(a) Short title.—This Act may be cited as the “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021”.

(b) Table of contents.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

In this Act:

(1) CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.—The term “congressional intelligence committees” has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

(2) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2021 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government:

(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.

(3) The Department of Defense.

(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.

(5) The National Security Agency.

(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.

(7) The Coast Guard.

(8) The Department of State.

(9) The Department of the Treasury.

(10) The Department of Energy.

(11) The Department of Justice.

(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.

(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.

(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

(16) The Department of Homeland Security.

(a) Specifications of amounts.—The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act.

(b) Availability of classified schedule of authorizations.—

(1) AVAILABILITY.—The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President.

(2) DISTRIBUTION BY THE PRESIDENT.—Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the executive branch.

(3) LIMITS ON DISCLOSURE.—The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except—

(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a));

(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or

(C) as otherwise required by law.

(a) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2021 the sum of $683,000,000.

(b) Classified authorization of appropriations.—In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for fiscal year 2021 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund $514,000,000 for fiscal year 2021.

The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) it is essential that the people of the United States have trust and confidence in the legitimacy of the Armed Forces and the intelligence community, which are obligated to protect the rights of all the people of the United States;

(2) in a democracy, intelligence activities must not only be legitimate, they must also be perceived as legitimate;

(3) intelligence support to domestic-focused activities by the Armed Forces or Federal law enforcement components involved in responding to protests, including to monitor, assess, or otherwise track Americans who are taking to the streets or otherwise engaging in constitutionally protected activity within the United States, is inappropriate in all but the most extreme circumstances;

(4) although all elements of the intelligence community are authorized under Executive Order 12333 to provide assistance to law enforcement that is “not precluded by applicable law”, activities that may be appropriate in the context of routine criminal investigations may nevertheless be inappropriate in the context of law enforcement response to protest or civil disturbances.

(b) Notice requirement.—Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

(c) Clerical amendment.—The table of contents for the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 512 the following new item:

“513. Notice of provision of support for Federal, State, local, or Tribal government response to civil disobedience or domestic civil disturbances.”.

(a) In general.—If any element of the intelligence community receives direction from the President to engage in any activity pursuant to a presidential emergency action document or an equivalent or successor document, the head of such element shall, not later than 72 hours before engaging in such activity, submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written notice under this section.

(b) Contents of notice.—A notice under subsection (a) with respect to any direction to engage in an activity, shall include each of the following:

(1) A summary of the presidential emergency action document or equivalent document pursuant to which the activity is directed.

(2) A detailed description of the activity or activities that the element of the intelligence community has been directed to undertake.

(3) The date on which the President directed the element to undertake such activity.

(4) An identification of any other government departments or agencies involved in the activity and a description of the roles of any such department or agency with respect to such activity.

(c) Form of notice.—A notice under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex only to the extent necessary to protect against identified, specific threats to the national security of the United States.

(d) Delay of notice.—If the head of an element of the intelligence community that is required to provide notice under subsection (a) determines it is necessary, and in the event of a specific threat to the national security of the United States caused by a national emergency, the head of the element may delay the submittal of such notice by a period not to exceed five days. If the head of an element delays the submittal of such notice under this subsection, the head shall advise the chair and ranking members of the congressional intelligence committees of the activity covered by the notice as soon as possible but not later than 24 hours after the element has commenced the activity.

(e) Presidential emergency action document.—In this section, the term “presidential emergency action document” means—

(1) each of the approximately 56 documents described as presidential emergency action documents in the budget justification materials for the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice submitted to Congress in support of the budget of the President for fiscal year 2018; and

(2) any other pre-coordinated legal document in existence before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act that—

(A) is designated as a presidential emergency action document; or

(B) is designed to implement a presidential decision or transmit a presidential request when an emergency disrupts normal governmental or legislative processes.

(a) In general.—Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

(b) Clerical amendment.—The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1108 the following new item:

“Sec. 1109. Requirement to buy certain satellite component from American sources.”.

Section 602(a)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. 3304(a)(2)) is amended—

(1) by striking “$1,000,000” both places it appears and inserting “$2,000,000”; and

(2) by striking “the Director of National Intelligence shall submit a notification” and inserting “the head of such component, in coordination with and subject to the approval of the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit a notification”.

(a) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) student loan repayment programs are a crucial tool in attracting and retaining talented individuals to the intelligence community, particularly individuals from diverse backgrounds;

(2) generous student loan repayment programs help the intelligence community compete with the private sector for talented employees;

(3) departments and agencies containing elements of the intelligence community have authority to establish student loan repayment programs either under section 5379 of title 5, United States Code, or under the delegable authority of the Director of National Intelligence under section 102A(n)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(n)(1));

(4) although the Director should use the authority under such section 102A(n)(1) sparingly, and should be exceedingly sparing in delegating such authority to an element of the intelligence community, the Director should approve well-predicated requests for such authority in the student loan repayment context if an element of the intelligence community can articulate an impediment to establishing or enhancing a program under section 5379 of title 5, United States Code; and

(5) student loan repayment programs established by an element of the intelligence community should provide flexibility to intelligence community employees, including employees who pursue loan-financed education in the middle of their careers or after the day on which they first become intelligence community employees.

(b) Student loan repayment program standards.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, or a designee of the Director who is an employee of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish minimum standards for the repayment of student loans of employees of elements of the intelligence community by such elements of the intelligence community.

(c) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the standards established under subsection (b). Such report shall include—

(1) an explanation of why such minimum standards were established; and

(2) how such standards advance the goals of—

(A) attracting and retaining a talented intelligence community workforce;

(B) competing with private sector companies for talented employees; and

(C) promoting the development of a diverse workforce.

(d) Failure To meet standards.—Not later than 180 days after the date on which the standards required under subsection (b) are established, the head of an element of the intelligence community that does not meet such standards shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing an explanation for why such element does not meet such standards and an identification of any additional authority or appropriations required to for the element to meet such standards.

(e) Submittal of regulations and policies to Congress.—Not later than 180 days after the date on which the standards required under subsection (b) are established, the head of an element of the intelligence community shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a copy of all internal regulations and policies governing the student loan repayment program of that element as well as copies of such policies redacted to remove classified information.

(f) Appropriate congressional committees defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;

(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;

(3) with respect to an element of the intelligence community within the Department of Defense, the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives;

(4) with respect to an element of the intelligence community within the Department of Justice, the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and House of Representatives;

(5) with respect to an element of the intelligence community within the Department of Homeland Security, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives;

(6) with respect to an element of the intelligence community within the Department of State, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(7) with respect to an element of the intelligence community within the Department of Energy, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives; and

(8) with respect to an element of the intelligence community within the Department of the Treasury, the Committee on Finance of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

(g) Form of reports.—Each of the reports required under subsections (c) and (d) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(a) Purpose.—The purpose of this section is to—

(1) help the intelligence community recruit and retain a dynamic, multi-talented, and diverse workforce capable of meeting the security goals of the United States; and

(2) establish best practices and processes for other elements of the Federal Government seeking to pursue similar policies.

(b) Authorization of paid leave for a serious health condition for employees of elements of the intelligence community.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Title III of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 304 the following:

(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents at the beginning of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 304 the following:

“Sec. 305. Paid serious health condition leave.”.

(c) Applicability.—Section 305 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (b), shall apply with respect to leave taken in connection with a serious health condition (as defined in subsection (a) of such section 305) that occurs or continues to exist on or after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence issues the written directive under subsection (e)(3) of such section 305.

(a) Modifications to requirement.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 304 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3073a) is amended to read as follows:

(2) REVISED REGULATIONS.—

(A) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the intelligence community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees updated regulations issued under such section 304, as amended by paragraph (1).

(B) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees—

(i) a written certification for each head of an element of the intelligence community who has issued the updated regulations under such section 304, as amended by paragraph (1); and

(ii) for each head of an element of the intelligence community who has not issued such updated regulations, an explanation for the failure to issue such updated regulations.

(3) INITIAL REPORT.—In the first report submitted by the Director of National Intelligence under subsection (e) of such section 304, as amended by paragraph (1), the Director shall include an assessment of the licensing requirements under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) and recommendations with respect to strengthening the activities regulated under such section 304.

(b) Clerical amendment.—The table of sections at the beginning of such Act is amended by striking the item relating to section 304 and inserting the following new item:

“Sec. 304. Requirements for certain employment activities by former intelligence officers and employees.”.

Section 106A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3041a) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and

(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new subsection (d):

“(d) Clarification of authority.—The Director of National Intelligence may not transfer any element of the National Reconnaissance Office to the Space Force. Nothing in chapter 908 of title 10, United States Code, shall affect the authorities, duties, or responsibilities of the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, including with respect to the authority of the Director to operate a unified organization to carry out the research, development, test, evaluation, acquisition, launch, deployment, and operations of overhead reconnaissance systems and related data processing facilities of the National Reconnaissance Office.”.

(a) Office of the Ombudsman for Analytic Objectivity.—The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

(b) Reference.—Any reference in any law, regulation, map, document, paper, or other record of the United States to the Ombudsman for Analytic and Collection Objectivity of the Central Intelligence Agency shall be deemed to be a reference to the Office of the Ombudsman for Analytic Objectivity of the Central Intelligence Agency established by section 24(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), as added by subsection (a).

(c) Report on surveys for fiscal years 2018 and 2019.—Not later than 10 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees any reports previously prepared by the Ombudsman for Analytic and Collection Objectivity with respect to the surveys of analytic objectivity conducted for fiscal years 2018 and 2019.

(a) In general.—Section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to the Executive Secretary, National Space Council the following new items:

(b) Application.—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply with respect to—

(1) any individual who is appointed to serve as the Director of the National Security Agency on or after the date of the enactment of this Act; and

(2) any individual who is appointed to serve as the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Section 1599h of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

(2) in subsection (b)(1)—

(A) in subparagraph (E), by striking “; and”;

(B) in subparagraph (F), by striking the semicolon and inserting “; and”; and

(C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

“(G) in the case of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, appoint individuals to a total of not more than 7 positions in the Agency, of which not more than 2 such positions may be positions of administration or management in the Agency;”; and

(3) in subsection (c)(2), by striking “or the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center” and inserting “the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, or the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency”.

Section 119 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by striking subsection (g) and inserting the following new subsection:

(2) by striking “defense committees” each place it appears and inserting “appropriate congressional committees”.

The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

(a) Program.—Subtitle D of title XIII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (5 U.S.C. 3301 note et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

(b) Clerical amendment.—The table of contents for such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1332 the following new item:

“Sec. 1333. Intelligence and cybersecurity diversity fellowship program.”.

(a) Climate Security Advisory Council.—

(1) REPEAL OF SUNSET.—Section 120 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3060) is amended by striking subsection (d) and redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (d).

(2) TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.—Subsection (c)(4) of such section is amended by striking “security indicators” and inserting “intelligence indications”.

(b) Plan for Climate Security Intelligence Center.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the chair of the Climate Security Advisory Council established under section 120 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3060) shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written plan to permanently establish within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence a Climate Security Intelligence Center (to be headed by a Director appointed by the Director of National Intelligence) to fulfil each of the duties described in subsection (c). Such plan shall include the following:

(1) Recommendations for the Center, developed based on findings by the Climate Security Advisory Council in carrying out its duties and responsibilities, that relate to—

(A) the scope of the mission, duties, responsibilities, and functions of the Center;

(B) the composition and staffing of the Center with personnel from agencies of the Federal Government, including through the detail of nonintelligence community personnel to the Center; and

(C) approaches to data-sharing, information exchanges, and other types of collaboration (at the appropriate level of classification), on matters relating to climate security and environmental science between the Center and—

(i) elements of the Federal Government that are not elements of the intelligence community; and

(ii) other key stakeholders in the scientific enterprise of the United States, including institutions of higher education, Federal research laboratories (including the national security laboratories), private industry, and nonprofit research organizations.

