(a) Short title.—This Act may be cited as the “Taiwan Policy Act of 2022”.

(b) Table of contents.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Definitions.

Congress finds the following:

(1) Since 1949, the close relationship between the United States and Taiwan has been of enormous benefit to both parties and to the Indo-Pacific region as a whole.

(2) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) has enabled the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan to maintain a strong and important relationship that promotes regional security, prosperity, and shared democratic values.

(3) The security of Taiwan and the ability for the people of Taiwan to determine their own future is fundamental to United States interests and values.

(4) The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States and the American Institute in Taiwan facilitate critical consular relations that—

(A) protect the interests of the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan; and

(B) strengthen people-to-people ties.

(5) Increased engagement between public officials, commercial interests, civil society leaders, and others enhances United States-Taiwan relations and its economic, security, and democratic dimensions.

(6) Taiwan serves as a critical partner on regional and transnational issues, such as public health, climate change, critical and emerging technologies, cybersecurity, trade, and freedom of navigation.

(7) Taiwan exemplifies a thriving democracy consisting of more than 23,000,000 people who value their suffrage, free markets, right to due process, freedom of expression, and other individual liberties.

(8) President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China (referred to in this Act as the “PRC”) continues to repeat his desire to stifle the freedom of Taiwan, as evidenced by his July 2021 proclamation, in which he stated, “All sons and daughters of China, including compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, must work together and move forward in solidarity, resolutely smashing any Taiwan independence plots.”.

(9) As President Xi Jinping consolidates his power in the Chinese Communist Party (referred to in this Act as the “CCP”), he is escalating the PRC’s campaign of coercion and intimidation against Taiwan, as evidenced by—

(A) the accelerated preparations made by the PRC and its People’s Liberation Army (referred to in this Act as the “PLA”) for an offensive attack against Taiwan, such as the PLA's January 2022 incursion of nearly 40 fighters, bombers, and other warplanes into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone;

(B) the PLA’s growing offensive preparations in the Taiwan Strait, such as amphibious assault and live-fire exercises and record-scale incursions into Taiwanese air space;

(C) the Foreign Ministry’s diplomatic efforts to isolate Taiwan, such as abusing its position in international institutions and multilateral fora to exclude Taiwanese participation despite Taiwan’s demonstrated expertise in relevant subjects, such as public health;

(D) threats and actions to compromise Taiwan’s economy and critical suppliers, such as draconian export controls and the “31 Measures” intended to lure Taiwanese talent to mainland China and away from Taiwan;

(E) persistent and targeted cyberattacks, numbering nearly 20,000,000 per month, which are intended to compromise Taiwan’s critical infrastructure and inflict civilian harm;

(F) political and economic pressure on other countries who seek closer ties with Taiwan, such as recent export controls related to Lithuania after Lithuania announced a permanent Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania.

(10) On multiple occasions, through both formal and informal channels, the United States has expressed its concern for the PRC’s destabilizing activities in the Taiwan Strait and on the international stage that aim to subvert Taiwan’s democratic institutions.

(11) The Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States—

(A) identifies Taiwan as an important leading regional partner;

(B) seeks to bolster Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities; and

(C) reaffirms that Taiwan’s future must be determined peacefully and in accordance with the wishes and best interests of the people of Taiwan.

(12) The PRC considers stifling the freedom of Taiwan as a critical and necessary step to displacing the United States as the preeminent military power in the Indo-Pacific and continues its modernization campaign to enhance the power-projection capabilities of the PLA and its ability to conduct joint operations.

(13) Taiwan maintains a modern, ready, self-defense force that adheres to the highest democratic principles and benefits from continued state-of-the-art security assistance.

(14) It is a vital national security interest of the United States to defend Taiwan for the purposes of—

(A) mitigating the PLA’s ability to project power and establish contested zones within the First and Second Island Chains and limiting the PLA’s freedom of maneuver to conduct unconstrained power projection capabilities beyond the First Island Chain in order to protect United States territory, such as Hawaii and Guam;

(B) defending the territorial integrity of Indo-Pacific allies, such as Japan;

(C) deterring other countries and competitors from exercising force as a means to revise the established status quo;

(D) championing democratic institutions and societies in the Indo-Pacific region and throughout the world; and

(E) maintaining a rules-based international order that—

(i) constrains authoritarian powers;

(ii) enshrines collective security;

(iii) promotes democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and

(iv) promotes peace and prosperity.

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;

(C) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(E) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and

(F) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(2) PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY; PLA.—The terms “People’s Liberation Army” and “PLA” mean the Armed Forces of the People’s Republic of China.

(3) REPUBLIC OF CHINA.—The term “Republic of China” means the East Asia island country commonly known as “Taiwan”.

(4) SHARP POWER.—The term “sharp power” means the coordinated and often concealed application of disinformation, media manipulation, economic coercion, cyber-intrusions, targeted investments, and academic censorship that is intended—

(A) to corrupt political and nongovernmental institutions and interfere in democratic elections and encourage self-censorship of views at odds with those of the Government of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party; or

(B) to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions, or outcomes in Taiwan and elsewhere that support the interests of the Government of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to support the security of Taiwan, the stability of cross-Strait relations, and the freedom of the people of Taiwan to determine their own future, and to strenuously oppose any action by the PRC to use force to change the status quo of Taiwan;

(2) to cooperate with Taiwan as an important partner of the United States in promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific;

(3) to deter the use of force by the PRC to change the status quo of Taiwan by coordinating with allies and partners to identify and develop significant economic, diplomatic, and other measures that will deter and impose costs on any such use of force and support and cooperate with Taiwan to implement, resource, and modernize its military capabilities, including an effective defense strategy, through security assistance and increases in defense spending;

(4) to strengthen cooperation with the military of Taiwan under the framework of the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the Six Assurances, with consideration of the ongoing military buildup in China and the military balance in the Taiwan Strait, and to transfer defense articles to Taiwan to enhance its capabilities, including its efforts to undertake defensive operations and maintain the ability to deny PRC coercion and invasion;

(5) to urge Taiwan to increase its own investments in military capabilities, including those that support the implementation of an effective defense strategy;

(6) to advance and finalize key provisions of the United States-Taiwan Trade and Investment Framework Agreement and deepen economic ties between the United States and Taiwan and advance the interests of the United States by negotiating a bilateral free trade agreement as soon as possible, which will include appropriate levels of labor rights and environmental protections;

(7) to include Taiwan as a partner in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework;

(8) to welcome Taiwan's meaningful participation in important international organizations, including organizations that address global health, civilian air safety, and efforts to counter transnational crime and bilateral and multilateral security summits, military exercises, and economic dialogues and forums;

(9) to support the Government of Taiwan as a representative democratic government, constituted through free and fair elections that reflect the will of the people of Taiwan and promote dignity and respect for the democratically elected leaders of Taiwan, who represent more than 23,000,000 citizens, by using the full range of diplomatic and other appropriate tools available to promote Taiwan’s international space;

(10) to ensure that distinctions in practice regarding United States relations with Taiwan are consistent with the longstanding, comprehensive, strategic, and values-based relationship the United States shares with Taiwan, and contribute to the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues; and

(11) to create and execute a plan for enhancing our relationship with Taiwan by forming a robust partnership that—

(A) meets current geopolitical challenges;

(B) fully accounts for Taiwan’s democratic status; and

(C) remains faithful to United States principles and values, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances.

(a) In general.—The Secretary of State and other Federal departments and agencies shall—

(1) engage with the democratically elected government of Taiwan as the legitimate representative of the people of Taiwan; and

(2) end the outdated practice of referring to the government in Taiwan as the “Taiwan authorities”.

(b) No restrictions on bilateral interactions.—Notwithstanding the continued supporting role of the American Institute in Taiwan in carrying out United States foreign policy and protecting United States interests in Taiwan, the United States Government shall not place any undue restrictions on the ability of officials of the Department of State or other Federal departments and agencies to interact directly and routinely with their counterparts in the Government of Taiwan.

Section 315 of the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–260) is amended—

(1) in subsection (c)(1), by adding at the end before “; and” the following: “and any successor document or related document disseminating such policies”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(d) Periodic reviews.—For as long as the Department of State’s guidance that governs relations with Taiwan described in subsection (a) remains in effect, the Secretary of State shall conduct periodic reviews as described in subsection (a) and submit updated reports as described in subsection (c) not less frequently than every two years following the submission of the initial report described in subsection (c).”.

No funds authorized or appropriated for the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the United States Development Finance Corporation, or the Peace Corps may be used to create, procure, or display any map that depicts Taiwan, Kinmen, Matsu, Penghu, Wuqiu, Green Island, or Orchid Island as part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China.

(a) Defined term.—In this section, the term “official purposes” means—

(1) the wearing of official uniforms;

(2) conducting government-hosted ceremonies or functions; and

(3) appearances on Department of State social media accounts promoting engagements with Taiwan.

