(a) Short title.—This Act may be cited as the “Economic Statecraft for the Twenty-First Century Act”.

(b) Table of contents.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Findings.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) As of 2020, the United States accounts for nearly 25 percent of the world’s gross domestic product, amounting to approximately $20,953,000,000,000. The United States has major business dealings on almost every continent with involvement in multilateral financial systems, bilateral and multilateral economic partnerships, and a robust economy that held nearly 30 percent of the world’s share of research and development in 2019.

(2) Since World War II, the United States has been a leader in the global economy, as demonstrated by its membership in economic-focused multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the International Labour Organization, and the Group of Twenty (G20). The United States has leveraged its economic advantage to ensure its national security in countless instances, such as through the investment of billions of dollars used to rebuild Europe and restore world order following World War II.

(3) The robust economy of the United States is directly tied to its ability to engage economically, diplomatically, and militarily with allies and adversaries. In a 2019 Pew Research study, of the countries surveyed, 46 percent of Asia-Pacific countries, 37 percent of European countries, and 47 percent of Middle Eastern countries view the United States as the world’s leading economic power. African countries that had an overall more favorable impression of the People’s Republic of China have consequently been engaging in greater economic partnerships with the People’s Republic of China, amounting to approximately $2,960,000,000 in 2020.

(4) According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, about 70 percent of global economic activity occurs through global value chains. Driven by a greater outsourcing of service industry work and greater financial and business service linkages with Europe, the United States has increased its engagement with global value chains in both the manufacturing and services industries. Although the United States has attempted to encourage value-based practices in international business through business advisories, public diplomacy, and other economic tools, countries like the People’s Republic of China do not operate with such value-oriented business operations.

(5) In 2020, exports made up 10 percent of the United States economy, and the United States utilizes export controls to safeguard its economic edge and national security interests. As has been seen in the case of export controls imposed through the Entity List maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce to restrict dual-use trade with the People’s Republic of China, such controls curtail potential militant activity by the People’s Liberation Army in the South China Sea, human rights abuses, and the use of semiconductor technology for military purposes. The expanded usage of export controls can continue to benefit United States economic security.

(6) International financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the African Development Bank have key roles in encouraging regional cooperation, sustaining economic development, reducing global greenhouse gas emissions, and reducing global poverty. Those values are in line with United States international development practices, a commonality that can be leveraged for greater coordinated cooperation in the future, especially in the wake of the COVID–19 pandemic, including as follows:

(A) To meet the needs of developing countries that need to repay debt amounting to approximately $860,000,000,000 in 2020, United States cooperation with key multilateral organizations in the smooth rollout of the Debt Service Suspension Initiative Refresher can ensure global economic recovery from the pandemic while mitigating the risk of loan default.

(B) The rise in debt transparency has become a critical issue as more countries become unaware of the full extent of their sovereign debt as a result of predatory lending and poor debt management. The continued support by the United States of international financial institutions can facilitate reforms that go beyond the 2003 proposal of the International Monetary Fund for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism.

(7) Despite the impact of the COVID–19 pandemic, which has had devastating effects on global supply chains and economic productivity, the economy of the People’s Republic of China continues to grow. As a result, global investors are looking more toward the People’s Republic of China, instead of the United States, for potential economic activity and are willing to turn a blind eye to the People’s Republic of China’s human rights violations, including its use of forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

(8) The United States, as a major economic leader, has a role in preventing predatory economic practices, such as loans to developing countries from the Government of the People’s Republic of China through the Belt and Road Initiative. As the People’s Republic of China has come to fill the role of an economic leader to many developing countries with its lending, the United States stands to lose economically from its trading partners being stuck in billion dollar debt traps. Furthermore, such predatory practices have come to the United States with the increase of foreign investment in the United States from $4,400,000,000,000 to $4,630,000,000,000 over the course of 2020.

(a) In general.—The United States International Development Finance Corporation, the United States Agency for International Development, the Trade and Development Agency, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and other independent and executive branch agencies responsible for disbursing foreign aid and development assistance shall require all applicants for United States aid to disclose any debt the applicant may owe to any entity known to be owned or controlled by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, including loan amounts, duration, rates, and contractual provisions.

(b) Limitation.—United States foreign aid and development assistance may not be used to amortize any loan principal owed to any entity known to be owned or controlled by the Government of the People’s Republic of China.

(a) In general.—The Secretary of State shall coordinate with willing Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development member countries—

(1) to study the effects of the People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and other predatory economic practices;

(2) to create a shared set of facts and promote more transparency with respect to such practices, including a joint stocktaking of the People's Republic of China’s distortive economic practices, such as subsidies and other forms of market-distorting state intervention in the People's Republic of China’s economy, and the negative global spillovers from such practices;

(3) to establish a solid definitional foundation for future dialogues on the People's Republic of China’s unfair economic practices and a clear understanding of common concerns and priorities among member countries; and

(4) to issue joint informational reports that contain the results of such data gathering efforts.

(a) Establishment.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish an interagency task force, which shall be known as the “Countering Economic Coercion Task Force” (referred to in this section as the “Task Force”).

(b) Duties.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Task Force shall—

(A) oversee the development and implementation of an integrated United States Government strategy to respond to coercive economic practices of the People’s Republic of China that are abusive, arbitrary, pretextual, and contrary to international rules, which shall include—

(i) systematically monitoring and evaluating—

(I) the costs of such practices on United States businesses and overall United States economic performance;

(II) instances in which such practices taken against a non-Chinese entity have benefitted United States parties; and

(III) the impacts such practices have had on United States national interests;

(ii) facilitating coordination among Federal departments and agencies when responding to such practices; and

(iii) proactively deterring such economic coercion;

(B) consult with United States allies and partners regarding—

(i) the feasibility and desirability of collectively identifying, assessing, and responding to the People’s Republic of China’s coercive economic practices;

(ii) actions that could be taken to expand international coordination; and

(iii) establishing a consistent, coherent, and collective international response to such coercive practices, including a long-term deterrence to such practices;

(C) effectively engage the United States private sector, particularly sectors, groups, or other entities that are susceptible to such coercive economic practices, to identify their concerns regarding such practices; and

(D) develop and implement a process for regularly sharing relevant information, including classified information, to the extent appropriate and practicable, on such coercive economic practices with United States allies, partners, and the private sector.

(2) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out its duties under this subsection, the Task Force should regularly consult, to the extent necessary and appropriate, with—

(A) relevant stakeholders in the private sector;

(B) Federal departments and agencies that are not represented on the Task Force; and

(C) United States allies and partners.

(c) Membership.—The President shall—

(1) appoint the Chair of the Task Force from among the staff of the National Security Council;

(2) appoint the Vice Chair of the Task Force from among the staff of the National Economic Council; and

(3) direct the head of each of the following Federal departments and agencies to appoint personnel, at the level of Assistant Secretary or higher, to participate in the Task Force:

(A) The Department of State.

(B) The Department of Commerce.

(C) The Department of the Treasury.

(D) The Department of Justice.

(E) The Office of the United States Trade Representative.

(F) The Department of Agriculture.

(G) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence and other appropriate elements of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)).

(H) The Securities and Exchange Commission.

(I) The United States International Development Finance Corporation.

(J) Any other department or agency designated by the President.

(d) Reports.—

(1) INITIAL REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Task Force shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes—

(A) a comprehensive review of the array of economic tools the Government of the People's Republic of China employs or could employ to coerce other governments, non-Chinese companies (including United States companies), and multilateral institutions and organizations, including the Government of the People's Republic of China's continued efforts to codify informal practices into its domestic law;

(B) the strategy developed pursuant to subsection (b)(1)(A);

(C) an interagency definition of the People’s Republic of China’s coercive economic practices that captures—

(i) the use of informal or extralegal coercive economic practices; and

(ii) the illegitimate use of formal economic tools;

(D) a comprehensive review of the array of economic and diplomatic tools that the United States Government employs or could employ to respond to economic coercion against the United States and United States allies and partners;

(E) a list of unilateral or multilateral—

(i) proactive measures to defend or deter against the People’s Republic of China’s coercive economic practices; and

(ii) actions taken in response to the Government of the People’s Republic of China’s general use of coercive economic practices;

(F) an assessment of areas in which United States allies and partners are vulnerable to the People’s Republic of China’s coercive economic practices; and

(G) a description of the gaps in existing resources or capabilities of Federal departments and agencies—

(i) to respond effectively to the People’s Republic of China’s coercive economic practices directed at United States entities; and

(ii) to assist United States allies and partners in their responses to such practices.