(2) A proposed process for transferring from the Climate Security Advisory Council to the Center the functions currently carried out by such Council, including a timeline for the transfer and a statement on the feasibility of establishing the Center and completing the transfer by the end of 2022.

(3) A request for any resources, facilities, personnel, or authorities that the Climate Security Advisory Council determines necessary to ensure that, upon establishment, the Center and its Director may fulfil the duties described in subsection (c).

(c) Duties.—The duties described in this subsection are the following:

(1) To serve as the primary organization within the intelligence community for—

(A) analyzing climate security threats and the climate influence of the United States; and

(B) identifying and disseminating climate intelligence indications and warnings.

(2) To assess and identify best practices in the analysis of climate security, including identifying publicly available information and clandestinely collected intelligence that enables such analysis.

(3) To assess and identify best practices with respect to prior efforts of the intelligence community to analyze climate security, including—

(A) the Measurements of Earth Data for Environmental Analysis program of the Central Intelligence Agency;

(B) the Center on Climate Change and National Security of the Central Intelligence Agency; and

(C) climate security-related activities of the Director of National Intelligence.

(4) To use the best practices identified under paragraphs (2) and (3) to inform the work of the Climate Security Intelligence Center.

(5) To consult, as appropriate, with other elements of the intelligence community and Federal agencies to avoid duplication of existing efforts.

(6) To carry out any functions transferred pursuant to the process proposed in subsection (b)(2).

(7) To perform such other duties as the Director of National Intelligence shall specify.

(d) Study on advisory council model for strategic or transnational threats.—

(1) STUDY.—The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of other elements of the intelligence community determined appropriate by the Director, shall conduct a study on the effectiveness of the Climate Security Advisory Council as a potential model for future advisory councils that—

(A) focus on optimizing the collection and analysis of intelligence relating to strategic or transnational threats to the national security of the United States (including threats posed by disease outbreaks, pandemics, or other global health threats); and

(B) are composed of elements of the intelligence community and relevant elements of the Federal Government that are not elements of the intelligence community.

(2) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the findings of the study under paragraph (1).

(e) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) CLIMATE SECURITY.—The term “climate security” means the effects of climate change on the following:

(A) The national security of the United States.

(B) Infrastructure that enhances the national security of the United States, including—

(i) military installations, Department of Defense facilities, intelligence community facilities, and other physical facilities that contribute to or otherwise support operations of the intelligence community or the Department of Defense; and

(ii) critical infrastructure of the United States (as defined in subsection (e) of the Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e))).

(C) Subnational, national, regional, and global politics, governance, and political stability.

(D) The security of allies and partners of the United States.

(E) Ongoing or potential political violence, including unrest, rioting, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, terrorism, rebellion, revolution, civil war, and interstate war.

(2) CLIMATE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES.—The term “climate influence of the United States” means the global influence and leadership of the United States with respect to the climate policies of other countries, international organizations, and transnational groups.

(3) CLIMATE INTELLIGENCE INDICATIONS AND WARNINGS.—The term “climate intelligence indications and warnings” means climate security developments with the potential to—

(A) imminently and substantially alter the political stability or degree of human security in a state or region; or

(B) threaten the United States, the military, political, or economic interests of allies or coalition partners of the United States, or citizens of the United States abroad.

(a) In general.—The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new title:

(b) Definition.—Section 3 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3003) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(8) The term ‘covered Inspector General’ means each Inspector General of an element of the intelligence community, including the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.”.

(c) Clerical amendments.—The table of sections at the beginning of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by adding after the items relating to title XI the end the following new items:

(a) In general.—Title XII of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by section 501, is amended by inserting after section 1201 the following new section:

(b) Clerical amendment.—The table of sections at the beginning of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1201, as added by section 501, the following new item:

“Sec. 1203. Designation of acting Inspectors General of the intelligence community in cases of vacancies.”.

(a) Determination.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Title XII of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by section 501, is amended by inserting after section 1203, as added by section 502, the following new section:

(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1203, as added by section 502, the following new item:

“Sec. 1205. Determination of matters of urgent concern.”.

(b) Conforming amendments.—

(1) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—Section 103H(k)(5)(G) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)(G)) is amended by striking “In this paragraph” and inserting “In accordance with section 1205, in this paragraph”.

(2) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.—Section 17(d)(5)(G) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)(G)) is amended by striking “In this paragraph” and inserting “In accordance with section 1205 of the National Security Act of 1947, in this paragraph”.

(c) Reports on unresolved differences.—Paragraph (3) of section 103H(k) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(k)) is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

“(C) With respect to each report submitted pursuant to paragraph (A)(i), the Inspector General shall include in the report, at a minimum—

“(i) a general description of the unresolved differences, the particular duties or responsibilities of the Inspector General involved, and, if such differences relate to a complaint or information under paragraph (5), a description of the complaint or information and the entities or individuals identified in the complaint or information; and

“(ii) to the extent such differences can be attributed not only to the Director but also to any other official, department, agency, or office within the executive branch, or a component thereof, the titles of such official, department, agency, or office.”.

(d) Clarification of role of Director of National Intelligence.—Section 102A(f)(1) of (50 U.S.C. 3024(f)(1)) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph (C); and

(2) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following new subparagraph:

“(B) The authority of the Director of National Intelligence under subparagraph (A) includes coordinating and supervising activities undertaken by elements of the intelligence community for the purpose of protecting the United States from any foreign interference in elections in the United States.”.

(a) In general.—Title XII of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by section 501, is further amended by inserting after section 1205, as added by section 503, the following new subtitle:

(b) Technical and clerical amendments.—

(1) TRANSFER.—The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended as follows:

(A) Section 1104 is—

(i) transferred to title XII of such Act, as added by section 501;

(ii) inserted before section 1223 of such Act, as added by this section; and

(iii) redesignated as section 1221.

(B) Section 1106 is—

(i) amended by striking “section 1104” each place it appears and inserting “section 1221”;

(ii) transferred to title XII of such Act, as added by section 501;

(iii) inserted after section 1223 of such Act, as added by this section; and

(iv) redesignated as section 1225.

(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENTS.—The table of sections at the beginning of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended—

(A) by striking the items relating to section 1104 and section 1106; and

(B) by inserting after the item relating to section 1205 the following new items:

(c) Definitions.—Section 3 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3003), as amended by section 501, is further amended by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:

“(9) The term ‘whistleblower’ means a person who makes a whistleblower disclosure.

“(10) The term ‘whistleblower disclosure’ means a disclosure that is protected under section 1221 of this Act or section 3001(j)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)).”.

(d) Conforming amendment.—Section 5331 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (division E of Public Law 116–92; 50 U.S.C. 3033 note) is amended by striking “section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234)” and inserting “section 1221 of the National Security Act of 1947”.

(a) In general.—Title XII of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by section 501, is further amended by inserting after section 1225, as designated by section 504(b), the following new section:

(b) Clerical amendment.—The table of sections at the beginning of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1225, as added by section 504(b), the following new item:

“Sec. 1227. Procedures regarding disclosures to Congress.”.

(c) Conforming amendment.—Section 103H(k)(5)(D)(i) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)(D)(i)) is amended by adding at the end the following: “The employee may request information pursuant to section 1227 with respect to contacting such committees.”.

(a) In general.—Paragraph (3) of subsection (a) of section 1221 of the National Security Act of 1947, as designated by section 504(b)(1)(A), is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (I), by striking “; or” and inserting a semicolon;

(2) by redesignating subparagraph (J) as subparagraph (K); and

(3) by inserting after subparagraph (I) the following:

“(J) a knowing and willful disclosure revealing the identity or other personally identifiable information of such employee or such contractor employee without the express written consent of such employee or such contractor employee or if the Inspector General determines it is necessary for the exclusive purpose of investigating a complaint or information received under section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. 8H); or”.

(b) Applicability to detailees.—Such subsection is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(5) EMPLOYEE.—The term ‘employee’, with respect to an agency or a covered intelligence community element, includes an individual who has been detailed to such agency or covered intelligence community element.”.

(c) Private right of action for unlawful disclosure of whistleblower identity.—Subsection (d) of such section is amended to read as follows:

“(d) Enforcement.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the President shall provide for the enforcement of this section.

“(2) PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL, WILLFUL DISCLOSURE OF WHISTLEBLOWER IDENTITY.—In a case in which an employee of an agency, or other employee or officer of the Federal Government, takes a personnel action described in subsection (a)(3)(J) against an employee of a covered intelligence community element as a reprisal in violation of subsection (b) or in a case in which a contractor employee takes a personnel action described in such subsection against another contractor employee as a reprisal in violation of subsection (c), the employee or contractor employee against whom the personnel action was taken may bring a private action for all appropriate remedies, including injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages, against the employee or contractor employee who took the personnel action, in a Federal district court of competent jurisdiction within 180 days of when the employee or contractor employee first learned of or should have learned of the violation.”.

(a) Intelligence Community.—Paragraph (4) of section 103H(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3033(c)) is amended to read as follows:

“(4) The provisions of title XII shall apply to the Inspector General with respect to the removal of the Inspector General, a vacancy in the position of the Inspector General, and any other matter relating to the Inspector General as specifically provided for in such title.”.

(b) Central Intelligence Agency.—Paragraph (6) of section 17(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(b)) is amended to read as follows:

“(6) The provisions of title XII of the National Security Act of 1947 shall apply to the Inspector General with respect to the removal of the Inspector General, a vacancy in the position of the Inspector General, and any other matter relating to the Inspector General as specifically provided for in such title.”.

(c) Other elements.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Title XII of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by section 501, is further amended by inserting after section 1205, as added by section 503, the following new section:

(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1205, as added by section 503, the following new item:

“Sec. 1207. Coordination with other provisions of law.”.

If any provision of this title, any amendment made by this title, or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the title, of any such amendments, and of the application of such provisions to other persons and circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

(a) Modifications.—Section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3030) is amended to read as follows:

(b) Initial reports.—

(1) REPORT ON EFFORTS.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit the first report under section 103E(d)(1)(A) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by subsection (a).

(2) REPORTS ON ASSESSMENT AND COVERED ACTIVITIES.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit the first reports under subparagraphs (B) and (C) of section 103E(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by subsection (a).

(a) Reports.—Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as amended by section 305, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

(b) Clerical amendment.—The table of contents at the beginning of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1109, as added by section 305, the following new item:

“Sec. 1110. Annual reports on research and development for scientific and technological advancements.”.

(c) Initial report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit the first report under section 1109 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a).

(a) Program.—Subtitle A of title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

(b) Clerical amendment.—The table of contents at the beginning of the National Security Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1002 the following new item:

“Sec. 1003. Improvement of education in science, technology, engineering, arts, and mathematics.”.

(a) In general.—Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), is amended by inserting after section 503 the following new section:

(b) Clerical amendment.—The table of contents at the beginning of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 503 the following new item:

“Sec. 503A. Quarterly reports on cyber intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities of the Department of Defense.”.