(b) In general.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall rescind any contact guideline, internal restriction, section of the Foreign Affairs Manual or the Foreign Affairs Handbook, or related guidance or policies that, explicitly or implicitly, including through restrictions or limitations on activities of United States Government personnel, limits the ability of members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and government representatives from the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office to display, for official purposes, symbols of Republic of China sovereignty, including—

(1) the flag of the Republic of China (Taiwan); and

(2) the corresponding emblems or insignia of military units.

(a) Statement of policy.—It shall be the policy of the United States, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the Six Assurances—

(1) to provide the people of Taiwan with de facto diplomatic treatment equivalent to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities; and

(2) to rename the “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office” in the United States as the “Taiwan Representative Office”.

(b) Renaming.—The Secretary of State shall seek to enter into negotiations with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office to rename its office in Washington, DC, the “Taiwan Representative Office”.

(c) References.—If the negotiations under subsection (b) result in the renaming of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office as the Taiwan Representative Office, any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other record of the United States Government to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office shall be deemed to be a reference to the Taiwan Representative Office, including for all official purposes of the United States Government, all courts of the United States, and any proceedings by such Government or in such courts.

(a) Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018.—Section 209(a)(2) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 3301 note) is amended by striking “, the 3 joint communiques,”.

(b) Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020.—Section 312(6) of the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–260) is amended by striking “and in accordance with the United States ‘One China’ policy”.

The appointment of an individual to the position of Director of the American Institute in Taiwan’s Taipei office shall be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. Upon Senate confirmation, such individual shall have the title of Representative.

(a) Deterrence of people’s liberation army aggression.—It is the policy of the United States to provide Taiwan arms conducive to deterring acts of aggression by the People’s Liberation Army.

(b) Provision of defense articles and services.—It is the policy of the United States to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to implement a strategy to deny and deter acts of coercion or aggression by the People’s Liberation Army.

(c) Rule of construction.—Nothing in this Act, nor the President’s action in extending diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China, nor the absence of diplomatic relations between the people of Taiwan and the United States, nor the lack of formal recognition of Taiwan by the United States, and any related circumstances, may be construed to constitute a legal or practical obstacle to any otherwise lawful action of the President or of any United States Government agency that is needed to advance or protect United States interests pertaining to Taiwan, including actions intended to strengthen security cooperation between the United States and Taiwan or to otherwise deter the use of force against Taiwan by the People’s Liberation Army.

(a) Taiwan security programs.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall use the authorities under this section to strengthen the United States-Taiwan defense relationship, and to support the acceleration of the modernization of Taiwan’s defense capabilities required to deter or, if necessary, to defeat an invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China.

(b) Annual report on advancing the defense of Taiwan.—

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(2) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 7 years, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that describes steps taken to enhance the United States-Taiwan defense relationship and Taiwan’s modernization of its defense capabilities.

(3) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report required under paragraph (2) shall include—

(A) an assessment of the commitment of Taiwan to implement a military strategy that will deter and, if necessary, defeat military aggression by the People’s Republic of China, including the steps that Taiwan has taken and the steps that Taiwan has not taken towards such implementation;

(B) an assessment of the efforts of Taiwan to acquire and employ within its forces counter intervention capabilities, including—

(i) long-range precision fires;

(ii) integrated air and missile defense systems;

(iii) anti-ship cruise missiles;

(iv) land-attack cruise missiles;

(v) coastal defense;

(vi) anti-armor;

(vii) undersea warfare;

(viii) survivable swarming maritime assets;

(ix) manned and unmanned aerial systems;

(x) mining and countermining capabilities;

(xi) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities;

(xii) command and control systems; and

(xiii) any other defense capabilities that the United States and Taiwan jointly determine are crucial to the defense of Taiwan, in accordance with the process developed pursuant to section 203(a);

(C) an evaluation of the balance between conventional and counter intervention capabilities in the defense force of Taiwan as of the date on which the report is submitted;

(D) an assessment of steps taken by Taiwan to enhance the overall readiness of its defense forces, including—

(i) the extent to which Taiwan is requiring and providing regular and relevant training to such forces;

(ii) the extent to which such training is realistic to the security environment that Taiwan faces; and

(iii) the sufficiency of the financial and budgetary resources Taiwan is putting toward readiness of such forces;

(E) an assessment of steps taken by Taiwan to ensure that the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency can recruit, train, equip, and mobilize its forces;

(F) an evaluation of—

(i) the severity of manpower shortages in the military of Taiwan, including in the reserve forces;

(ii) the impact of such shortages in the event of a conflict scenario; and

(iii) the efforts made by the Government of Taiwan to address such shortages;

(G) an assessment of the efforts made by Taiwan to boost its civilian defenses, including any informational campaigns to raise awareness among the population of Taiwan of the risks Taiwan faces;

(H) an assessment of the efforts made by Taiwan to secure its critical infrastructure, including in transportation, telecommunications networks, and energy;

(I) an assessment of the efforts made by Taiwan to enhance its cybersecurity, including the security of civilian government and military networks;

(J) an assessment of any significant gaps in any of the matters described in subparagraphs (A) through (I) with respect to which the United States assesses that additional action is needed;

(K) a description of cooperative efforts between the United States and Taiwan on the matters described in subparagraphs (A) through (J); and

(L) a description of any resistance within the Government of Taiwan and the military leadership of Taiwan to—

(i) implementing the matters described in subparagraphs (A) through (I); or

(ii) United States support or engagement with regard to such matters.

(4) FORM.—The report required under paragraph (2) shall be submitted in classified form, but shall include a detailed unclassified summary.

(5) SHARING OF SUMMARY.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly share the unclassified summary required under paragraph (4) with the government and military of Taiwan.

(c) Authority To provide assistance.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall use amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (i) to provide assistance to the Government of Taiwan under subsection (d).

(d) Foreign Military Financing Program established.—The Secretary of State shall establish a Foreign Military Financing Program to provide assistance, including equipment, training, and other support, to enable the Government and military of Taiwan—

(1) to accelerate the modernization of defense capabilities that will enable Taiwan to delay, degrade, and deny attempts by People’s Liberation Army forces—

(A) to conduct coercive or grey zone activities;

(B) to achieve maritime control over the Taiwan Strait and adjoining seas;

(C) to secure a lodgment on any Taiwanese islands and expand or otherwise use such lodgment to seize control of a population center or other key territory in Taiwan; and

(2) to prevent the People’s Republic of China from decapitating, seizing control of, or otherwise neutralizing or rendering ineffective the Government of Taiwan.

(e) Regional contingency stockpile.—Of the amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (i)(1), not more than $100,000,000 may be used during each of the fiscal years 2023 through 2032 to maintain a stockpile (if established under section 212), in accordance with section 514 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321h), as amended by section 211.

(f) Availability of funds.—

(1) ANNUAL SPENDING PLAN.—Not later than December 1, 2022, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a plan to the appropriate committees of Congress describing how funds appropriated pursuant to subsection (i)(2) will be used to achieve the purposes described in subsection (d).

(2) CERTIFICATION.—Amounts appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to subsection (i)(2) shall be made available for the purpose described in such subsection after the Secretary of State certifies to the appropriate committees of Congress that Taiwan has increased its defense spending relative to Taiwan’s defense spending in its prior fiscal year, excepting accounts in Taiwan’s defense budget related to personnel expenditures, (other than military training and education and any funding related to the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency).

(3) REMAINING FUNDS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subparagraph (B), amounts appropriated for a fiscal year pursuant to subsection (i)(2) that are not obligated and expended during such fiscal year shall be added to the amount that may be used for Foreign Military Financing to Taiwan in the subsequent fiscal year.

(B) RESCISSION.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (i)(2) that remain unobligated on September 30, 2027 shall be rescinded and deposited into the general fund of the Treasury.

(g) Defense articles and services from the United States inventory and other sources.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—In addition to assistance provided pursuant to subsection (c), the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, may make available to the Government of Taiwan, in such quantities as the Secretary of State considers appropriate to provide assistance to the Government of Taiwan under subsection (d)—

(A) weapons and other defense articles from the United States inventory and other sources; and

(B) defense services.

(2) REPLACEMENT.—The Secretary of State may use amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (i)(2) for the cost of replacing any item provided to the Government of Taiwan pursuant to paragraph (1)(A).

(h) Foreign military financing loan and loan guarantee authority.—

(1) DIRECT LOANS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding section 23(c)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763), during fiscal years 2023 through 2027, the Secretary of State may make direct loans available for Taiwan pursuant to section 23 of such Act.

(B) MAXIMUM OBLIGATIONS.—Gross obligations for the principal amounts of loans authorized under subparagraph (A) may not exceed $2,000,000,000.

(C) SOURCE OF FUNDS.—

(i) DEFINED TERM.—In this subparagraph, the term “cost”—

(I) has the meaning given such term in section 502(5) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 661a(5));

(II) shall include the cost of modifying a loan authorized under subparagraph (A); and

(III) may include the costs of selling, reducing, or cancelling any amounts owed to the United States or to any agency of the United States.

(ii) IN GENERAL.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (i)(1) may be made available to pay for the cost of loans authorized under subparagraph (A).

(D) FEES AUTHORIZED.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—The Government of the United States may charge fees for loans made pursuant to subparagraph (A), which shall be collected from borrowers through a financing account (as defined in section 502(7) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 661a(7)).

