The Senate opposes any effort to withdraw the United States from the North Atlantic Treaty, done at Washington, DC, April 4, 1949.

No funds authorized or appropriated by any Act may be used to support, directly or indirectly, any efforts on the part of any United States Government official to take steps to withdraw the United States from the North Atlantic Treaty, done at Washington, DC, April 4, 1949, until such time as the Senate passes, by an affirmative vote of two-thirds of Members, a resolution advising and consenting to the withdrawal of the United States from the treaty.

The Senate Legal Counsel is authorized to represent the Senate in initiating or intervening in any judicial proceedings in any Federal court of competent jurisdiction, on behalf of the Senate, in order to oppose any withdrawal of the United States from the North Atlantic Treaty in the absence of the passage by the Senate of a resolution described in section 102.

The Senate Legal Counsel shall report as soon as practicable to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate with respect to any judicial proceedings which the Senate Legal Counsel initiates or in which it intervenes pursuant to this title.

(a) In general.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees providing an assessment of the threats and challenges facing the NATO alliance and United States diplomatic posture.

(b) Elements.—The report required under subsection (a) shall include the following elements:

(1) A review of current and emerging United States national security interests in the NATO area of responsibility.

(2) A review of current United States political and diplomatic engagement and political-military coordination with NATO and NATO member states.

(3) Options for the realignment of United States engagement with NATO to respond to new threats and challenges presented by the Government of the Russian Federation to the NATO alliance, as well as new opportunities presented by allies and partners.

(4) The views of counterpart governments, including heads of state, heads of government, political leaders, and military commanders in the region.

(a) Report.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report with recommendations regarding the need for and suitability of transferring excess defense articles under this section to countries in the NATO alliance, with particular emphasis on the foreign policy benefits as it pertains to those member states currently purchasing defense articles or services from the Russian Federation.

(b) Period for review by congress of recommendations for EDA transfer to NATO members.—During the 30-calendar-day period following submission by the Secretary of Defense of the report required under subsection (a), the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives shall, as appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain information in order to fully review the recommendations included in the report.

(c) Transfer authority.—The President is authorized to transfer such excess defense articles in a fiscal year as the Secretary of Defense recommends pursuant to this section to countries for which receipt of such articles was justified pursuant to the annual congressional presentation documents for military assistance programs, or for which receipt of such articles was separately justified to Congress, for such fiscal year.

(d) Limitations on transfers.—The President may transfer excess defense articles under this section only if—

(1) such articles are drawn from existing stocks of the Department of Defense;

(2) funds available to the Department of Defense for the procurement of defense equipment are not expended in connection with the transfer;

(3) the President determines that the transfer of such articles will not have an adverse impact on the military readiness of the United States;

(4) with respect to a proposed transfer of such articles on a grant basis, the President determines that the transfer is preferable to a transfer on a sales basis, after taking into account the potential proceeds from, and likelihood of, such sales, and the comparative foreign policy benefits that may accrue to the United States as the result of a transfer on either a grant or sales basis; and

(5) the President determines that the transfer of such articles will not have an adverse impact on the national technology and industrial base and, particularly, will not reduce the opportunities of entities in the national technology and industrial base to sell new or used equipment to the countries to which such articles are transferred.

(e) Terms of transfers.—

(1) NO COST TO RECIPIENT COUNTRY.—Excess defense articles may be transferred under this section without cost to the recipient country.

(2) PRIORITY.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the delivery of excess defense articles under this section to member countries of NATO that still purchase defense goods and services from the Russian Federation and pledge to decrease such purchases shall be given priority to the maximum extent feasible over the delivery of such excess defense articles to other countries.

(3) TRANSPORTATION AND RELATED COSTS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B), funds available to the Department of Defense may not be expended for crating, packing, handling, and transportation of excess defense articles transferred under the authority of this section.

(B) EXCEPTION.—The President may provide for the transportation of excess defense articles without charge to a country for the costs of such transportation if—

(i) it is determined that it is in the national interest of the United States to do so;

(ii) the recipient is a NATO member state currently purchasing defense goods and services from the Russian Federation that has pledged to reduce such purchases;

(iii) the total weight of the transfer does not exceed 50,000 pounds; and

(iv) such transportation is accomplished on a space available basis.

In this subtitle:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(2) NATO.—The term “NATO” means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs of the Department of State shall—

(1) identify opportunities for greater efficiency of operations, including through improved coordination of efforts across public diplomacy bureaus and offices of the Department; and

(2) maximize shared use of resources between, and within, such public diplomacy bureaus and offices in cases in which programs, facilities, or administrative functions are duplicative or substantially overlapping.

(a) In general.—The Secretary of State shall—

(1) conduct regular research and evaluation of public diplomacy programs and activities of the Department, including through the routine use of audience research, digital analytics, and impact evaluations, to plan and execute such programs and activities; and

(2) make the findings of the research and evaluations conducted under paragraph (1) available to Congress.

(b) Director of Research and Evaluation.—

(1) APPOINTMENT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall appoint a Director of Research and Evaluation in the Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources for the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

(2) LIMITATION ON APPOINTMENT.—The appointment of a Director of Research and Evaluation pursuant to paragraph (1) shall not result in an increase in the overall full-time equivalent positions within the Department.

(3) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Director of Research and Evaluation shall—

(A) coordinate and oversee the research and evaluation of public diplomacy programs of the Department of State—

(i) to improve public diplomacy strategies and tactics; and

(ii) to ensure that programs are increasing the knowledge, understanding, and trust of the United States among relevant target audiences;

(B) report to the Director of Policy and Planning in the Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources under the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs of the Department;

(C) routinely organize and oversee audience research, digital analytics, and impact evaluations across all public diplomacy bureaus and offices of the Department;

(D) support embassy public affairs sections;

(E) share appropriate public diplomacy research and evaluation information within the Department and with other Federal departments and agencies;

(F) regularly design and coordinate standardized research questions, methodologies, and procedures to ensure that public diplomacy activities across all public diplomacy bureaus and offices are designed to meet appropriate foreign policy objectives; and

(G) report biannually to the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, through the Commission’s Subcommittee on Research and Evaluation established pursuant to subsection (f), regarding the research and evaluation of all public diplomacy bureaus and offices of the Department.

(4) GUIDANCE AND TRAINING.—Not later than one year after the appointment of the Director of Research and Evaluation pursuant to paragraph (1), the Director shall create guidance and training for all public diplomacy officers regarding the reading and interpretation of public diplomacy program evaluation findings to ensure that such findings and lessons learned are implemented in the planning and evaluation of all public diplomacy programs and activities throughout the Department.