(2) INTERIM REPORTS.—

(A) FIRST INTERIM REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date on which the report is submitted pursuant to paragraph (1), the Task Force shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes—

(i) updates to the information required under subparagraphs (A) through (G) of paragraph (1); and

(ii) a description of the activities conducted by the Task Force to implement the strategy required under subsection (b)(1)(A).

(B) SECOND INTERIM REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date on which the report is submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A), the Task Force shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes an update to the elements required under the previously submitted report.

(3) FINAL REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the report required under paragraph (2)(B) is submitted to the appropriate congressional committees, the Task Force shall submit a final report to the appropriate congressional committees and make such report available to the public on the website of the Executive Office of the President. The final report shall include—

(A) an analysis of the Government of the People’s Republic of China’s coercive economic practices, including the cost of such practices to United States businesses;

(B) a description of areas of particular vulnerability for United States businesses and the businesses of United States partners and allies;

(C) recommendations on the best means for continuing the effort to counter such coercive practices; and

(D) a list of the cases that have been made public pursuant to subsection (e).

(4) FORM.—

(A) INITIAL AND INTERIM REPORTS.—The reports required under paragraphs (1), (2)(A), and (2)(B) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include classified annexes.

(B) FINAL REPORT.—The report required under paragraph (3) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(e) Publicly available list.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter until its termination pursuant to subsection (f), the Task Force, to the extent practicable, shall make available to the public on the website of the Executive Office of the President a list of instances during the most recent 6-month period that the Government of the People's Republic of China has directed coercive economic practices against a non-Chinese entity.

(2) UPDATES.—The list required under paragraph (1)—

(A) shall be updated every 180 days; and

(B) shall be managed by the Secretary of State after the Task Force is terminated pursuant to subsection (f).

(f) Sunset.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Task Force shall be terminated at the end of the 60-day period beginning on the date on which the final report required under subsection (d)(3) is submitted to the appropriate congressional committees and made publicly available.

(2) ADDITIONAL ACTIONS.—During the 60-day period referred to in paragraph (1), the Task Force may conclude its activities, including providing testimony to Congress concerning its final report.

(a) In general.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to Congress a description of the strategy being used by the Department of State to respond to the Government of the People's Republic of China’s increased economic coercion against countries who have strengthened their ties with, or support for, Taiwan.

(b) Assistance for Lithuania.—The Secretary of State shall provide assistance to Lithuania to support its supply chain resilience efforts.

The Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network, in consultation with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States and the Office of Technical Assistance of the Department of the Treasury, shall, to protect the national security of the United States and countries that are allies or partners of the United States, establish a formal process for—

(1) the exchange of information relating to foreign investment with the governments of such countries; and

(2) the provision of assistance to those countries with respect to—

(A) reviewing foreign investment transactions in such countries;

(B) determining the beneficial ownership of parties to such transactions; and

(C) identifying trends in investment and technology that could pose risks to the national security of the United States and such countries.

(a) Increased inspections.—

(1) REPORT ON SEIZURES OF COUNTERFEIT GOODS.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection shall submit to the Committee on Finance of the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives a report on seizures by U.S. Customs and Border Protection of counterfeit goods during the one-year period preceding submission of the report, including the number of such seizures disaggregated by category of good, source country, and mode of transport.

(2) INCREASED INSPECTIONS OF GOODS FROM CERTAIN COUNTRIES.—The Commissioner shall increase inspections of imports of goods from each source country identified in the report required by subsection (a) as one of the top source countries of counterfeit goods, as determined by the Commissioner.

(b) Publication of criteria for notorious markets list.—Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than every 5 years thereafter, the United States Trade Representative shall publish in the Federal Register criteria for determining that a market is a notorious market for purposes of inclusion of that market in the list developed by the Trade Representative pursuant to section 182(e) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2242(e)) (commonly known as the “Notorious Markets List”).

(a) In general.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall create a list (referred to in this section as the “intellectual property violators list”) that identifies—

(1) all centrally administered state-owned enterprises incorporated in the People’s Republic of China that have benefitted from—

(A) a significant act or series of acts of intellectual property theft that subjected an economic sector of the United States or a company incorporated in the United States to harm; or

(B) an act or government policy of involuntary or coerced technology transfer of intellectual property ultimately owned by a company incorporated in the United States; and

(2) any corporate officer of, or principal shareholder with controlling interests in, an entity described in paragraph (1).

(b) Rules for identification.—To determine whether there is a credible basis for determining that an entity should be included on the intellectual property violators list, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall consider—

(1) any finding by a court in the United States that the entity has violated relevant United States laws intended to protect intellectual property rights; or

(2) substantial and credible information received from any entity described in subsection (c) or other interested persons.

(c) Consultation.—In carrying out this section, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, may consult, as necessary and appropriate, with—

(1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;

(2) entities in the private sector;

(3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise; and

(4) the Governments of Australia, Canada, countries in the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.

(d) Report.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall publish in the Federal Register a report that—

(A) lists the entities described in subsection (a)(1);

(B) describes the circumstances surrounding acts or policies described in subsection (a)(1)(B), including any role of the Government of the People’s Republic of China;

(C) assesses, to the extent practicable, the economic advantage derived by entities described in subsection (a)(1); and

(D) assesses whether each entity described in subsection (a)(1) is using or has used stolen intellectual property in commercial activity in Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the United Kingdom, or the United States.

(2) FORM.—The report published under paragraph (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

(3) DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE.—The Director of National Intelligence may authorize the declassification of information, as appropriate, to inform the contents of the report published under paragraph (1).

(e) Requirement To protect confidential business information.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State and the head of any other Federal agency involved in the production of the intellectual property violators list shall protect from disclosure any proprietary information submitted by a private sector party and marked as confidential business information, unless the party submitting the information—

(A) had notice, at the time of submission, that such information would be disclosed by the Secretary; or

(B) subsequently consents to the disclosure of such information.

(2) NONCONFIDENTIAL VERSION OF REPORT.—If confidential business information is provided by a private sector party in connection with the production of the intellectual property violators list, the Secretary of State shall publish a nonconfidential version of the report under subsection (d) in the Federal Register that summarizes or deletes, if necessary, the confidential business information.

(3) TREATMENT AS TRADE SECRETS.—Proprietary information submitted by a private sector party under this section—

(A) shall be considered to be trade secrets and commercial or financial information exempt under subsection (b)(4) of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, from being made available to the public under subsection (a) of that section; and

(B) shall be exempt from disclosure without the express approval of the party.

(a) Report.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that identifies—

(1) subsidies provided by the central government of the People’s Republic of China to enterprises in the People’s Republic of China; and

(2) discriminatory treatment favoring enterprises in the People’s Republic of China over foreign market participants.

(b) Elements of report.—In compiling each report under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall consider—

(1) regulatory and other policies enacted or promoted by the central government of the People’s Republic of China that—

(A) discriminate in favor of enterprises in the People’s Republic of China at the expense of foreign market participants;

(B) shield centrally administered, state-owned enterprises from competition; or

(C) otherwise suppress market-based competition;

(2) financial subsidies, including favorable lending terms, from or promoted by the central government of the People’s Republic of China or centrally administered, state-owned enterprises in the People’s Republic of China that materially benefit enterprises in the People’s Republic of China over foreign market participants in contravention of generally accepted market principles; and

(3) any subsidy that meets the definition of subsidy under article 1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures referred to in section 101(d)(12) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(12)).

(c) Form of report.—Each report required by subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.

(d) Consultation.—In carrying out this section, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, may, as necessary and appropriate, consult with—

(1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;

(2) the private sector; and

(3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise.

(e) Appropriate congressional committees defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

In this subtitle:

(1) COVERED ITEM.—The term “covered item” includes semiconductor manufacturing equipment, including extreme ultraviolet photolithography equipment and argon fluoride immersion photolithography equipment.

(2) CRITICAL MINERAL.—The term “critical mineral” has the meaning given the term in section 7002(a) of the Energy Act of 2020 (30 U.S.C. 1606(a)).

(3) EXPORT; IN-COUNTRY TRANSFER; REEXPORT.—The terms “export”, “in-country transfer”, and “reexport” have the meanings given those terms in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801).

(a) Required strategy.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, and private sector entities, shall develop a strategy to diplomatically engage the governments of the Netherlands, Japan, and other appropriate countries for the purposes of coordinating, developing, and instituting controls on the export of covered items to the People's Republic of China.