(ii) LIMITATION ON FEE PAYMENTS.—Amounts made available under any appropriations Act for any fiscal year may not be used to pay any fees associated with a loan authorized under subparagraph (A).

(E) REPAYMENT.—Loans made pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be repaid not later than 12 years after the loan is received by the borrower, including a grace period of not more than 1 year on repayment of principal.

(F) INTEREST.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding section 23(c)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763(c)(1), interest for loans made pursuant to subparagraph (A) may be charged at a rate determined by the Secretary of State, except that such rate may not be less than the prevailing interest rate on marketable Treasury securities of similar maturity.

(ii) TREATMENT OF LOAN AMOUNTS USED TO PAY INTEREST.—Amounts made available under this paragraph for interest costs shall not be considered assistance for the purposes of any statutory limitation on assistance to a country.

(2) LOAN GUARANTEES.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (i)(1) may be made available for the costs of loan guarantees for Taiwan under section 24 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2764) for Taiwan to subsidize gross obligations for the principal amount of commercial loans and total loan principal, any part of which may be guaranteed, not to exceed $2,000,000,000.

(B) MAXIMUM AMOUNTS.—A loan guarantee authorized under subparagraph (A)—

(i) may not guarantee a loan that exceeds $2,000,000,000; and

(ii) may not exceed 80 percent of the loan principal with respect to any single borrower.

(C) SUBORDINATION.—Any loan guaranteed pursuant to subparagraph (A) may not be subordinated to—

(i) another debt contracted by the borrower; or

(ii) any other claims against the borrower in the case of default.

(D) REPAYMENT.—Repayment in United States dollars of any loan guaranteed under this paragraph shall be required not later than 12 years after the loan agreement is signed.

(E) FEES.—Notwithstanding section 24 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2764), the Government of the United States may charge fees for loan guarantees authorized under subparagraph (A), which shall be collected from borrowers, or from third parties on behalf of such borrowers, through a financing account (as defined in section 502(7) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 661a(7)).

(F) TREATMENTS OF LOAN GUARANTEES.—Amounts made available under this paragraph for the costs of loan guarantees authorized under subparagraph (A) shall not be considered assistance for the purposes of any statutory limitation on assistance to a country.

(3) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—Amounts appropriated to carry out this subsection may not be expended without prior notification of the appropriate committees of Congress.

(i) Authorization of appropriations.—

(1) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—In addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated for Foreign Military Financing, there is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State for Taiwan Foreign Military Finance grant assistance—

(A) $250,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;

(B) $750,000,000 for fiscal year 2024;

(C) $1,500,000,000 for fiscal year 2025;

(D) $2,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2026; and

(E) $2,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2027.

(2) TRAINING AND EDUCATION.—Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated under paragraph (1), the Secretary of State shall use not less than $2,000,000 per fiscal year for 1 or more blanket order Foreign Military Financing training programs related to the defense needs of Taiwan.

(j) Sunset provision.—Assistance may not be provided under this section after September 30, 2032.

(a) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 10 years, the Secretary of Defense shall—

(1) conduct a classified review of the United States strategy to defend Taiwan; and

(2) share the results of such review with the Chairman and Ranking Member of the appropriate committees of Congress.

(b) Elements.—The review conducted pursuant to subsection (a) shall include—

(1) an assessment of Taiwan’s current and near-term capabilities, United States force readiness, and the adequacy of the United States strategy to enable the defense of Taiwan;

(2) a detailed strategy of denial to defend Taiwan against aggression by the People’s Liberation Army, including an effort to seize and hold the island of Taiwan;

(3) a comprehensive assessment of risks to the United States and United States interests, including readiness shortfalls that pose strategic risk;

(4) a review of indicators of the near-term likelihood of the use of force by the People’s Liberation Army against Taiwan; and

(5) a list of military capabilities, including capabilities that enable a strategy of denial, that—

(A) would suit the operational environment and allow Taiwan to respond effectively to a variety of contingencies across all potential phases of conflict involving the People’s Liberation Army; and

(B) would reduce the threat of conflict, thwart an invasion, and mitigate other risks to the United States and Taiwan.

(a) In general.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall establish and maintain a joint consultative mechanism with Taiwan that convenes on a recurring basis—

(1) to develop a joint assessment of, and coordinate planning with respect to, the threats Taiwan faces from the People’s Republic of China across the spectrum of possible military action; and

(2) to identify nonmaterial and material solutions to deter and defeat such threats.

(b) Integrated priorities list.—In carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall develop with Taiwan—

(1) an integrated priorities list;

(2) relevant plans for acquisition and training for relevant nonmaterial and material solutions; and

(3) other measures to appropriately prioritize the defense needs of Taiwan to maintain effective deterrence across the spectrum of possible military action by the People’s Republic of China.

(c) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that describes the joint assessment developed pursuant to subsection (a)(1).

(a) Statement of policy.—It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to ensure that requests by Taiwan to purchase arms from the United States are not prematurely rejected or dismissed before Taiwan submits a letter of request or other formal documentation, particularly when such requests are for capabilities that are not included on any United States Government priority lists of necessary capabilities for the defense of Taiwan;

(2) to ensure requests by Taiwan to purchase arms from the United States are evaluated with full consideration of the United States strategy to defend Taiwan pursuant to section 203 and the joint consultative mechanism with Taiwan pursuant to section 204; and

(3) to ensure close consultation among representatives of Taiwan, Congress, industry, and the Executive branch about requests referred to in paragraph (1) and the needs of Taiwan before Taiwan submits formal requests for such purchases.

(b) Requirement.—Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress—

(1) a list of categories of counter intervention capabilities and a justification for each such category; and

(2) a description of the degree to which the United States has a policy of openness or flexibility for evaluating requests by Taiwan to purchase arms from the United States that may not fall within the scope of counter intervention capabilities included in the list required under paragraph (1), due to considerations such as—

(A) joint planning of respective mission roles between the United States, Taiwan, and other parties in the event of conflict concerning Taiwan;

(B) the evolution of defense technologies;

(C) the identification of new concepts of operation or ways to employ certain capabilities; and

(D) other factors that might change assessments by the United States and Taiwan of what constitutes counter intervention capabilities.

(a) In general.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall establish or expand a comprehensive training program with Taiwan designed to—

(1) enhance interoperability and capabilities for joint operations between the United States and Taiwan;

(2) enhance rapport and deepen partnership between the militaries of the United States and Taiwan, and foster understanding of the United States among individuals in Taiwan;

(3) improve Taiwan’s defense capabilities; and

(4) train future leaders of Taiwan, promote professional military education, civilian control of the military, and protection of human rights.

(b) Elements.—The training program required by subsection (a) should prioritize relevant and realistic training, including as necessary joint United States-Taiwan contingency tabletop exercises, war games, full-scale military exercises, and an enduring rotational United States military presence that assists Taiwan in maintaining force readiness and utilizing United States defense articles and services transferred from the United States to Taiwan.

(c) Authorization of participation of taiwan in the international military education and training program.—Taiwan is authorized to participate in the International Military Education and Training program for the purposes described in subsection (a) and to carry out the elements described in subsection (b).

(d) Report.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 3 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a classified report that describes all training provided to the Armed Forces of Taiwan in the prior fiscal year, including—

(1) a description of advancements in United States-Taiwan military interoperability pursuant to such training;

(2) a description of increasing familiarization of the militaries of the United States and Taiwan with each other pursuant to such training;

(3) improvements to Taiwan’s defense capabilities pursuant to such training; and

(4) an identification of all requests from Taiwan for further training.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) joint military exercises with Taiwan are an important component of improving military readiness and joint operability of both countries;

(2) the Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command, and other commands in the United States Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility, already possess the legal authority to carry out such exercises; and

(3) the United States should better use existing authorities to improve the readiness and joint operability of United States and Taiwanese forces.

(b) Authority recognized.—The Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command is authorized to carry out military exercises with Taiwan that—

(1) include multiple warfare domains and make extensive use of the military common operations network used by United States, allied, and Taiwanese forces;

(2) to the maximum extent practical, incorporate the cooperation of 2 or more combatant and subordinate unified commands; and

(3) present a complex military problem and include a force presentation of a strategic competitor.

(a) Assessment required.—Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit a written, classified assessment of Taiwan’s needs in the areas of civilian defense and resilience to the appropriate committees of Congress, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(b) Matters To be included.—The assessment required under subsection (a) shall—

(1) analyze the potential role of Taiwan’s public and civilian assets in defending against various scenarios for foreign militaries to coerce or conduct military aggression against Taiwan;

(2) carefully analyze Taiwan’s needs for enhancing its defensive capabilities through the support of civilians and civilian sectors, including—

(A) greater utilization of Taiwan’s high tech labor force;

(B) the creation of clear structures and logistics support for civilian defense role allocation;

(C) recruitment and skills training for Taiwan's defense and civilian sectors;

(D) strategic stockpiling of resources related to critical food security and medical supplies; and

(E) other defense needs and considerations at the provincial, city, and neighborhood levels;

(3) analyze Taiwan’s needs for enhancing resiliency among its people and in key economic sectors;

(4) identify opportunities for Taiwan to enhance communications and strengthen cooperation between the military, other government departments, civilian agencies, and the general public, including—

(A) communications infrastructure necessary to ensure reliable communications in response to a conflict or crisis; and

(B) a plan to effectively communicate to the general public in response to a conflict or crisis; and

(5) identify the areas and means through which the United States could provide training and assistance to support the needs discovered through the assessment and fill any critical gaps where capacity falls short of such needs.