(c) Prioritizing research and evaluation.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of Policy, Planning, and Resources shall ensure that research and evaluation, as coordinated and overseen by the Director of Research and Evaluation, supports strategic planning and resource allocation across all public diplomacy bureaus and offices of the Department.

(2) ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES.—Amounts allocated for the purposes of research and evaluation of public diplomacy programs and activities pursuant to subsection (a) shall be made available to be disbursed at the direction of the Director of Research and Evaluation among the research and evaluation staff across all public diplomacy bureaus and offices of the Department.

(3) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(A) the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs of the Department of State should coordinate the human and financial resources that support the Department’s public diplomacy and public affairs programs and activities;

(B) proposals or plans related to resource allocations for public diplomacy bureaus and offices should be routed through the Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs for review and clearance; and

(C) the Department should allocate, for the purposes of research and evaluation of public diplomacy activities and programs pursuant to subsection (a)—

(i) 3 to 5 percent of program funds made available under the heading “educational and cultural exchange programs”; and

(ii) 3 to 5 percent of program funds allocated for public diplomacy programs under the heading “diplomatic and consular programs”.

(d) Limited exemption.—Chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code (commonly known as the “Paperwork Reduction Act”) shall not apply to collections of information directed at foreign individuals conducted by, or on behalf of, the Department of State for the purpose of audience research, monitoring, and evaluations, and in connection with the Department’s activities conducted pursuant to the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1431 et seq.), the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2451 et seq.), section 1287 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note), or the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.).

(e) Limited exemption to the Privacy Act.—The Department shall maintain, collect, use, and disseminate records (as such term is defined in section 552a(a)(4) of title 5, United States Code) for research and data analysis of public diplomacy efforts intended for foreign audiences. Such research and data analysis shall be reasonably tailored to meet the purposes of this subsection and shall be carried out with due regard for privacy and civil liberties guidance and oversight.

(f) Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy.—

(1) SUBCOMMITTEE FOR RESEARCH AND EVALUATION.—The Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy shall establish a Subcommittee for Research and Evaluation to monitor and advise on the research and evaluation activities of the Department and the United States Agency for Global Media.

(2) REPORT.—The Subcommittee for Research and Evaluation established pursuant to paragraph (1) shall submit an annual report to Congress in conjunction with the Commission on Public Diplomacy’s Comprehensive Annual Report on the performance of the Department and the United States Agency for Global Media in carrying out research and evaluations of their respective public diplomacy programming.

(3) REPEAL OF SUNSET.—Section 1334 of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6553) is hereby repealed.

(g) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) AUDIENCE RESEARCH.—The term “audience research” means research conducted at the outset of a public diplomacy program or campaign planning and design on specific audience segments to understand the attitudes, interests, knowledge, and behaviors of such audience segments.

(2) DIGITAL ANALYTICS.—The term “digital analytics” means the analysis of qualitative and quantitative data, accumulated in digital format, to indicate the outputs and outcomes of a public diplomacy program or campaign.

(3) IMPACT EVALUATION.—The term “impact evaluation” means an assessment of the changes in the audience targeted by a public diplomacy program or campaign that can be attributed to such program or campaign.

(4) PUBLIC DIPLOMACY BUREAUS AND OFFICES.—The term “public diplomacy bureaus and offices” means the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of Public Affairs, the Bureau of International Information Programs, the Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources, the Global Engagement Center, and the public diplomacy functions within the regional and functional bureaus.

(a) Office of Cyberspace and the Digital Economy.—Section 1 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (g) as subsection (h); and

(2) by inserting after subsection (f) the following:

“(g) Office of Cyberspace and the Digital Economy.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—There is established, within the Department of State, an Office of Cyberspace and the Digital Economy (referred to in this subsection as the ‘Office’). The head of the Office shall have the rank and status of ambassador and shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

“(2) DUTIES.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—The head of the Office shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of State shall prescribe, including implementing the United States international cyberspace policy strategy issued by the Department of State in March 2016 pursuant to section 402 of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 (division N of Public Law 114–113; 129 Stat. 2978).

“(B) DUTIES DESCRIBED.—The principal duties and responsibilities of the head of the Office shall be—

“(i) to serve as the principal cyber policy official within the senior management of the Department of State and as the advisor to the Secretary of State for cyber issues;

“(ii) to lead the Department of State’s diplomatic cyberspace efforts, including efforts relating to international cybersecurity, Internet access, Internet freedom, digital economy, cybercrime, deterrence and international responses to cyber threats, and other issues that the Secretary assigns to the Office;

“(iii) to promote an open, interoperable, reliable, unfettered, and secure information and communications technology infrastructure for all critical infrastructure globally;

“(iv) to represent the Secretary of State in interagency efforts to develop and advance cyberspace policy described in subparagraph (A);

“(v) to coordinate cyberspace efforts and other relevant functions, including countering terrorists' use of cyberspace, within the Department of State and with other components of the United States Government;

“(vi) to act as a liaison to public and private sector entities on relevant cyberspace issues;

“(vii) to lead United States Government efforts to establish a global deterrence framework;

“(viii) to develop and execute adversary-specific strategies to influence adversary decisionmaking through the imposition of costs and deterrence strategies;

“(ix) to advise the Secretary and coordinate with foreign governments on external responses to national security level cyber incidents, including coordination on diplomatic response efforts to support allies threatened by malicious cyber activity, in conjunction with members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other like-minded countries;

“(x) to promote the adoption of national processes and programs that enable threat detection, prevention, and response to malicious cyber activity emanating from the territory of a foreign country, including as such activity relates to the European allies of the United States, as appropriate;

“(xi) to promote the building of foreign capacity to protect the global network with the goal of enabling like-minded participation in deterrence frameworks;

“(xii) to promote the maintenance of an open and interoperable Internet governed by the multi-stakeholder model, instead of by centralized government control;

“(xiii) to promote an international regulatory environment for technology investments and the Internet that benefits United States economic and national security interests;

“(xiv) to promote cross border flow of data and combat international initiatives seeking to impose unreasonable requirements on United States businesses;

“(xv) to promote international policies to protect the integrity of United States and international telecommunications infrastructure from foreign-based, cyber-enabled threats;

“(xvi) to serve as the interagency coordinator for the United States Government on engagement with foreign governments on cyberspace and digital economy issues described in the Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act of 2019;

“(xvii) to promote international policies to secure radio frequency spectrum for United States businesses and national security needs;

“(xviii) to promote and protect the exercise of human rights, including freedom of speech and religion, through the Internet;

“(xix) to build capacity of United States diplomatic officials to engage on cyber issues;

“(xx) to encourage the development and adoption by foreign countries of internationally recognized standards, policies, and best practices; and

“(xxi) to promote and advance international policies that protect individuals’ private data.