(b) Aspects of the strategy.—The diplomatic strategy required by subsection (a) shall include—

(1) a review of United States technological assets and capabilities in semiconductor manufacturing equipment, including photolithography;

(2) an assessment of how export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment can be integrated into a broader United States technology strategy that includes support for—

(A) research and development;

(B) investment screening;

(C) talent recruitment and retention;

(D) standard setting;

(E) international partnerships; and

(F) supply chain security;

(3) a plan of action to guide relevant United States engagement with the Netherlands, Japan, and other appropriate countries, including conducting bilateral and multilateral engagements to formulate export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment;

(4) a plan of action to guide United States engagement with foreign entities that develop, construct, and export semiconductor manufacturing equipment;

(5) a review of the potential diplomatic, economic, and security effects of implementing export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment;

(6) an analysis of the impact of export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment on the semiconductor manufacturing industry and artificial intelligence chipmaking capabilities of the People's Republic of China;

(7) a review of the potential economic impacts on United States entities if export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment are implemented; and

(8) specific, measurable metrics of success for United States diplomatic activities related to semiconductor manufacturing equipment.

(c) Objectives of the strategy.—The objectives of the diplomatic strategy required by subsection (a) are—

(1) to formulate a political arrangement among the United States, Japan, the Netherlands, and other appropriate countries for the control of exports of covered items to the People's Republic of China;

(2) to maintain United States and allied technological advantages in semiconductor manufacturing equipment;

(3) to protect the interests of United States and allied companies operating in the field of semiconductor manufacturing and semiconductor manufacturing equipment; and

(4) to ensure the United States continues to engage with allies on efforts involving the development and protection of a free, equitable, open, secure, and stable digital domain.

(d) Form.—The strategy required by subsection (a) shall be submitted to the appropriate congressional committees in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(e) Appropriate congressional committees defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

(a) In general.—Following the completion of the strategy required by section 132, the President shall prohibit the export, reexport, and in-country transfer of covered items to the People's Republic of China.

(b) Additional controls.—The President may prescribe such additional regulations and export controls as are necessary to carry out the strategy required by section 132.

(c) Waivers.—The President may waive the application of controls under subsection (a) or (b) with respect to a covered item if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the export, reexport, or in-country transfer of the covered item is in the national security interests of the United States.

(d) Appropriate congressional committees defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

(a) Report required.—Not later than May 1, 2023, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce, in concurrence with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the semiconductor manufacturing capabilities of the People's Republic of China.

(b) Contents.—The report required by subsection (a) shall include—

(1) a detailed assessment of the domestic semiconductor manufacturing capabilities of the People's Republic of China;

(2) a detailed assessment of year-by-year technological development efforts by the People's Republic of China in the fields of semiconductor manufacturing and artificial intelligence chipmaking, including relevant government plans and initiatives;

(3) a detailed assessment of engagement between the People's Republic of China and other foreign countries with respect to semiconductor manufacturing equipment capabilities;

(4) an analysis of the impact of United States and allied export controls on covered items on development of semiconductor manufacturing in the People's Republic of China; and

(5) an assessment of whether such export controls remain effective in curbing the development of semiconductor manufacturing equipment capabilities in the People's Republic of China.

(c) Form.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(2) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified portion of the report required by subsection (a) shall be made available on a publicly accessible internet website of the Federal Government.

(d) Appropriate congressional committees defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(a) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on how the United States is coordinating with its partners and allies—

(1) to secure global supply chains, including supply chains for—

(A) semiconductor manufacturing and advanced packaging;

(B) large capacity batteries, including batteries for electric vehicles;

(C) critical minerals; and

(D) pharmaceuticals and active pharmaceutical ingredients;

(2) to develop common standards for transparent, trusted, and sustainable supply chains; and

(3) to end reliance on the People's Republic of China for such supply chains.

(b) Appropriate congressional committees defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

It is the policy of the United States to partner, consult, and coordinate with foreign governments (at the national and subnational levels), civil society, international organizations, international financial institutions, subnational communities, commercial and recreational mining industry leaders, and the private sector, in a concerted effort—

(1) to increase knowledge and raise awareness of the links between mining and refining of critical minerals, national security, climate change, and clean energy development;

(2) to improve, in countries in which such mining and refining is conducted, resource mobilization and processing, transport, and mineral refining capacity;

(3) to develop other strategies to maximize economic benefits from critical mineral resource development for the countries and communities in which such development takes place;

(4) to promote transparency and combat—

(A) human rights abuses, exploitive labor practices, and corruption within the critical mineral extraction industry; and

(B) the influence the industry has on poor governance, democratic backsliding, and declines in the rule of law;

(5) to support—

(A) strengthening systems and bilateral and multilateral partnerships for reducing the monopolization of critical minerals and the exploitation of workers in the critical mineral extraction industry and reducing corruption as a means—

(i) to ensure the availability of critical minerals at competitive market-rate costs;

(ii) to uphold adequate labor standards to ensure critical minerals are not produced at the expense of the lives and livelihoods of workers in the critical mineral extraction industry; and

(iii) to maintain the integrity of institutions governing the extraction and refinement of critical minerals;

(B) deployment of and access to advanced technologies to recycle critical minerals to extend use and application beyond a single use; and

(C) implementation of management measures to track and report instances of corruption and exploitation in the critical mineral extraction industry; and

(6) to work cooperatively with international partners—

(A) to ensure that the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative has full unimpeded and uninfluenced access to global critical mineral industrial operations;

(B) to establish—

(i) an alliance to counter any state or private monopolization on the control, supply chains, or industrial processing and extraction of critical mineral resources;

(ii) measurable targets for reducing corruption and exploitation of workers in the critical mineral extraction industry; and

(iii) action plans to achieve such targets and a mechanism to provide regular reporting;

(C) to promote consumer education, awareness, and outreach on exploitation of workers in the critical mineral extraction industry; and

(D) to share best practices in materials management and industrial systems operations to maximize the benefit of critical mineral resources.

(a) In general.—The Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies—

(1) lead and coordinate efforts to implement the policy described in section 136; and

(2) develop strategies and implement programs that prioritize engagement and cooperation with foreign governments, subnational, national, and local stakeholders and the private sector to expedite efforts and assistance in foreign countries—

(A) to partner with, encourage, and advise national and subnational governments on the development and execution, where practicable, of projects, programs, and initiatives—

(i) to improve the capacity, security, and standards of operations of critical minerals supply chains;

(ii) to monitor and track how well critical minerals supply chains are functioning internationally, based on uniform and transparent standards developed in cooperation with municipal, industrial, and civil society stakeholders; and

(iii) to conduct outreach campaigns to raise public awareness of the importance of proper management and oversight of critical mineral supply chains;

(B) to partner with and provide technical assistance to investors and national and international institutions, including private sector actors, to develop new business opportunities and solutions to uphold the highest standards in critical mineral supply chains and implement best practices in foreign countries by—

(i) improving and expanding the capacity of foreign industries to responsibly employ extractive industry management practices;

(ii) improving and expanding the capacity and transparency of tracking mechanisms for critical minerals to reduce exploitation and corruption;

(iii) eliminating incentives that undermine responsible supply chain management; and

(iv) building the capacity of countries—

(I) to reduce, monitor, regulate, and manage the extraction, refinement, and transport of critical minerals appropriately and transparently; and

(II) to encourage private investment in critical mineral extraction and refinement.

(b) Prioritization.—In carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall prioritize assistance to countries and regional organizations in regions with—

(1) rapidly developing economies; and

(2) past instances of human rights abuses, exploitation, and corruption.

(c) Effectiveness measurement.—In prioritizing and expediting efforts and assistance under this section, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall use clear, accountable, and metric-based targets to measure the effectiveness of assistance in achieving the policy described in section 136.