(c) Form of report.—Notwithstanding the classified nature of the assessment required under subsection (a), the assessment shall be shared with appropriate officials of the Government of Taiwan to facilitate cooperation.

(d) Authorization of appropriations.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated to complete the assessment required under subsection (a)—

(A) $500,000 for the Department of State; and

(B) $500,000 for the Department of Defense.

(2) TRANSFER AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense are authorized to transfer any funds appropriated to their respective departments pursuant to paragraph (1) to the Director of National Intelligence for the purposes of facilitating the contributions of the intelligence community to the assessment required under subsection (a).

(a) In general.—Not later than February 15, 2023, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101 of title 10, United States Code) a report on the feasibility and advisability of enhanced cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan.

(b) Elements.—Each report required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) A description of the cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan during the preceding calendar year, including mutual visits, exercises, training, and equipment opportunities.

(2) An evaluation of the feasibility of enhancing cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan on a range of activities, including—

(A) disaster and emergency response;

(B) cyber defense and communications security;

(C) military medical cooperation;

(D) cultural exchange and education of members of the National Guard in Mandarin Chinese; and

(E) programs for National Guard advisors to assist in training the reserve components of the military forces of Taiwan.

(3) Recommendations to enhance such cooperation and improve interoperability, including through familiarization visits, cooperative training and exercises, and co-deployments.

(4) Any other matter the Secretary of Defense determines appropriate.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States Government should appropriately prioritize the review of excess defense article transfers to Taiwan.

(b) Five-Year plan.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall—

(1) develop a 5-year plan to appropriately prioritize excess defense article transfers to Taiwan; and

(2) submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that describes such plan.

(c) Required coordination.—The United States Government shall coordinate and align excess defense article transfers with capacity-building efforts of Taiwan.

(d) Transfer authority.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 516(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)) is amended by striking “and to the Philippines” and inserting “, to the Philippines, and to Taiwan”.

(2) TREATMENT OF TAIWAN.—With respect to the transfer of excess defense articles under section 516(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by paragraph (1), Taiwan shall receive the same benefits as the other countries referred to in such section.

(a) Prioritized processing and prohibition on bundling of foreign military sales requests from taiwan.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall appropriately prioritize and expedite the processing of requests from Taiwan under the Foreign Military Sales program consistent with the Arms Export Control Act and in furtherance of the Taiwan Relations Act.

(b) Use of Special Defense Acquisition Fund.—The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall seek to utilize the Special Defense Acquisition Fund established under chapter 5 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2795 et seq.) to expedite the procurement and delivery of defense articles and defense services for the purpose of assisting and supporting the Armed Forces of Taiwan.

(c) Annual report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 10 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that describes the steps that have been taken to carry out subsection (a).

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) prioritizing the defense needs of United States allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific is a national security priority; and

(2) sustained support to key Indo-Pacific partners for interoperable defense systems is critical to preserve—

(A) the safety and security of American persons;

(B) the free flow of commerce through international trade routes;

(C) the United States commitment to collective security agreements, territorial integrity, and recognized maritime boundaries;

(D) United States values regarding democracy and commitment to maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific; and

(E) Taiwan’s defense capability.

(b) Report required.—Not later than March 1, 2023, and annually thereafter for a period of five years, the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, shall transmit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report with respect to the transfer of all defense articles or defense services that have yet to be completed pursuant to the authorities provided by—

(1) section 3, 21, or 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2753, 2761, or 2776); or

(2) section 516(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)).

(c) Elements.—The report required under subsection (b) shall include the following elements:

(1) A list of all approved transfers of defense articles and services authorized by Congress pursuant to sections 25 and 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2765, 2776) with a total value of $25,000,000 or more, to Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Australia, or New Zealand, that have not been fully delivered by the start of the fiscal year in which the report is being submitted.

(2) The estimated start and end dates of delivery for each approved and incomplete transfer listed pursuant to paragraph (1), including additional details and dates for any transfers that involve multiple tranches of deliveries.

(3) With respect to each approved and incomplete transfer listed pursuant to paragraph (1), a detailed description of—

(A) any changes in the delivery dates of defense articles or services relative to the dates anticipated at the time of congressional approval of the transfer, including specific reasons for any delays related to the United States Government, defense suppliers, or a foreign partner;

(B) the feasibility and advisability of providing the partner subject to such delayed delivery with an interim capability or solution, including drawing from United States stocks, and the mechanisms under consideration for doing so as well as any challenges to implementing such a capability or solution;

(C) authorities, appropriations, or waiver requests that Congress could provide to improve delivery timelines or authorize the provision of interim capabilities or solutions identified pursuant to subparagraph (B); and

(D) a description of which countries are ahead of Taiwan for delivery of each item listed pursuant to paragraph (1).

(4) A description of ongoing interagency efforts to support attainment of operational capability of the corresponding defense articles and services once delivered, including advance training with United States or Armed Forces of partner countries on the systems to be received. The description of any such training shall also include an identification of the training implementer.

(5) If a transfer listed pursuant to paragraph (1) has been terminated prior to the date of the submission of the report for any reason—

(A) the case information for such transfer, including the date of congressional notification, delivery date of the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA), final signature of the LOA, and information pertaining to delays in delivering LOAs for signature;

(B) a description of the reasons for which the transfer is no longer in effect; and

(C) the impact this termination will have on the intended end user and the consequent implications for regional security, including the impact on deterrence of military action by countries hostile to the United States, the military balance in the Taiwan Strait, and other factors.

(6) A separate description of the actions the United States is taking to expedite deliveries of defense articles and services to Taiwan, including in particular, whether the United States intends to divert defense articles from United States stocks to provide an interim capability or solution with respect to any delayed deliveries to Taiwan and the plan, if applicable, to replenish any such diverted stocks.

(7) A description of other potential actions already undertaken by or currently under consideration by the Department of State and the Department of Defense to improve delivery timelines for the transfers listed pursuant to paragraph (1).

(d) Appropriate committees of congress defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

(e) Form.—The report required under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

(a) Whole-of-Government review.—Not later than 14 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall convene the heads of all relevant Federal departments and agencies to conduct a whole-of-government review of all available economic, diplomatic, and other strategic measures to deter the use of force by the People’s Republic of China to change the status quo of Taiwan.

(b) Briefing required.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of National Intelligence, and any other relevant heads of Federal departments and agencies shall provide a detailed briefing to the appropriate committees of Congress regarding—

(1) all available economic, diplomatic, and other strategic measures to deter the use of force by the People's Republic of China, including coercion, grey-zone tactics, assertions, shows of force, quarantines, embargoes, or other measures to change the status quo of Taiwan;

(2) efforts by the United States Government to deter the use of force by the People’s Republic of China to change the status quo of Taiwan; and

(3) progress to date of all coordination efforts between the United States Government and its allies and partners with respect to deterring the use of force to change the status quo of Taiwan.

(c) Coordinated consequences with allies and partners.—The Secretary of State shall—

(1) coordinate with United States allies and partners to identify and develop significant economic, diplomatic, and other measures to deter the use of force by the People’s Republic of China to change the status quo of Taiwan; and

(2) announce in advance, the severe multilateral consequences that would be imposed on the People’s Republic of China immediately after it engaged in any such use of force.

(a) In general.—Section 514(b)(2)(A) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321h(b)(2)(A)) is amended by striking “$200,000,000” and all that follows and inserting “$500,000,000 for any of the fiscal years 2023, 2024, or 2025.”.

(b) Establishment.—Subject to section 514 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321h), the President may establish a regional contingency stockpile for Taiwan that consists primarily of munitions.

(c) Inclusion of Taiwan among other allies eligible for defense articles.—Chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2311 et seq.) is amended—

(1) in section 514(c)(2) (22 U.S.C. 2321h(c)(2)), by inserting “Taiwan,” after “Thailand,”; and

(2) in section 516(c)(2) (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)), by inserting “to Taiwan,” after “major non-NATO allies on such southern and southeastern flank,”.

(d) Annual briefing.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 7 years, the President shall provide a briefing to the appropriate committees of Congress regarding the status of a regional contingency stockpile established under subsection (b).

It is the sense of Congress that the President should use the presidential drawdown authority under sections 506(a) and 552(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2318(a) and 2348a(c)) to provide security assistance and other necessary commodities and services to Taiwan in support of Taiwan’s self-defense.

Section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321k) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(c) Additional designations.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Taiwan is designated as a major non-NATO ally for purposes of this Act, the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), and section 2350a of title 10, United States Code.