“(3) QUALIFICATIONS.—The head of the Office should be an individual of demonstrated competency in the fields of—

“(A) cybersecurity and other relevant cyber issues; and

“(B) international diplomacy.

“(4) ORGANIZATIONAL PLACEMENT.—

“(A) INITIAL PLACEMENT.—During the 4-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of the Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act of 2019, the head of the Office shall report to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs or to an official holding a higher position than the Under Secretary for Political Affairs in the Department of State.

“(B) SUBSEQUENT PLACEMENT.—After the conclusion of the 4-year period referred to in subparagraph (A), the head of the Office shall report to—

“(i) an appropriate Under Secretary; or

“(ii) an official holding a higher position than Under Secretary.

“(5) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this subsection may be construed to preclude—

“(A) the Office from being elevated to a Bureau within the Department of State; or

“(B) the head of the Office from being elevated to an Assistant Secretary, if such an Assistant Secretary position does not increase the number of Assistant Secretary positions at the Department above the number authorized under subsection (c)(1).”.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the Office of Cyberspace and the Digital Economy established under section 1(g) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, as added by subsection (a)—

(1) should be a Bureau of the Department of State headed by an Assistant Secretary, subject to the rule of construction specified in paragraph (5)(B) of such section 1(g); and

(2) should coordinate with other bureaus of the Department of State and use all tools at the disposal of the Office to combat activities taken by the Russian Federation, or on behalf of the Russian Federation, to undermine the cybersecurity and democratic values of the United States and other nations.

(c) United Nations.—The Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations should use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to oppose any measure that is inconsistent with the United States international cyberspace policy strategy issued by the Department of State in March 2016 pursuant to section 402 of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 (division N of Public Law 114–113; 129 Stat. 2978).

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) AGENCY.—The term “agency” has the meaning given the term in section 5721 of title 5, United States Code.

(2) APPROPRIATION.—The term “appropriation” includes funds made available by statute and under section 9104 of title 31, United States Code.

(3) SCHEDULE A.—The term “Schedule A” means positions other than those of a confidential or policy-determining character for which it is impracticable to examine, pursuant to section 213.3101 of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations, or successor regulation.

(b) Authority.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to the availability of appropriations, the Secretary of State may procure the services of Schedule A employees in the amount and for the offices specified in paragraph (2) for the purpose of hiring individuals with special qualifications, including prior work experience involving economic or financial sanctions, for the development and implementation of economic and financial sanctions.

(2) ASSIGNMENT OF SCHEDULE A EMPLOYEES.—Using the authority provided under paragraph (1), the Secretary of State may procure the services of—

(A) not to exceed 5 Schedule A employees for the Office of Sanctions Coordination to be established pursuant to subsection (h) of section 1 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a), as added by section 612; and

(B) not to exceed 15 Schedule A employees for the Counter Threat Finance and Sanctions component of the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB/TFS).

(c) Limitation.—Positions in the Senior Executive Service may not be filled using the authority provided under subsection (b).

(d) Equal opportunity and non-Discrimination.—The Secretary of State shall ensure compliance with equal opportunity and other non-discrimination regulations of the United States Government in exercising the authority provided under subsection (b).

(e) Report.—The Secretary of State shall report to the Office of Personnel Management on an annual basis with respect to the number of Schedule A employees employed by the Department of State using the authority provided under subsection (b).

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States Agency for Global Media and its grantee networks have a critical mission to inform, engage, and connect people around the world in support of freedom and democracy; and

(2) those networks must adhere to professional journalistic standards and integrity and not engage in disinformation activities.

This title may be cited as the “Chemical Weapons Nonproliferation Act of 2019”.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The international norm against the use of chemical weapons has severely eroded since 2012. At least 4 actors between 2012 and the date of the enactment of this Act have used chemical weapons: Syria, North Korea, the Russian Federation, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in Iraq and Syria.

(2) On March 4, 2018, the Government of the Russian Federation knowingly used novichok, a lethal chemical agent, in an attempt to kill former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia, in Salisbury, United Kingdom.

(3) In September 2018, the Government of the United Kingdom charged 2 Russian suspects with the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal, further highlighting the culpability of the Government of the Russian Federation in the attack.

(4) On June 27, 2018, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (commonly known as the “OPCW”), during its Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, adopted a decision to “put in place arrangements to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic by identifying and reporting on all information potentially relevant to the origin of those chemical weapons in those instances in which the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria determines or has determined that use or likely use occurred, and cases for which the OPCW–UN Joint Investigative Mechanism has not issued a report; and decide[d] also that the Secretariat shall provide regular reports on its investigations to the Council and to the United Nations Secretary-General for their consideration”.

(5) In addition, during the Fourth Special Session, the State Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention voted to provide new powers to the Director-General of the OPCW to attribute chemical weapons attacks. The decision “affirms that, whenever a chemical weapons use occurs on the territory of a State Party, those who were the perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved should be identified, and underscores the added value of the Secretariat conducting an independent investigation of an alleged use of chemical weapons with a view to facilitating universal attribution of all chemical weapons attacks”.

(6) Finally, the decision of the State Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention allows “the Director-General, if requested by a State Party investigating a possible chemical weapons use on its territory, [to] provide technical expertise to identify those who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons”.

(7) The Government of the Russian Federation attempted to impede the adoption of the identification mechanism in the Fourth Special Session, and has repeatedly worked to degrade the OPCW’s ability to identify chemical weapons users.

(8) The Government of the Russian Federation has shown itself to be unwilling or incapable of compelling the President of Syria, Bashar al-Assad, an ally of the Russian Federation, to stop using chemical weapons against the civilian population in Syria.

(9) The United States remains steadfast in its commitment to its key ally the United Kingdom, its commitment to the mutual defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and its commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

(10) Thirty-four countries, including the United States, have joined the International Partnership against Impunity for the use of Chemical Weapons, which represents a political commitment by participating countries to hold to account persons responsible for the use of chemical weapons.

(11) The Defense Ministry of the Government of the Netherlands exposed 4 Russians as agents of the GRU intelligence service who had attempted to hack OPCW networks during the OPCW’s investigation of the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury, United Kingdom.