(a) Solicitation and compilation of information.—

(1) PROCESS.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and Sector-Specific Agencies the Director determines appropriate, shall establish a formal process to solicit and compile information needs of covered entities to improve the defenses of such entities against foreign cybersecurity threats.

(2) RECURRENT INPUT.—The Director shall ensure that the information compiled under paragraph (1) is current by continuing to solicit and compile information under such paragraph as follows:

(A) By not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director first establishes the process under such paragraph.

(B) On a biennial basis thereafter.

(b) Evaluation.—Using the information solicited and compiled under subsection (a), and using any other intelligence information and processes, the Director, in coordination with the Secretary, shall conduct an evaluation with respect to the intelligence needs relating to foreign cybersecurity threats. Such evaluation shall—

(1) identify common technologies or interdependencies that are likely to be targeted by nation-state adversaries;

(2) identify foreign intelligence gaps regarding foreign cybersecurity threats to covered entities;

(3) identify and execute methods of empowering Sector-Specific Agencies to—

(A) identify specific critical lines of businesses, technologies, and processes within their respective sectors; and

(B) coordinate directly with the intelligence community regarding sector-specific cybersecurity threat; and

(4) consider whether to enhance or adjust national intelligence collection and analysis priorities.

(c) Annual reports.—Not later than 90 days after the date on which the Director conducts the evaluation under subsection (b), and annually thereafter, the Director and the Secretary shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that—

(1) assesses how the cybersecurity threat information obtained from covered entities is shaping intelligence collection and dissemination activities;

(2) evaluates the success of the intelligence community in sharing relevant, actionable cybersecurity threat intelligence with such entities; and

(3) addresses any legislative or policy changes necessary to enhance the cybersecurity of such entities.

(d) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means the following:

(A) The congressional intelligence committees.

(B) The Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

(C) The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(2) COVERED ENTITIES.—The term “covered entities” means owners and operators of critical infrastructure.

(3) CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE.—The term “critical infrastructure” has the meaning given that term in section 1016(e) of the USA PATRIOT Act (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)).

(4) CYBERSECURITY THREAT.—The term “cybersecurity threat” has the meaning given that term in section 2201(3) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 651(3)).

(5) SECTOR-SPECIFIC AGENCY.—The term “Sector-Specific Agency” has the meaning given that term in section 2201(5) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 651(5)).

(a) Review of cybersecurity threats.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of National Intelligence, after coordinating with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall conduct a review of applicable laws, policies, procedures, and resources of the intelligence community that apply to the intelligence community’s understanding of cybersecurity threats to covered entities. Such review shall address the ability of the intelligence community to share cyber threat information with the Federal departments and agencies responsible for providing warning and indicators to covered entities to enable them to defend against such threats.

(2) CONTENTS OF REVIEW.—The review required under subsection (a) shall include a consideration of each of the following:

(A) The capabilities and limitations of the intelligence community in collection on foreign adversary malicious cyber activity targeting covered entities.

(B) The ability of the intelligence community to share cyber threat intelligence information with covered entities.

(C) Procedures for the sanitization and declassification of intelligence, including the efficiency of such procedures.

(D) Which criteria and procedures should be implemented to identify intelligence community products for expedited sharing.

(E) Current and projected national intelligence requirements that relate to cybersecurity threats to covered entities.

(F) Budgetary changes to ensure that the intelligence community is postured to provide adequate indicators and warning of cybersecurity threats to covered entities.

(3) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than December 31, 2021, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the review required under this subsection.

(B) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under subparagraph (A) may be submitted in classified or unclassified form. If such report is submitted in unclassified form, it may include a classified annex.

(b) Review of National Security Directive 42.—Not later than December 31, 2021, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing the results of a review of the implementation and effectiveness of National Security Directive 42, with a specific focus on the role of the National Manager for National Security Systems. Such review shall include—

(1) an appraisal of the National Manager’s authorities and resources;

(2) consideration of the definition of “national security system”; and

(3) recommendations to improve the cybersecurity posture of national security assets, including such assets controlled or accessed by covered entities.

(c) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and

(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.

(2) COVERED ENTITIES.—The term “covered entities” means—

(A) owners and operators of critical infrastructure; and

(B) academic institutions in the United States, corporations incorporated in the United States, and corporations operating inside the United States.

(a) Study.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Security Agency shall conduct a feasibility study with respect to requiring contractors (including subcontractors) of departments or agencies of the Federal Government that own or operate national security systems to implement mandatory cybersecurity policies or defensive measures. The study shall include—

(1) the estimated cost to the Federal Government of deploying such mandatory cybersecurity policies or defensive measures;

(2) whether there are sufficient legal and policy authorities in place to implement such mandatory cybersecurity policies or defensive measures;

(3) a description of enforcement mechanisms for such mandatory cybersecurity policies or defensive measures; and

(4) the timeline for implementation of such mandatory cybersecurity policies or defensive measures.

(b) Briefings.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and quarterly thereafter during the one-year period following the date of such enactment, the Director shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a briefing on the study.

(c) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) DEFENSIVE MEASURES.—The term “defensive measures” has the meaning given that term in section 102 of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 1501).

(2) NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM.—The term “national security system” has the meaning given that term in section 3542 of title 44, United States Code.

(a) Findings; sense of congress.—

(1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(A) All elements of the intelligence community employ artificial intelligence in some form, and the artificial intelligence research and development efforts of many of the elements overlap;

(B) the elements do not adequately share resources, expertise, and data and often fail to make even closely related systems interoperate;

(C) siloed artificial intelligence research and development inefficiently splits resources across the intelligence community leading to duplicative and less effective capabilities;

(D) developing state-of-the-art artificial intelligence capabilities requires large quantities of training data, computing power, and subject matter expertise;

(E) research and development is the largest cost driver for artificial intelligence capabilities but once developed, artificial intelligence capabilities are generally inexpensive to provide to more users;

(F) the Director of National Intelligence has addressed similar challenges in the realm of information technology through the IC IT Enterprise initiative;

(G) the IC IT Enterprise initiative has successfully consolidated capabilities like cloud computing and identity management into intelligence community-wide capabilities, primarily by selecting executive agents from within the intelligence community to take the lead in their respective areas of interest and excellence; and

(H) the Augmenting Intelligence through Machines initiative of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence has centralized strategic thinking in its strategy for augmenting intelligence using machines but has not sufficiently coordinated the artificial intelligence and machine learning research programs of the intelligence community to encourage efficiency and avoid duplication of effort.

(2) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(A) consolidating the resources of the intelligence community regarding artificial intelligence research and development to carry out intelligence community-wide efforts would yield economies of scale and improve mission outcomes; and

(B) the Augmenting Intelligence through Machines initiative of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence should lead such efforts.

(b) AI project identification.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community, the Chief Data Officer of the Intelligence Community, the Director of Science and Technology of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of elements of the intelligence community the Director determines appropriate, shall identify research areas, applications, supporting technologies, and infrastructure regarding artificial intelligence that—

(1) would advance the mission of multiple elements of the intelligence community, with an emphasis in areas that are already being worked on by multiple elements;

(2) can be either assigned to an executive agent or addressed by a joint research and development effort; and

(3) have the potential to significantly impact intelligence outcomes or the efficiency of the intelligence community.

(c) Implementation plan.—

(1) DEVELOPMENT.—With respect to each research area, application, supporting technology, or infrastructure identified under subsection (b), the Director shall develop an implementation plan to consolidate research and development, program management, acquisition, and sustainment into an intelligence community-wide effort that results in intelligence community-wide capabilities. Each such plan shall include—

(A) an outline of the most significant barriers to creating effective, intelligence community-wide artificial intelligence capabilities; and

(B) recommendations to overcome such barriers.

(2) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 180 days after the date on which the Director identifies a research area, application, supporting technology, or infrastructure under subsection (b), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees the plan under paragraph (1).

(a) Findings.—Congress finds that—

(1) developing faster, more energy efficient, and more resilient computing is important to the future of the national security of the United States and the leadership by the United States in artificial intelligence; and

(2) multidisciplinary teams co-designing microelectronics for artificial intelligence will lead to unprecedented capabilities that will help ensure that the United States maintains its superiority in this worldwide competition for economic and national security.

(b) Awards for research and development.—The Director of National Intelligence, acting through the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, shall award contracts or grants, or enter into transactions other than contracts, to encourage microelectronics research.

(c) Use of funds.—The Director shall award contracts or grants to, or enter into transactions other than contracts with, entities under subsection (b) to carry out any of the following:

(1) Advanced engineering and applied research into novel computing models, materials, devices, architectures, or algorithms to enable the advancement of artificial intelligence and machine learning.

(2) Research efforts to—

(A) overcome challenges with engineering and applied research of microelectronics, including with respect to the physical limits on transistors, electrical interconnects, and memory elements; or

(B) promote long-term advancements in computing technologies, including by fostering a unified and multidisciplinary approach encompassing research and development into algorithm design, computing architectures, microelectronic devices and circuits, and the chemistry and physics of new materials.

(3) Any other activity the Director determines would promote the development of microelectronics research.

(d) Award amounts.—In awarding contracts or grants, or entering into transactions other than contracts, under subsection (b), the Director may award not more than a total of $15,000,000.

(a) Initial notice.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 304 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30104) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(j) Disclosure of reportable foreign contacts.—

“(1) COMMITTEE OBLIGATION TO NOTIFY.—Not later than 1 week after a reportable foreign contact, each political committee shall notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Commission of the reportable foreign contact and provide a summary of the circumstances with respect to such reportable foreign contact. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, not later than 1 week after receiving a notification from a political committee under this paragraph, shall submit to the political committee, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate written or electronic confirmation of receipt of the notification.

“(2) INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATION TO NOTIFY.—Not later than 3 days after a reportable foreign contact—

“(A) each candidate and each immediate family member of a candidate shall notify the treasurer or other designated official of the principal campaign committee of such candidate of the reportable foreign contact and provide a summary of the circumstances with respect to such reportable foreign contact; and

“(B) each official, employee, or agent of a political committee shall notify the treasurer or other designated official of the committee of the reportable foreign contact and provide a summary of the circumstances with respect to such reportable foreign contact.

“(3) REPORTABLE FOREIGN CONTACT.—In this subsection:

“(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘reportable foreign contact’ means any direct or indirect contact or communication that—

“(i) is between—

“(I) a candidate, an immediate family member of the candidate, a political committee, or any official, employee, or agent of such committee; and

“(II) an individual that the person described in subclause (I) knows, has reason to know, or reasonably believes is a covered foreign national; and

“(ii) the person described in clause (i)(I) knows, has reason to know, or reasonably believes involves—

“(I) an offer or other proposal for a contribution, donation, expenditure, disbursement, or solicitation described in section 319; or

“(II) coordination or collaboration with, an offer or provision of information or services to or from, or persistent and repeated contact with, a covered foreign national in connection with an election.

“(B) EXCEPTIONS.—

“(i) CONTACTS IN OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ELECTED OFFICIAL.—The term ‘reportable foreign contact’ shall not include any contact or communication with a covered foreign national by an elected official or an employee of an elected official solely in an official capacity as such an official or employee.

“(ii) CONTACTS FOR PURPOSES OF ENABLING OBSERVATION OF ELECTIONS BY INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS.—The term ‘reportable foreign contact’ shall not include any contact or communication with a covered foreign national by any person which is made for purposes of enabling the observation of elections in the United States by a foreign national or the observation of elections outside of the United States by a candidate, political committee, or any official, employee, or agent of such committee.

