Compact should take into account the national strategy of the eligible country and shall include—

(A) the specific objectives that the country and the United States expect to achieve during the term of the Compact, including both how the foreign military financing under the Compact will advance shared security interests and advance partner capacity building efforts as well as to advance national efforts towards just and democratic governance;

(B) the responsibilities of the country and the United States in the achievement of such objectives;

(C) regular benchmarks to measure, where appropriate, progress toward achieving such objectives; and

(D) the strategy of the eligible country to sustain progress made toward achieving such objectives after expiration of the Compact.

(e) Congressional consultation prior to compact negotiations.—Not later than 15 days before commencing negotiations of a Compact with an eligible country, the Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees with respect to the proposed Compact negotiation and shall identify the objectives and mechanisms to be used for the negotiation of the Compact.

(f) Assessment of pilot program and recommendations.—Not later than 90 days after the conclusion of the pilot program, the Secretary of State shall provide a report to the appropriate congressional committees with respect to the pilot program, including an assessment of the success and utility of the pilot program established under this subsection in meeting United States objectives and a recommendation with respect to whether to continue on a pilot or permanent basis a further foreign military financing compact program.

There is authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2022 through fiscal year 2026 for the Department of State, out of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.) (relating to international military education and training (IMET) assistance), $45,000,000 for activities in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with this Act.

(a) Sense of congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States Government should prioritize the review of excess defense article transfers to Indo-Pacific partners.

(b) Five-Year plan.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall develop a five-year plan to prioritize excess defense article transfers to the Indo-Pacific and provide a report describing such plan to the appropriate congressional committees.

(c) Transfer authority.—Section 516(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)) is amended by inserting “, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia” after “and to the Philippines”.

(d) Required coordination.—The United States Government shall coordinate and align excess defense article transfers with capacity building efforts of regional allies and partners.

(a) Authority.—The President is authorized to transfer to a government of a country listed pursuant to the amendment made under section 228(c) two OLIVER HAZARD PERRY class guided missile frigates on a grant basis under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).

(b) Grants not counted in annual total of transferred excess defense articles.—The value of a vessel transferred to another country on a grant basis pursuant to authority provided by this section shall not be counted against the aggregate value of excess defense articles transferred in any fiscal year under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).

(c) Costs of transfers.—Any expense incurred by the United States in connection with a transfer authorized by this section shall be charged to the recipient notwithstanding section 516(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(e)).

(d) Repair and refurbishment in united states shipyards.—To the maximum extent practicable, the President shall require, as a condition of the transfer of a vessel under this subsection, that the recipient to which the vessel is transferred have such repair or refurbishment of the vessel as is needed, before the vessel joins the naval forces of that recipient, performed at a shipyard located in the United States.

(e) Expiration of authority.—The authority to transfer a vessel under this section shall expire at the end of the 3-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(a) Sense of congress.—Congress—

(1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or the use of force to impede freedom of operations in international airspace by military or civilian aircraft, to alter the status quo, or to destabilize the Indo-Pacific region;

(2) urges the Government of China to refrain from implementing the declared East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South China Sea, which is contrary to freedom of overflight in international airspace, and to refrain from taking similar provocative actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region;

(3) reaffirms that the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal’s decision is final and legally binding on both parties and that the People’s Republic of China’s claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are unlawful; and

(4) condemns the People’s Republic of China for failing to abide by the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal’s ruling, despite Chinese obligations as a state party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

(b) Statement of policy.—It shall be the policy of the United States to—

(1) reaffirm its commitment and support for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including longstanding United States policy regarding Article V of the United States-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and reaffirm its position that Article V of the United States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands;

(2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and lawful use of the sea, or the airspace above it, that belong to all nations, and oppose the militarization of new and reclaimed land features in the South China Sea;

(3) continue certain policies with respect to the PRC claims in the South China Sea, namely—

(A) that PRC claims in the South China Sea, including to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea, are unlawful;

(B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a maritime claim vis-à-vis the Philippines in areas that the Tribunal found to be in the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf;

(C) to reject any PRC claim to waters beyond a 12 nautical mile territorial sea derived from islands its claims in the Spratly Islands; and

(D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial or maritime claim to James Shoal;

(4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in destabilizing activities, including illegal occupation or efforts to unlawfully assert administration over disputed claims;

(5) ensure that disputes are managed without intimidation, coercion, or force;

(6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust claims in accordance with international law;

(7) uphold the principle that territorial and maritime claims, including territorial waters or territorial seas, must be derived from land features and otherwise comport with international law;

(8) oppose the imposition of new fishing regulations covering disputed areas in the South China Sea, regulations which have raised tensions in the region;

(9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if that Code of Conduct reflects the interests of Southeast Asian claimant states and does not serve as a vehicle for the People’s Republic of China to advance its unlawful maritime claims;

(10) reaffirm that an existing body of international rules and guidelines, including the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation between the United States Armed Forces and the forces of other countries, including the People’s Republic of China;

(11) support the development of regional institutions and bodies, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation in the region and reinforce the role of international law;

(12) encourage the deepening of partnerships with other countries in the region for maritime domain awareness and capacity building, as well as efforts by the United States Government to explore the development of appropriate multilateral mechanisms for a “common operating picture” in the South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries that would serve to help countries avoid destabilizing behavior and deter risky and dangerous activities;

(13) oppose actions by any country to prevent any other country from exercising its sovereign rights to the resources of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf by making claims to those areas in the South China Sea that have no support in international law; and

(14) assure the continuity of operations by the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, including, when appropriate, in cooperation with partners and allies, to reaffirm the principle of freedom of operations in international waters and airspace in accordance with established principles and practices of international law.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Secretary of State should expand and strengthen existing measures under the United States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy to provide capabilities to allies and partners consistent with agreed-on division of responsibility for alliance roles, missions and capabilities, prioritizing allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with United States strategic imperatives;

(2) the United States should design for export to Indo-Pacific allies and partners capabilities critical to maintaining a favorable military balance in the region, including long-range precision fires, air and missile defense systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, land attack cruise missiles, conventional hypersonic systems, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and command and control systems;

(3) the United States should pursue, to the maximum extent possible, anticipatory technology security and foreign disclosure policy on the systems described in paragraph (2); and

(4) the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, should—

(A) urge allies and partners to invest in sufficient quantities of munitions to meet contingency requirements and avoid the need for accessing United States stocks in wartime; and

(B) cooperate with allies to deliver such munitions, or when necessary, to increase allies’ capacity to produce such munitions.

(b) Appropriate committees of Congress defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(4) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

(c) Report.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that describes United States priorities for building more capable security partners in the Indo-Pacific region.

(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall—

(A) provide a priority list of defense and military capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and partners must possess for the United States to be able to achieve its military objectives in the Indo-Pacific region;

(B) identify, from the list referred to in subparagraph (A), the capabilities that are best provided, or can only be provided, by the United States;

(C) identify—

(i) actions required to prioritize United States Government resources and personnel to expedite fielding the capabilities identified in subparagraph (B); and

(ii) steps needed to fully account for and a plan to integrate all means of United States foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, security assistance, and all applicable authorities of the Department of State and the Department of Defense;

(D) assess the requirements for United States security assistance, including International Military Education and Training, in the Indo-Pacific region, as a part of the means to deliver critical partner capability requirements identified in subparagraph (B);

(E) assess the resources necessary to meet the requirements for United States security assistance, and identify resource gaps;

(F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling requirements for United States security assistance in the Indo-Pacific region, including resources and personnel limits, foreign legislative and policy barriers, and factors related to specific partner countries;

(G) identify limitations on the United States ability to provide such capabilities, including those identified under subparagraph (B), because of existing United States treaty obligations, United States policies, or other regulations;

(H) recommend improvements to the process for developing requirements for partners capabilities; and

(I) identify required jointly agreed recommendations for infrastructure and posture, based on any ongoing mutual dialogues.