It shall be the policy of the United States—

(1) to protect and defend the interests of the United States, allies of the United States, and the international community at large from the continuing threat of chemical weapons and their proliferation;

(2) to maintain a steadfast commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the OPCW;

(3) to promote and strengthen the investigative and identification mechanisms of the OPCW, including the development of a new OPCW laboratory and enhancements to the OPCW network of designated laboratories, through the provision of additional resources and technical equipment to better allow the OPCW to detect, identify, and attribute chemical weapons attacks;

(4) to pressure the Government of the Russian Federation to halt its efforts to degrade the international efforts of the United Nations and the OPCW to investigate chemical weapons attacks and to designate perpetrators of such attacks by—

(A) highlighting within international fora, including the United Nations General Assembly and the OPCW, the repeated efforts of the Government of the Russian Federation to degrade international efforts to investigate chemical weapons attacks; and

(B) consulting with allies and partners of the United States with respect to methods for strengthening the investigative mechanisms of the OPCW;

(5) to examine additional avenues for investigating, identifying, and holding accountable chemical weapons users if the Government of the Russian Federation continues in its attempts to block or hinder investigations of the OPCW; and

(6) to punish the Government of the Russian Federation for, and deter that Government from, any chemical weapons production and use through the imposition of sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and the use of the mechanisms specified in the Chemical Weapons Convention for violations of the Convention.

(a) In general.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that includes an assessment of—

(1) whether the mandatory sanctions required by the Chemical and Biological Weapons and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (22 U.S.C. 5601 et seq.) have been imposed with respect to the Russian Federation; and

(2) whether the Government of the Russian Federation has taken any steps to avoid sanctions required by that Act after the determination of the United States with respect to the use of chemical weapons by the Russian Federation.

(b) Form of report.—Each report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form and shall include a classified annex.

(a) In general.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report on the chemical and biological weapon programs of the Government of the Russian Federation that includes an assessment of—

(1) whether that Government has production capabilities in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972, and entered into force March 26, 1975 (26 UST 583);

(2) any use by that Government of chemical or biological weapons during the 10-year period preceding submission of the report; and

(3) any direct or indirect support, including transfers of material, knowledge, or technology, by that Government for the chemical or biological weapons programs of other countries or non-state actors.

(b) Form of report.—Each report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(a) In general.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State $25,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2020 through 2024, to be provided to the OPCW as a voluntary contribution pursuant to section 301(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2221(a)) for the purpose of strengthening the OPCW’s investigative and identification mechanisms for chemical weapons attacks.

(b) Availability of funds.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) shall remain available until expended.

In this title, the term “Chemical Weapons Convention” means the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, done at Geneva September 3, 1992, and entered into force April 29, 1997.

This title may be cited as the “International Cybercrime Prevention Act”.

Part I of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in section 1956(c)(7)(D)—

(A) by striking “or section 2339D” and inserting “section 2339D”; and

(B) by striking “of this title, section 46502” and inserting “, or section 2512 (relating to the manufacture, distribution, possession, and advertising of wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepting devices) of this title, section 46502”; and

(2) in section 1961(1), by inserting “section 1030 (relating to fraud and related activity in connection with computers) if the act indictable under section 1030 is felonious,” before “section 1084”.

(a) In general.—Section 2513 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

(b) Technical and conforming amendment.—The table of sections for chapter 119 is amended by striking the item relating to section 2513 and inserting the following:

“2513. Confiscation of wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepting devices and other property.”.

(a) Amendment.—Section 1345 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in the heading, by inserting “and abuse” after “fraud”;

(2) in subsection (a)—

(A) in paragraph (1)—

(i) in subparagraph (B), by striking “or” at the end;

(ii) in subparagraph (C), by inserting “or” after the semicolon; and

(iii) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following:

“(D) violating or about to violate section 1030(a)(5) of this title where such conduct has caused or would cause damage (as defined in section 1030) without authorization to 100 or more protected computers (as defined in section 1030) during any 1-year period, including by—

“(i) impairing the availability or integrity of the protected computers without authorization; or

“(ii) installing or maintaining control over malicious software on the protected computers that, without authorization, has caused or would cause damage to the protected computers;”; and

(B) in paragraph (2), in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by inserting “, a violation described in subsection (a)(1)(D),” before “or a Federal”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(c) A restraining order, prohibition, or other action described in subsection (b), if issued in circumstances described in subsection (a)(1)(D), may, upon application of the Attorney General—

“(1) specify that no cause of action shall lie in any court against a person for complying with the restraining order, prohibition, or other action; and

“(2) provide that the United States shall pay to such person a fee for reimbursement for such costs as are reasonably necessary and which have been directly incurred in complying with the restraining order, prohibition, or other action.”.

(b) Technical and conforming amendment.—The table of sections for chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to section 1345 and inserting the following:

“1345. Injunctions against fraud and abuse.”.

(a) In general.—Chapter 47 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 1030 the following:

(b) Table of sections.—The table of sections for chapter 47 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1030 the following:

“1030A. Aggravated damage to a critical infrastructure computer.”.

Section 1030 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)—

(A) in paragraph (7), by adding “or” at the end; and

(B) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following:

“(8) intentionally traffics in the means of access to a protected computer, if—

“(A) the trafficker knows or has reason to know the protected computer has been damaged in a manner prohibited by this section; and

“(B) the promise or agreement to pay for the means of access is made by, or on behalf of, a person the trafficker knows or has reason to know intends to use the means of access to—

“(i) damage a protected computer in a manner prohibited by this section; or

“(ii) violate section 1037 or 1343;”;

(2) in subsection (c)(3)—

(A) in subparagraph (A), by striking “(a)(4) or (a)(7)” and inserting “(a)(4), (a)(7), or (a)(8)”; and

(B) in subparagraph (B), by striking “(a)(4), or (a)(7)” and inserting “(a)(4), (a)(7), or (a)(8)”;

(3) in subsection (e)—

(A) in paragraph (11), by striking “and” at the end;

(B) in paragraph (12), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”; and

(C) by adding at the end the following:

“(13) the term ‘traffic’, except as provided in subsection (a)(6), means transfer, or otherwise dispose of, to another as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value.”;

(4) in subsection (g), in the first sentence, by inserting “, except for a violation of subsection (a)(8),” after “of this section”; and

(5) by striking subsections (i) and (j) and inserting the following:

“(i) Criminal forfeiture.—

“(1) The court, in imposing sentence on any person convicted of a violation of this section, or convicted of conspiracy to violate this section, shall order, in addition to any other sentence imposed and irrespective of any provision of State law, that such person forfeit to the United States—

“(A) such person’s interest in any property, real or personal, that was used or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate the commission of such violation; and

“(B) any property, real or personal, constituting or derived from any gross proceeds, or any property traceable to such property, that such person obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation.

“(2) The criminal forfeiture of property under this subsection, including any seizure and disposition of the property, and any related judicial or administrative proceeding, shall be governed by the provisions of section 413 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 853), except subsection (d) of that section.

“(j) Civil forfeiture of property used in the commission of an offense.—

“(1) Any personal property, including any Internet domain name or Internet Protocol address, that was used or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate the commission of any violation of this section, or a conspiracy to violate this section shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States, and no property right shall exist in such property.