In implementing the policy described in section 136, the President shall direct the Secretary of State and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States, consistent with the broad development goals of the United States—

(1) to work with countries and the private sector to break up the monopolization of critical mineral industries;

(2) to commit to promoting transparent private sector development in the critical minerals sector;

(3) to enhance coordination with the private sector to increase access to critical minerals;

(4) to provide technical assistance to the regulatory authorities of countries that are members of the body to remove unnecessary barriers to investment; and

(5) to utilize clear, accountable, and metric-based targets to measure the effectiveness of such actions.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States should exercise leadership in the Build Back Better World initiative of the Group of Seven (G7) to mobilize public and private sector capital and expertise toward meeting the infrastructure needs of low- and middle-income countries, estimated to exceed $40,000,000,000,000, over the next two decades;

(2) the initiative should also advance strategic objectives, including—

(A) strengthening partnerships with emerging market and developing countries to promote quality, transparent infrastructure investment that also supports good governance and the rule of law;

(B) combating climate change through sustainable infrastructure projects that aid partner countries in the transition to net zero emissions, reduce their vulnerabilities to climate change, and improve their resilience;

(C) promoting public health and health security through infrastructure projects that increase the availability, accessibility, and affordability of health care in partner countries;

(D) increasing internal and external connections in digital, transportation, and energy infrastructure in partner countries;

(E) improving education, economic opportunities, and standards of living in marginalized communities in partner countries, including for women and girls, racial and ethnic minorities, individuals with disabilities, individuals who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer (commonly referred to as “LGBTQ+”), and individuals with low incomes; and

(F) providing partners a principled, sustainable alternative to exploitative, coercive, and harmful infrastructure investments; and

(3) the United States should establish a Build Back Better World Task Force—

(A) to coordinate its development finance agencies, such as the United States International Development Finance Corporation, Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Trade and Development Agency, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the United States Agency for International Development;

(B) to engage international partners such as the G7, multilateral development banks, international financial institutions, multinational corporations and banks, non-governmental organizations, and other industrial-country partners;

(C) to leverage other development finance institutions, such as the Blue Dot Network, the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network, and the Transaction Advisory Fund; and

(D) to produce strategic guidance that identifies international infrastructure projects and details implementation plans, including—

(i) an explanation of how each infrastructure project advances the strategic objectives described in paragraph (2);

(ii) a description of consultations, criteria, and justification for such projects;

(iii) distribution of such projects across economic sectors and geographical regions;

(iv) budget estimates, proposed sources of financing, and required appropriations for such projects;

(v) lists of timelines and contractual parties and their respective rights and responsibilities with respect to such projects; and

(vi) certification that such projects—

(I) meet specified standards, such as those of the Blue Dot Network; and

(II) will not have negative impacts on the environment, local communities, national sovereignty, or economic growth.

The BUILD Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.) is amended—

(1) in section 1413 (22 U.S.C. 9613)—

(A) in subsection (a), by inserting “a Strategic Investments Officer,” after “Development Officer,”;

(B) in subsection (g)(2)(F), by striking “subsection (i)” and inserting “subsection (j)”;

(C) by redesignating subsections (h) and (i) as subsections (i) and (j), respectively;

(D) by inserting after subsection (g) the following new subsection:

“(h) Strategic Investments Officer.—

“(1) APPOINTMENT.—Subject to the approval of the Board, the Chief Executive Officer shall appoint a Strategic Investments Officer from among individuals with experience in international economic policy, who—

“(A) shall report directly to the Board; and

“(B) shall be removable only by a majority vote of the Board.

“(2) DUTIES.—The Strategic Investments Officer shall—

“(A) coordinate efforts to develop the Corporation’s initiatives—

“(i) to counter predatory state-directed investment and coercive economic practices of adversaries of the United States; and

“(ii) to preserve the sovereignty of partner countries;

“(B) coordinate the Corporation's strategic investment policies and implementation efforts with the Department of State, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Trade and Development Agency, and other relevant United States Government departments and agencies, including by directly liaising with missions of the Department of State to ensure that departments, agencies, and missions have training, awareness, and access to the Corporation's tools with respect to strategic investment policy and projects;

“(C) manage the responsibilities of the Corporation under section 1442(b)(5) and paragraphs (1)(C) and (3)(C) of section 1443(b);

“(D) support the Chief Development Officer in coordinating and implementing the activities of the Corporation under section 1445; and

“(E) be an ex officio member of the Development Advisory Council established under subsection (j), and attend each meeting of the Council.”;

(E) in subsection (i)(3)(C), as so redesignated, by striking “subsection (i)” and inserting “subsection (j)”; and

(F) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(k) Strategic Investments Advisory Council.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—There is established a Strategic Investments Advisory Council (in this subsection referred to as the ‘Council’) to advise the Board on strategic investment objectives of the Corporation.

“(2) MEMBERSHIP.—Members of the Council shall be appointed by the Board, on the recommendation of the Chief Executive Officer and the Strategic Investment Officer, and shall be composed of not more than 9 members from the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy.

“(3) FUNCTIONS.—The Board shall call upon members of the Council, either collectively or individually, to advise the Board regarding the extent to which the Corporation is meeting the strategic investment goals of the United States and any suggestions for improvements with respect to such goals, including opportunities in countries and project development and implementation challenges and opportunities.

“(4) FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT.—The Council shall not be subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.).”;

(2) in section 1442 (22 U.S.C. 9652)—

(A) in subsection (b)—

(i) in paragraph (3), by striking “; and” and inserting a semicolon;

(ii) in paragraph (4)(B), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”; and

(iii) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(5) develop standards for, and a method for ensuring, appropriate strategic investment metrics of the Corporation’s portfolio.”; and

(B) in subsection (d), by striking “1413(i)” and inserting “1413(j)”; and

(3) in section 1443 (22 U.S.C. 9653)—

(A) in subsection (a)—

(i) in paragraph (3), by striking “; and” and inserting a semicolon;

(ii) in paragraph (4), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”; and

(iii) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(5) the impact of the strategic investments made by the Corporation, which shall be included in a classified annex.”; and

(B) in subsection (b)—

(i) in paragraph (1)—

(I) in subparagraph (A), by striking “; and” and inserting a semicolon;

(II) in subparagraph (B), by adding “and” at the end; and

(III) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

“(C) the impact of the Corporation’s strategic investment efforts on United States foreign policy goals;”; and

(ii) in paragraph (3)—

(I) in subparagraph (A), by striking “; and” and inserting a semicolon; and

(II) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

“(C) outcomes of the strategic investments portfolio, and whether or not such investments are meeting the foreign policy objectives of the United States; and”.

(a) In general.—Section 1463(c)(1) of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9683(c)(1)) is amended by striking “the Corporation or any other appropriate department or agency of the United States Government” and inserting “any appropriate department or agency of the United States Government (other than the Corporation)”.

(b) Effective date.—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect as if included in the enactment of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.).

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) In 2019, the People’s Republic of China was the top supplier of goods imported into the United States, providing significant quantities of rare earth minerals, pharmaceutical ingredients, medical equipment, and other goods vital to the economic prosperity and national security of the United States.

(2) The COVID–19 pandemic and production outages and shipping disruptions in the People’s Republic of China have jeopardized worldwide access to critical goods, contributing to an unprecedented, ongoing supply chain crisis that has exposed the severe risks of concentrating global supply chains in the People’s Republic of China and demonstrated the need for the United States to increase supply chain resiliency and diversity through reshoring and nearshoring initiatives.

(3) Relocating supply chains from the People’s Republic of China to Latin America and the Caribbean is in the commercial and security interests of the United States and offers several significant advantages for the United States Government and United States entities, including—

(A) reduced transit times to markets in the United States, which will lower freight costs, enable quicker adaptability to fluctuating consumer demand, and lessen the large carbon footprint of current supply chains;

(B) having supply chains located in countries with which the United States has longstanding bilateral ties and shared democratic values, lessening the risk of geopolitical disruptions to supply chains; and

(C) having supply chains located in countries with existing comparative advantages for sourcing and manufacturing key critical goods that cannot be entirely sourced from or manufactured in the United States, including rare earth minerals, pharmaceuticals, medical goods, and semiconductors.

(4) Switching 15 percent of United States imports from its top 10 source countries outside of the Western Hemisphere to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean would increase the exports of the region by approximately $72,000,000,000 annually, helping the region recover from the effects of the COVID–19 pandemic while also reducing pressures encouraging migration to the United States.

(b) Statement of policy.—It shall be the policy of the United States—

(1) to work with allies and partners of the United States in the Western Hemisphere to achieve more resilient, diverse, and secure supply chains;

(2) to pursue nearshoring initiatives to relocate supply chains to Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly for products unlikely to be sourced or manufactured in the United States, while simultaneously pursuing reshoring initiatives to increase domestic production in the United States; and

(3) to engage with regional governments, multilateral development banks, and the private sector to develop and advance joint efforts to incentivize entities to relocate supply chains to, and strengthen supply chains within, the Western Hemisphere.

(c) Strategy.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as determined by the Secretary, shall develop and implement a strategy to increase supply chain resiliency and security by promoting and strengthening nearshoring efforts to relocate supply chains from the People’s Republic of China to the Western Hemisphere.