(3) FORM.—The report required under this subsection shall be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

(a) Sense of congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) a more streamlined, shared, and coordinated approach, which leverages economies of scale with major allies, is necessary for the United States to retain its lead in defense technology;

(2) allowing for the export, re-export, or transfer of defense-related technologies and services to members of the national technology and industrial base (as defined in section 2500 of title 10, United States Code) would advance United States security interests by helping to leverage the defense-related technologies and skilled workforces of trusted allies to reduce the dependence on other countries, including countries that pose challenges to United States interests around the world, for defense-related innovation and investment; and

(3) it is in the interest of the United States to continue to increase cooperation with Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to protect critical defense-related technology and services and leverage the investments of like-minded, major ally nations in order to maximize the strategic edge afforded by defense technology innovation.

(b) Report.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that—

(A) describes the Department of State’s efforts to facilitate access among the national technology and industrial base to defense articles and services subject to the United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)); and

(B) identifies foreign legal, regulatory, foreign policy, or other challenges or considerations that prevent or frustrate these efforts, to include any gaps in the respective export control regimes implemented by United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Australia, or Canada.

(2) FORM.—This report required under paragraph (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

(a) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees regarding United States diplomatic engagement with other nations that host or are considering hosting any military installation of the Government of the People’s Republic of China.

(b) Matters To be included.—The report required under subsection (a) shall include—

(1) a list of countries that currently host or are considering hosting any military installation of the Government of the People’s Republic of China;

(2) a detailed description of United States diplomatic and related efforts to countries that are considering hosting a military installation of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, and the results of such efforts;

(3) an assessment on the adverse impact on United States interests of the Government of the People’s Republic of China successfully establishing a military installation at any of the locations it is currently considering;

(4) a description and list of any commercial ports outside of the People’s Republic of China that the United States Government assesses could be used by the Government of the People’s Republic of China for military purposes, and any diplomatic efforts with the governments of the countries where such ports are located;

(5) the impact of the military installations of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on United States interests; and

(6) lessons learned from the diplomatic experience of addressing the PRC’s first overseas base in Djibouti.

(c) Form of report.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be classified, but may include a unclassified summary.

It is the policy of the United States to sustain maximum economic pressure on the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (referred to in this section as the “DPRK”) until the regime undertakes complete, verifiable, and irreversible actions toward denuclearization, including by—

(1) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to implement and enforce existing United Nations sanctions with regard to the DPRK;

(2) pressing all nations, including the PRC, and in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions, to end the practice of hosting DPRK citizens as guest workers, recognizing that such workers are demonstrated to constitute an illicit source of revenue for the DPRK regime and its nuclear ambitions;

(3) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to pursue rigorous interdiction of shipments to and from the DPRK, including ship-to-ship transfers, consistent with United Nations Security Council resolutions;

(4) pressing the PRC and PRC entities—

(A) to cease business activities with United Nations-designated entities and their affiliates in the DPRK; and

(B) to expel from the PRC individuals who enable the DPRK to acquire materials for its nuclear and ballistic missile programs; and

(5) enforcing United Nations Security Council resolutions with respect to the DPRK and United States sanctions, including those pursuant to the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (Public Law 114–122), the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public Law 115–44), the Otto Warmbier North Korea Nuclear Sanctions and Enforcement Act of 2019 (title LXXI of division F of Public Law 116–92), and relevant United States executive orders.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) although it casts the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a development initiative, the People’s Republic of China is also utilizing the BRI to advance its own security interests, including to expand its power projection capabilities and facilitate greater access for the People’s Liberation Army through overseas military installations; and

(2) the expansion of the People’s Liberation Army globally through overseas military installations will undermine the medium- and long-term security of the United States and the security and development of strategic partners in critical regions around the world, which is at odds with United States goals to promote peace, prosperity, and self-reliance among partner nations, including through the Millennium Challenge Corporation.

(b) Limitation on assistance.—Except as provided in subsection (c), for fiscal years 2022 through 2031, the government of a country that is hosting on its territory a military installation of the Government of the People’s Republic of China or facilitates the expansion of the presence of the People’s Liberation Army for purposes other than participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations or for temporary humanitarian, medical, and disaster relief operations in such country shall not be eligible for assistance under sections 609 or 616 of the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7708, 7715).

(c) National interest waiver.—The President may, on a case by case basis, waive the limitation in subsection (b) if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a written determination that the waiver is important to the national interests of the United States; and

(2) a detailed explanation of how the waiver is important to those interests.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to strengthen alliances and partnerships Europe and with like-minded countries around the globe to effectively compete with the People’s Republic of China; and

(2) to work in collaboration with such allies and partners—

(A) to address significant diplomatic, economic, and military challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China;

(B) to deter the People’s Republic of China from pursuing military aggression;

(C) to promote the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in accordance with international law;

(D) to promote private sector-led long-term economic development while countering efforts by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to leverage predatory economic practices as a means of political and economic coercion in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond;

(E) to promote the values of democracy and human rights, including through efforts to end the repression by the Chinese Communist Party of political dissidents and Uyghurs and other ethnic Muslim minorities, Tibetan Buddhists, Christians, and other minorities;

(F) to respond to the crackdown by the Chinese Communist Party, in contravention of the commitments made under the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 and the Basic Law of Hong Kong, on the legitimate aspirations of the people of Hong Kong; and

(G) to counter the Chinese Communist Party efforts to spread disinformation in the People’s Republic of China and beyond with respect to the response of the Chinese Communist Party to COVID–19.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States and Canada have a unique relationship based on shared geography, extensive personal connections, deep economic ties, mutual defense commitments, and a shared vision to uphold democracy, human rights, and the rules based international order established after World War II;

(2) the United States and Canada can better address China’s economic, political, and security influence through closer cooperation on counternarcotics, environmental stewardship, transparent practices in public procurement and infrastructure planning, the Arctic, energy and connectivity issues, trade and commercial relations, bilateral legal matters, and support for democracy, good governance, and human rights;

(3) amidst the COVID–19 pandemic, the United States and Canada should maintain joint initiatives to address border management, commercial and trade relations, a shared approach with respect to the People’s Republic of China, and transnational challenges, including pandemics and climate change;

(4) the United States and Canada should enhance cooperation to counter Chinese disinformation, influence operations, economic espionage, and propaganda efforts;

(5) the People’s Republic of China’s infrastructure investments, particularly in 5G telecommunications technology, extraction of natural resources, and port infrastructure, pose national security risks for the United States and Canada;

(6) the United States should share, as appropriate, intelligence gathered regarding—

(A) Huawei’s 5G capabilities; and

(B) the Chinese Government’s intentions with respect to 5G expansion;

(7) the United States and Canada should continue to advance collaborative initiatives to implement the January 9, 2020, United States-Canada Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals Development Collaboration; and

(8) the United States and Canada must prioritize cooperation on continental defense and in the Arctic, including by modernizing the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) to effectively defend the Northern Hemisphere against the range of threats by peer competitors, including long range missiles and high-precision weapons.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Government of the People’s Republic of China’s apparent arbitrary detention and abusive treatment of Canadian nationals Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig in apparent retaliation for the Government of Canada’s arrest of Meng Wanzhou is deeply concerning;

(2) the Government of Canada has shown international leadership by—

(A) upholding the rule of law and complying with its international legal obligations, including those pursuant to the Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and Canada, signed at Washington December 3, 1971; and

(B) launching the Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations, which has been endorsed by 57 countries and the European Union and reaffirms well-established prohibitions under international human rights conventions against the arbitrary detention of foreign nationals to be used as leverage in state-to-state relations; and

(3) the United States continues to join the Government of Canada in calling for the immediate release of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig and for due process for Canadian national Robert Schellenberg.