“(2) Seizures and forfeitures under this subsection shall be governed by the provisions of chapter 46 relating to civil forfeitures, except that such duties as are imposed on the Secretary of the Treasury under the customs laws described in section 981(d) shall be performed by such officers, agents, and other persons as may be designated for that purpose by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General.”.

Section 1030(e) of title 18, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in paragraph (2)—

(A) in subparagraph (A), by striking “or” at the end;

(B) in subparagraph (B), by adding “or” at the end; and

(C) by adding at the end the following:

“(C) that—

“(i) is part of a voting system; and

“(ii) (I) is used for the management, support, or administration of a Federal election; or

“(II) has moved in or otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce;”;

(2) in paragraph (11), by striking “and” at the end;

(3) in paragraph (12), by striking the period and inserting a semicolon; and

(4) by adding at the end the following:

“(13) the term ‘Federal election’ means any election (as defined in section 301(1) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101(1))) for Federal office (as defined in section 301(3) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101(3))); and

“(14) the term ‘voting system’ has the meaning given the term in section 301(b) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(b)).”.

(a) Defined term.—Section 101(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(53) The term ‘improper interference in a United States election’ means conduct by an alien that—

“(A) (i) violates Federal criminal, voting rights, or campaign finance law; or

“(ii) is under the direction of a foreign government; and

“(B) interferes with a general or primary Federal, State, or local election or caucus, including—

“(i) the campaign of a candidate; and

“(ii) a ballot measure, including—

“(I) an amendment;

“(II) a bond issue;

“(III) an initiative;

“(IV) a recall;

“(V) a referral; and

“(VI) a referendum.”.

(b) Improper interference in United States elections.—Section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(H) IMPROPER INTERFERENCE IN A UNITED STATES ELECTION.—Any alien who is seeking admission to the United States to engage in improper interference in a United States election, or who has engaged in improper interference in a United States election, is inadmissible.”.

It is the sense of Congress that economic and financial sanctions, when used as part of a coordinated and comprehensive strategy, are a powerful tool to advance United States foreign policy and national security interests.

Part 2 of subtitle A of title II of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9521 et seq.) is amended—

(1) by redesignating sections 235, 236, 237, and 238 as sections 239E, 239F, 239H, and 239I, respectively; and

(2) by inserting after section 234 the following:

Part 2 of subtitle A of title II of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9521 et seq.), as amended by section 602, is further amended by inserting after section 239 the following:

(a) Implementation and penalties.—Part 2 of subtitle A of title II of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9521 et seq.), as amended by sections 602 and 603, is further amended by inserting after section 239F the following:

(b) Definitions.—Section 221 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9521) is amended—

(1) by redesignating paragraph (6) as paragraph (7); and

(2) by inserting after paragraph (5) the following:

“(6) RUSSIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term ‘Russian financial institution’ means—

“(A) a financial institution organized under the laws of the Russian Federation or any jurisdiction within the Russian Federation, including a foreign branch of such an institution;

“(B) a financial institution located in the Russian Federation;

“(C) a financial institution, wherever located, owned or controlled by the Government of the Russian Federation; and

“(D) a financial institution, wherever located, owned or controlled by a financial institution described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).”.

(c) Clerical amendment.—The table of contents for the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act is amended by striking the items relating to sections 235 through 238 and inserting the following:

“Sec. 235. Sanctions with respect to transactions with certain Russian political figures and oligarchs.
“Sec. 236. Sanctions with respect to transactions with the cyber sector of the Russian Federation.
“Sec. 237. Sanctions with respect to transactions related to investments in Russian liquefied natural gas export facilities.
“Sec. 238. Prohibition on transactions relating to new sovereign debt of the Russian Federation.
“Sec. 239. Sanctions with respect to Russian financial institutions that support interference in democratic processes or elections.
“Sec. 239A. Sanctions with respect to transactions related to investments in energy projects supported by Russian state-owned or parastatal entities outside of the Russian Federation.
“Sec. 239B. Sanctions with respect to support for the development of crude oil resources in the Russian Federation.
“Sec. 239C. Sanctions with respect to Russian detention of 24 Ukrainian naval personnel on and after November 25, 2018.
“Sec. 239D. Sanctions for violations by the Russian Federation of freedom of navigation.
“Sec. 239E. Sanctions described.
“Sec. 239F. Exceptions, waiver, and termination.
“Sec. 239G. Implementation and penalties.
“Sec. 239H. Exception relating to activities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
“Sec. 239I. Rule of construction.”.

(d) Conforming amendments.—Part 2 of subtitle A of title II of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9521 et seq.), as amended by this section, is further amended—

(1) in section 231, by striking subsection (e); and

(2) by striking “section 235” each place it appears and inserting “section 239E”.

(e) Guidance.—The President shall, in a prompt and timely way, publish guidance on the implementation of this subtitle and the amendments made by this subtitle and any regulations prescribed pursuant to this subtitle or any such amendment.

Section 216(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 2017 (22 U.S.C. 9511(a)(2)(B)(i)) is amended—

(1) in subclause (II), by striking “; or” and inserting a semicolon;

(2) in subclause (III), by striking “; and” and inserting “; or”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

“(IV) the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (title IV of Public Law 112–208; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note); and”.

It is the sense of Congress that the President should—

(1) continue to uphold and seek unity with European and other key partners with respect to sanctions implemented with respect to the Russian Federation, which have been effective and instrumental in countering the aggression of the Russian Federation;

(2) engage to the fullest extent possible with governments that are partners of the United States with regard to closing loopholes, including the allowance of extended prepayment for the delivery of goods and commodities and other loopholes, in multilateral and unilateral restrictive measures against the Russian Federation, with the aim of maximizing alignment of those measures; and

(3) increase efforts to vigorously enforce compliance with sanctions in place as of the date of the enactment of this Act with respect to the Russian Federation in response to the crises in Ukraine and Syria, cyber intrusions and attacks, and human rights violators in the Russian Federation.

(a) In general.—Section 1 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a), as amended by section 211, is further amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (h) as subsection (i); and

(2) by inserting after subsection (g) the following:

“(h) Office of Sanctions Coordination.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—There is established, within the Department of State, an Office of Sanctions Coordination (referred to in this subsection as the ‘Office’).