(d) Elements.—The strategy required under subsection (c) shall—

(1) be informed by consultations with the governments of allies and partners of the United States in the Western Hemisphere and labor organizations and trade unions in the United States;

(2) provide a description of how reshoring and nearshoring initiatives can be pursued in a complementary fashion to strengthen the national interests of the United States;

(3) include an assessment of—

(A) the status and effectiveness of current efforts by regional governments, multilateral development banks, and the private sector to promote nearshoring to the Western Hemisphere;

(B) major challenges hindering those efforts; and

(C) how the United States can strengthen the effectiveness of those efforts;

(4) identify countries in Latin America and the Caribbean with comparative advantages for sourcing and manufacturing critical goods and countries with the greatest nearshoring opportunities;

(5) identify how activities by the United States Agency for International Development and the United States International Development Finance Corporation can effectively be leveraged to strengthen and promote nearshoring to Latin America and the Caribbean;

(6) advance diplomatic initiatives to secure specific national commitments by governments in Latin America and the Caribbean to undertake efforts to create favorable conditions for nearshoring in the region, including commitments—

(A) to develop formalized national nearshoring strategies;

(B) to address corruption and rule of law concerns;

(C) to modernize digital and physical infrastructure;

(D) to lower trade barriers;

(E) to improve ease of doing business; and

(F) to finance and incentivize nearshoring initiatives;

(7) advance diplomatic initiatives to harmonize standards and regulations, expedite customs operations, and facilitate economic integration in Latin America and the Caribbean; and

(8) develop and implement programs to finance, incentivize, or otherwise promote nearshoring to the Western Hemisphere in accordance with the assessments and identifications made pursuant to paragraphs (3), (4), and (5), including, at minimum, programs—

(A) to develop physical and digital infrastructure;

(B) to promote transparency in procurement processes;

(C) to provide technical assistance in implementing national nearshoring strategies;

(D) to mobilize private investment; and

(E) to secure commitments by private sector entities to relocate supply chains from the People’s Republic of China to the Western Hemisphere.

(e) Coordination with multilateral development banks.—In implementing the strategy required under subsection (c), the Secretary of State and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as determined by the Secretary, shall coordinate with the United States Executive Director to the Inter-American Development Bank and the United States Executive Director to the World Bank.

(f) Annual report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives the strategy required under subsection (c) and a description of progress made in the implementation of that strategy.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Blue Dot Network helps public and private investors finance infrastructure projects that are inclusive, transparent, sustainable, environmentally and socially responsible, and compliant with international standards, laws, and regulations;

(2) the Blue Dot Network helps mitigate threats such as the predatory infrastructure investment practices of the People's Republic of China and critical shortfalls in global infrastructure financing;

(3) the Blue Dot Network advances the interests of the United States through setting principal international standards, but also requires sufficient investments in other tools of economic statecraft such as the United States International Development Finance Corporation and the Millennium Challenge Corporation to be effective;

(4) the United States International Development Finance Corporation should deepen its cooperation with Japan Bank for International Cooperation and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia to promote the Blue Dot Network and finance certified projects;

(5) the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development must continue to update and refine its methodologies and metrics for infrastructure project certification based on guidelines such as the Group of Twenty (G20) Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment;

(6) the Blue Dot Network must complement other principled development finance initiatives such as the Infrastructure Technology and Assistance Network and the Transaction Advisory Fund of the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network;

(7) future development finance initiatives should build on the foundations of the initiatives described in paragraph (6); and

(8) the governments of other countries committed to good governance, international law, and infrastructure investment should work with the Blue Dot Network to certify infrastructure projects and attract public and private sector investments.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Three Seas Initiative promotes security, economic integration, modernization, and prosperity in Central and Eastern Europe through critical investments energy, transportation, and digital infrastructure;

(2) the United States International Development Finance Corporation should finalize its approved investment of $300,000,000 and approve an additional $700,000,000 investment in the Three Seas Initiative to fulfill its 2020 commitments;

(3) Central and Eastern Europe must develop better north-south infrastructure and economic integration to break the dominance by the Russian Federation of east-west trade corridors and regional energy supplies;

(4) in the wake of the premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustified invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, the Three Seas Initiative has never been more important for the security of its 12 participants: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia;

(5) the Three Seas Initiative should prioritize construction of regional liquid natural gas terminals that can help diversify the region’s energy supplies and reduce the malign influence of the Russian Federation;

(6) the People’s Republic of China’s $14,000,000,000 of infrastructure investments in the region have degraded the environment, eroded the rule of law, infringed upon state sovereignty, and pose a national security threat;

(7) the Digital Economy Cooperation Initiative should cooperate with the Three Seas Initiative to further modernize the region’s economy and develop the regions digital, communications, and financial infrastructure;

(8) the European Union has made substantial contributions to the objectives of the Three Seas Initiative and should continue to do so through mechanisms such as the Connecting Europe Facility; and

(9) the United States should encourage regional initiatives such as the Three Seas Initiative to galvanize public and private sector investments in regional infrastructure projects that adhere to environmental, equitable, social, and sustainable standards.

It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation should make climate finance commitments at the World Economic Forum.

(a) In general.—The Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation shall strive to reduce the net carbon footprint of the Corporation’s entire investment portfolio to zero by 2028.

(b) Priority.—In carrying out the goal described in subsection (a), the Chief Executive Officer shall prioritize projects in countries struggling with transitioning from carbon intensive electricity to clean energy.

(c) Report.—The Chief Executive Officer shall submit a report to Congress that describes the Corporation’s efforts to meet the goals described in subsections (a) and (b).

It is the policy of the United States to ensure that its engagement with multilateral international financial institution’s is consistent with United States policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in order to achieve worldwide net-zero carbon emissions by 2050.

Section 1(c) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a(c)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking “24” and inserting “25”;

(2) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and

(3) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:

“(5) ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENERGY RESOURCES.—Subject to the numerical limitation specified in paragraph (1), there is authorized to be established in the Department of State an Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources who shall be responsible to the Secretary of State for matters pertaining to the formulation and implementation of international policies—

“(A) to protect United States energy security interests; and

“(B) to promote responsible global clean energy production.”.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should restore its historic alliance with countries of the European Union regarding climate action by renewing the commitment to advancing shared values, principles, goals, and global cooperation for addressing climate change and achieving the goals of the decision of the 21st Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change adopted in Paris December 12, 2015 (commonly known as the “Paris Agreement”).

(b) Discretionary clean energy development finance fund.—The Chief Executive Officer of United States International Development Finance Corporation shall partner with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to establish the Discretionary Clean Energy Development Finance Fund.

(c) Energy transition assistance for Eastern Europe.—Title V of the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 (22 U.S.C. 5451 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

(d) United States-European Union Working Group.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Energy, shall seek to establish a formal United States-European Union Working Group that will develop a strategy to respond to the People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

(a) Statement of policy.—It is the policy of the United States to ensure that the United States leads in the innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such as next-generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, and biotechnology, by—

(1) providing necessary investment and concrete incentives for the private sector to accelerate development of such technologies;

(2) modernizing export controls and investment screening regimes and associated policies and regulations;

(3) enhancing United States leadership in technical standards-setting bodies and avenues for developing norms regarding the use of emerging critical technologies;

(4) reducing United States barriers and increasing incentives for collaboration with allies and partners on the research and co-development of critical technologies;

(5) collaborating with allies and partners to protect critical technologies by—

(A) crafting multilateral export control measures;

(B) building capacity for defense technology security;

(C) safeguarding chokepoints in supply chains; and

(D) ensuring diversification; and

(6) designing major defense capabilities for export to allies and partners.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States must lead in international bodies that set the governance norms and rules for critical digitally enabled technologies in order to ensure that those technologies operate within a free, secure, interoperable, and stable digital domain;

(2) the United States, along with allies and partners, should lead an international effort that utilizes all of the economic and diplomatic tools at its disposal to combat the expanding use of information and communications technology products and services to surveil, repress, and manipulate populations (also known as “digital authoritarianism”);

(3) the United States should lead a global effort to ensure that freedom of information, including the ability to safely consume or publish information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained as the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral mechanism for communication;

(4) the United States should lead a global effort to develop and adopt a set of common principles and standards for critical technologies to ensure that the use of such technologies cannot be abused by malign actors, whether those actors are governments or other entities, and that those actors do not threaten democratic governance or human rights;

(5) the United States and its allies and partners should maintain participation and leadership at international standards-setting bodies for 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure;

(6) the United States should work with its allies and partners to encourage and facilitate the development of secure supply chains and networks for 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure; and

(7) the maintenance of a high standard of security in telecommunications and cyberspace between the United States and its allies and partners is a national security interest of the United States.