(a) In general.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a strategy to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives that describes how the United States will enhance cooperation with the Government of Canada in managing relations with the Government of China.

(b) Elements.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall—

(1) identify key policy points of convergence and divergence between the United States and Canada in managing relations with the People’s Republic of China in the areas of technology, trade, economic practices, cyber security, secure supply chains and critical minerals, and illicit narcotics;

(2) include the development coordination efforts with Canadian counterparts to enhance the cooperation between the United States and Canada with respect to—

(A) managing economic relations with the People’s Republic of China;

(B) democracy and human rights in the People’s Republic of China;

(C) technology issues involving the People’s Republic of China;

(D) defense issues involving the People’s Republic of China; and

(E) international law enforcement and transnational organized crime issues.

(3) detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to work with Canada to counter Chinese projection of an authoritarian governing model around the world;

(4) detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence cooperation to date and future plans to support Canadian efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to Huawei’s 5G technology;

(5) detail diplomatic and defense collaboration—

(A) to advance joint United States-Canadian priorities for responsible stewardship in the Arctic Region; and

(B) to counter Chinese efforts to project political, economic, and military influence into the Arctic Region; and

(6) detail diplomatic efforts to work with Canada to track and counter Chinese attempts to exert influence across the multilateral system, including at the World Health Organization.

(c) Form.—The strategy required under this section shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the public, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.

(d) Consultation.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees regarding the development and implementation of the strategy required under this section.

(a) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, shall submit a multi-year strategy for increasing United States economic competitiveness and promoting good governance, human rights, and the rule of law in Latin American and Caribbean countries, particularly in the areas of investment, equitable and sustainable development, commercial relations, anti-corruption activities, and infrastructure projects, to—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Committee on Finance of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;

(4) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(6) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives;

(7) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives; and

(8) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(b) Additional elements.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include a plan of action, including benchmarks to achieve measurable progress, to—

(1) enhance the technical capacity of countries in the region to advance the sustainable development of equitable economies;

(2) reduce trade and non-tariff barriers between the countries of the Americas;

(3) facilitate a more open, transparent, and competitive environment for United States businesses in the region;

(4) establish frameworks or mechanisms to review long term financial sustainability and security implications of foreign investments in strategic sectors or services, including transportation, communications, natural resources, and energy;

(5) establish competitive and transparent infrastructure project selection and procurement processes that promote transparency, open competition, financial sustainability, adherence to robust global standards, and the employment of the local workforce;

(6) strengthen legal structures critical to robust democratic governance, fair competition, combat corruption, and end impunity;

(7) identify and mitigate obstacles to private sector-led economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean; and

(8) maintain transparent and affordable access to the internet and digital infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere.

(c) Reporting requirement.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, and the leadership of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, shall brief the congressional committees listed in subsection (a) regarding the implementation of this part, including examples of successes and challenges.

(a) Appropriate committees of congress defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(6) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(b) Reporting requirement.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, working through the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, and in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that assesses the nature, intent, and impact to United States strategic interests of Chinese diplomatic activity aimed at influencing the decisions, procedures, and programs of multilateral organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean, including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Organization of American States, and the Inter-American Development Bank.

(2) FORM.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form and shall include classified annexes.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) since 2005, the Government of China has expanded sovereign lending to governments in Latin America and the Caribbean with loans that are repaid or collateralized with natural resources or commodities;

(2) several countries in Latin American and the Caribbean that have received a significant amount of sovereign lending from the Government of China face challenges in repaying such loans;

(3) the Government of China’s predatory economic practices and sovereign lending practices in Latin America and the Caribbean negatively influence United States national interests in the Western Hemisphere;

(4) the Inter-American Development Bank, the premier multilateral development bank dedicated to the Western Hemisphere, should play a significant role supporting the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in achieving sustainable and serviceable debt structures; and

(5) a tenth general capital increase for the Inter-American Development Bank would strengthen the Bank’s ability to help the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean achieve sustainable and serviceable debt structures.

(b) Support for a general capital increase.—The President shall take steps to support a tenth general capital increase for the Inter-American Development Bank, including advancing diplomatic engagement to build support among member countries of the Bank for a tenth general capital increase for the Bank

(c) Tenth capital increase.—The Inter-American Development Bank Act (22 U.S.C. 283 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

(d) Addressing China’s sovereign lending in the Americas.—The Secretary of the Treasury and the United States Executive Director to the Inter-American Development Bank shall use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States—

(1) to advance efforts by the Bank to help countries restructure debt resulting from sovereign lending by the Government of China in order to achieve sustainable and serviceable debt structures; and

(2) to establish appropriate safeguards and transparency and conditionality measures to protect debt-vulnerable member countries of the Inter-American Development Bank that borrow from the Bank for the purposes of restructuring Chinese bilateral debt held by such countries and preventing such countries from incurring subsequent Chinese bilateral debt.

(e) Briefings.—

(1) IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the President shall provide to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives a briefing detailing efforts to carry out subsection (b) and (d) and the amendment made by subsection (c).

(2) PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE AND SERVICEABLE DEBT STRUCTURES.—Not later than 180 days after the successful completion of a tenth general capital increase for the Inter-American Development Bank, and every 180 days thereafter for a period of 3 years, the President shall provide to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives a briefing on efforts by the Bank to support countries in Latin American and the Caribbean in their efforts to achieve sustainable and serviceable debt structures.

(a) In general.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State $12,000,000 for the International Military Education and Training Program for Latin America and the Caribbean for each of fiscal years 2021 through 2026.

(b) Modernization.—The Secretary of State shall take steps to modernize and strengthen the programs receiving funding under subsection (a) to ensure that such programs are vigorous, substantive, and the preeminent choice for international military education and training for Latin American and Caribbean partners.

(c) Required elements.—The programs referred to in subsection (a) shall—

(1) provide training and capacity-building opportunities to Latin American and Caribbean security services;

(2) provide practical skills and frameworks for—

(A) improving the functioning and organization of security services in Latin America and the Caribbean;

(B) creating a better understanding of the United States and its values; and

(C) using technology for maximum efficiency and organization; and

(3) promote and ensure that security services in Latin America and the Caribbean respect civilian authority and operate in compliance with international norms, standards, and rules of engagement, including a respect for human rights.

(d) Limitation.—Security assistance under this section is subject to limitations as enshrined in the requirements of section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d).

(a) Sense of congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Government of China is exporting its model for internal security and state control of society through advanced technology and artificial intelligence; and

(2) the inclusion of communication networks and communications supply chains with equipment and services from companies with close ties to or susceptible to pressure from governments or security services without reliable legal checks on governmental powers can lead to breaches of citizens’ private information, increased censorship, violations of human rights, and harassment of political opponents.

(b) Diplomatic engagement.—The Secretary of State shall conduct diplomatic engagement with governments and civil society organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean to—

(1) help identify and mitigate the risks to civil liberties posed by technologies and services described in subsection (a); and

(2) offer recommendations on ways to mitigate such risks.

(c) Internet freedom programs.—The Chief Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media, working through the Open Technology Fund, and the Secretary of State, working through the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s Internet Freedom and Business and Human Rights Section, shall expand and prioritize efforts to provide anti-censorship technology and services to journalists in Latin America and the Caribbean, in order to enhance their ability to safely access or share digital news and information.