“(2) NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF DESIGNATION.—The President shall notify Congress in accordance with subsection (a)(2) before terminating the designation specified in paragraph (1).”.

(a) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State shall develop and implement a strategy to respond to—

(1) covert, coercive, and corrupting activities carried out to advance the Chinese Communist Party’s “United Front” work, including activities directed, coordinated, or otherwise supported by the United Front Work Department or its subordinate or affiliated entities; and

(2) information and disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and nontraditional propaganda measures supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party that are directed toward persons or entities in Taiwan.

(b) Elements.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include descriptions of—

(1) the proposed response to propaganda and disinformation campaigns by the People’s Republic of China and cyber-intrusions targeting Taiwan, including—

(A) assistance in building the capacity of the Government of Taiwan and private-sector entities to document and expose propaganda and disinformation supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, or affiliated entities;

(B) assistance to enhance the Government of Taiwan’s ability to develop a whole-of-government strategy to respond to sharp power operations, including election interference; and

(C) media training for Taiwan officials and other Taiwan entities targeted by disinformation campaigns;

(2) the proposed response to political influence operations that includes an assessment of the extent of influence exerted by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party in Taiwan on local political parties, financial institutions, media organizations, and other entities;

(3) support for exchanges and other technical assistance to strengthen the Taiwan legal system’s ability to respond to sharp power operations;

(4) the establishment of a coordinated partnership, through the American Institute in Taiwan's Global Cooperation and Training Framework, with like-minded governments to share data and best practices with the Government of Taiwan regarding ways to address sharp power operations supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party; and

(5) programs carried out by the Global Engagement Center to expose misinformation and disinformation in the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda.

(a) In general.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a description of the strategy being used by the Department of State to respond to the Government of the People’s Republic of China’s increased economic coercion against countries which have strengthened their ties with, or support for, Taiwan.

(b) Assistance for countries and entities targeted by the People's Republic of China for economic coercion.—The Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the Department of Commerce and the Department of the Treasury shall provide appropriate assistance to countries and entities that are subject to trade restrictions and other forms of economic coercion by the People's Republic of China.

(a) In general.—The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, acting through the American Institute in Taiwan, as appropriate, shall seek to establish a framework with Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and other entities, as appropriate, for robust, continuous, shared defense planning and force development that includes regular dialogues at appropriate levels throughout the United States Government.

(b) Objectives.—The objectives of the framework described in subsection (a) shall include—

(1) outlining pathways for the advancement of shared priorities to meet current and emerging security challenges;

(2) developing common threat perceptions and perceptions surrounding escalation;

(3) developing a common understanding of potential conflict scenarios, including their likelihood, predictability, and political import, and a shared conception on the means required to deter such aggression and the risk tolerance for employing such means;

(4) delineating further how the United States and Taiwan can collaborate to advance the military capabilities and readiness of Taiwan;

(5) ensuring unified planning and role clarity for various contingencies involving the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan;

(6) ensuring the Armed Forces of Taiwan have the appropriate systems, munitions, capabilities, and training for maximum deterrent effect within a combined deterrence;

(7) ensuring Taiwan’s existing and new systems and capabilities are integrated into a combined deterrence effort for maximum deterrent effect;

(8) aligning Taiwan’s defense budgeting priorities with the overall combined deterrence effort;

(9) ensuring that systems and capabilities between Taiwan and the United States support complementary missions and achieve interoperability, as appropriate;

(10) strengthening cooperation on cybersecurity to deter malicious cyber activities against Taiwan’s security systems and critical infrastructure, to attribute such activities, and to defend against adversaries effectively;

(11) strengthening cooperation on information operations to counter People’s Republic of China disinformation campaigns;

(12) developing closer partnership of defense intelligence communities in support of military planning and defensive operations; and

(13) ensuring appropriate counterintelligence measures for other elements of the framework.

(c) Technical assistance.—The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State shall provide Taiwan with such technical assistance, including with respect to budgeting, as is necessary to ensure productive operation of the framework described in subsection (a).

(d) Inclusion of additional allies and partners.—The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State shall seek to, as appropriate, coordinate with or include additional allies and partners in the framework described in subsection (a).

(e) Report.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the progress in establishing the framework described in subsection (a).

(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

(A) A description of the structure of the framework.

(B) The effectiveness of the framework in establishing a unified defense posture.

(C) Obstacles to the creation of the framework, either political or procedural, with respect to the Secretaries counterparts in Taiwan.

(D) Progress made in establishing shared defense planning for various Taiwan Strait contingencies.

(E) A description and assessment of the effectiveness of counterintelligence measures taken to ensure the needed secrecy for joint planning.

(F) The effectiveness of incorporating third parties into the framework.

(3) EVALUATION.—Not later than 1 year after the date on which the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State submit the report required by paragraph (1), the Secretaries shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an evaluation of the progress and effectiveness of the framework that includes the elements listed in paragraph (2) and a discussion of the effectiveness of the framework in rationalizing Taiwan’s arms procurement in relation to producing a maximally deterrent posture.

(4) FORM.—The report required by paragraph (1) and the evaluation required by paragraph (3) shall be submitted in classified form, with an unclassified summary if appropriate.

(5) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(A) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(i) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(ii) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(B) COMBINED DETERRENCE EFFORT.—The term “combined deterrence effort” means the development and operation of complementary deterrent postures by the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded countries, as appropriate, to maintain peace and stability in the area of Taiwan.

(a) Statement of policy.—It is the policy of the United States to promote Taiwan’s inclusion and meaningful participation in international organizations.

(b) Support for meaningful participation.—The Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations and other relevant United States officials shall actively support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in all appropriate international organizations.

(c) Report.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that—

(1) describes the People's Republic of China’s efforts at the United Nations and other international bodies to block Taiwan’s meaningful participation and inclusion; and

(2) recommends appropriate responses that should be taken by the United States to carry out the policy described in subsection (a).

Section 2(a) of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (Public Law 116–135) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(10) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971)—

“(A) established the representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations;

“(B) did not address the issue of representation of Taiwan and its people in the United Nations or in any related organizations; and

“(C) did not take a position on the relationship between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan or include any statement pertaining to Taiwan’s sovereignty.

“(11) The United States opposes any initiative that seeks to change Taiwan’s status without the consent of the people of Taiwan.”.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States fully supports Taiwan’s participation in, and contribution to, international organizations and underscores the importance of the relationship between Taiwan and the United States;

(2) diversifying the donor base of the Inter-American Development Bank (referred to in this title as the “IDB”) and increasing allied engagement in the Western Hemisphere reinforces United States national interests;

(3) Taiwan’s significant contribution to the development and economies of Latin America and the Caribbean demonstrate that Taiwan’s membership in the IDB as a non-borrowing member would benefit the IDB and the entire Latin American and Caribbean region; and

(4) non-borrowing membership in the IDB would allow Taiwan to substantially leverage and channel the immense resources Taiwan already provides to Latin America and the Caribbean to reach a larger number of beneficiaries.

The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, is authorized—

(1) to initiate a United States plan to endorse non-borrowing IDB membership for Taiwan; and

(2) to instruct the United States Governor of the IDB to work with the IDB Board of Governors to admit Taiwan as a non-borrowing member of the IDB.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not later than April 1 of each year thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit an unclassified report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that—

(1) describes the United States plan to endorse and obtain non-borrowing membership status for Taiwan at the IDB;

(2) includes an account of the efforts made by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury to encourage IDB member states to promote Taiwan’s bid to obtain non-borrowing membership at the IDB; and

(3) identifies the steps that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury will take to endorse and obtain non-borrowing membership status for Taiwan at the IDB in the following year.

(a) In general.—The United States Governor of the International Monetary Fund (in this section referred to as the “Fund”) shall use the voice and vote of the United States to vigorously support—

(1) the admission of Taiwan as a member of the Fund;

(2) participation by Taiwan in regular surveillance activities of the Fund with respect to the economic and financial policies of Taiwan, consistent with Article IV consultation procedures of the Fund;

(3) employment opportunities for Taiwan nationals, without regard to any consideration that, in the determination of the United States Governor, does not generally restrict the employment of nationals of member countries of the Fund; and

(4) the ability of Taiwan to receive appropriate technical assistance and training by the Fund.

(b) Waiver.—The Secretary of the Treasury may waive any requirement of subsection (a) for 1 year at a time on reporting to Congress that providing the waiver will substantially promote the objective of securing the meaningful participation of Taiwan at each international financial institution (as defined in section 1701(c)(2) of the International Financial Institutions Act).

(c) Sunset.—This section shall have no force or effect on the earlier of—

(1) the date of approval by the Board of Governors of the Fund for the admission of Taiwan as a member of the Fund; or

(2) the date that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(a) Sense of congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) should allow Taiwan to meaningfully participate in the organization, including in ICAO triennial assembly sessions, conferences, technical working groups, meetings, activities, and mechanisms;

(2) Taiwan is a global leader and hub for international aviation, with a range of expertise, information, and resources and the fifth busiest airport in Asia (Taoyuan International Airport), and its meaningful participation in ICAO would significantly enhance the ability of ICAO to ensure the safety and security of global aviation; and

(3) coercion by the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Republic of China has ensured the systematic exclusion of Taiwan from meaningful participation in ICAO, significantly undermining the ability of ICAO to ensure the safety and security of global aviation.