“(iii) EXCEPTIONS NOT APPLICABLE IF CONTACTS OR COMMUNICATIONS INVOLVE PROHIBITED DISBURSEMENTS.—A contact or communication by an elected official or an employee of an elected official shall not be considered to be made solely in an official capacity for purposes of clause (i), and a contact or communication shall not be considered to be made for purposes of enabling the observation of elections for purposes of clause (ii), if the contact or communication involves a contribution, donation, expenditure, disbursement, or solicitation described in section 319.

“(C) COVERED FOREIGN NATIONAL DEFINED.—

“(i) IN GENERAL.—In this paragraph, the term ‘covered foreign national’ means—

“(I) a foreign principal (as defined in section 1(b) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611(b))) that is a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party;

“(II) any person who acts as an agent, representative, employee, or servant, or any person who acts in any other capacity at the order, request, or under the direction or control, of a foreign principal described in subclause (I) or of a person any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign principal described in subclause (I); or

“(III) any person included in the list of specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury pursuant to authorities relating to the imposition of sanctions relating to the conduct of a foreign principal described in subclause (I).

“(ii) CLARIFICATION REGARDING APPLICATION TO CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES.—In the case of a citizen of the United States, subclause (II) of clause (i) applies only to the extent that the person involved acts within the scope of that person’s status as the agent of a foreign principal described in subclause (I) of clause (i).

“(4) IMMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBER.—In this subsection, the term ‘immediate family member’ means, with respect to a candidate, a parent, parent-in-law, spouse, adult child, or sibling.”.

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to reportable foreign contacts which occur on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(b) Information included on report.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 304(b) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 30104(b)) is amended—

(A) by striking “and” at the end of paragraph (7);

(B) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (8) and inserting “; and”; and

(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(9) for any reportable foreign contact (as defined in subsection (j)(3))—

“(A) the date, time, and location of the contact;

“(B) the date and time of when a designated official of the committee was notified of the contact;

“(C) the identity of individuals involved; and

“(D) a description of the contact, including the nature of any contribution, donation, expenditure, disbursement, or solicitation involved and the nature of any activity described in subsection (j)(3)(A)(ii)(II) involved.”.

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to reports filed on or after the expiration of the 60-day period which begins on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(a) In general.—Section 302 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30102) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(j) Reportable foreign contacts compliance policy.—

“(1) REPORTING.—Each political committee shall establish a policy that requires all officials, employees, and agents of such committee to notify the treasurer or other appropriate designated official of the committee of any reportable foreign contact (as defined in section 304(j)) not later than 3 days after such contact was made.

“(2) RETENTION AND PRESERVATION OF RECORDS.—Each political committee shall establish a policy that provides for the retention and preservation of records and information related to reportable foreign contacts (as so defined) for a period of not less than 3 years.

“(3) CERTIFICATION.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—Upon filing its statement of organization under section 303(a), and with each report filed under section 304(a), the treasurer of each political committee (other than an authorized committee) shall certify that—

“(i) the committee has in place policies that meet the requirements of paragraphs (1) and (2);

“(ii) the committee has designated an official to monitor compliance with such policies; and

“(iii) not later than 1 week after the beginning of any formal or informal affiliation with the committee, all officials, employees, and agents of such committee will—

“(I) receive notice of such policies;

“(II) be informed of the prohibitions under section 319; and

“(III) sign a certification affirming their understanding of such policies and prohibitions.

“(B) AUTHORIZED COMMITTEES.—With respect to an authorized committee, the candidate shall make the certification required under subparagraph (A).”.

(b) Effective date.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply with respect to political committees which file a statement of organization under section 303(a) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30103(a)) on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) TRANSITION RULE FOR EXISTING COMMITTEES.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, each political committee under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 shall file a certification with the Federal Election Commission that the committee is in compliance with the requirements of section 302(j) of such Act (as added by subsection (a)).

Section 309(d)(1) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30109(d)(1)) is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs:

“(E) Any person who knowingly and willfully commits a violation of subsection (j) or (b)(9) of section 304 or section 302(j) shall be fined not more than $500,000, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.

“(F) Any person who knowingly and willfully conceals or destroys any materials relating to a reportable foreign contact (as defined in section 304(j)) shall be fined not more than $1,000,000, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.”.

(a) In general.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report relating to notifications received by the Federal Bureau of Investigation under section 304(j)(1) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (as added by section 701(a) of this Act).

(b) Elements.—Each report under subsection (a) shall include, at a minimum, the following with respect to notifications described in subsection (a):

(1) The number of such notifications received from political committees during the year covered by the report.

(2) A description of protocols and procedures developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation relating to receipt and maintenance of records relating to such notifications.

(3) With respect to such notifications received during the year covered by the report, a description of any subsequent actions taken by the Director resulting from the receipt of such notifications.

(c) Congressional intelligence committees defined.—In this section, the term “congressional intelligence committees” has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

Nothing in this subtitle or the amendments made by this subtitle shall be construed—

(1) to impede legitimate journalistic activities; or

(2) to impose any additional limitation on the right to express political views or to participate in public discourse of any individual who—

(A) resides in the United States;

(B) is not a citizen of the United States or a national of the United States, as defined in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)); and

(C) is not lawfully admitted for permanent residence, as defined by section 101(a)(20) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20)).

(a) Clarification of treatment of provision of certain information as contribution or donation of a thing of value.—Section 319 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30121) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(c) Clarification of treatment of provision of certain information as contribution or donation of a thing of value.—For purposes of this section, a ‘contribution or donation of money or other thing of value’ includes the provision of opposition research, polling, or other non-public information relating to a candidate for election for a Federal, State, or local office for the purpose of influencing the election, regardless of whether such research, polling, or information has monetary value, except that nothing in this subsection shall be construed to treat the mere provision of an opinion about a candidate as a thing of value for purposes of this section.”.

(b) Clarification of application of foreign money ban to all contributions and donations of things of value and to all solicitations of contributions and donations of things of value.—Section 319(a) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 30121(a)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking “promise to make a contribution or donation” and inserting “promise to make such a contribution or donation”;

(2) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking “donation” and inserting “donation of money or other thing of value, or to make an express or implied promise to make such a contribution or donation,”; and

(3) by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:

“(2) a person to solicit, accept, or receive (directly or indirectly) a contribution or donation described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1), or to solicit, accept, or receive (directly or indirectly) an express or implied promise to make such a contribution or donation, from a foreign national.”.

(c) Enhanced penalty for certain violations.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 309(d)(1) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 30109(d)(1)), as amended by section 703, is further amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

“(G) (i) Any person who knowingly and willfully commits a violation of section 319 which involves a foreign national which is a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party, or which involves a thing of value consisting of the provision of opposition research, polling, or other non-public information relating to a candidate for election for a Federal, State, or local office for the purpose of influencing the election, shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both.

“(ii) In clause (i), each of the terms ‘government of a foreign country’ and ‘foreign political party’ has the meaning given such term in section 1 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as Amended (22 U.S.C. 611).”.

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to violations committed on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(a) Provision of information by Federal Election Commission.—Section 303 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30103) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(e) Acknowledgment of foreign money ban.—

“(1) NOTIFICATION BY COMMISSION.—Not later than 30 days after a political committee files its statement of organization under subsection (a), and biennially thereafter until the committee terminates, the Commission shall provide the committee with a written explanation of section 319.

“(2) ACKNOWLEDGMENT BY COMMITTEE.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after receiving the written explanation of section 319 under paragraph (1), the committee shall transmit to the Commission a signed certification that the committee has received such written explanation and has provided a copy of the explanation to all members, employees, contractors, and volunteers of the committee.

“(B) PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR SIGNATURE.—The certification required under subparagraph (A) shall be signed—

“(i) in the case of an authorized committee of a candidate, by the candidate; or

“(ii) in the case of any other political committee, by the treasurer of the committee.”.

(b) Effective date; transition for existing committees.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply with respect to political committees which file statements of organization under section 303 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30103) on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) TRANSITION FOR EXISTING COMMITTEES.—

(A) NOTIFICATION BY FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Federal Election Commission shall provide each political committee under such Act with the written explanation of section 319 of such Act, as required under section 303(e)(1) of such Act (as added by subsection (a)).

(B) ACKNOWLEDGMENT BY COMMITTEE.—Not later than 30 days after receiving the written explanation under subparagraph (A), each political committee under such Act shall transmit to the Federal Election Commission the signed certification, as required under section 303(e)(2) of such Act (as added by subsection (a)).

(a) Findings; sense of Congress.—

(1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(A) There is a strong bipartisan conviction, shared widely throughout the legislative and executive branches of the United States Government and elsewhere, that ensuring full accountability for the brutal murder on October 2, 2018, of Jamal Khashoggi, a former Washington Post columnist and resident of the United States, is in the public interest and also the national interest of the United States.

(B) Section 5714 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (division E of Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 2173) required the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a written report in “unclassified form” that includes “identification of those who carried out, participated in, ordered, or were otherwise complicit in or responsible for the death of Jamal Khashoggi.”.

(C) Section 1277 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 1701) likewise obligated the Director to submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a written report on the assessment of the intelligence community regarding Mr. Khashoggi’s brutal murder.

(D) Such section 1277 specifically called, among other things, for a determination and presentation of evidence with respect to the advance knowledge and role of any current or former official of the Government of Saudi Arabia or any current or former senior Saudi political figure over the directing, ordering, or tampering of evidence in relation to Mr. Khashoggi’s murder.

(E) Such section 1277 also required the Director to submit a list of foreign persons whom the Director has high confidence were responsible for, complicit in, or otherwise knowingly and materially assisted the murder, or impeded its impartial investigation, or who ordered or otherwise directed an act or acts contributing to or causing the murder.

(F) Contrary to the unambiguous and lawful command of Congress under such sections 5714 and 1277, the Director did not produce any unclassified report as required by either such section, and instead, on February 20, 2020, the Director submitted to such committees a classified report, which the Director referred to as an “annex”.

(G) The evident belief of the Director that no unclassified information can be produced in accordance with the directives of Congress is dubious, in light of the extensive body of credible, unclassified reporting available regarding the murder of Mr. Khashoggi, and the roles and culpability of officials at the highest levels of the Government of Saudi Arabia.

(2) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence should reasonably have been able to produce an unclassified report pursuant to section 5714 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 and section 1277 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 that did not alter or obscure, in any way, the intelligence community’s core determinations, its presentation of evidence, or identification of relevant persons, as required, without putting sources and methods at risk.

(b) Limitation.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2021 for any element of the intelligence community may be obligated or expended for the purposes described in paragraph (2) until the date on which the Director of National Intelligence makes public the covered annex pursuant to subsection (d).

(2) PURPOSES DESCRIBED.—The purposes described in this paragraph are any engagement or interaction of any kind with the General Intelligence Presidency of the Government of Saudi Arabia, or any other intelligence or security service of the Government of Saudi Arabia, including with respect to supporting, partnering, assisting, or otherwise cooperating, directly or indirectly with the General Intelligence Presidency or such services.

(3) EXCEPTION.—The limitation in paragraph (1) shall not apply to sharing information with or receiving from the Government of Saudi Arabia regarding—

(A) a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person; or

(B) law enforcement activities, including with respect to cooperation between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Government of Saudi Arabia.