(d) Support for civil society.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall work through nongovernmental organizations to—

(1) support and promote programs that support internet freedom and the free flow of information online in Latin America and the Caribbean;

(2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reliable access to internet in Latin America and the Caribbean;

(3) provide integrated support to civil society for technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy, and applied research programs in Latin America and the Caribbean;

(4) train journalists and civil society leaders in Latin America and the Caribbean on investigative techniques necessary to ensure public accountability and prevent government overreach in the digital sphere;

(5) assist independent media outlets and journalists in Latin America and the Caribbean to build their own capacity and develop high-impact, in-depth news reports covering governance and human rights topics;

(6) provide training for journalists and civil society leaders on investigative techniques necessary to improve transparency and accountability in government and the private sector;

(7) provide training on investigative reporting of incidents of corruption and unfair trade, business and commercial practices related to China, including the role of the Government of China in such practices;

(8) assist nongovernmental organizations to strengthen their capacity to monitor the activities described in paragraph (7); and

(9) identify local resources to support the preponderance of activities that would be carried out under this subsection.

(e) Briefing requirement.—Not more than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media shall provide a briefing regarding the efforts described in subsections (c), (d), and (e) to—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States, the European Union, and countries of Europe are close partners, sharing values grounded in democracy, human rights, transparency, and the rules-based international order established after World War II;

(2) without a common approach by the United States, European Union, and countries of Europe on connectivity, trade, transnational problems, and support for democracy and human rights, the People’s Republic of China will continue to increase its economic, political and security leverage in Europe;

(3) the People’s Republic of China’s deployment of assistance to European countries following the COVID–19 outbreak showcased a coercive approach to aid, but it also highlighted Europe’s deep economic ties to China;

(4) as European states seek to recover from the economic toll of the COVID–19 outbreak, the United States must stand in partnership with Europe to support our collective economic recovery and reinforce our collective national security and defend these shared values;

(5) the United States, European Union, and other European countries should coordinate on joint strategies to diversify reliance on supply chains away from the People’s Republic of China, especially in the medical and pharmaceutical sectors;

(6) the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, and the countries of Europe should leverage their respective economic innovation capabilities to support the global economic recovery from the COVID–19 recession and draw a contrast with the centralized economy of the People’s Republic of China;

(7) the United States and European Union should accelerate efforts to de-escalate their trade disputes, including negotiating a United States-European Union trade agreement that benefits workers and the broader economy in both the United States and European Union;

(8) the United States, European Union, and Japan should continue trilateral efforts to address economic challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China;

(9) the United States, European Union, and countries of Europe should enhance cooperation to counter Chinese disinformation, influence operations, and propaganda efforts;

(10) the United States and European nations share serious concerns with the repressions being supported and executed by the Government of China, and should continue implementing measures to address the Government of China’s specific abuses in Tibet, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang, and should build joint mechanisms and programs to prevent the export of China’s authoritarian governance model to countries around the world;

(11) the United States and European nations should remain united in their shared values against attempts by the Government of China at the United Nations and other multilateral organizations to promote efforts that erode the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, like the “community of a shared future for mankind” and “democratization of international relations”;

(12) the People’s Republic of China’s infrastructure investments around the world, particularly in 5G telecommunications technology and port infrastructure, could threaten democracy across Europe and the national security of key countries;

(13) as appropriate, the United States should share intelligence with European allies and partners on Huawei’s 5G capabilities and the intentions of the Government of China with respect to 5G expansion in Europe;

(14) the European Union’s Investment Screening Regulation, which came into force in October 2020, is a welcome development, and member states should closely scrutinize Chinese investments in their countries through their own national investment screening measures;

(15) the President should actively engage the European Union on the implementation of the Export Control Reform Act regulations and work to align the law’s regulations with European Union priorities;

(16) the President should strongly advocate for the listing of more items and technologies to restrict dual use exports controlled at the National Security and above level to the People’s Republic of China under the Wassenaar Arrangement;

(17) the United States should explore the value of establishing a body akin to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) that would specifically coordinate the export of United States and European Union sensitive technologies to the People’s Republic of China; and

(18) the United States should work with counterparts in Europe to—

(A) evaluate United States and European overreliance on Chinese goods, including in the medical and pharmaceutical sectors, and develop joint strategies to diversify supply chains;

(B) counter Chinese efforts to use COVID–19-related assistance as a coercive tool to pressure developing countries by offering relevant United States and European expertise and assistance; and

(C) leverage the United States and European private sectors to advance the post-COVID–19 economic recovery.

(a) In general.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall brief the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives on a strategy for how the United States will enhance cooperation with the European Union, NATO, and European partner countries on managing relations with the People’s Republic of China.

(b) Elements.—The briefing required by subsection (a) shall do the following:

(1) Identify the senior Senate-confirmed Department of State official that leads United States efforts to cooperate with the European Union, NATO, and European partner countries to advance a shared approach with respect to the People’s Republic of China.

(2) Identify key policy points of convergence and divergence between the United States and European partners with respect to the People’s Republic of China in the areas of technology, trade, and economic practices.

(3) Describe efforts to advance shared interests with European counterparts on—

(A) economic challenges with the People’s Republic of China;

(B) democracy and human rights challenges with respect to the People’s Republic of China;

(C) technology issues with respect to the People’s Republic of China;

(D) defense issues with respect to the People’s Republic of China; and

(E) developing a comprehensive strategy to respond to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) established by the Government of the People’s Republic of China.

(4) Describe the coordination mechanisms among key regional and functional bureaus within the Department of State and Department of Defense tasked with engaging with European partners on the People’s Republic of China.

(5) Detail diplomatic efforts made up to the date on which the date of the briefing and future plans to work with European partners to counter Chinese advancement of an authoritarian governing model around the world.

(6) Detail the diplomatic efforts made up to the date on which the strategy is submitted and future plans to support European efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to Huawei’s 5G technology.

(7) Detail how United States public diplomacy tools, including the Global Engagement Center of the Department of State, will coordinate efforts with counterpart entities within the European Union to counter Chinese propaganda.

(8) Describe the staffing and budget resources the Department of State dedicates to engagement between the United States and the European Union on the People’s Republic of China and provide an assessment of out-year resource needs to execute the strategy.

(9) Detail diplomatic efforts to work with European partners to track and counter Chinese attempts to exert influence across multilateral fora, including at the World Health Organization.

(c) Form.—The briefing required by section (a) shall be classified.

(d) Consultation.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees regarding the development and implementation of the strategy.

(a) In general.—The President should work with transatlantic partners to build on the agreement among the Development Finance Corporation, FinDev Canada, and the European Development Finance Institutions (called the DFI Alliance) to enhance coordination on shared objectives to foster private sector-led development and provide market-based alternatives to state-directed financing in emerging markets, particularly as related to the People’s Republic of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including by integrating efforts such as—

(1) the European Union Strategy on Connecting Europe and Asia;

(2) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas Initiative Fund;

(3) the Blue Dot Network among the United States, Japan, and Australia; and

(4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has leveraged $65,000,000,000 for infrastructure projects and emphasizes transparency standards.

(b) Cooperation at the United Nations.—The United States and Europe should coordinate efforts to address the Government of China’s use of the United Nations to advance and legitimize BRI as a global good, including the proliferation of memoranda of understanding between the People’s Republic of China and United Nations funds and programs on BRI implementation.

(c) Standards.—The United States and the European Union should coordinate and develop a strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation with the OECD and the Paris Club on ensuring the highest possible standards for Belt and Road Initiative contracts and terms with developing countries.

(a) Appropriate committees of Congress defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(b) Report and briefing required.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and such other heads of Federal agencies as the Director considers appropriate, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report and brief the appropriate committees of Congress on cooperation between China and Iran and between China and Russia.

(2) CONTENTS.—The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

(A) An identification of major areas of diplomatic energy, infrastructure, banking, financial, economic, military, and space cooperation—

(i) between China and Iran; and

(ii) between China and Russia.

(B) An assessment of the effect of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID–19) pandemic on such cooperation.