(b) Plan for taiwan’s meaningful participation in the international civil aviation organization.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized—

(1) to initiate a United States plan to secure Taiwan’s meaningful participation in ICAO, including in ICAO triennial assembly sessions, conferences, technical working groups, meetings, activities, and mechanisms; and

(2) to instruct the United States representative to the ICAO to—

(A) use the voice and vote of the United States to ensure Taiwan’s meaningful participation in ICAO, including in ICAO triennial assembly sessions, conferences, technical working groups, meetings, activities, and mechanisms; and

(B) seek to secure a vote at the next ICAO triennial assembly session on the question of Taiwan’s participation in that session.

(c) Report concerning taiwan’s meaningful participation in the international civil aviation organization.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not later than April 1 of each year thereafter for the following 6 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit an unclassified report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that—

(1) describes the United States plan to ensure Taiwan’s meaningful participation in ICAO, including in ICAO triennial assembly sessions, conferences, technical working groups, meetings, activities, and mechanisms;

(2) includes an account of the efforts made by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce to ensure Taiwan’s meaningful participation in ICAO, including in ICAO triennial assembly sessions, conferences, technical working groups, meetings, activities, and mechanisms; and

(3) identifies the steps the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce will take in the next year to ensure Taiwan’s meaningful participation in ICAO, including in ICAO triennial assembly sessions, conferences, technical working groups, meetings, activities, and mechanisms.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Taiwan has been an important trading partner of the United States for many years, accounting for $114,000,000,000 in two-way trade in 2021.

(2) Taiwan has demonstrated the capacity to hold a strong economic partnership with the United States. Along with a robust trading profile of goods and services, Taiwan supports an estimated 208,000 American jobs and its cumulative investment in the United States is at least $13,700,000,000, numbers that will only increase with a comprehensive bilateral trade agreement.

(3) In addition to supplementing United States goods and services, Taiwan is a reliable partner in many United States industries, which is not only critical for diversifying United States supply chains, but is also essential to reducing the United States reliance on other countries, such as China, who seek to leverage supply chain inefficiencies in their path to regional and global dominance. Such diversification of United States supply chains is critical to our national security.

(4) The challenges to establishing an agreement with Taiwan, such as reaching an agreement on agricultural standards, must not prevent the completion of a bilateral trade agreement. Taiwan has already taken steps to further the progress towards such an agreement by announcing its intent to lift restrictions on United States pork and beef products, which will greatly increase the accessibility of American farmers and ranchers to Taiwan markets. In light of this important development, the United States should immediately move forward with substantial negotiations for a comprehensive bilateral trade agreement with Taiwan.

(5) A free and open Indo-Pacific is a goal that needs to be actively pursued to counter China’s use of unfair trading practices and other policies to advance its economic dominance in the Indo-Pacific region. An agreement with Taiwan would—

(A) help the United States accomplish this goal by building a network of like-minded governments dedicated to fair competition and open markets that are free from government manipulation; and

(B) encourage other nations to deepen economic ties with Taiwan.

(6) Since November 2020, Taiwan and the United States have engaged in the U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue, covering a broad range of economic issues including—

(A) 5G networks and telecommunications security;

(B) supply chains resiliency;

(C) infrastructure cooperation;

(D) renewable energy;

(E) global health; and

(F) science and technology.

(7) A trade agreement between the United States and Taiwan would promote security and economic growth for the United States, Taiwan, and the entire Indo-Pacific region.

(8) Excluding Taiwan from the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework would—

(A) create significant distortions in the regional and global economic architecture; and

(B) run counter to the United States economic interests.

(9) Taiwan is the United States largest trading partner with whom we do not have an income tax treaty or agreement. Taiwan has such agreements with 34 countries, including countries that have trade agreements with the United States and do not maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

(10) The American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei, in its “2022 Taiwan White Paper”, called for the United States and Taiwan to continue exploring an income tax agreement to boost bilateral trade and investment by reducing double taxation and increasing economic efficiency and integration.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States Trade Representative should resume meetings under the United States and Taiwan Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with the goal of reaching a bilateral free trade agreement with Taiwan;

(2) the United States Trade Representative should undertake efforts to assess whether the Agreement Concerning Digital Trade, signed at Washington October 7, 2019, and entered into force January 1, 2020, between the United States and Japan, provides a model for a similar agreement between the United States and Taiwan to strengthen economic ties with Taiwan in key sectors;

(3) the United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of Commerce should undertake efforts to assure Taiwan’s engagement and participation in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework;

(4) the United States should utilize and expand Preclearance programs to meet the needs of the United States travel and tourism industry, including by prioritizing the establishment of Preclearance facilities with Indo-Pacific allies and partners, including Taiwan; and

(5) the United States should—

(A) begin negotiations on an income tax agreement between the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States; and

(B) work on a congressional-executive agreement to establish such an income tax agreement.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States and Taiwan share common development goals in a wide range of sectors, including public health, agriculture, food security, democracy and governance, and education;

(2) enhanced cooperation between the United States and Taiwan would better advance these goals; and

(3) the United States Agency for International Development should explore opportunities to partner with Taiwan on projects in developing countries related to inclusive economic growth, resilience, global health, education, infrastructure, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and other areas.

(a) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that—

(1) analyzes the feasibility and advisability for the establishment of a preclearance facility in Taiwan;

(2) describes the plan for the establishment of a preclearance facility in Taiwan or in other countries in the Indo-Pacific region;

(3) assesses the impacts that preclearance operations in Taiwan will have on—

(A) the security partnership between the United States and Taiwan;

(B) trade between the United States and Taiwan, including the impact on established supply chains;

(C) the tourism industry in the United States, including the potential impact on revenue and tourist-related commerce;

(D) United States and foreign passengers traveling to the United States for business-related activities;

(E) cost savings and potential market access by expanding operations into the Indo-Pacific region;

(F) opportunities for government-to-government collaboration available in Taiwan after preclearance operations are established; and

(G) U.S. Customs and Border Patrol international and domestic port of entry staffing; and

(4) includes country-specific information on the anticipated homeland security benefits and the security vulnerabilities associated with conducting preclearance operations in Taiwan.

(b) Appropriate congressional committees defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) AGENCY HEAD.—The term “agency head” means, in the case of the executive branch of United States Government, or in the case of a legislative branch agency specified in paragraph (2), the head of the respective agency.

(2) AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.—The term “agency of the United States Government” includes the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research Service, and the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission of the legislative branch, as well as any agency of the executive branch.

(3) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(C) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(4) DETAILEE.—The term “detailee” means an employee of an agency of the United States Government on loan to the American Institute in Taiwan, without a change of position from the agency at which such employee is employed.

(5) IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—The term “implementing partner” means any United States organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from tax under section 501(a) of such Code that—

(A) is selected through a competitive process;

(B) performs logistical, administrative, and other functions, as determined by the Department of State and the American Institute of Taiwan, in support of the Taiwan Fellowship Program; and

(C) enters into a cooperative agreement with the American Institute in Taiwan to administer the Taiwan Fellowship Program.

(b) Establishment of Taiwan Fellowship Program.—

(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State shall establish the “Taiwan Fellowship Program” (hereafter referred to in this section as the “Program”) to provide a fellowship opportunity in Taiwan of up to two years for eligible United States citizens through the cooperative agreement established in paragraph (2). The Department of State, in consultation with the American Institute in Taiwan and the implementing partner, may modify the name of the Program.

(2) COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The American Institute in Taiwan shall use amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to subsection (f)(1) to enter into an annual or multi-year cooperative agreement with an appropriate implementing partner.

(B) FELLOWSHIPS.—The Department of State, in consultation with the American Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing partner, shall award to eligible United States citizens, subject to available funding—

(i) not fewer than five fellowships during the first two years of the Program; and

(ii) not fewer than ten fellowships during each of the remaining years of the Program.

(3) INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the American Institute in Taiwan, in consultation with the Department of State, shall—

(A) begin negotiations with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office, or with another appropriate entity, for the purpose of entering into an agreement to facilitate the placement of fellows in an agency of the governing authorities on Taiwan; and

(B) begin the process of selecting an implementing partner, which—

(i) shall agree to meet all of the legal requirements required to operate in Taiwan; and

(ii) shall be composed of staff who demonstrate significant experience managing exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region.

(4) CURRICULUM.—

(A) FIRST YEAR.—During the first year of each fellowship under this subsection, each fellow should study—

(i) the Mandarin Chinese language;

(ii) the people, history, and political climate on Taiwan; and

(iii) the issues affecting the relationship between the United States and the Indo-Pacific region.

(B) SECOND YEAR.—During the second year of each fellowship under this section, each fellow, subject to the approval of the Department of State, the American Institute in Taiwan, and the implementing partner, and in accordance with the purposes of this Act, shall work in—

(i) a parliamentary office, ministry, or other agency of the governing authorities on Taiwan; or

(ii) an organization outside of the governing authorities on Taiwan, whose interests are associated with the interests of the fellow and the agency of the United States Government from which the fellow had been employed.