“(2) HEAD.—The head of the Office shall—

“(A) have the rank and status of ambassador;

“(B) be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; and

“(C) report to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

“(3) DUTIES.—The head of the Office shall—

“(A) serve as the principal advisor to the senior management of the Department and the Secretary regarding the role of the Department in the development and implementation of sanctions policy, including sanctions with respect to the Russian Federation, Iran, North Korea, and other countries;

“(B) represent the United States in diplomatic and multilateral fora on sanctions matters;

“(C) consult and closely coordinate with the European Union to ensure the maximum effectiveness of sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union with respect to the Russian Federation;

“(D) advise the Secretary directly and provide input with respect to all activities, policies, and programs of all bureaus and offices of the Department relating to the implementation of sanctions policy; and

“(E) serve as the principal liaison of the Department to other Federal agencies involved in the design and implementation of sanctions policy.

“(4) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this subsection may be construed to preclude—

“(A) the Office from being elevated to a Bureau within the Department; or

“(B) the head of the Office from being elevated to level of an Assistant Secretary.”.

(b) Report required.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing the efforts of the Office of Sanctions Coordination established under the amendments made by subsection (a) to coordinate sanctions policy with the European Union.

(a) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes the following:

(1) A description of each instance, during the period specified in subsection (b)—

(A) in which the United States has imposed sanctions with respect to a person for activity related to the Russian Federation, but in which the European Union has not imposed corresponding sanctions; and

(B) in which the European Union has imposed sanctions with respect to a person for activity related to the Russian Federation, but in which the United States has not imposed corresponding sanctions.

(2) An explanation for the reason for each discrepancy between sanctions imposed by the European Union and sanctions imposed by the United States described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1).

(b) Period specified.—The period specified in this subsection is—

(1) in the case of the first report submitted under subsection (a), the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on the date the report is submitted; and

(2) in the case of a subsequent such report, the 180-day period preceding the submission of the report.

(c) Form of report.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

(d) Appropriate congressional committees defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

In this subtitle:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

(2) SENIOR FOREIGN POLITICAL FIGURE.—The term “senior foreign political figure” has the meaning given that term in section 1010.605 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).

Section 241 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public Law 115–44; 131 Stat. 922) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (c) and (d), respectively;

(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:

“(b) Updated report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act of 2019, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an updated report on oligarchs and parastatal entities of the Russian Federation that builds on the report submitted under subsection (a) on January 29, 2018, and that includes the matters described in paragraphs (1) through (5) of subsection (a).”; and

(3) in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (1), by striking “The report required under subsection (a)” and inserting “The reports required by subsections (a) and (b)”.

(a) In general.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the persons that the President has determined under section 224(a)(1)(A) of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9524(a)(1)(A)) knowingly engaged, on or after August 2, 2017, and before the date of the report, in significant activities undermining cybersecurity against any person, including a democratic institution or government on behalf of the Government of the Russian Federation.

(b) Elements.—The report required by subsection (a) shall contain the following:

(1) A list of the persons described in subsection (a).

(2) A description of diplomatic efforts to work with governments and democratic institutions in other countries the cybersecurity of which the President determines has been undermined by the Government of the Russian Federation.

(c) Updates.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an update to the report required by subsection (a).

(a) In general.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the foreign persons that the President has determined under section 4(b)(1) of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8923(b)(1)), as amended by section 225 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public Law 115–44; 131 Stat. 910), have knowingly, on or after August 2, 2017, and before the date of the report, made a significant investment in a special Russian crude oil project.

(b) Updates.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an update to the report required by subsection (a).

(a) In general.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the foreign financial institutions that the President has determined under section 5(a) of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8924(a)), as amended by section 226 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public Law 115–44; 131 Stat. 910), have knowingly engaged, on or after August 2, 2017, and before the date of the report, in significant transactions involving significant investments in a special Russian crude oil project described in section 4(b)(1) of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014.

(b) Updates.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an update to the report required by subsection (a).

(a) In general.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the foreign persons that the President has determined under subsection (a) of section 10 of the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8909), as added by section 228 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public Law 115–44; 131 Stat. 911), have, on or after August 2, 2017, and before the date of the report—

(1) materially violated, attempted to violate, conspired to violate, or caused a violation of any license, order, regulation, or prohibition contained in or issued pursuant to any covered Executive order (as defined in subsection (f) of such section 10), the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.), or the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8921 et seq.); or

(2) facilitated a significant transaction or transactions, including deceptive or structured transactions, for or on behalf of—

(A) any person subject to sanctions imposed by the United States with respect to the Russian Federation; or

(B) any child, spouse, parent, or sibling of an individual described in subparagraph (A).

(b) Updates.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an update to the report required by subsection (a).

(a) In general.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the foreign persons that the President has determined under section 233 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9527) have made, on or after August 2, 2017, and before the date of the report, an investment of $10,000,000 or more (or any combination of investments of not less than $1,000,000 each, which in the aggregate equals or exceeds $10,000,000 in any 12-month period), or facilitated such an investment, if the investment directly and significantly contributes to the ability of the Russian Federation to privatize state-owned assets in a manner that unjustly benefits—

(1) officials of the Government of the Russian Federation; or

(2) close associates or family members of those officials.

(b) Updates.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an update to the report required by subsection (a).

(a) In general.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the foreign persons that the President has determined under section 234 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9528) have knowingly, on or after August 2, 2017, and before the date of the report, exported, transferred, or otherwise provided to Syria significant financial, material, or technological support that contributes materially to the ability of the Government of Syria to—

(1) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related technologies;

(2) acquire or develop ballistic or cruise missile capabilities;

(3) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons;

(4) acquire significant defense articles, defense services, or defense information (as such terms are defined under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.)); or

(5) acquire items designated by the President for purposes of the United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).

(b) Updates.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an update to the report required by subsection (a).

(a) In general.—This title and the amendments made by this title shall not apply with respect to activities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

(b) Rule of construction.—Nothing in this title or the amendments made by this title shall be construed to authorize the imposition of any sanction or other condition, limitation, restriction, or prohibition, that directly or indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Russian Federation of any product or service, or the procurement of such product or service by any contractor or subcontractor of the United States or any other entity, relating to or in connection with any space launch conducted for—

(1) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; or

(2) any other non-Department of Defense customer.

Nothing in this title or the amendments made by this title shall be construed—

(1) to supersede the limitations or exceptions on the use of rocket engines for national security purposes under section 1608 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–291; 128 Stat. 3626; 10 U.S.C. 2271 note), as amended by section 1607 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92; 129 Stat. 1100) and section 1602 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2582); or

(2) to prohibit a contractor or subcontractor of the Department of Defense from acquiring components referred to in such section 1608.

(a) Determination.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a determination of whether the Russian Federation meets the criteria for designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.

(2) FORM.—The determination required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex, if appropriate.

(b) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(2) STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM.—The term “state sponsor of terrorism” means a country the government of which the Secretary of State has determined is a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, for purposes of—

(A) section 1754(c)(1)(A)(i) of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 4813(c)(1)(A)(i));

(B) section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371);

(C) section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)); or

(D) any other provision of law.