(3) FORM.—The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(c) Sense of congress on sharing with allies and partners.—It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies should share the findings of the report submitted under subsection (b) with important allies and partners of the United States, as appropriate.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States should continue to stand with friends and partners in South and Central Asia as they contend with efforts by the Government of China to interfere in their respective political systems and encroach upon their sovereign territory; and

(2) the United States should reaffirm its commitment to the Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership with India and further deepen bilateral defense consultations and collaboration with India commensurate with its status as a major defense partner.

(a) In general.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a strategy for how the United States will engage with the countries of South and Central Asia, including through the C5+1 mechanism, with respect to the People’s Republic of China.

(b) Elements.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include the following elements:

(1) A detailed description of the security and economic challenges that the People’s Republic of China poses to the countries of South and Central Asia, including border disputes with South and Central Asian countries that border China, Chinese investments in land and sea ports, transportation infrastructure, and energy projects across the region.

(2) A detailed description of United States efforts to provide alternatives to Chinese investment in infrastructure and other sectors in South and Central Asia.

(3) A detailed description of bilateral and regional efforts to work with countries in South Asia on strategies to build resilience against Chinese efforts to interfere in their political systems and economies.

(4) A detailed description of United States diplomatic efforts to work with the Government of Afghanistan on addressing the challenges posed by Chinese investment in the Afghan mineral sector.

(5) A detailed description of United States diplomatic efforts with the Government of Pakistan with respect to matters relevant to the People’s Republic of China, including investments by the People’s Republic of China in Pakistan through the Belt and Road Initiative.

(6) In close consultation with the Government of India, identification of areas where the United States Government can provide diplomatic and other support as appropriate for India’s efforts to address economic and security challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China in the region.

(7) A description of the coordination mechanisms among key regional and functional bureaus within the Department of State and Department of Defense tasked with engaging with the countries of South and Central Asia on issues relating to the People’s Republic of China.

(8) A description of the efforts being made by Federal departments agencies, including the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, and the Office of the United States Trade Representative, to help the nations of South and Central Asia develop trade and commerce links that will help those nations diversify their trade away from China.

(c) Form.—The strategy required under section (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form that can be made available to the public, but may include a classified annex as necessary.

(d) Consultation.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less than annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall consult with the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee of Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives regarding the development and implementation of the strategy required under subsection (a).

(a) Appropriate committees of Congress defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(b) Intelligence assessment.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that assesses the nature and impact of Chinese political, economic, and security sector activity in Africa, and its impact on United States strategic interests, including—

(1) the amount and impact of direct investment, loans, development financing, oil-for-loans deals, and other preferential trading arrangements;

(2) the involvement of Chinese state-owned enterprises in Africa;

(3) the amount of African debt held by the People’s Republic of China;

(4) the involvement of Chinese private security, technology and media companies in Africa;

(5) the scale and impact of Chinese arms sales to African countries;

(6) the methods, tools, and tactics used to facilitate illegal and corrupt activity, including trade in counterfeit and illicit goods, to include smuggled extractive resources and wildlife products, from Africa to China;

(7) the methods and techniques that China uses to exert undue influence on African governments and facilitate corrupt activity in Africa, and to influence African multilateral organizations; and

(8) an analysis of the soft power, cultural and educational activities undertaken by the PRC and CCP to seek to expand influence in Africa.

(a) Appropriate committees of Congress defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

(b) Strategy requirement.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the leadership of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report setting forth a multi-year strategy for increasing United States economic competitiveness and promoting improvements in the investment climate in Africa, including through support for democratic institutions, the rule of law, including property rights, and for improved transparency, anti-corruption and governance.

(c) Elements.—The strategy submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall include—

(1) a description and assessment of barriers to United States investment in Africa for United States businesses, including a clear identification of the different barriers facing small-sized and medium-sized businesses, and an assessment of whether existing programs effectively address such barriers;

(2) a description and assessment of barriers to African diaspora investment in Africa, and recommendations to overcome such barriers;

(3) an identification of the economic sectors in the United States that have a comparative advantage in Africa markets;

(4) a determination of priority African countries for promoting two-way trade and investment and an assessment of additional foreign assistance needs, including democracy and governance and rule of law support, to promote a conducive operating environment in priority countries;

(5) an identification of opportunities for strategic cooperation with European allies on trade and investment in Africa, and for establishing a dialogue on trade, security, development, and environmental issues of mutual interest; and

(6) a plan to regularly host a United States-Africa Leaders Summit to promote two-way trade and investment, strategic engagement, and security in Africa

(d) Assessment of united states government human resources capacity.—The Comptroller General of the United States shall—

(1) conduct a review of the number of Foreign Commercial Service Officers and Department of State Economic Officers at United States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa; and

(2) develop an assessment of whether human resource capacity in such embassies is adequate to meet the goals of the various trade and economic programs and initiatives in Africa, including the African Growth and Opportunity Act and Prosper Africa.

(a) Appropriate committees of Congress defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(b) Interagency working group To counter Chinese cyber aggression in Africa.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish an interagency Working Group, which shall include representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and such other agencies of the United States Government as the President considers appropriate, on means to counter Chinese cyber aggression with respect to Africa.

(2) DUTIES.—The Working Group established pursuant to this subsection shall develop a set of recommendations for—

(A) bolstering the capacity of governments in Africa to ensure the integrity of their data networks and critical infrastructure where applicable;

(B) providing alternatives to Huawei;

(C) an action plan for United States embassies in Africa to offer to provide assistance to host-country governments with protecting their vital digital networks and infrastructure from Chinese espionage, including an assessment of staffing resources needed to implement the action plan in embassies in Africa;

(D) utilizing interagency resources to counter Chinese disinformation and propaganda in traditional and digital media targeted to African audiences; and

(E) helping civil society in Africa counter digital authoritarianism and identifying tools and assistance to enhance and promote digital democracy.

The Secretary of State may station on a permanent basis Department of State personnel at such United States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa as the Secretary considers appropriate focused on the activities, policies and investments of the People’s Republic of China in Africa.

(a) Finding.—Congress finds that youth in Africa can have a positive impact on efforts to foster economic growth, improve public sector transparency and governance, and counter extremism, and should be an area of focus for United States outreach on the continent.

(b) Policy.—It is the policy of the United States, in cooperation and collaboration with private sector companies, civic organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and national and regional public sector entities, to commit resources to enhancing the entrepreneurship and leadership skills of African youth with the objective of enhancing their ability to serve as leaders in the public and private sectors in order to help them spur growth and prosperity, strengthen democratic governance, and enhance peace and security in their respective countries of origin and across Africa.

(c) Young african leaders initiative.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There is hereby established the Young African Leaders Initiative, to be carried out by the Secretary of State.

(2) FELLOWSHIPS.—The Secretary is authorized to support the participation in the Initiative established under this paragraph, in the United States, of fellows from Africa each year for such education and training in leadership and professional development through the Department of State as the Secretary of State considers appropriate. The Secretary shall establish and publish criteria for eligibility for participation as such a fellow, and for selection of fellows among eligible applicants for a fellowship.

(3) RECIPROCAL EXCHANGES.—Under the Initiative, United States citizens may engage in such reciprocal exchanges in connection with and collaboration on projects with fellows under paragraph (1) as the Secretary considers appropriate.

(4) REGIONAL CENTERS AND NETWORKS.—The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall establish each of the following:

(A) Not fewer than four regional centers in Africa to provide in-person and online training throughout the year in business and entrepreneurship, civic leadership, and public management.

(B) An online network that provides information and online courses on, and connections with leaders in, the private and public sectors in Africa.

(d) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State should increase the number of fellows from Africa in the Young African Leaders Initiative above the number that participated in the Initiative in fiscal year 2020 .