(c) Declassification review.—

(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director, acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall complete a declassification review of the covered annex.

(2) CONDUCT OF REVIEW.—The declassification review under paragraph (1) shall—

(A) be conducted in accordance with section 1.7 of Executive Order No. 13526 (75 Fed. Reg. 707; relating to classified national security information) with respect to requiring that in no case shall information be classified, continue to be maintained as classified, or fail to be declassified in order to—

(i) conceal violations of law;

(ii) prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; or

(iii) prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protecting in the interest of the national security;

(B) evaluate and take into consideration the full body of credible, open-source reporting available to the intelligence community regarding the murder of Jamal Khashoggi; and

(C) make public as much information contained in the covered annex as possible.

(d) Publication and submission.—

(1) PUBLICATION.—Following the declassification review of the covered annex under subsection (c), the Director shall make public on the internet website of the Director the covered annex. If the declassification review determines that any information in the covered annex should remain classified, the Director may redact such information in a manner that—

(A) prevents public release of information only to the extent necessary to protect specific, identified harms to the national security of the United States; and

(B) does not alter or obscure the determinations of, presentation of evidence by, or identification of relevant persons by, the intelligence community with respect to the murder of Jamal Khashoggi.

(2) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 15 days before the date on which the Director makes the covered annex public under paragraph (1), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the redactions made by the Director under such paragraph, including, for each such redaction, an explanation of how the redacted information would harm the national security of the United States despite the robust body of available open-source reporting on the murder of Jamal Khashoggi.

(3) FORM.—The report under paragraph (2) shall be in unclassified form to the extent practicable, but may include a classified annex.

(e) Covered annex defined.—In this section, the term “covered annex” means the report regarding the murder of Jamal Khashoggi submitted on February 20, 2020, by the Director of National Intelligence to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(a) Prohibition.—Except as provided by subsection (b), none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2021 for any element of the intelligence community may be obligated or expended to share intelligence for the purpose of enabling or assisting air strikes in Yemen by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition.

(b) Exception.—The prohibition under subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to the sharing of intelligence with Saudi Arabia for the purposes of countering al‐Qaeda, the Islamic State in Yemen, or other terrorist groups that the intelligence community assesses to be operating in Yemen and to pose a threat to the United States.

(a) Sense of Congress; policy.—

(1) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that it is in the national interest of the United States that the United States that all parties to the Yemen conflict comply with the law of armed conflict.

(2) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States that credible evidence of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights by the coalition led by Saudi Arabia in Yemen should be a principal factor in United States decisions to authorize the sale, transfer, or delivery of offensive weapons and equipment to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

(b) Report.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of relevant intelligence community entities, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing—

(A) a detailed description of any incident that has occurred since 2015 in which Saudi Arabia or one of its coalition partners has been determined to have used United States weapons against civilians or civilian objects in Yemen;

(B) for each such incident, the assessment of the intelligence community as to whether the leadership of Saudi Arabia took credible steps following the incident to alter the conduct of its armed forces; and

(C) an assessment of—

(i) efforts by the Government of Saudi Arabia since 2015 to avoid disproportionate harm to civilians and civilian objects in Yemen;

(ii) whether United States assistance to the Saudi-led coalition has led to a demonstrable decrease in civilians killed or injured by Saudi-led airstrikes and damage to civilian infrastructure;

(iii) the humanitarian and strategic consequences of strikes against civilians in Yemen for the broader Middle East region and United States interests; and

(iv) the credibility of written assurances officials of Saudi Arabia provided to the United States Government in 2017, including whether Saudi Arabia has taken substantial and meaningful steps to adhere to such assurances.

(2) SOURCES.—The report required under this subsection shall be based on all available sources.

(3) DELAY OF SUBMITTAL.—If the Director determines that the report cannot be submitted by the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall, before such date—

(A) submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report setting forth the reasons why the report cannot be submitted by such date and an estimated date for the submission of the report; and

(B) together with the relevant experts from the National Intelligence Council and other relevant elements of the intelligence community, testify before the appropriate congressional committees with respect to the issues to be covered by the report.

(4) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(c) Rule of construction.—Nothing in this section may be construed as authorizing the use of military force or sharing of intelligence with the Government of Saudi Arabia.

(d) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(2) The term “offensive weapons” means precision-guided munitions, other bombs, anti-tank missiles, small-diameter rockets, and large mortars.

(a) Sense of Congress; policy.—

(1) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that it is in the national interest of the United States to prevent the proliferation of sensitive unmanned aerial vehicles (in this section referred to as “UAV”) and related technology, especially to China, Russia, and other countries that the National Defense Strategy identifies as peer or near-peer competitors.

(2) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States that actions to prevent the proliferation of sensitive UAV technology to China, Russia, and other countries shall be a principal factor in decisions of the United States to authorize the sale, transfer, or delivery of category 1 UAV systems to the United Arab Emirates.

(b) Report.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of relevant intelligence community elements, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing—

(A) an assessment of efforts by the United Arab Emirates (in this section referred to as “UAE”) since 2014 to prevent the proliferation of UAV and related technology, including category 1 UAV systems;

(B) a description of any cooperation between UAE-based entities and entities in China, Russia, or any other country that the National Defense Strategy identifies as a peer competitor;

(C) a description of any effort by the government of the UAE and UAE-based entities to conceal such cooperation from the United States;

(D) a detailed inventory of all instances in which the government of the UAE and UAE-based entities have promoted the transfer and sale of armed and unarmed UAV technology, including details regarding to which countries the government of the UAE and UAE-based entities transferred or proposed transferring the technology;

(E) a description of the attitude and willingness of the leadership of the UAE to take steps to comply with the standards of the Missile Technology Control Regime (in this section referred to as the “MTCR”) for the export of UAVs and category 1 UAV systems; and

(F) a description of the technological and defense benefits that Russia, China, and other countries are assessed to have accrued as a result of cooperation, research and development, and related activities with UAE-based entities.

(2) SOURCES.—The report required under this subsection shall be based on all available sources.

(3) DELAY OF SUBMITTAL.—If the Director determines that the report cannot be submitted by the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall, before such date—

(A) submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report setting forth the reasons why the report cannot be submitted by such date and an estimated date for the submission of the report; and

(B) together with the relevant experts from the National Intelligence Council and other relevant elements of the intelligence community, testify before the appropriate congressional committees with respect to the issues to be covered by the report.

(4) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(c) Rule of construction.—Nothing in this section may be construed as authorizing the sharing of intelligence with the government of the UAE.

(d) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(2) The term “UAV technology” means armed and unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles capable of carrying 500 kilogram payloads for more than 300 kilometers, including those that fly under 650 kilometers per hour.

(3) The term “category 1 UAV system” means a complete rocket and all unmanned aerial vehicle systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, sounding rockets, cruise missiles, target drones, and reconnaissance drones), capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kilograms to a range of at least 300 kilometers, and the major complete subsystems (including rocket stages, engines, guidance sets, and re-entry vehicles), related software and technology, and specially designed production facilities for such rockets and systems.

(a) Sense of Congress; Statement of Policy.—

(1) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(A) it is in the vital national interest of the United States to prevent the onward proliferation of nuclear weapons technology in the Middle East;

(B) Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s public declaration in March 2018 that Saudi Arabia would pursue a nuclear bomb if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, and Iran’s separate decision to expand nuclear enrichment activities following the withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in May 2018, both increase the threat of a regional nuclear arms race; and

(C) the Comptroller General of the United States concluded in May 2020 that—

(i) it is unclear whether the Department of State and the Department of Energy kept Congress “fully and currently informed” of nuclear cooperation negotiations with Saudi Arabia, as required by section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153); and

(ii) these negotiations are stalled over nonproliferation conditions.

(2) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States that any civil nuclear cooperation agreement by the United States with Saudi Arabia should include strong safeguards, including the nonproliferation criteria established under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(b) Report.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of elements of the intelligence community that the Director determines appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing an assessment of the efforts by the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since 2015 to develop a nuclear program.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The report under paragraph (1) shall include an assessment of the following:

(A) The state of nuclear cooperation between Saudi Arabia and any other country other than the United States, such as the People’s Republic of China or the Russian Federation.

(B) Efforts by Saudi Arabia to modernize and further develop the missile capabilities and program of Saudi Arabia, including with other countries other than the United States, such as China.

(C) The willingness of Saudi Arabia to accede to and abide by a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) that would include the prohibition on domestic uranium enrichment.

(D) The willingness of Saudi Arabia to sign, implement, and abide by an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

(E) The willingness of Saudi Arabia to accept international monitoring and inspections of the nuclear activities of Saudi Arabia, similar in scope to such monitoring and inspections that Iran agreed to under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

(F) If the United States and Saudi Arabia were to enter into a civil nuclear cooperation agreement under such section 123 that does not contain the prohibitions and criteria described in subparagraphs (C) and (D), the likelihood that the United Arab Emirates would seek to remove restrictions on its peaceful nuclear program and renegotiate its civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States.

(3) SOURCES.—The report under paragraph (1) shall be based on all available credible sources.

(4) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(5) EXTENSION.—If the Director of National Intelligence determines that the Director cannot submit the report under paragraph (1) by the date required by such paragraph, the Director shall, before such date—

(A) submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report setting forth the reasons why the report cannot be submitted by such date and an estimated date for the submission of the report; and

(B) along with the relevant experts from the National Intelligence Council and other relevant elements of the intelligence community, testify before the appropriate congressional committees on the issues that will be covered by the report.

(c) Rule of construction.—Nothing in this section may be construed as authorizing——

(1) the sharing of intelligence with the Government of Saudi Arabia; or

(2) any nuclear cooperation with the Government of Saudi Arabia.

(d) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the congressional intelligence committees; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(2) JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION.—The term “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” means the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed at Vienna on July 14, 2015, by Iran and by the People’s Republic of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and all implementing materials and agreements related to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

(3) PROHIBITION ON DOMESTIC URANIUM ENRICHMENT.—The term “prohibition on domestic uranium enrichment” means, with respect to a civil nuclear cooperation agreement under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), provisions in the agreement that prohibit domestic uranium enrichment in the same manner as the agreement entered into by the United States and the United Arab Emirates under such section.

(a) Report.—Not later than February 1, 2021, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report that includes a detailed description of—

(1) the role of governmental and nongovernmental entities and individuals of Saudi Arabia in promoting, funding, and exporting ideologies, including so-called “Wahhabist ideology”, that inspire extremism or extremist groups in other countries; and

(2) the strategic consequences for vital national security interests of the United States as a result of such promotion, funding, or export.

(b) Form.—The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(a) Report.—Not later than February 1, 2021, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report that includes an assessment of any efforts, including the use of financial resources, by the Governments of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, or Qatar to influence political processes, policies, policymakers, or public debate in the United States (without regard to the legality of such efforts).

(b) Form.—The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(a) Finding; sense of Congress.—

(1) FINDING.—Congress finds that the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China promulgated the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on June 30, 2020.