(5) FLEXIBLE FELLOWSHIP DURATION.—Notwithstanding any requirement under this section, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the American Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing partner, may award fellowships that have a duration of between nine months and two years, and may alter the curriculum requirements under paragraph (4) for such purposes.

(6) SUNSET.—The Program shall terminate ten years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(c) Program requirements.—

(1) ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS.—A United States citizen is eligible for a fellowship under this section if he or she—

(A) is an employee of the United States Government;

(B) has received at least one exemplary performance review in his or her current United States Government role within at least the last three years prior to the beginning of the fellowship;

(C) has at least two years of experience in any branch of the United States Government;

(D) has a demonstrated professional or educational background in the relationship between the United States and countries in the Indo-Pacific region; and

(E) has demonstrated his or her commitment to further service in the United States Government.

(2) RESPONSIBILITIES OF FELLOWS.—Each recipient of a fellowship under this section shall agree, as a condition of such fellowship—

(A) to maintain satisfactory progress in language training and appropriate behavior in Taiwan, as determined by the Department of State, the American Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, its implementing partner;

(B) to refrain from engaging in any intelligence or intelligence-related activity on behalf of the United States Government; and

(C) to continue Federal Government employment for a period of not less than four years after the conclusion of the fellowship or for not less than two years for a fellowship that is one year or shorter.

(3) RESPONSIBILITIES OF IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—

(A) SELECTION OF FELLOWS.—The implementing partner, in close coordination with the Department of State and the American Institute in Taiwan, shall—

(i) make efforts to recruit fellowship candidates who reflect the diversity of the United States;

(ii) select fellows for the Program based solely on merit, with appropriate supervision from the Department of State and the American Institute in Taiwan; and

(iii) prioritize the selection of candidates willing to serve a fellowship lasting one year or longer.

(B) FIRST YEAR.—The implementing partner should provide each fellow in the first year (or shorter duration, as jointly determined by the Department of State and the American Institute in Taiwan for those who are not serving a two-year fellowship) with—

(i) intensive Mandarin Chinese language training; and

(ii) courses in the politic, culture, and history of Taiwan, China, and the broader Indo-Pacific.

(C) WAIVER OF REQUIRED TRAINING.—The Department of State, in coordination with the American Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing partner, may waive any of the training required under subparagraph (B) to the extent that a fellow has Mandarin Chinese language skills, knowledge of the topic described in subparagraph (B)(ii), or for other related reasons approved by the Department of State and the American Institute in Taiwan. If any of the training requirements are waived for a fellow serving a two-year fellowship, the training portion of his or her fellowship may be shortened to the extent appropriate.

(D) OFFICE; STAFFING.—The implementing partner, in consultation with the Department of State and the American Institute in Taiwan, shall maintain an office and at least one full-time staff member in Taiwan—

(i) to liaise with the American Institute in Taiwan and the governing authorities on Taiwan; and

(ii) to serve as the primary in-country point of contact for the recipients of fellowships under this section and their dependents.

(E) OTHER FUNCTIONS.—The implementing partner should perform other functions in association in support of the Program, including logistical and administrative functions, as prescribed by the Department of State and the American Institute in Taiwan.

(4) NONCOMPLIANCE.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Any fellow who fails to comply with the requirements under this section shall reimburse the American Institute in Taiwan for—

(i) the Federal funds expended for the fellow’s participation in the fellowship, as set forth in subparagraphs (B) and (C); and

(ii) interest accrued on such funds (calculated at the prevailing rate).

(B) FULL REIMBURSEMENT.—Any fellow who violates subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (2) shall reimburse the American Institute in Taiwan in an amount equal to the sum of—

(i) all of the Federal funds expended for the fellow’s participation in the fellowship; and

(ii) interest on the amount specified in clause (i), which shall be calculated at the prevailing rate.

(C) PRO RATA REIMBURSEMENT.—Any fellow who violates paragraph (2)(C) shall reimburse the American Institute in Taiwan in an amount equal to the difference between—

(i) the amount specified in subparagraph (B); and

(ii) the product of—

(I) the amount the fellow received in compensation during the final year of the fellowship, including the value of any allowances and benefits received by the fellow; multiplied by

(II) the percentage of the period specified in paragraph (2)(C) during which the fellow did not remain employed by the United States Government.

(5) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the selection of the first class of fellows under this Act, and annually thereafter for ten years, the Department of State shall offer to brief the appropriate congressional committees regarding the following issues:

(A) An assessment of the performance of the implementing partner in fulfilling the purposes of this section.

(B) The number of applicants each year, the number of applicants willing to serve a fellowship lasting one year or longer, and the number of such applicants selected for the fellowship.

(C) The names and sponsoring agencies of the fellows selected by the implementing partner and the extent to which such fellows represent the diversity of the United States.

(D) The names of the parliamentary offices, ministries, other agencies of the governing authorities on Taiwan, and nongovernmental institutions to which each fellow was assigned.

(E) Any recommendations, as appropriate, to improve the implementation of the Program, including added flexibilities in the administration of the program.

(F) An assessment of the Program’s value upon the relationship between the United States and Taiwan or the United States and Asian countries.

(6) ANNUAL FINANCIAL AUDIT.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The financial records of any implementing partner shall be audited annually in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards by independent certified public accountants or independent licensed public accountants who are certified or licensed by a regulatory authority of a State or another political subdivision of the United States.

(B) LOCATION.—Each audit under subparagraph (A) shall be conducted at the place or places where the financial records of the implementing partner are normally kept.

(C) ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS.—The implementing partner shall make available to the accountants conducting an audit under subparagraph (A)—

(i) all books, financial records, files, other papers, things, and property belonging to, or in use by, the implementing partner that are necessary to facilitate the audit; and

(ii) full facilities for verifying transactions with the balances or securities held by depositories, fiscal agents, and custodians.

(D) REPORT.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—Not later than six months after the end of each fiscal year, the implementing partner shall provide a report of the audit conducted for such fiscal year under subparagraph (A) to the Department of State and the American Institute in Taiwan.

(ii) CONTENTS.—Each audit report shall—

(I) set forth the scope of the audit;

(II) include such statements, along with the auditor’s opinion of those statements, as may be necessary to present fairly the implementing partner’s assets and liabilities, surplus or deficit, with reasonable detail;

(III) include a statement of the implementing partner’s income and expenses during the year; and

(IV) include a schedule of—

(aa) all contracts and cooperative agreements requiring payments greater than $5,000; and

(bb) any payments of compensation, salaries, or fees at a rate greater than $5,000 per year.

(iii) COPIES.—Each audit report shall be produced in sufficient copies for distribution to the public.

(d) Taiwan fellows on detail from Government service.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—

(A) DETAIL AUTHORIZED.—With the approval of the Secretary of State, an agency head may detail, for a period of not more than two years, an employee of the agency of the United States Government who has been awarded a fellowship under this Act, to the American Institute in Taiwan for the purpose of assignment to the governing authorities on Taiwan or an organization described in subsection (b)(4)(B)(ii).

(B) AGREEMENT.—Each detailee shall enter into a written agreement with the Federal Government before receiving a fellowship, in which the fellow shall agree—

(i) to continue in the service of the sponsoring agency at the end of fellowship for a period of at least four years (or at least two years if the fellowship duration is one year or shorter) unless such detailee is involuntarily separated from the service of such agency; and

(ii) to pay to the American Institute in Taiwan any additional expenses incurred by the United States Government in connection with the fellowship if the detailee voluntarily separates from service with the sponsoring agency before the end of the period for which the detailee has agreed to continue in the service of such agency.

(C) EXCEPTION.—The payment agreed to under subparagraph (B)(ii) may not be required of a detailee who leaves the service of the sponsoring agency to enter into the service of another agency of the United States Government unless the head of the sponsoring agency notifies the detailee before the effective date of entry into the service of the other agency that payment will be required under this subsection.

(2) STATUS AS GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE.—A detailee—

(A) is deemed, for the purpose of preserving allowances, privileges, rights, seniority, and other benefits, to be an employee of the sponsoring agency;

(B) is entitled to pay, allowances, and benefits from funds available to such agency, which is deemed to comply with section 5536 of title 5, United States Code; and

(C) may be assigned to a position with an entity described in subsection (b)(4)(B)(i) if acceptance of such position does not involve—

(i) the taking of an oath of allegiance to another government; or

(ii) the acceptance of compensation or other benefits from any foreign government by such detailee.

(3) RESPONSIBILITIES OF SPONSORING AGENCY.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The agency of the United States Government from which a detailee is detailed should provide the fellow allowances and benefits that are consistent with Department of State Standardized Regulations or other applicable rules and regulations, including—

(i) a living quarters allowance to cover the cost of housing in Taiwan;

(ii) a cost-of-living allowance to cover any possible higher costs of living in Taiwan;

(iii) a temporary quarters subsistence allowance for up to seven days if the fellow is unable to find housing immediately upon arriving in Taiwan;

(iv) an education allowance to assist parents in providing the fellow’s minor children with educational services ordinarily provided without charge by public schools in the United States;

(v) moving expenses to transport personal belongings of the fellow and his or her family in their move to Taiwan, which is comparable to the allowance given for American Institute in Taiwan employees assigned to Taiwan; and

(vi) an economy-class airline ticket to and from Taiwan for each fellow and the fellow’s immediate family.