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the CEO of the United States Agency for Global Media shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the resources and timeline needed to establish within the Agency an organization whose mission shall be to promote democratic values and institutions in Africa by providing objective, accurate, and relevant news and information to the people of Africa, especially in countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established, about the region, the world, and the United States through uncensored news, responsible discussion, and open debate.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the economic influence of the People’s Republic of China through its oil and gas imports from the Middle East, infrastructure investments, technology transfer, and arms sales provide influence and leverage that runs counter to United States interests in the region;

(2) the People’s Republic of China seeks to erode United States influence in the Middle East and North Africa through the sale of Chinese arms, associated weapons technology, and joint weapons research and development initiatives;

(3) the People’s Republic of China seeks to establish military or dual use facilities in geographically strategic locations in the Middle East and North Africa to further the Chinese Communist Party’s Belt and Road Initiative at the expense of United States national security interests; and

(4) the export of certain communications infrastructure from the People’s Republic of China degrades the security of partner networks, exposes intellectual property to theft, threatens the ability of the United States to conduct security cooperation with compromised regional partners, and furthers China’s authoritarian surveillance model.

(b) Strategy required.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development and the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall jointly develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy for countering and limiting Chinese influence in, and access to, the Middle East and North Africa.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) an assessment of China’s intent with regards to increased cooperation with Middle East and North African countries and how these activities fit into their broader global strategic objectives;

(B) an assessment of how governments across the region are responding to Chinese efforts to increase Chinese military presence in their countries;

(C) efforts to improve regional cooperation through foreign military sales, financing, and efforts to build partner capacity and increase interoperability with the United States;

(D) an assessment of Chinese joint research and development with the Middle East, North Africa, impacts on United States’ national security interests, and recommended steps to mitigate Chinese influence;

(E) an assessment of arms sales and weapons technology transfers from the People’s Republic of China to the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on United States’ national security interests, and recommended steps to mitigate Chinese influence;

(F) an assessment of Chinese military sales to the region including lethal and non lethal unmanned aerial systems;

(G) an assessment of People’s Republic of China military basing and dual-use facility initiatives across the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on United States’ national security interests, and recommended steps to mitigate Chinese influence;

(H) efforts to improve regional security cooperation with United States allies and partners with a focus on—

(i) maritime security in the Arabian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean;

(ii) integrated air and missile defense;

(iii) cyber security;

(iv) border security; and

(v) critical infrastructure security, to include energy security;

(I) increased support for government-to-government engagement on critical infrastructure development projects including ports and water infrastructure;

(J) efforts to encourage United States private sector and public-private partnerships in healthcare technology and foreign direct investment in non-energy sectors;

(K) efforts to expand youth engagement and professional education exchanges with key partner countries;

(L) specific steps to counter increased Chinese investment in telecommunications infrastructure and diplomatic efforts to stress the political, economic, and social benefits of a free and open internet;

(M) efforts to promote United States private sector engagement in and public-private partnerships on renewable energy development;

(N) the expansion of public-private partnership efforts on water, desalination, and irrigation projects; and

(O) efforts to warn United States partners in the Middle East and North Africa of the risks associated with Chinese telecommunications infrastructure and provide alternative “clean paths” to Chinese technology.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States and the international community have long-term interests in the stability, security, and prosperity of the people of the Middle East and North Africa.

(2) In addition to and apart from military and security efforts, the United States should harness a whole of government approach, including bilateral and multilateral statecraft, economic lines of effort, and public diplomacy to compete with and counter Chinese Communist Party influence.

(3) A clearly articulated positive narrative of United States engagement, transparent governance structures, and active civil society engagement help counter predatory foreign investment and influence efforts.

(b) Statement of policy.—It is the policy of the United States that the United States and the international community should, continue diplomatic and economic efforts throughout the Middle East and North Africa that support reform efforts to—

(1) promote greater economic opportunity;

(2) foster private sector development;

(3) strengthen civil society; and

(4) promote transparent and democratic governance and the rule of law.

(a) Sense of Congress on Arctic security.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment—

(A) creates new national and regional security challenges due to increased military activity in the Arctic;

(B) heightens the risk of the Arctic emerging as a major theater of conflict in ongoing strategic competition;

(C) threatens maritime safety as Arctic littoral nations have inadequate capacity to patrol the increased vessel traffic in this remote region, which is a result of diminished annual levels of sea ice;

(D) impacts public safety due to increased human activity in the Arctic region where search and rescue capacity remains very limited; and

(E) threatens the health of the Arctic’s fragile and pristine environment and the unique and highly sensitive species found in the Arctic’s marine and terrestrial ecosystems; and

(2) the United States should reduce the consequences outlined in paragraph (1) by—

(A) carefully evaluating the wide variety and dynamic set of security and safety risks unfolding in the Arctic;

(B) developing policies and making preparations to mitigate and respond to threats and risks in the Arctic, including by continuing to work with allies and partners in the Arctic region to deter potential aggressive activities and build Arctic competencies;

(C) adequately funding the National Earth System Prediction Capability to substantively improve weather, ocean, and ice predictions on the time scales necessary to ensure regional security and trans-Arctic shipping;

(D) investing in resources, including a significantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure that the United States has adequate capacity to prevent and respond to security threats in the Arctic region;

(E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with all nations in the Arctic region for—

(i) maintaining peace and stability in the Arctic region; and

(ii) fostering cooperation on stewardship and safety initiatives in the Arctic region; and

(F) examining the possibility of reconvening the Arctic Chiefs of Defense Forum.

(b) Statement of policy.—It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to recognize only the nations enumerated in subsection (c)(1) as Arctic nations, and to reject all other claims to this status; and

(2) that the militarization of the Arctic poses a serious threat to Arctic peace and stability, and the interests of United States allies and partners.

(c) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) ARCTIC NATIONS.—The term “Arctic nations” means the 8 nations with territory or exclusive economic zones that extend north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude north of the equator, namely Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway, Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Sweden, and Iceland.

(2) ARCTIC REGION.—The term “Arctic Region” means the geographic region north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude north of the equator.

(d) Designation.—The Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) shall designate a deputy assistant secretary serving within the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs as “Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arctic Affairs”, who shall be responsible for OES affairs in the Arctic Region.

(e) Duties.—The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arctic Affairs shall—

(1) facilitate the development and coordination of United States foreign policy in the Arctic Region relating to—

(A) strengthening institutions for cooperation among the Arctic nations;

(B) enhancing scientific monitoring and research on local, regional, and global environmental issues;

(C) protecting the Arctic environment and conserving its biological resources;

(D) promoting responsible natural resource management and economic development; and

(E) involving Arctic indigenous people in decisions that affect them.

(2) coordinate the diplomatic objectives with respect to the activities described in paragraph (1), and, as appropriate, represent the United States within multilateral fora that address international cooperation and foreign policy matters in the Arctic Region;

(3) help inform, in coordination with the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, transnational commerce and commercial maritime transit in the Arctic Region;

(4) coordinate the integration of scientific data on the current and projected effects of emerging environmental changes on the Arctic Region and ensure that such data is applied to the development of security strategies for the Arctic Region;

(5) make available the methods and approaches on the integration of climate, data, and environmental science to regional security planning programs in the Department of State to better ensure that broader decision-making processes may more adequately account for the effects of climate change;

(6) assist with the development of, and facilitate the implementation of, an Arctic Region Security Policy in accordance with subsection (f);

(7) use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to encourage other countries and international multilateral organizations to support the principles of the Arctic Region Security Policy implemented pursuant to subsection (f); and

(8) perform such other duties and exercise such powers as the Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs shall prescribe.

(f) Rank and status.—The Secretary of State may change the title of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arctic Affairs designated under subsection (c) to Special Representative or Special Envoy with the rank of Ambassador if—

(1) the President nominates the person so designated to that rank and status; and

(2) the Senate confirms such person to such rank and status.