(c) Enhancing representation and leadership of United States at international standards-Setting bodies.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall—

(A) establish an interagency working group to provide assistance and technical expertise to enhance the representation and leadership of the United States at international bodies that set standards for equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined networks that support 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure, such as the International Telecommunication Union and the 3rd Generation Partnership Project; and

(B) work with allies, partners, and the private sector to increase productive engagement with respect to the standards described in subparagraph (A).

(2) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.—The interagency working group described in paragraph (1) shall—

(A) be chaired by the Secretary of State or a designee of the Secretary of State; and

(B) consist of the head (or designee) of each Federal department or agency the President determines appropriate.

(3) BRIEFINGS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and subsequently thereafter as provided under subparagraph (B), the interagency working group described in paragraph (1) shall provide a strategy to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that addresses—

(i) promotion of United States leadership at international standards-setting bodies for equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined networks relevant to 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure, taking into account the different processes followed by the various international standard-setting bodies;

(ii) diplomatic engagement with allies and partners to share security risk information and findings pertaining to equipment that supports or is used in 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure and cooperation on mitigating such risks;

(iii) China’s presence and activities at international standards-setting bodies relevant to 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure, including information on the differences in the scope and scale of China’s engagement at such bodies compared to engagement by the United States or its allies and partners and the security risks raised by Chinese proposals in such standards-setting bodies; and

(iv) engagement with private sector communications and information service providers, equipment developers, academia, federally funded research and development centers, and other private sector stakeholders to propose and develop secure standards for equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined networks that support 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure.

(B) SUBSEQUENT BRIEFINGS.—Upon receiving a request from the appropriate congressional committees, or as determined appropriate by the chair of the interagency working group described in paragraph (1), the interagency working group shall provide such committees an updated briefing that covers the matters described in clauses (i) through (iv) of subparagraph (A).

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Group of Twenty (G20) Digital Economy Working Group advances national and international interests through promoting principled and practical standards; and

(2) the United States should continue to support, engage, and exercise leadership in the working group—

(A) to maximize the benefits and minimize the harms of the $70,000,000,000 and growing global digital economy;

(B) to increase international digital connectivity and trade;

(C) to modernize the global economy with new technologies such as blockchain, artificial intelligence, and machine learning;

(D) to protect cross border data flow and data free flow with trust;

(E) to promote social inclusion through digital quality control, consumer protection, child protection, and equitable access to new technologies;

(F) to improve efficiency and interoperability for technologies and regulations in the public sector;

(G) to advance the past initiatives of the working group such Smart Cities, Digital Security, and the Connecting Humanity 2030 Initiative; and

(H) to enable progress toward the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to prioritize diplomacy and international engagement in the artificial intelligence strategies and policies of the United States;

(2) to prioritize artificial intelligence issues in United States diplomacy;

(3) to collaborate with allies and partners to—

(A) research, develop, produce, and invest in artificial intelligence technologies that support economic prosperity, collective security, democracy, and human rights;

(B) promote commitments and international law related to artificial intelligence that reflect shared values;

(C) ensure that artificial intelligence technologies are safe, secure, and trustworthy;

(D) create and maintain artificial intelligence-related technical and institutional infrastructure;

(E) share artificial intelligence-related data, technology, and knowledge, subject to appropriate safeguards and restrictions;

(F) prevent the unwanted transfer of sensitive artificial intelligence-related technical information;

(G) coordinate artificial intelligence-related export controls and investment screening procedures; and

(H) educate and train new cohorts of artificial intelligence researchers, developers, and practitioners;

(4) to incorporate perspectives and expertise from industry, academia, and civil society into United States diplomatic activities related to artificial intelligence;

(5) to engage with bilateral and multilateral organizations active in artificial intelligence research, development, and policy; and

(6) to use diplomacy and foreign assistance to support activities for deploying artificial intelligence that create broadly shared prosperity, account for relevant artificial intelligence safety and security concerns, and uphold human rights and democratic values.

(a) In general.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 2 years thereafter, the Secretary of State shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy for United States diplomacy related to artificial intelligence.

(b) Contents.—Each strategy required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) A review of relevant prior and ongoing initiatives, the outcomes of those initiatives, and key ongoing challenges to those initiatives.

(2) The objectives and priorities that will be used to guide the diplomacy of the United States Government related to artificial intelligence, including objectives and priorities related to each of the following:

(A) Promoting human rights and democratic values in the development and deployment of artificial intelligence technologies, including by advancing relevant international law and principles.

(B) Deterring and disrupting malicious and oppressive uses of artificial intelligence.

(C) Fostering United States collaboration with allies and partners in artificial intelligence research and development.

(D) Developing appropriate technical standards, metrics, and measurement techniques for artificial intelligence.

(E) Mitigating safety risks of artificial intelligence.

(F) Maintaining secure supply chains for artificial intelligence technology and its inputs, including computing hardware.

(G) Ensuring the integrity of the artificial intelligence research and development activities of the United States and its allies and partners.

(H) Ensuring the equitable deployment and adoption of artificial intelligence technology, including through trade, foreign assistance, and development finance.

(I) Involving the private sector and civil society.

(J) Responding to the artificial intelligence activities and strategies of other countries, including the People's Republic of China.

(3) Specific, measurable indicators of progress corresponding to the objectives and priorities described in paragraph (2).

(4) For each strategy other than the first strategy required by subsection (a), an assessment of whether and how progress with respect to each of the indicators identified in the preceding strategy was realized.

(5) A detailed implementation plan, including timelines, designations of lead and supporting implementing entities of the United States Government, budgetary estimates (as applicable), and descriptions of any additional budgetary resources, technical expertise, legal authorities, or personnel needed for implementation of the strategy.

(6) Any other matters the Secretary considers relevant.

(c) Consultation.—In preparing each strategy required by subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall consult with—

(1) the Secretary of Defense;

(2) the Secretary of Homeland Security;

(3) the Secretary of Commerce;

(4) the Secretary of Energy;

(5) the Director of the National Science Foundation;

(6) the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy;

(7) the heads of such other relevant Federal agencies and departments as the Secretary of State considers appropriate; and

(8) such nongovernmental partners as the Secretary considers appropriate.

(d) Form.—Each strategy required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(e) Publication.—The Secretary of State shall make each strategy required by subsection (a) (without its classified annex, if any) available on a publicly accessible website.

(f) Definition of appropriate congressional committees.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(a) Findings.—Congress finds the following:

(1) Innovation in artificial intelligence and other emerging technology domains has become increasingly global. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, worldwide spending on research and development more than tripled between 2000 and 2020. The United States accounted for almost 70 percent of such spending in 1960, but less than ¹⁄3 in 2018.

(2) Many allies and partners of the United States are technological powers in their own right, with robust research and development activities and world-leading capabilities in fields such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, robotics, and biotechnology.

(3) Adversaries of the United States, including the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and Iran, also emphasize technology and innovation in their geopolitical strategies. In particular, the Chinese Communist Party believes innovation is essential to its continued rule and is investing heavily in research and development as part of a strategy to “leapfrog” the United States into global leadership.

(4) The United States and its allies and partners collectively control a much larger share of research and development activity than the People's Republic of China. Together, the United States and 6 like-minded countries, namely, Japan, Germany, South Korea, India, France, and the United Kingdom, account for more than ¹⁄2 of global spending on research and development, while the People's Republic of China accounts for approximately ¹⁄4 .

(5) The National Science Board’s “Vision 2030” report, issued in May 2020, states, “Staying at the frontiers of discovery requires leaning into internationalism, particularly given the nation’s falling share of global knowledge production, paired with the rising importance and impact of international collaboration and knowledge- and technology-intensive industries.”.

(6) Previously, in 2008, the National Science Board reported, “The U.S. Government could play a more effective role in supporting international S&E (science and engineering) partnerships by developing a coherent international S&E strategy to coordinate the activities and objectives of the various Federal agencies that play a role in such partnerships. … No single U.S. agency is responsible for coordinating or supporting international S&E partnerships, and few U.S. agencies that do S&E work have explicit missions in international relations.”.

(7) As of March 2022, numerous Federal departments and offices administer joint research and development activities with international partners, including the Office of International Science and Engineering within the National Science Foundation, the Division of International Relations within the National Institutes of Health, and the Office of International Science & Technology Cooperation within the Department of Energy.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) international collaboration on research and development is critical to maintaining United States leadership in artificial intelligence and other critical technologies; and

(2) Federal initiatives related to international collaboration on research and development should be—

(A) consistently and adequately funded; and

(B) coordinated across agencies to increase impact, minimize undue duplication, and ensure alignment with policies and strategic objectives of the United States.