(B) MODIFICATION OF BENEFITS.—The American Institute in Taiwan and its implementing partner, with the approval of the Department of State, may modify the benefits set forth in subparagraph (A) if such modification is warranted by fiscal circumstances.

(4) NO FINANCIAL LIABILITY.—The American Institute in Taiwan, the implementing partner, and any governing authorities on Taiwan or nongovernmental entities in Taiwan at which a fellow is detailed during the second year of the fellowship may not be held responsible for the pay, allowances, or any other benefit normally provided to the detailee.

(5) REIMBURSEMENT.—Fellows may be detailed under paragraph (1)(A) without reimbursement to the United States by the American Institute in Taiwan.

(6) ALLOWANCES AND BENEFITS.—Detailees may be paid by the American Institute in Taiwan for the allowances and benefits listed in paragraph (3).

(e) GAO report.—Not later than one year prior to the sunset of the Program pursuant to subsection (b)(6), the Comptroller General of the United States shall transmit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that includes the following:

(1) An analysis of United States Government participants in the Program, including the number of applicants and the number of fellowships undertaken, and the places of employment.

(2) An assessment of the costs and benefits for participants in the Program and for the United States Government of such fellowships.

(3) An analysis of the financial impact of the fellowship on United States Government offices that have detailed fellows to participate in the Program.

(4) Recommendations, if any, on how to improve the Program.

(f) Funding.—

(1) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the American Institute in Taiwan—

(A) for fiscal year 2023, $2,900,000, of which $500,000 should be used by an appropriate implementing partner to launch the Program; and

(B) for fiscal year 2024, and each succeeding fiscal year, $2,400,000.

(2) PRIVATE SOURCES.—Subject to appropriation, the implementing partner selected to implement the Program may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donations of services or property in carrying out such program, subject to the review and approval of the American Institute in Taiwan.

(a) Statement of policy.—It is the policy of the United States to invite Taiwanese counterparts to participate in high-level bilateral and multilateral summits, military exercises, and economic dialogues and forums.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States Government should invite Taiwan to regional dialogues on issues of mutual concern;

(2) the United States Government and Taiwanese counterparts should resume meetings under the United States-Taiwan Trade and Investment Framework Agreement and reach a bilateral free trade agreement;

(3) the United States Government should invite Taiwan to participate in bilateral and multilateral military training exercises;

(4) the United States Government and Taiwanese counterparts should engage in a regular and routine strategic bilateral dialogue on arms sales in accordance with Foreign Military Sales mechanisms; and

(5) the United States Government should support export licenses for direct commercial sales supporting Taiwan’s indigenous defensive capabilities.

(a) List of high-Level visits.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in accordance with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115–135), shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a list of high-level officials from the United States Government who have traveled to Taiwan; and

(2) a list of high-level officials of Taiwan who have entered the United States.

(b) Annual report.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for a period of 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit a report on the implementation of the Taiwan Travel Act to the appropriate congressional committees.

(a) Global cooperation and training framework.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is authorized to conduct training programs, workshops, and other activities with the government of Taiwan pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Taiwan signed in 2015 on the Global Cooperation and Training Framework.

(2) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that Global Cooperation and Training Framework activities that promote ties between the United States, Taiwan, and other democratic partners, or that undergird Taiwan’s diplomatic relationships, or that counter malign authoritarian activities, are particularly beneficial to our shared interests, and that examples of such activities in 2019 include—

(A) the “Good Energy Governance in the Indo-Pacific” workshop, co-hosted by Japan and Australia;

(B) the “International Austronesian Languages Revitalization Forum”, co-hosted with Japan and held in Palau, a nation that maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan;

(C) the “Defending Democracy through Media Literacy II” workshop, which focused on addressing and countering disinformation in democratic elections and was co-hosted by Japan and Sweden; and

(D) the “Anti-Corruption in the Public and Private Sections” workshop, which focused on promoting clean governance, preventing corporate governance, and preserving competitiveness through trade secret protection, and co-hosted by Japan.

(b) Authorization of appropriations.—There are authorized to be appropriated $3,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2023 through 2026 for the Global Cooperation and Training Framework.

(a) Finding.—Congress finds that the efforts by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party to compel private United States businesses, corporations, and nongovernmental entities to use language mandated by the People’s Republic of China (referred to in this section as the “PRC”) to describe the relationship between Taiwan and the PRC are an illegitimate attempt to enforce political censorship globally.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States Government, in coordination with United States businesses and nongovernmental entities, should formulate a code of conduct for, and otherwise coordinate on, interacting with the Government of the PRC and the Chinese Communist Party and their affiliated entities, the aim of which is—

(1) to counter PRC operations that threaten free speech, academic freedom, and the normal operations of United States businesses and nongovernmental entities; and

(2) to counter PRC efforts to censor the way the world refers to issues deemed sensitive to the PRC Government and Chinese Communist Party leaders, including issues related to Taiwan, Tibet, the Tiananmen Square Massacre, and the mass internment of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims, among many other issues.

(c) Prohibition against recognizing the People's Republic of China's claims to sovereignty over Taiwan.—

(1) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(A) issues related to the sovereignty of Taiwan are for the people of Taiwan to decide through the democratic process they have established;

(B) the dispute between the PRC and Taiwan must be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the people of Taiwan;

(C) the 2 key obstacles to peaceful resolution are—

(i) the authoritarian nature of the PRC political system under one-party rule of the Chinese Communist Party, which is fundamentally incompatible with Taiwan’s democracy; and

(ii) the PRC’s pursuit of coercion and aggression towards Taiwan, in potential violation of the third United States-PRC Joint Communiqué, which was completed on August 17, 1982;

(D) any attempt to coerce or force the people of Taiwan to accept a political arrangement that would subject them to direct or indirect rule by the PRC, including a “one country, two systems” framework, would constitute a grave challenge to United States security interests in the region.

(2) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to oppose any attempt by the PRC authorities to unilaterally impose a timetable or deadline for unification on Taiwan.

(3) PROHIBITION ON RECOGNITION OF PRC CLAIMS WITHOUT THE ASSENT OF PEOPLE OF TAIWAN.—No department or agency of the United States Government may formally or informally recognize PRC claims to sovereignty over Taiwan without the assent of the people of Taiwan, as expressed directly through the democratic process.

(d) Strategy To protect United States businesses and nongovernmental entities from coercion.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit an unclassified report, with a classified annex, if necessary, on how to protect United States businesses and nongovernmental entities from PRC operations, including coercion and threats that lead to censorship or self-censorship, or which compel compliance with political or foreign policy positions of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy shall include—

(A) information regarding efforts by the PRC Government to censor the websites of United States airlines, hotels, and other businesses regarding the relationship between Taiwan and the PRC;

(B) information regarding efforts by the PRC Government to target United States nongovernmental entities through operations intended to weaken support for Taiwan;

(C) information regarding United States Government efforts to counter the threats posed by Chinese state-sponsored propaganda and disinformation, including information on best practices, current successes, and existing barriers to responding to such threat; and

(D) details of any actions undertaken to create the code of conduct described in subsection (b), including a timetable for the implementation of such code of conduct.

The Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (Public Law 116–135) is amended—

(1) in section 2(5), by striking “and Kiribati” and inserting “Kiribati, and Nicaragua,”;

(2) in section 4—

(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking “should be” and inserting “is”;

(B) in paragraph (2), by striking “and” at the end;

(C) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”; and

(D) by adding at the end the following:

“(4) to support Taiwan’s diplomatic relations with other governments and countries.”; and

(3) in section 5—

(A) in subsection (a)—

(i) in paragraph (2), by striking “and” at the end;

(ii) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”; and

(iii) by adding at the end the following:

“(4) identify why governments and countries have altered their diplomatic status vis-a-vis Taiwan and make recommendations to mitigate further deterioration in Taiwan’s diplomatic relations with other governments and countries.”;

(B) in subsection (b), by striking “1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State shall report” and inserting “90 days after the date of the enactment of the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022, and annually thereafter for a period of 7 years, the Secretary of State shall submit an unclassified report, with a classified annex,”;

(C) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and

(D) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:

“(c) Briefings.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022, and annually thereafter for a period of 7 years, the Department of State shall provide briefings to the appropriate congressional committees on the steps taken in accordance with section (a). The briefings required under this subsection shall take place in an unclassified setting, but may be accompanied by an additional classified briefing.”.

Nothing in this Act may be construed—

(1) to restore diplomatic relations with the Republic of China; or

(2) to alter the United States Government’s position with respect to the international status of the Republic of China.

Any reports required to be submitted under this Act or any amendment made by this Act that are subject to deadlines for submission consisting of similar units of time may be consolidated into a single report.