(a) In general.—Section 5326 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(e) Reporting by title insurance companies.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall issue an order under subsection (a) requiring a domestic title insurance company to obtain, maintain, and report to the Secretary information on the beneficial owners of entities that purchase residential real estate in high-value transactions in which the domestic title insurance company is involved.

“(2) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection:

“(A) BENEFICIAL OWNER.—The term ‘beneficial owner’, with respect to an entity, means an individual who, directly or indirectly, owns 25 percent or more of the equity interests in the entity.

“(B) DOMESTIC TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY.—The term ‘domestic title insurance company’ has the meaning given that term in regulations prescribed by the Secretary.

“(C) HIGH-VALUE TRANSACTION.—The term ‘high-value’, with respect to a real estate transaction, has the meaning given that term in regulations prescribed by the Secretary based on the real estate market in which the transaction takes place.”.

(b) Regulations.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe regulations to carry out the amendment made by subsection (a).

(c) Authorization of appropriations.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary such sums as may be necessary to carry out the amendment made by subsection (a).

Section 3112A(c) of the USEC Privatization Act (42 U.S.C. 2297h–10a(c)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (2)(A)—

(A) in clause (vi), by striking “; and” and inserting a semicolon;

(B) in clause (vii), by striking the period and inserting “; and”; and

(C) by adding at the end the following:

“(viii) in calendar year 2021, 463,620 kilograms;

“(ix) in calendar year 2022, 456,930 kilograms;

“(x) in calendar year 2023, 449,810 kilograms;

“(xi) in calendar year 2024, 435,933 kilograms;

“(xii) in calendar year 2025, 421,659 kilograms;

“(xiii) in calendar year 2026, 421,659 kilograms;

“(xiv) in calendar year 2027, 394,072 kilograms;

“(xv) in calendar year 2028, 386,951 kilograms;

“(xvi) in calendar year 2029, 386,951 kilograms; and

“(xvii) in calendar year 2030, 375,791 kilograms.”;

(2) in paragraph (3)—

(A) in subparagraph (A), by striking the semicolon and inserting “; or”;

(B) in subparagraph (B), by striking “; or” and inserting a period; and

(C) by striking subparagraph (C);

(3) in paragraph (5)(A), by striking “reference data” and all that follows through “2019” and inserting the following: “lower scenario data in the document of the World Nuclear Association entitled ‘Nuclear Fuel Report: Global Scenarios for Demand and Supply Availability 2017–2035’. In each of calendar years 2022, 2025, and 2028”; and

(4) in paragraph (9), by striking “December 31, 2020” and inserting “December 31, 2030”.

(a) Establishment.—There is established a National Fusion Center to Respond to Hybrid Threats, which shall focus primarily on such threats from the Government of the Russian Federation, and shall be chaired by senior United States Government officials from participating agencies (in this section referred to as the “Center”).

(b) Mission.—The primary missions of the Center are as follows:

(1) To serve as the primary organization in the United States Government to coordinate analysis and policy implementation across the United States Government in responding to hybrid threats posed by the Government of the Russian Federation to the national security, sovereignty, democracy, and economic activity of the United States and United States allies, including the following activities:

(A) Execution of disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda campaigns through traditional and social media platforms.

(B) Formation, infiltration, or manipulation of cultural, religious, educational, and political organizations or parties.

(C) Covert transfer of illicit money through shell corporations and financial institutions to facilitate corruption, crime, and malign influence activities, including through political parties and interest groups.

(D) Coercive tactics and gray zone activities, including through para-military and para-police and security services and militias.

(E) Cyber and other non-traditional threats, including against public infrastructure, government institutions, or political organizations or actors.

(F) Use of energy resources or infrastructure to influence or constrain sovereign states and political actors.

(2) To synchronize the efforts of the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the intelligence community, other relevant civilian United States Government agencies, and United States military combatant commands with respect to countering efforts by the Government of the Russian Federation to undermine the national security, political sovereignty, democratic institutions, and economic activity of the United States and its United States allies, including by—

(A) ensuring that each such element is aware of and coordinating on such efforts; and

(B) overseeing the development and implementation of comprehensive and integrated policy responses to such efforts.

(3) In coordination with the head of the Global Engagement Center established by section 1287 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note), to examine current and emerging efforts by malign state actors to use propaganda and disinformation operations, including—

(A) traditional media platforms such as television, radio, and print; and

(B) social media platforms and other Internet communication tools.

(4) To identify and close gaps across the departments and agencies of the Federal Government with respect to expertise, readiness, and planning to address the threats posed by the Government of the Russian Federation.

(c) Reporting requirement.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of the Center shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees every 180 days a report on threats posed by the Russian Federation to the national security, sovereignty, and economic activity of the United States and its allies.

(2) MATTERS INCLUDED.—Each report under paragraph (1) shall include, with respect to the period covered by the report, a discussion of the following:

(A) The nature, extent, and execution of the threats described in such paragraph.

(B) The ability of the United States Government to identify and defend against such threats.

(C) The progress of the Center in achieving its missions, including through coordination with other governments and multilateral organizations.

(D) Recommendations the Director determines necessary for legislative actions to improve the ability of the Center to achieve its missions.

(3) FORM.—Each report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(d) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

(2) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term “intelligence community” means an element of the intelligence community specified or designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947.

(e) Authorization of appropriations.—There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.

(a) Authorization of appropriations.—There is authorized to be appropriated for the Countering Russian Influence Fund described in section 7070(d) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2017 (division J of Public Law 115–31; 131 Stat. 706), $250,000,000 for fiscal years 2020 and 2021.

(b) Use of funds.—Amounts in the Countering Russian Influence Fund shall be used in countries of Europe and Eurasia the Secretary of State has determined are vulnerable to malign influence by the Russian Federation to effectively implement, subject to the availability of funds, the following goals:

(1) To assist in protecting critical infrastructure and electoral mechanisms from cyberattacks.

(2) To combat corruption, improve the rule of law, and otherwise strengthen independent judiciaries and prosecutors general offices.

(3) To respond to the humanitarian crises and instability caused or aggravated by the invasions and occupations of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine by the Russian Federation.

(4) To improve participatory legislative processes and legal education, political transparency and competition, and compliance with international obligations.

(5) To build the capacity of civil society, media, and other nongovernmental organizations countering the influence and propaganda of the Russian Federation to combat corruption, prioritize access to truthful information, and operate freely in all regions.

(6) To assist the Secretary of State in executing the functions specified in section 1239(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115–91; 10 U.S.C. 113 note) for the purposes of recognizing, understanding, exposing, and countering propaganda and disinformation efforts by foreign governments, in coordination with the relevant regional Assistant Secretary or Assistant Secretaries of the Department of State.