(g) Arctic region security policy.—The Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs shall be the lead bureau for developing and implementing the United States’ Arctic Region Security Policy, in coordination with the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, embassies, other regional bureaus, and relevant offices to advance United States national security interests, including through conflict prevention efforts, security assistance, humanitarian disaster response and prevention, and economic and other relevant assistance programs. The Arctic Region Security Policy shall assess, develop, budget for, and implement plans, policies, and actions—

(1) to bolster the diplomatic presence of the United States in Arctic nations, including through enhancements to diplomatic missions and facilities, participation in regional and bilateral dialogues related to Arctic security, and coordination of United States initiatives and assistance programs across agencies to protect the national security of the United States and its allies and partners;

(2) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic nations to the effects of environmental change and increased civilian and military activity from Arctic nations and other nations that may result from increased accessibility of the Arctic Region;

(3) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic Region and Arctic nations that—

(A) are vulnerable to the changing Arctic environment; and

(B) are strategically significant to the United States;

(4) to coordinate the integration of environmental change and national security risk and vulnerability assessments into the decision making process on foreign assistance awards to Arctic nations;

(5) to advance principles of good governance by encouraging and cooperating with Arctic nations on collaborative approaches—

(A) to responsibly manage natural resources in the Arctic Region;

(B) to share the burden of ensuring maritime safety in the Arctic Region;

(C) to prevent the escalation of security tensions by mitigating against the militarization of the Arctic Region;

(D) to develop mutually agreed upon multilateral policies among Arctic nations on the management of maritime transit routes through the Arctic Region and work cooperatively on the transit policies for access to and transit in the Arctic Region by non-Arctic nations; and

(E) to facilitate the development of Arctic Region Security Action Plans to ensure stability and public safety in disaster situations in a humane and responsible fashion; and

(6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, survivability, and resiliency of United States interests and nondefense assets in the Arctic Region.

It shall be the policy of the United States—

(1) to elevate the countries of Oceania as a strategic national security and economic priority of the United States Government;

(2) to promote civil society, the rule of law, and democratic governance across Oceania as part of a free and open Indo-Pacific region;

(3) to broaden and deepen relationships with the Freely Associated States of the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia through robust defense, diplomatic, economic, and development exchanges that promote the goals of individual states and the entire region;

(4) to work with the governments of Australia, New Zealand, and Japan to advance shared alliance goals of the Oceania region concerning health, environmental protection, disaster resilience and preparedness, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, maritime security, and economic development;

(5) to participate, wherever possible and appropriate, in existing regional organizations and international structures to promote the national security and economic goals of the United States and countries of the Oceania region;

(6) to invest in a whole-of-government United States strategy that will enhance youth engagement and advance long-term growth and development throughout the region, especially as it relates to protecting marine resources that are critical to livelihoods and strengthening the resilience of the countries of the Oceania region against current and future threats resulting from extreme weather and severe changes in the environment;

(7) to deter and combat acts of malign foreign influence and corruption aimed at undermining the political, environmental, social, and economic stability of the people and governments of the countries of Oceania;

(8) to improve the local capacity of the countries of Oceania to address public health challenges and improve global health security;

(9) to help the countries of Oceania access market-based private sector investments that adhere to best practices regarding transparency, debt sustainability, and environmental and social safeguards as an alternative to state-directed investments by authoritarian governments;

(10) to ensure the people and communities of Oceania remain safe from the risks of old and degrading munitions hazards and other debris that threaten health and livelihoods; and

(11) to work cooperatively with all governments in Oceania to promote the dignified return of the remains of members of the United States Armed Forces that are missing in action from previous conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region.

(a) Oceania strategic roadmap.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategic roadmap for strengthening United States engagement with the countries of Oceania, including an analysis of opportunities to cooperate with Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, to address shared concerns and promote shared goals in pursuit of security and resiliency in the countries of Oceania.

(b) Elements.—The strategic roadmap required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) A description of United States regional goals and concerns with respect to Oceania and increasing engagement with the countries of Oceania.

(2) An assessment, based on paragraph (1), of United States regional goals and concerns that are shared by Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, including a review of issues related to anticorruption, maritime and other security issues, environmental protection, fisheries management, economic growth and development, and disaster resilience and preparedness.

(3) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives by the governments of the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan in pursuit of those shared regional goals and concerns, including with respect to the issues described in paragraph (1).

(4) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives by regional organizations and other related intergovernmental structures aimed at addressing the issues described in paragraph (1).

(5) A plan for aligning United States programs and resources in pursuit of those shared regional goals and concerns, as appropriate.

(6) Recommendations for additional United States authorities, personnel, programs, or resources necessary to execute the strategic roadmap.

(7) Any other elements the Secretary considers appropriate.

(a) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State to promote democracy in Hong Kong.

(b) Administration.—The Secretary of State shall designate an office with the Department of State to administer and coordinate the provision of such funds described in subsection (a) within the Department of State and across the United States Government.

(a) In general.—Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subparagraphs (E) as subparagraph (F); and

(2) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following:

“(E) Serious human rights abuses in connection with forced labor.”.

(b) Effective date; applicability.—The amendment made by subsection (a)—

(1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of this Act; and

(2) applies with respect to the first report required by section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 submitted after such date of enactment.

(a) In general.—Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note), as amended by section 302, is further amended—

(1) by redesignating subparagraphs (F) as subparagraph (G); and

(2) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the following:

“(F) Systematic rape, coercive abortion, forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive implantation policies and practices.”.

(b) Effective date; applicability.—The amendment made by subsection (a)—

(1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of this Act; and

(2) applies with respect to the first report required by section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 submitted after such date of enactment.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The People’s Republic of China, at the direction of the Chinese Communist Party, is advancing an ecosystem of anticompetitive economic and industrial policies that—

(A) distort global markets;

(B) limit innovation;

(C) unfairly advantage PRC firms at the expense of the United States and other foreign firms; and

(D) unfairly and harmfully prejudice consumer choice.

(2) Of the extensive and systemic economic and industrial policies pursued by the PRC, the mass subsidization of Chinese firms, intellectual property theft, and forced technology transfer are among the most damaging to the global economy.

(3) Through regulatory interventions and direct financial subsidies, the CCP, for the purposes of advancing national political and economic objectives, directs, coerces, and influences in anti-competitive ways the commercial activities of firms that are directed, financed, influenced, or otherwise controlled by the state, including state-owned enterprises, and ostensibly independent and private Chinese companies, such as technology firms in strategic sectors.

(4) The PRC Government, at the national and subnational levels, grants special privileges or status to certain PRC firms in key sectors designated as strategic, such as telecommunications, oil, power, aviation, banking, and semiconductors. Enterprises receive special state preferences in the form of favorable loans, tax exemptions, and preferential land access from the CCP.

(5) The subsidization of PRC companies, as described in paragraphs (3) and (4)—

(A) enables these companies to sell goods below market prices, allowing them to outbid and crowd out market-based competitors and thereby pursue global dominance of key sectors;

(B) distorts the global market economy by undermining longstanding and generally accepted market-based principles of fair competition, leading to barriers to entry and forced exit from the market for foreign or private firms, not only in the PRC, but in markets around the world;

(C) creates government-sponsored or supported de facto monopolies, cartels, and other anti-market arrangements in key sectors, limiting or removing opportunities for other firms; and

(D) leads to, as a result of the issues described in paragraphs (A) through (C), declines in profits and revenue needed by foreign and private firms for research and development.

(6) The CCP incentivizes and empowers Chinese actors to steal critical technologies and trade secrets from private and foreign competitors operating in the PRC and around the world, particularly in areas that the CCP has identified as critical to advancing PRC objectives. The PRC, as directed by the CCP, also continues to implement anti-competitive regulations, policies, and practices that coerce the handover of technology and other propriety or sensitive data from foreign enterprises to domestic firms in exchange for access to the PRC market.