(c) Government Accountability Office report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall prepare and release to the public a report that—

(1) enumerates and describes all significant Federal initiatives related to international collaboration on research and development in emerging technologies in existence as of the date on which the report is released;

(2) assesses whether those initiatives are equipped to achieve their stated goals;

(3) assesses whether those initiatives are properly managed and coordinated within and across Federal agencies; and

(4) recommends appropriate actions with respect to paragraphs (1) through (3).

(d) Independent report.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall seek to enter into a contract with an appropriately qualified independent research entity, such as a federally funded research and development center or other nonprofit organization, to produce a report on Federal activities related to international collaboration on research and development.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The report described in paragraph (1) shall—

(A) assess the effectiveness of Federal activities related to international collaboration conducted as of the date on which the report is produced;

(B) identify key opportunities for enhanced collaboration on research and development with allies and partners of the United States;

(C) identify key challenges to United States collaboration on research and development with allies and partners;

(D) propose a Federal strategy and corresponding implementation plan for future Federal activities related to international collaboration on research and development; and

(E) recommend other appropriate actions for the Secretary of State, other officials of the Department of State, Congress, and other relevant governmental and nongovernmental actors, and identify any additional resources or legal authorities necessary to carry out such actions.

(3) COMPLETION.—The contract described in paragraph (1) shall require delivery of the report described in that paragraph not later than 1 year after the date on which the contract is executed.

(4) PUBLICATION.—The Secretary of State shall make the report described in paragraph (1) available on a publicly accessible website.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to recognize rising debt stock in emerging market and developing countries as a national security and economic security threat and raise its importance in multilateral fora;

(2) to leverage the voice and vote of the United States in international financial institutions to prevent future unsustainable debt stocks in emerging market and developing countries;

(3) to promote rule-writing standards for transparency and disclosure that hold both debtors and creditors accountable, allow accurate debt sustainability assessments, and promote better debt management;

(4) to lead the international community in translating the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (commonly known as the “Common Framework”) into tangible action, including effective standstill for debt payments and credit revisions for petitioner countries and finalizing the debt treatment for the petitioner countries, beginning with Chad, Ethiopia, and Zambia;

(5) to reduce timelines and increase confidence in outcomes for the Common Framework so that private creditors continue to provide sufficient finances to petitioner countries and other countries witness the benefits of petitioning;

(6) to expand the Common Framework and offer its financial assistance to other heavily indebted lower-middle-income countries, beyond those currently covered;

(7) to cooperate with counterparts in the Group of Twenty (G20), the International Monetary Fund, private credit rating agencies, and regulators, to explore and develop new bond and loan contract issuance standards that authorize temporary suspensions of debt services to both private and public creditors without triggering a default in crisis situations;

(8) to engage with petitioner countries, before those countries exhaust their reserves, to strategize their ascension into the Common Framework and prevent further economic costs;

(9) to leverage the voice and vote of the United States in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank so that the Fund and the Bank complete preliminary assessments of the debt relief needed by each country eligible for Common Framework treatment before such countries petition for debt relief;

(10) that assessments described in paragraph (9) should—

(A) include realistic growth and fiscal projections;

(B) include implications of Common Framework debt relief; and

(C) be based on accurate and comprehensive debt data;

(11) to support the International Monetary Fund lending into arrears for the Common Framework in the case that private lenders fail to uphold their initial commitments;

(12) to leverage the voice and vote of the United States in international financial intuitions to promote and finance international initiatives to procure and deploy more affordable and accessible COVID–19 vaccinations and treatments for emerging market and developing countries;

(13) to address the near-term problems associated with the pandemic-induced global recession and also longer term problems of unsustainable credit lending and borrowing that victimizes emerging market and developing countries; and

(14) to consider the impact of the monetary policies of the United States and future increases in interest rates on emerging market and developing countries and mitigate related harms.

(a) Authorization of appropriations.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of the Treasury for fiscal year 2022 $102,000,000, for contribution to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust or other special purpose vehicle of the International Monetary Fund.

(2) AVAILABILITY OF AMOUNTS.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under paragraph (1) shall remain available until September 30, 2031.

(b) Use of amounts.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) shall be available—

(1) to cover the cost (as defined in section 502 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 661a)) of loans made by the Secretary of the Treasury to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust or other special purpose vehicle of the International Monetary Fund; and

(2) to subsidize gross obligations for the principal amount of direct loans not to exceed 15,000,000,000 Special Drawing Rights.

(c) Nonapplicability of certain limitation.—Section 5(f) of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act (22 U.S.C. 286c(f)) shall not apply to any loans made pursuant to this section to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust or other special purpose vehicle of the International Monetary Fund on or before September 30, 2031.

(d) Authorization of certain transactions.—The Exchange Stabilization Fund and the financing account corresponding to transactions with the International Monetary Fund are authorized to enter into such transactions as are necessary to effectuate loans made pursuant to this section and denominated in Special Drawing Rights to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust or other special purpose vehicle of the International Monetary Fund.

Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide the World Bank Group with all necessary amounts to address the United States arrears in contributions from fiscal years 2019 and 2020.

(a) Sense of congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the spread of SARS–CoV–2, the virus that causes COVID–19, has had a significant impact on economic, social, and humanitarian conditions throughout Latin America and the Caribbean;

(2) the Inter-American Development Bank is the preeminent multilateral development bank dedicated to regional economic and social development and the betterment of lives across Latin America and the Caribbean;

(3) the Bank has played an integral role in supporting member countries with the coordination and implementation of policies to mitigate the effects of the COVID–19 pandemic, the Venezuelan refugee and migration crisis, and other crises in the Western Hemisphere;

(4) a capital increase for the Bank would greatly increase its capacity to provide financing, institutional knowledge, and technical support to foster recovery and inclusion initiatives between regional governments, private sector entities, and international organizations; and

(5) the United States, as a founding member of the Bank, should support a capital stock increase to ensure the Bank is prepared to offer additional support to member countries severely impacted by the COVID–19 pandemic and other crises.

(b) Tenth general capital increase.—

(1) SUPPORT FOR A GENERAL CAPITAL INCREASE.—The President shall take steps to support a tenth general capital increase for the Inter-American Development Bank.

(2) DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.—The President shall advance diplomatic engagement to build support among member countries of the Bank for a tenth general capital increase for the Bank in order to strengthen the capacity of the Bank—

(A) to support Latin American and Caribbean countries in their efforts to address the COVID–19 pandemic and the related economic impact; and

(B) to advance inclusive economic and social development in the Americas.

(3) PROGRESS REPORT.—Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives a report detailing efforts to carry out paragraphs (1) and (2).

(4) TENTH CAPITAL INCREASE.—The Inter-American Development Bank Act (22 U.S.C. 283 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

(c) Support for environmental sustainability initiatives of Inter-American Development Bank.—

(1) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the Inter-American Development Bank should—

(A) establish its own environmental grant-making and financing facility in order to implement and expand environmental policies, metrics, and standards, to strengthen resilience and disaster preparedness, and to improve sustainability and conservation; and

(B) continue to strengthen environmental safeguards as an element of economic development in the Western Hemisphere.

(2) DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.—The President shall advance diplomatic engagement to build support among member countries of the Bank for the creation of an environmental fund and financing facility as part of the tenth general capital increase for the Bank.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Inter-American Development Bank was established in 1959 and—

(A) is the premier multilateral development bank in the Western Hemisphere;

(B) is the largest source of development financing for Latin America and the Caribbean; and

(C) issued more than $140,000,000,000 in loans and grants between 2011 and 2021.

(2) The Inter-American Development Bank—

(A) has 48 member states, of which 26 are borrowing members in the Latin America and the Caribbean region; and

(B) constitutes a critical forum for fostering collective action and meeting shared regional challenges, including COVID–19 recovery and response.

(3) Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the People's Republic of China are among the 22 non-borrowing, non-Western Hemisphere members of the Inter-American Development Bank.

(4) Taiwan—

(A) has been an observer at the Inter-American Development Bank since 1991;

(B) has contributed to a specialized financial intermediary development fund at IDB Lab since 2006;

(C) has been a non-regional member of the Central American Bank for Economic Integration since 1992;

(D) is a member of the Asian Development Bank, the World Trade Organization, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the International Chamber of Commerce; and

(E) is a participant of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Competition Committee, its Steel Committee, and its Fisheries Committee.

(5) Taiwan's economy is the 7th largest in Asia and the 20th largest in the world by purchasing power parity.

(6) Taiwan has been a model contributor of foreign aid in Latin America and the Caribbean, allocating between 30 percent and 50 percent of its foreign aid budget to Latin America and the Caribbean.