(2) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(A) the People’s Republic of China is legally bound to guarantee the civil liberties of the people of Hong Kong through 2047 under the Basic Law and the “Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong” (hereafter the Joint Declaration), in which China committed that for 50 years, the “social and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain unchanged, and so will the life-style”;

(B) the Joint Declaration states that “Rights and freedoms, including those of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research and of religious belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region”, and such rights are reiterated in Chapter III of the Basic Law;

(C) the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region violates China’s commitments under the Joint Declaration, constituting a violation of international law;

(D) the United States of America has a continued interest in the autonomy of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, particularly as it relates to the continued viability of the freedom of speech, of the press, and of publication; the freedom of association, or assembly; the freedom from arbitrary or unlawful arrest, detention, or imprisonment; the freedom from arbitrary or unlawful search of, or intrusion into, a Hong Kong resident’s home or other premises; the freedom and privacy of communication; the freedom of conscience; judicial independence; and the right to initiate legal proceedings in the courts to hold authorities accountable for unlawful acts; and

(E) the introduction of the Committee for Safeguarding National Security and a national security division of the Hong Kong Police Force that operates outside of the judicial oversight of the courts of Hong Kong further extends the reach of China’s security apparatus, undermining the integrity and independence of the judicial system of Hong Kong.

(b) Reports.—Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), is amended by inserting after section 1107 the following new section:

(c) Clerical amendment.—The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1107 the following new item:

“Sec. 1107A. Annual reports on security services of the People’s Republic of China in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.”.

(a) Research partnership.—

(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall seek to enter into a partnership with an academic or non-profit research institution to—

(A) carry out joint unclassified geospatial intelligence analyses of the activities of the People’s Republic of China that pose risks to the national security interests of the United States; and

(B) make available on a publicly available internet website unclassified geospatial intelligence products relating to such analyses.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The Director shall ensure that the activities of China analyzed under paragraph (1)(A) include the following:

(A) Any notable developments relating to the global activities of the People’s Liberation Army Ground Force, the People’s Liberation Army Navy, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force, and the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force Coast Guard Corps.

(B) Infrastructure projects associated with the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative.

(C) Maritime land reclamation activities conducted by China in the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean region, and the broader maritime commons.

(D) Matters relevant to global public health and climate security, including—

(i) indications and warnings of disease outbreaks with pandemic potential;

(ii) the activities of China likely contributing to climate change; and

(iii) any environmental degradation directly resulting from the practices of China.

(3) CONSORTIUM.—In carrying out paragraph (1), the Director may enter into a partnership with—

(A) one research institution; or

(B) a consortium of research institutions if the Director determines that the inclusion of multiple institutions will result in more effective research conducted pursuant to this section or improve the outcomes of such research.

(4) DURATION.—The Director shall carry out a partnership under this section for a period that is not less than 10 years following the date of the enactment of this Act.

(5) IMPROVEMENTS TO PARTNERSHIP.—The Director may modify the partnership under paragraph (1) or select a new research institution with which to enter into such a partnership if—

(A) the Director consults with the congressional intelligence committees with respect to the proposed modified or new partnership;

(B) the modified or new partnership is carried out in accordance with this section; and

(C) the Director determines that the modified or new partnership will result in more effective research conducted pursuant to this section or improve the outcomes of such research.

(b) Open-Source data.—

(1) IDENTIFICATION AND PUBLICATION.—During the life of the partnership under subsection (a), the Director shall regularly—

(A) identify raw, unclassified geospatial data that could improve the research conducted under the partnership if the data was made publicly available; and

(B) make such data publicly available.

(2) CONSULTATION.—The Director shall carry out paragraph (1) in consultation with the research institution or consortium of research institutions involved with the partnership under subsection (a).

(c) Briefings.—Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter during the life of the partnership under subsection (a), the Director shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the partnership. Each such briefing shall include the following:

(1) The outcomes of research conducted under the partnership.

(2) Identification of the actions that have been taken to increase the quantity and quality of unclassified geospatial analysis products made publicly available under the partnership, including the quantity and types of raw data the partnership has made publicly available.

(3) Identification of actual and projected costs to carry out the partnership.

(d) Appropriate congressional committees defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the congressional intelligence committees; and

(2) the Subcommittees on Defense of the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate.

(a) Report.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, and make publicly available on the internet website of the Director, a report on the pharmaceutical and personal protective equipment regulatory practices of the People’s Republic of China.

(b) Contents.—The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) An assessment of the quantity of active pharmaceutical ingredients produced annually within China.

(2) An estimate of the percentage of active pharmaceutical ingredients produced globally that originate in China.

(3) A description of the National Medical Products Administration of China, including with respect to—

(A) the roles and responsibilities of the Administration;

(B) the organizational structure of the Administration; and

(C) any affiliated institutions of the National Medical Products Administration.

(4) An assessment of the capacity of the National Medical Products Administration to effectively develop safety standards, efficacy standards, and any other relevant standards concerning the production of active pharmaceutical ingredients and pharmaceutical drugs.

(5) An assessment of the capacity of the National Medical Products Administration to enforce standards on the production and distribution of active pharmaceutical ingredients and pharmaceutical drugs.

(6) An overview of qualitative disparities between active pharmaceutical ingredients and pharmaceutical drugs approved by the National Medical Products Administration and similar drugs subject to regulatory oversight and approval in the markets of the member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

(7) An assessment of the qualitative disparities between the standards and enforcement practices of the National Medical Products Administration on the production and distribution of active pharmaceutical ingredients and pharmaceutical drugs and the good manufacturing practice guidelines issued by the International Council for Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use.

(8) An assessment of the susceptibility of the National Medical Products Administration, the subordinate organizations of the National Medical Products Administration, and other associated personnel to engage in corrupt practices, particularly practices that relate to assessing the safety of pharmaceutical ingredients and other pharmaceutical drugs within the authority of the National Medical Products Administration.

(9) An assessment of the national security risks associated with the reliance by the United States on pharmaceutical ingredients and pharmaceutical drugs originating in China, including an assessment of how and whether China could leverage its production of certain pharmaceutical ingredients as a means to coerce the United States or the partners and allies of the United States.

(10) An assessment of the percentage of personal protective equipment produced globally that originates in China.

(11) An assessment of the national security risks associated with any reliance by the United States on personal protective equipment originating in China, including an assessment of how and whether China could leverage its production of personal protective equipment as a means to coerce the United States or the partners and allies of the United States.

(c) Coordination.—In carrying out subsection (a), the Director shall coordinate with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and any other relevant head of an element of the intelligence community.

(d) Form.—The report submitted to the appropriate congressional committees under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(e) Appropriate congressional committees defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the congressional intelligence committees;

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives; and

(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Finance of the Senate.

(a) Requirement.—The Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall produce a National Intelligence Estimate on the situation in Afghanistan.

(b) Matters.—The National Intelligence Estimate produced under subsection (a) shall include an assessment of the prospects of a durable intra-Afghan settlement of the conflict in Afghanistan that leads to—

(1) a permanent ceasefire and sustained reduction in violence;

(2) a verifiable break between the Taliban and al-Qaeda;

(3) verifiable cooperation by the Taliban in efforts against al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Khorasan, and associated international terrorists the intelligence community determines are active in Afghanistan and pose a threat to the United States homeland or United States interests abroad; and

(4) sustainment of the social and human rights progress achieved by Afghan women and girls since 2001.

(c) Submission to Congress.—

(1) SUBMISSION.—Not later than February 1, 2021, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees the National Intelligence Estimate produced under subsection (a), including all intelligence reporting underlying the Estimate.

(2) NOTICE REGARDING SUBMISSION.—If before February 1, 2021, the Director determines that the National Intelligence Estimate produced under subsection (a) cannot be submitted by such date, the Director shall (before such date)—

(A) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report setting forth the reasons why the National Intelligence Estimate cannot be submitted by such date and an estimated date for the submission of the National Intelligence Estimate; and

(B) testify before the congressional intelligence committees on the issues that will be covered by the National Intelligence Estimate.

(3) FORM.—The National Intelligence Estimate shall be submitted under paragraph (1) in classified form.

(d) Public version.—Consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, at the same time as the Director submits to the congressional intelligence committees the National Intelligence Estimate under subsection (c), the Director shall make publicly available on the internet website of the Director an unclassified version of the key findings of the National Intelligence Estimate.

(a) Assessment required.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written assessment regarding tensions between the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan, including with respect to the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Such assessment shall include each of the following:

(1) An identification of the strategic interests of the United States and its partners in the Armenia-Azerbaijan region.

(2) A description of all significant uses of force in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh region and the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan during calendar year 2020, including a description of each significant use of force and an assessment of who initiated the use of such force.

(3) An assessment of the effect of United States military assistance to Azerbaijan and Armenia on the regional balance of power and the likelihood of further use of military force.

(4) An assessment of the likelihood of any further uses of force or potentially destabilizing activities in the region in the near- to medium-term.

(b) Form of assessment.—The assessment required under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(a) In general.—Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 108A the following new section:

(b) Clerical amendment.—The table of contents at the beginning of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 108A the following new item:

“Sec. 108B. Annual reports on world-wide threats.”.

(a) Reports.—Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as amended by section 602, is further amended by inserting after section 1110 the following new section:

(b) Clerical amendment.—The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1110, as added by section 602, the following new item:

“Sec. 1111. Annual intelligence assessments on relationship between women and violent extremism.”.

Section 120 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3060) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsections (d) and (e) as subsections (e) and (f), respectively; and

(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new subsection (d):

(a) Funding for scholarship, fellowship, and grant programs.—Section 810 of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1910) is amended—

(1) in subsection (c), by striking “for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2005,” and inserting “for each of fiscal years 2005 through 2021”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(d) Fiscal years beginning with fiscal year 2022.—In addition to amounts that may be made available to the Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal year, there is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2022, $8,000,000, to carry out the scholarship, fellowship, and grant programs under subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), respectively, of section 802(a)(1).”.

(b) Funding for National Flagship Language Initiative.—Section 811 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1911) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by striking “$10,000,000” and inserting “$16,000,000”; and

(2) in subsection (b), by striking “for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2005,” and inserting “for each of fiscal years 2005 through 2021”.

(c) Funding for scholarship program for advanced English language studies.—Section 812 of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1912) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by striking “for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2005,” and inserting “for each of fiscal years 2005 through 2021”;

(2) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c);

(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection (b):

“(b) Fiscal years beginning with fiscal year 2022.—In addition to amounts that may be made available to the Secretary under the Fund for a fiscal year, there is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2022, $2,000,000, to carry out the scholarship programs for English language studies by certain heritage community citizens under section 802(a)(1)(E).”; and

(4) in subsection (c), as so redesignated, by striking “subsection (a)” and inserting “this section”.

(a) Report.—Section 5712 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 2171) is—

(1) transferred to title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.);

(2) inserted after section 1112 of such title, as added by section 902;

(3) redesignated as section 1112; and

(4) amended—

(A) in the heading, by striking “and civil liberties” and inserting “, civil liberties, and civil rights”; and

(B) in subsection (b)—

(i) in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking “Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,” and inserting “On an annual basis,”; and

(ii) by striking “and civil liberties”, each place it appears and inserting “, civil liberties, and civil rights”.

(b) Clerical amendment.—The table of contents at the beginning of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1111, as added by section 902, the following new item:

“Sec. 1112. Report on best practices to protect privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights of Chinese Americans.”.

(a) National Intelligence Estimate.—

(1) REQUIREMENT.—The Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall produce a National Intelligence Estimate on the threat of global pandemic disease, including with respect to the following:

(A) An assessment of the possible courses of the COVID–19 pandemic during the 18 months following the date of the Estimate, including—

(i) the projected spread of COVID–19 outside the United States and the likelihood of subsequent major outbreaks;

(ii) the capacity of countries and international organizations to combat the further spread of COVID–19, including risks and opportunities for further global cooperation; and

(iii) the risks to the national security and health security of the United States if COVID–19 is not contained abroad.