(7) Companies in the United States and in foreign countries compete with state-subsidized PRC companies that enjoy the protection and power of the state in third-country markets around the world. The advantages granted to PRC firms, combined with significant restrictions to accessing the PRC market itself, severely hamper the ability of United States and foreign firms to compete, innovate, and pursue the provision of best value to customers. The result is an unbalanced playing field. Such an unsustainable course, if not checked, will over time lead to depressed competition around the world, reduced opportunity, and harm to both producers and consumers.

(8) As stated in the United States Trade Representative’s investigation of the PRC’s trade practices under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411), conducted in March 2018, “When U.S. companies are deprived of fair returns on their investment in IP, they are unable to achieve the growth necessary to reinvest in innovation. In this sense, China’s technology transfer regime directly burdens the innovation ecosystem that is an engine of economic growth in the United States and similarly-situated economies.”.

(9) In addition to forced technology described in this subsection, the United States Trade Representative’s investigation of the PRC under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411) also identified requirements that foreign firms license products at less than market value, government-directed and government-subsidized acquisition of sensitive technology for strategic purposes, and cyber theft as other key PRC technology and industrial policies that are unreasonable and discriminatory. These policies place at risk United States intellectual property rights, innovation and technological development, and jobs in dozens of industries.

(10) Other elements of the PRC’s ecosystem of industrial policies that harm innovation and distort global markets include—

(A) advancement of policies that encourage local production over imports;

(B) continuation of policies that favor unique technical standards in use by Chinese firms rather than globally accepted standards, which often force foreign firms to alter their products and manufacturing chains to compete;

(C) requirements that foreign companies disclose proprietary information to qualify for the adoption of their standards for use in the PRC domestic market; and

(D) maintenance of closed procurement processes, which limit participation by foreign firms, including by setting terms that require such firms to use domestic suppliers, transfer know-how to firms in the PRC, and disclose proprietary information.

(11) The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and associated industry-specific efforts under this initiative, such as the Digital Silk Road, are key vectors to advance the PRC’s mercantilist policies and practices globally. The resulting challenges do not only affect United States firms. As the European Chamber of Commerce reported in a January 2020 report, the combination of concessional lending to Chinese state-owned enterprises, nontransparent procurement and bidding processes, closed digital standards, and other factors severely limit European and other participation in BRI and make “competition [with Chinese companies] in third-country markets extremely challenging”. This underscores a key objective of BRI, which is to ensure the reliance of infrastructure, digital technologies, and other important goods on PRC supply chains and technical standards.

(b) Sense of congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the challenges presented by a nonmarket economy like the PRC’s economy, which has captured such a large share of global economic exchange, are in many ways unprecedented and require sufficiently elevated and sustained long-term focus and engagement;

(2) in order to truly address the most detrimental aspects of CCP-directed mercantilist economic strategy, the United States must adopt policies that—

(A) expose the full scope and scale of intellectual property theft and mass subsidization of Chinese firms, and the resulting harm to the United States, foreign markets, and the global economy;

(B) ensure that PRC companies face costs and consequences for anticompetitive behavior;

(C) provide options for affected United States persons to address and respond to unreasonable and discriminatory CCP-directed industrial policies; and

(D) strengthen the protection of critical technology and sensitive data, while still fostering an environment that provides incentives for innovation and competition;

(3) the United States must work with its allies and partners through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization, and other venues and fora—

(A) to reinforce long-standing generally accepted principles of fair competition and market behavior and address the PRC’s anticompetitive economic and industrial policies that undermine decades of global growth and innovation;

(B) to ensure that the PRC is not granted the same treatment as that of a free-market economy until it ceases the implementation of laws, regulations, policies, and practices that provide unfair advantage on PRC firms in furtherance of national objectives and impose unreasonable, discriminatory, and illegal burdens on market-based international commerce; and

(C) to align policies with respect to curbing state-directed subsidization of the private sector, such as advocating for global rules related to transparency and adherence to notification requirements, including through the efforts currently being advanced by the United States, Japan, and the European Union; and

(4) the United States and its allies and partners must collaborate to provide incentives to their respective companies to cooperate in areas such as—

(A) advocating for protection of intellectual property rights in markets around the world;

(B) fostering open technical standards; and

(C) increasing joint investments in overseas markets.

(a) In general.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall create a list (referred to in this section as the “intellectual property violators list”), which identifies all state-owned enterprises that have benefitted from—

(1) a significant act or series of acts of intellectual property theft that subjected a United States economic sector or particular company incorporated in the United States to harm; or

(2) an act or government policy of involuntary or coerced technology transfer of intellectual property ultimately owned by a company incorporated in the United States.

(b) Rules for identification.—To determine whether there is a credible basis for determining that a company should be included on the intellectual property violators list, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall consider—

(1) any finding by a United States court that the company has violated relevant United States laws intended to protect intellectual property rights; or

(2) substantial and credible information received from any entity described in subsection (c) or other interested persons.

(c) Consultation.—In carrying out this section, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, may consult, as necessary and appropriate, with—

(1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;

(2) the private sector; and

(3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise.

(d) Report.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall publish, in the Federal Register, an annual report that—

(A) lists the companies engaged in the activities described in subsection (a)(1); and

(B) describes the circumstances surrounding actions described in subsection (a)(2), including any role of the Government of the PRC; and

(C) assesses, to the extent practicable, the economic advantage derived by the companies engaged in the activities described in subsection (a)(1).

(2) FORM.—The report published under paragraph (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

(e) Declassification and release.—The Director of National Intelligence may authorize the declassification of information, as appropriate, to inform the contents of the report published pursuant to subsection (d).

(f) Requirement To protect business-Confidential information.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State and the heads of all other Federal agencies involved in the production of the intellectual property violators list shall protect from disclosure any proprietary information submitted by a private sector participant and marked as business-confidential information, unless the party submitting the confidential business information—

(A) had notice, at the time of submission, that such information would be released by the Secretary; or

(B) subsequently consents to the release of such information.

(2) NONCONFIDENTIAL VERSION OF REPORT.—If confidential business information is provided by a private sector participant, a nonconfidential version of the report under subsection (d) shall be published in the Federal Register that summarizes or deletes, if necessary, the confidential business information.

(3) TREATMENT AS TRADE SECRETS.—Proprietary information submitted by a private party under this section—

(A) shall be considered to be trade secrets and commercial or financial information (as defined under section 552(b)(4) of title 5, United States Code); and

(B) shall be exempt from disclosure without the express approval of the private party.

(a) Report.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of Commerce, shall publish an unclassified report in the Federal Register that identifies—

(1) subsidies provided by the Government of the PRC to enterprises in the PRC; and

(2) discriminatory treatment favoring enterprises in the PRC over foreign market participants.

(b) Subsidies and discriminatory treatment described.—In compiling the report under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall consider—

(1) regulatory and other policies enacted or promoted by the Government of the PRC that—

(A) discriminate in favor of enterprises in the PRC at the expense of foreign market participants;

(B) shield centrally administered, state-owned enterprises from competition; or

(C) otherwise suppress market-based competition;

(2) financial subsidies, including favorable lending terms, from or promoted by the Government of the PRC or centrally administered, state-owned enterprises that materially benefit PRC enterprises over foreign market participants in contravention of generally accepted market principles; and

(3) any subsidy that meets the definition of subsidy under article 1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures referred to in section 101(d)(12) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(12)).”.

(c) Consultation.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, may, as necessary and appropriate, consult with—

(1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;

(2) the private sector; and

(3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise.

(a) In general.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney General, shall offer to provide technical assistance to establish legislative and regulatory frameworks to combat the bribery of foreign public officials consistent with the principles of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions to the governments of countries—

(1) that are partners of the United States;

(2) that have demonstrated a will to combat foreign corrupt practices responsibly; and

(3) for which technical assistance will have the greatest opportunity to achieve measureable results.

(b) Strategy requirement.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a strategy for carrying out the activities described in subsections (a) to the appropriate congressional committees.