(7) Since 2010, Taiwan's International Cooperation and Development Fund has funded 95 projects in Central America, 64 projects in the Caribbean, and 21 projects in South America.

(8) Taiwan has been a firm supporter of Haiti as it confronts multiple simultaneous crises—

(A) by providing more than $145,000,000 in financing to modernize Haiti's electrical grid;

(B) by delivering 280,000 masks at the height of the COVID–19 pandemic; and

(C) by pledging $500,000 in disaster relief immediately after the August 14, 2021, earthquake in Haiti.

(9) According to data from the Pan American Development Foundation, communities receiving assistance from Taiwan display increased—

(A) food security;

(B) income generation; and

(C) capacity to recover from natural disasters.

(10) Taiwan has placed special emphasis on fostering development in Central America and in the Caribbean, including by signing the Agreement on the Republic of China (Taiwan)—Central America Economic Development Fund in 1998.

(11) Through its non-regional member status at the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, Taiwan has provided $266,700,000 in financial assistance to help Central American countries respond to the COVID–19 pandemic. On April 22, 2021, the Central American Bank for Economic Integration announced the opening of its Representative Office in Taiwan, deepening investment ties between Taiwan and Central America.

(12) Nine countries in Latin America and the Caribbean maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and Taiwan has 8 representative offices in 7 other countries in the region.

(13) Since 2016, the Government of the People's Republic of China has engaged in aggressive economic diplomacy to compel the withdrawal of diplomatic recognition for Taiwan, most notably in Panama, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador, all of which have terminated longstanding and productive diplomatic relationships with Taiwan and granted diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China.

(14) The Government of the People's Republic of China—

(A) announced a $1,100,000,000 construction project in Panama on the day that Panama switched from recognizing Taiwan to recognizing the People’s Republic of China as the government of China; and

(B) similarly offered assistance packages to the Dominican Republic and El Salvador in 2018 in exchange for those countries ceasing their diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.

(15) Taiwan's international engagement has faced increased resistance from the Government of the People's Republic of China, which has used its influence to deny Taiwan's invitations to multilateral fora. For example, Taiwan was not invited to the 2016 Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), despite participating as a guest at ICAO's 2013 summit. Taiwan's requests to participate in the General Assembly of the International Criminal Police Organization (commonly known as “INTERPOL”) were also rejected.

(16) Taiwan's inclusion in multilateral organizations, such as the Inter-American Development Bank, advances peace and stability in the world and in the Western Hemisphere specifically.

(17) Congress has demonstrated a longstanding policy of supporting Taiwan's participation in international bodies that address shared transnational challenges by—

(A) authorizing the Secretary of State, in Public Law 106–137, Public Law 107–10, and Public Law 108–235, to initiate a United States plan for supporting Taiwan's participation as an observer in the activities of the World Health Organization;

(B) directing the Secretary of State, in Public Law 113–17, to report on a strategy to obtain observer status for Taiwan at the International Civil Aviation Organization Assembly; and

(C) directing the Secretary of State, in Public Law 114–139, to develop a strategy to obtain observer status for Taiwan at the INTERPOL Assembly.

(18) Despite these efforts, Taiwan has not received an invitation to attend as an observer any of the events of the international organizations referred to in paragraph (17) since 2016.

(b) Sense of congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States fully supports Taiwan's participation in, and contribution to, international organizations and underscores the importance of the relationship between Taiwan and the United States;

(2) diversifying the Inter-American Development Bank's donor base and increasing ally engagement in the Western Hemisphere reinforces United States national interests;

(3) Taiwan's significant contribution to the development and economies of Latin America and the Caribbean demonstrate that Taiwan's membership in the Inter-American Development Bank as a non-borrowing member would benefit the Bank and the entire Latin American and Caribbean region; and

(4) non-borrowing membership in the Inter-American Development Bank would allow Taiwan to substantially leverage and channel the immense resources Taiwan already provides to Latin America and the Caribbean to reach a larger number of beneficiaries.

(c) Plan for the participation of taiwan in the inter-American development bank.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, is authorized—

(1) to initiate a United States plan to endorse non-borrowing membership in the Inter-American Development Bank for Taiwan; and

(2) to instruct the United States Governor of the Bank to work with the Board of Governors of the Bank to admit Taiwan as a non-borrowing member of the Bank.

(d) Report concerning member state status for taiwan at the Inter-American Development Bank.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not later than April 1 of each year thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit an unclassified report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that—

(1) describes the United States plan to endorse and obtain non-borrowing membership status for Taiwan at the Inter-American Development Bank;

(2) includes an account of the efforts that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury have made to encourage member states of the Bank to promote Taiwan's bid to obtain non-borrowing membership at the Bank; and

(3) identifies the steps that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury will take to endorse and obtain non-borrowing membership status for Taiwan at the Bank in the following year.

The Secretary of State shall pursue the following objectives at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum:

(1) Improving efficiency in supply chains, particularly semi-conductor supply chains.

(2) Encouraging continued public-private dialogues with policymakers and promoting a common set of technology standards, including the possibility of a digital trade agreement.

(3) Promoting the development and use of policy recommendations for governments to support research and development of clean energy (both renewable and non-renewable) and adopting robust clean energy standards.

(4) Advancing cooperation that reduces barriers to cross-border investment into emerging and growing markets.

(5) Improving cybersecurity in the Asia-Pacific region and developing tools for governments to combat cyber threats, including ransomware, disinformation, and cyber hacks.

It is the sense of Congress that the United States must exercise leadership in the international community’s response to the COVID–19 pandemic regarding public health and economic recovery and resiliency, including by—

(1) leveraging multilateral fora, such as the Group of Seven (G7) and the Group of Twenty (G20), which constitute more than 30 percent and 70 percent of the global economy, respectively, to coordinate an effective international response to persistent economic issues related to supply chains, inflation, and inequality;

(2) revitalizing the United Nations and its associated institutions to coordinate and facilitate international initiatives that—

(A) promote global health and economic security; and

(B) build resilience to present and forecasted shocks and stresses that impede economic growth or trigger, contribute to, result in, or cause backsliding;

(3) empowering like-minded allies and partners to leverage their respective strengths and assume greater responsibilities in such international fora and institutions;

(4) continuing to fund and finance international initiatives, such as COVAX, to provide and distribute life-saving vaccinations and medical treatments for COVID–19;

(5) promoting an equitable international economic recovery that promotes building developing countries’ resilience capacities to address enduring disparities and challenges facing lower and middle income countries in addition to more recent challenges related to high-levels of global inflation and market volatility; and

(6) supporting an impartial, independent, and international investigation into the origins of the COVID–19 pandemic to derive lessons learned and prevent similar international disasters in the future.

It is the sense of Congress that United States foreign assistance and development finance must better suit its foreign assistance and development finance institutions to improve global resilience capacities and mitigate the harmful effects of international shocks and stresses, including by—

(1) equipping people, institutions, and international systems with the tools and resources necessary to avoid, cope with, and recover from modern threats, such as pandemic diseases, climate change, and extreme weather, cybersecurity compromises, and supply chain disruptions;

(2) partnering with other countries to better assess their vulnerabilities and risks to international shocks and identifying sustainable strategies for mitigating risk and improving resilience;

(3) prioritizing funding for foreign assistance and development finance initiatives that seek to prevent, respond and reduce risks of international shocks;

(4) expanding foreign capacity building initiatives in law enforcement, public health, cybersecurity, food and energy security;

(5) strengthening institutions that facilitate economic cooperation and transparency in times of international crisis and uncertainty; and

(6) providing support for countries to strengthen domestic resource mobilization and access to effective and equitable development finance in order to reduce dependence on foreign assistance.

Section 1 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (h) (as added by section 361 of Public Law 116–260) as subsection (k); and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(l) Office of Economic Resiliency.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—There is established, within the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs of the Department of State, the Office of Economic Resiliency (in this subsection referred to as the ‘Office’).

“(2) FUNCTION.—The Office, under the direction of the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, shall lead United States’ efforts to develop and implement credible national action plans with partner countries aimed at detecting, understanding, preventing impacts of, and responding to present and forecasted shocks and stresses that are destabilizing to countries' national security and economic growth, including epidemics, pandemics, natural disasters, and other destabilizing events.”.

The United States Executive Director to the World Bank shall use the voice and vote of the United States to advocate for the establishment of a multi-donor trust fund to incentivize countries to develop and implement credible national action plans aimed at preventing, detecting, and responding to epidemics, pandemics, and other global destabilizing events.