(B) An assessment of the global public health system and the responses of the system to the COVID–19 pandemic, including—

(i) prospects for an effective global disease surveillance and response system, opportunities to advance the development of such a system, and signposts for evaluating whether or not an effective system has been developed before a disease outbreak occurs; and

(ii) an assessment of global health system capacity.

(C) An assessment of—

(i) the humanitarian and economic implications of the COVID–19 pandemic; and

(ii) the consequences of the COVID–19 pandemic with respect to political stability, armed conflict, democratization, and the global leadership by the United States of the post-World War II international system.

(D) An assessment of—

(i) likely threats by global pandemic diseases during the 10-year period following the date of the Estimate;

(ii) global readiness to avert a future global pandemic;

(iii) challenges and opportunities for the policy of the United States to advance global pandemic preparedness; and

(iv) the potential role of non-state and state-backed global influence activities or disinformation campaigns involving COVID–19 or future potential global pandemics.

(E) Any other matters the Director determines appropriate.

(2) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—

(A) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate the National Intelligence Estimate produced under paragraph (1), including all intelligence reporting underlying the Estimate.

(B) NOTICE REGARDING SUBMISSION.—If before the end of the 90-day period specified in subparagraph (A) the Director determines that the National Intelligence Estimate under paragraph (1) cannot be submitted by the end of that period, the Director shall (before the end of that period)—

(i) submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report setting forth—

(I) the reasons why the National Intelligence Estimate cannot be submitted by the end of that period; and

(II) an estimated date for the submission of the National Intelligence Estimate; and

(ii) testify before such committees on the issues that will be covered by the National Intelligence Estimate.

(C) FORM.—The National Intelligence Estimate shall be submitted under subparagraph (A) in classified form.

(3) PUBLIC VERSION.—Consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, at the same time as the Director submits to the congressional intelligence committees the National Intelligence Estimate under paragraph (2), the Director shall submit to the congressional committees specified in paragraph (4), and make publicly available on the internet website of the Director, an unclassified version of the National Intelligence Estimate.

(4) CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES SPECIFIED.—The congressional committees specified in this paragraph are the following:

(A) The Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(B) The Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(5) CONSULTATION.—The Director shall prepare the National Intelligence Estimate under paragraph (1) in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Secretary of State, and any other head of an element of the Federal Government the Director of National Intelligence determines appropriate.

(b) Future pandemic plan.—

(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the congressional committees specified in paragraph (3), and make publicly available on the internet website of the President, a report containing a whole-of-government plan for an effective response to subsequent major outbreaks of the COVID–19 pandemic and for other future global pandemic diseases.

(2) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The plan under paragraph (1) shall address how to improve the following:

(A) Pandemic planning.

(B) Homeland preparedness.

(C) International disease surveillance.

(D) Diagnostic testing.

(E) Contact tracing.

(F) The role of the Federal Government with respect to the regulation, acquisition, and disbursement, of medical supplies and other public health resources necessary to respond to COVID–19 or other diseases with pandemic potential (including diagnostic testing equipment, biomedical equipment, drugs and medicines, and hygiene equipment).

(G) The procurement and distribution of personal protective equipment.

(H) Early domestic response to future global pandemic diseases in the United States.

(3) CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES SPECIFIED.—The congressional committees specified in this paragraph are the following:

(A) The Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(B) The Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(c) Global strategy.—

(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall transmit to the congressional committees specified in paragraph (2), and make publicly available on the internet website of the President, a report containing a global strategy for mobilizing international institutions to combat the COVID–19 pandemic.

(2) CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES SPECIFIED.—The congressional committees specified in this paragraph are the following:

(A) The Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(B) The Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

Section 6722(b)(2) of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (division E of Public Law 116–98) is amended—

(1) in the paragraph heading, by striking “Quinquennial” and inserting “Annual”;

(2) by striking “beginning on the date that is 5 years after the date on which the Director submits the report under paragraph (1), and every 5 years thereafter” and inserting “not later than January 31, 2021, and annually thereafter”; and

(3) by inserting “required under paragraph (1)” before the period at the end.

(a) Report.—

(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, and publish on the internet website of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, a report assessing the past and present efforts by the United States Government to collect and analyze open-source science and technology intelligence.

(2) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The report under paragraph (1) shall include a description of each of the following:

(A) Current efforts by the intelligence community to collect and analyze open-source science and technology intelligence.

(B) Current efforts by the People’s Republic of China to collect, analyze, and exploit open-source science and technology intelligence.

(C) Historical funding and human resourcing trends with respect to efforts by the United States Government to collect and analyze open-source science and technology intelligence.

(D) The rationale for previous reductions by the United States Government in funding or staffing for efforts to collect and analyze open-source science and technology intelligence.

(E) Any lack of authorities or statutory limitations that impede efforts of the United States Government to collect and analyze open-source science and technology intelligence.

(F) The resources required for the United States Government to initiate new, or expand existing, operations to collect and analyze open-source science and technology intelligence.

(G) Recommendations for expanding operations by the United States Government to collect and analyze open-source science and technology, including an assessment of the feasibility of—

(i) establishing a funding program of record dedicated to open-source science and technology intelligence;

(ii) co-locating open source-trained intelligence officers, intelligence officers with technical capabilities, and associated staff from different entities within and outside of the intelligence community; and

(iii) training a dedicated open-source intelligence officer cadre composed of language experts and science and technology experts.

(3) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but the report submitted to the congressional intelligence committees may include a classified annex.

(b) Interagency working group.—

(1) PREPARATION OF REPORT.—The Director of National Intelligence shall convene an interagency working group (in this section referred to as the “working group”) to prepare the report under subsection (a) and to provide the briefing under subsection (c).

(2) MEMBERS.—The working group shall be composed of representatives from the following:

(A) The Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

(B) The National Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

(C) The Central Intelligence Agency.

(D) The Defense Intelligence Agency.

(E) The Department of Defense.

(F) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

(G) The National Security Agency.

(H) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security.

(I) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(J) The Bureau for Intelligence and Research of the Department of State.

(K) The Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy.

(L) Any other component of the United States Government, regardless of whether the component is an element of the intelligence community, that the Director determines—

(i) collects open-source science and technology intelligence; and

(ii) would materially assist in the activities of the working group.

(c) Interim briefing.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the working group shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a briefing on the initial findings of the working group under subsection (a).

(d) Open-Source science and technology intelligence defined.—In this section, the term “open-source science and technology intelligence” means information of intelligence value regarding scientific and technological developments that appears in print or electronic form, including radio, television, newspapers, journals, the internet, commercial databases, videos, graphics, drawings, or any other publicly available source.

(a) Study.—The Director of National Intelligence shall seek to enter into an agreement with a federally funded research and development center or a nongovernmental entity to conduct a comprehensive study on the future of the collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, dissemination, and evaluation of open-source intelligence by the intelligence community. The Director shall select such entity in consultation with the congressional intelligence committees.

(b) Matters included.—The study under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) Recommendations with respect to the governance of open-source intelligence within the intelligence community, including regarding—

(A) whether such governance of open-source intelligence should be assigned to a functional manager or an executive agent, or use another governance structure;

(B) which official of the intelligence community should serve as such a functional manager, executive agent, or the leader of such other governance structure, and what authorities the official should have in serving in such role;

(C) which official of the intelligence community should be responsible for conducting oversight by the executive branch for open-source intelligence;

(D) which elements of the intelligence community should retain capabilities to collect, process, exploit, and disseminate open-source intelligence;

(E) how to effectively integrate such collection capabilities among the elements of the intelligence community; and

(F) whether to establish a new agency as an element of the intelligence community dedicated to open-source intelligence or to establish a fusion center to co-locate open-source intelligence capabilities of the elements of the intelligence community, including a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of each such approach.

(2) Recommendations regarding the requirements processes for open-source intelligence, including with respect to—

(A) the utility (or disutility) of a unified collection management process for open-source intelligence for all of the intelligence community;

(B) what such a process might look like;

(C) ways to integrate an open-source requirements process into all-source collection management; and

(D) ways that automation might be leveraged to facilitate open-source requirements and collection management.

(3) An assessment of the value of rejuvenating a career service for a professional cadre of the intelligence community that focuses on collecting and disseminating open-source intelligence and recommendations for such a rejuvenation.

(4) Recommendations regarding the need to adjust any legal and policy frameworks (including any applicable guidelines of the Attorney General) that would facilitate the collection, retention, and dissemination of open-source intelligence while balancing customer needs with the privacy interests of United States persons.

(5) An assessment of methods to use open-source intelligence to support the operations of the intelligence community, including recommendations on when and how open-source intelligence should support such operations.

(6) With respect to the data management of open-source intelligence, recommendations on proposed data ingestion tools, scraping capabilities, and other tools and capabilities to collect, process, exploit, and analyze the volume of open-source intelligence, including recommendations on how the intelligence community can increase the speed and security with which the intelligence community adopts open-source technology and unclassified commercial products.

(7) Any other matters the Director or the entity selected to conduct the study determines appropriate.

(c) Cooperation.—The Director shall make available to the entity selected to conduct the study under subsection (a) the necessary information and materials to conduct the study, including with respect to—

(1) accessing secure workspaces;

(2) accessing directives and policy guidance of the intelligence community and other policy documents regarding the governance and execution of open-source intelligence;

(3) reviewing technological systems used to conduct open-source intelligence collection;

(4) interviewing senior personnel of the intelligence community, including such personnel with responsibility for the open-source intelligence mission of the intelligence community; and

(5) ensuring that each head of an element of the intelligence community provides the cooperation described in this subsection.

(d) Consultation.—The entity selected to conduct the study under subsection (a) shall consult with the congressional intelligence committees before beginning to conduct such study.

(e) Report.—Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the study under subsection (a), without change. The report shall be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

(a) Survey.—The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (as the open source functional manager for the intelligence community), in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and any other head of an element of the intelligence community that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency determines appropriate, shall conduct a survey to measure the satisfaction of customers of open-source intelligence with the Open Source Enterprise of the Central Intelligence Agency.

(b) Purpose.—The Director shall ensure that the survey under subsection (a)—

(1) evaluates which types of open-source intelligence supports the missions of the customers of such intelligence, regardless of whether the customers are elements of the intelligence community and regardless of whether the customers are receiving such intelligence from the Open Source Enterprise;

(2) evaluates how responsive the Open Source Enterprise is to the missions of the elements of the intelligence community and the other customers of the Open Source Enterprise;

(3) enables the Open Source Enterprise to set strategic priorities; and

(4) enables Congress to better oversee the strategic direction of the Open Source Enterprise and to provide support to the collection and analysis of open-source intelligence.

(c) Contents.—

(1) ASSESSMENT.—The survey under subsection (a) shall include qualitative and quantitative questions designed to assess the following:

(A) The value of support provided by the Open Source Enterprise to the mission of the customer taking the survey.

(B) The accessibility of the products of the Open Source Enterprise.

(C) The frequency that such products are used in accomplishing the mission of the customer.

(D) The responsiveness of the Open Source Enterprise to tasking requests.

(E) Areas in which the Open Source Enterprise could improve.

(F) The in-house open-source intelligence capabilities of the customer taking the survey, including—

(i) a description of such capabilities;

(ii) how such capabilities are tailored to the mission of the customer;

(iii) when such capabilities were established; and

(iv) whether and to what extent the customer coordinates with the Open Source Enterprise regarding such capabilities.

(2) SURVEY ANSWERS.—A customer who receives the survey under subsection (a) shall make all reasonable efforts to respond fully and frankly to the survey.

(d) Design methodology.—In carrying out subsection (a), the Director of Central Intelligence shall seek advice regarding design methodology for customer satisfaction surveys from—

(1) experts in survey design of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and

(2) senior executives of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State who conduct a survey similar to the survey under subsection (a).

(e) Report.—

(1) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the date on which the survey is completed under subsection (a), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the strategic direction of the Open Source Enterprise based on the results of the survey, including explanations of how the Open Source Enterprise will—

(A) build off the successes of the Open Source Enterprise; and

(B) fill gaps in the collection, production, analysis, or dissemination of open-source intelligence.

(2) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified form.

(3) BRIEFING.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director submits to the congressional intelligence committees the report under paragraph (1), the Director shall provide to such committees a briefing on the strategic direction of the Open Source Enterprise.

(a) Intelligence assessment.—

(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, in coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, and in consultation with other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an intelligence assessment on threats to the United States associated with foreign violent White supremacist extremist organizations.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The assessment under paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) A list of foreign violent White supremacist extremist organizations.

(B) With respect to each such organization—

(i) an overview of the membership, ideology, and activities;

(ii) a description of any transnational links to the United States or United States persons;

(iii) a description of the leadership, plans, intentions, and capabilities;

(iv) whether (and if so, to what extent) foreign governments or their proxies provide any manner of support to such organizations, including a list of each such foreign government or proxy;

(v) a description of the composition and characteristics of the members and support networks, including whether (and if so, to what extent) the members are also a part of a military, security service, or police;

(vi) a description of financing and other forms of material support;

(vii) an assessment of trends and patterns relative to communications, travel, and training (including whether and to what extent the organization is engaged in or facilitating military or paramilitary training);

(viii) an assessment of the radicalization and recruitment, including an analysis of the extremist messaging motivating members and supporters; and

(ix) whether (and if so, to what extent) foreign governments have sufficient laws and policies to counter threats to the United States associated with the organization, including best practices and gaps.

(C) An assessment of the status and extent of information sharing, intelligence partnerships, foreign police cooperation, and mutual legal assistance between the United States and foreign governments relative to countering threats to the United States associated with foreign violent White supremacist extremist organizations.

(D) An assessment of intelligence gaps and recommendations on how to remedy such gaps.

(E) An opportunity analysis regarding countering such threats, including, at a minimum, with respect to mitigating and disrupting the transnational nexus.

(3) STANDARDS.—The intelligence assessment under paragraph (1) shall be conducted in a manner that meets the analytic integrity and tradecraft standards of the intelligence community.

(4) FORM AND PUBLIC RELEASE.—The intelligence assessment under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex in electronic form that is fully indexed and searchable. In carrying out this paragraph, the officials specified in paragraph (1) shall—

(A) ensure that the assessment is unclassified to the extent possible;

(B) make the unclassified assessment publicly available on the internet websites of the officials—

(i) by not later than 30 days after submission to the appropriate congressional committees; and

(ii) in an electronic format that is fully indexed and searchable; and

(C) ensure that the assessment is drafted in a way to maximize the ability to share the assessment, including the classified annex, with the entities under paragraph (5).

(5) SHARING.—Consistent with the protection of classified information, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, in coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, shall share the intelligence assessment under paragraph (1) with—

(A) appropriate Federal departments and agencies;

(B) Joint Terrorism Task Forces and the Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes Fusion Cell of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

(C) State, local, and Tribal law enforcement officials, including officials who operate within State, local, and regional fusion centers through the Department of Homeland Security State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative established in accordance with section 210A of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124h); and

(D) appropriate foreign governments, including foreign intelligence services and foreign police, and international institutions, that partner with the United States on countering threats associated with foreign violent White supremacist extremist organizations.

(b) Report.—

(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 150 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence (acting through the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center), in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and in a manner consistent with the authorities and responsibilities of such Secretary or Director, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the use of Federal laws, regulations, and policies by the Federal Government to counter threats to the United States and United States persons associated with foreign violent White supremacist extremist organizations.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The report under paragraph shall include the following:

(A) An identification, description, and assessment of the use and efficacy of, Federal laws, regulations, and policies used by the Federal Government to address threats to the United States and United States persons associated with foreign violent White supremacist extremist organizations, including pursuant to—

(i) section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485) and section 119 of the National Security Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3056), particularly with respect to the coordination and integration of all instruments of national power;

(ii) Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note), as amended;

(iii) the designation of foreign terrorist organizations under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189);

(iv) the designation of specially designated terrorists, specially designated global terrorists, or specially designated nationals and blocked persons, pursuant to Executive Orders 13886, 13372, and 13224 and parts 594, 595, 596, and 597 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations;

(v) National Security Presidential Memorandums 7 and 9, particularly with respect to the sharing of terrorism information and screening and vetting activities; and

(vi) any other applicable Federal laws, regulations, or policies.

(B) An assessment of whether (and if so, to what extent and why) such Federal laws, regulations, and policies are sufficient to counter such threats, including a description of any gaps and specific examples to illustrate such gaps.

(C) Recommendations regarding how to remedy the gaps under subparagraph (B).

(3) PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, in consultation with the civil liberties and privacy officers of the Federal departments and agencies the Board determines appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing—

(A) an assessment of the impacts on the privacy and civil liberties of United States persons concerning the use or recommended use of any Federal laws, regulations, and policies specified in paragraph (2); and

(B) recommendations on options to develop protections to mitigate such impacts.

(4) FORM AND PUBLIC RELEASE.—The reports under paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex in electronic form that is fully indexed and searchable. In carrying out this paragraph, the officials responsible for submitting such reports shall—

(A) ensure that the reports are unclassified to the extent possible;

(B) make the unclassified reports publicly available on the internet websites of the officials—

(i) by not later than 30 days after submission to the appropriate congressional committees; and

(ii) in an electronic format that is fully indexed and searchable.

(c) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate.

(2) FOREIGN VIOLENT WHITE SUPREMACIST EXTREMIST ORGANIZATION.—The term “foreign violent White supremacist extremist organization” means an organization, such as a neo-Nazi or racist skinhead group or militia, with a substantial component based outside the United States, that is engaged in the planning or execution of racially or ethnically motivated acts of terrorism or other targeted violence motivated by White supremacist extremism, particularly against immigrants or individuals perceived to be immigrants, African Americans or other people of African descent, Jews, Muslims, or other people perceived to be ethnic minorities or otherwise not perceived to be White.

(3) TERRORISM INFORMATION.—The term “terrorism information” has the meaning given that term in section 1016(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(a)).

(4) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term “United States person” has the meaning given that term in section 105A(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3039).

(a) In general.—From amounts made available under subsection (e), the Assistant Secretary shall, beginning not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, make grants on a competitive basis to support the deployment and use of Open RAN 5G Networks throughout the United States by—

(1) promoting the use of technology, including software, hardware, and microprocessing technology, that will enhance competitiveness in the supply chains of Open RAN 5G Networks;

(2) accelerating the deployment of Open Network Equipment;

(3) promoting the use of Open Network Equipment;

(4) establishing objective criteria that can be used to determine if equipment meets the definition of Open Network Equipment;

(5) promoting the inclusion of security features that enhance the integrity and availability of Open Network Equipment; or

(6) promoting the application of network function virtualization to facilitate the deployment of Open RAN 5G Networks and a more diverse vendor market.

(b) Grant criteria.—The Assistant Secretary, in consultation with the Commission, the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish the criteria under which the Assistant Secretary shall award a grant under subsection (a).

(c) Reports to Congress.—

(1) ANNUAL REPORT ON GRANTS MADE.—For each fiscal year for which amounts are available to make grants under subsection (a), the Assistant Secretary shall submit to the relevant committees of Congress a report that includes, with respect to that fiscal year—

(A) a description of—

(i) to whom grants under subsection (a) were made, the amount thereof, and criteria used to award such grants; and

(ii) the progress the Assistant Secretary has made in meeting the objectives described in subsection (a) of the grant program under this section; and

(B) any additional information that the Assistant Secretary determines appropriate.

(2) REPORT ON 5G NETWORK SUPPLY CHAIN.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary shall submit to the relevant committees of Congress a written report—

(A) that includes recommendations on promoting the competitiveness and sustainability of trusted Open RAN 5G Networks; and

(B) identifying whether any additional authorities are needed by the Assistant Secretary to facilitate the timely adoption of Open Network Equipment, including the authority to provide loans, loan guarantees, and other forms of credit extension that would maximize the use of grant amounts awarded under this section.

(d) Advisory committee.—

(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Assistant Secretary shall establish an Advisory Committee to advise the Assistant Secretary in the manner described in paragraph (3).

(2) COMPOSITION.—The Advisory Committee established under paragraph (1) shall be composed of—

(A) representatives from—

(i) the Commission;

(ii) the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency;

(iii) the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence;

(iv) the National Institute of Standards and Technology;

(v) the Department of State;

(vi) the National Science Foundation; and

(vii) the Department of Homeland Security; and

(B) other representatives from the private and public sectors, at the discretion of the Assistant Secretary.

(3) DUTIES.—The Advisory Committee established under paragraph (1) shall be used to advise the Assistant Secretary on technology developments to help inform—

(A) the strategic direction of the grant program established under subsection (a); and

(B) efforts of the Federal Government to promote a more secure, diverse, sustainable, and competitive supply chain for Open RAN 5G Networks.

(e) Authorization of appropriations.—

(1) AMOUNT AUTHORIZED.—There is authorized to be appropriated to make grants under subsection (a) $750,000,000 for fiscal years 2021 through 2031.

(2) AVAILABILITY.—Amounts made available under paragraph (1) shall remain available through fiscal year 2031.

(f) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) 3GPP.—The term “3GPP” means the Third Generation Partnership Project.

(2) 5G NETWORK.—The term “5G network” means a radio network as described by 3GPP Release 15 or higher, or any successor network.

(3) ASSISTANT SECRETARY.—The term “Assistant Secretary” means the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information.

(4) COMMISSION.—The term “Commission” means the Federal Communications Commission.

(5) OPEN NETWORK EQUIPMENT.—The term “Open Network Equipment” means equipment that follows a set of open standards (such as O–RAN standards or the Open Radio Access Network approach to standardization, adopted by the O–RAN Alliance, 3GPP, or other organizations) and open interfaces for multi-vendor network equipment interoperability, such that the equipment may be integrated into the Radio Access Networks of an Open RAN 5G Network.

(6) OPEN RAN 5G NETWORK.—The term “Open RAN 5G Network” means a 5G network that follows a set of open standards (such as O–RAN standards or the Open Radio Access Network approach to standardization, adopted by the O–RAN Alliance, 3GPP, or other organizations) and open interfaces for multi-vendor network equipment interoperability.

(7) RELEVANT COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The term “relevant committees of Congress” means—

(A) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives;

(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;

(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;

(D) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives;

(E) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives;

(F) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate;

(G) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;

(H) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(I) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and

(J) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

It is the sense of the Congress that the work of the Third Option Foundation to heal, help, and honor members of the special operations community of the Central Intelligence Agency and their families is invaluable.