(c) Revision of activities for which amounts may be used.—The Secretary of State may modify a goal described in subsection (b) if, not later than 15 days before revising such goal, the Secretary notifies the appropriate congressional committees of the revision.

(d) Implementation.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall, acting through the Coordinator of United States Assistance to Europe and Eurasia (authorized pursuant to section 601 of the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 (22 U.S.C. 5461) and section 102 of the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5812)), and in consultation with the Administrator for the United States Agency for International Development, the Director of the Global Engagement Center of the Department of State, the Secretary of Defense, EUCOM, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, coordinate and carry out activities to achieve the goals described in subsection (b).

(2) METHOD.—Activities to achieve the goals described in subsection (b) shall be carried out through—

(A) initiatives of the United States Government;

(B) Federal grant programs such as the Information Access Fund;

(C) nongovernmental or international organizations; or

(D) support exchanges with countries facing state-sponsored disinformation and pressure campaigns, particularly in Europe and Eurasia, provided that a portion of the funds are made available through a process whereby the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the Department of State solicits proposals from posts located in affected countries to counter state-sponsored disinformation and hybrid threats, promote democracy, and support exchanges with countries facing state-sponsored disinformation and pressure campaigns.

(3) REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than April 1 of each year, the Secretary of State, acting through the Coordinator of United States Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the programs and activities carried out to achieve the goals described in subsection (b) during the preceding fiscal year.

(B) ELEMENTS.—Each report required by subparagraph (A) shall include, with respect to each program or activity described in that subparagraph—

(i) the amount of funding for the program or activity;

(ii) the goal described in subsection (b) to which the program or activity relates; and

(iii) an assessment of whether or not the goal was met.

(e) Coordination with global partners.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—In order to maximize impact, eliminate duplication, and speed the achievement of the goals described in subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall ensure coordination with—

(A) the European Union and its institutions;

(B) the governments of countries that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union; and

(C) international organizations and quasi-governmental funding entities that carry out programs and activities that seek to accomplish the goals described in subsection (b).

(f) Rule of construction.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to apply to or limit United States foreign assistance not provided using amounts available in the Countering Russian Influence Fund.

(g) Expansion of pilot program.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall expand the pilot program required under section 254(g) of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9543(g)) to hire additional personnel within the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to develop and implement programs focused on combating corruption, improving rule of law, and building capacity of civil society, political parties, and independent media.

(2) REPORT ON ENSURING ADEQUATE STAFFING FOR GOVERNANCE ACTIVITIES.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on implementation of the pilot program required under section 254(g) of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (22 U.S.C. 9543(g)).

(h) Appropriate congressional committees defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Government of the Russian Federation has applied, and continues to apply traditional uses of force, intelligence operations, cyber attacks, and influence campaigns, including through the use of corruption, disinformation, and cultural and social influence, which represent clear and present threats to the countries of Europe and Eurasia;

(2) in response, governments in Europe and Eurasia should redouble efforts to build resilience within their institutions, political systems, and civil societies;

(3) the United States Government supports the democratic and rule of law-based institutions that the Government of the Russian Federation seeks to undermine, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the European Union;

(4) the United States Government should continue to work with and strengthen such institutions, including the European Union, as a partner against aggression by the Government of the Russian Federation through the coordination of aid programs, development assistance, and other efforts to counter malign Russian influence;

(5) the United States Government should continue to work with the individual countries of Europe and Eurasia to bolster efforts to counter malign Russian influence in all its forms; and

(6) the United States Government should increase assistance and diplomatic efforts in Europe, including in European Union and NATO countries, to address threats to fundamental human rights and backsliding in rule of law protections, operating space for independent media and civil society, and other democratic institutions, whose strength is critical to defending against malign Russian influence over the long term.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The International Criminal Police Organization (commonly known as “INTERPOL”) works to prevent and fight crime through enhanced cooperation and innovation on police and security matters, including counterterrorism, cybercrime, counternarcotics, and transnational organized crime.

(2) United States membership and participation in INTERPOL advances the national security and law enforcement interests of the United States related to combating counterterrorism, cybercrime, counternarcotics, and combating transnational organized crime.

(3) Article 2 of INTERPOL’s Constitution states that the organization aims “[t]o ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities […] in the spirit of the ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’”.

(4) Article 3 of INTERPOL’s Constitution states that, “[i]t is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.”.

(5) Independent international nongovernmental organizations have documented how several INTERPOL member countries, including the Government of the Russian Federation and others, have used INTERPOL's processes, including the red notice and red diffusion mechanisms, for activities of a political character.

(b) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that the Government of the Russian Federation and the governments of certain other countries have repeatedly abused and misused INTERPOL’s red notice and red diffusion mechanisms for overtly political purposes and activities such as harassing or persecuting political opponents, human rights defenders, or journalists.

(c) Censure of abusive activity and institutional reforms.—The Attorney General, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at INTERPOL—

(1) to inform the General Secretariat about cases in which countries are misusing its systems for activities of a political character or other purposes contrary to INTERPOL's Constitution, so that appropriate measures may be taken by INTERPOL;

(2) to advance institutional reforms at INTERPOL, including in the General Secretariat, the Commission for the Control of Files, and the Notices and Diffusions Task Force within the General Secretariat, to prevent member countries from abusing and misusing INTERPOL’s red notice and diffusion mechanisms;

(3) to increase, to the extent practicable, dedicated funding to the Commission for the Control of Files and the Notices and Diffusions Task Force in order to further expand operations related to the review of requests for red notices and red diffusions; and

(4) to censure member countries that repeatedly abuse and misuse INTERPOL's red notice and red diffusion mechanisms, including restricting the access of those countries to INTERPOL's data systems.

(d) Report on United States support for INTERPOL reforms.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an unclassified report on United States support for institutional reforms at INTERPOL that are necessary to address abuse and misuse of INTERPOL's red notice and red diffusion mechanisms.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include—

(A) to the extent feasible, a description of United States support for reforms that increase INTERPOL's transparency with respect to—

(i) the number of red notices and red diffusions requested by each member country;

(ii) the number or proportion of requests for red notice or red diffusions rejected by INTERPOL, following internal review, for each member country;

(iii) how INTERPOL’s General Secretariat identifies requests for red notice or red diffusions that are politically motivated or are otherwise in violation of INTERPOL’s rules; and

(iv) how INTERPOL reviews and addresses cases in which a member country has abused or misused the red notice and red diffusion mechanisms for overtly political purposes; and

(B) a list of countries that the Secretary determines have repeatedly abused and misused the red notice and red diffusion mechanisms for political purposes.

(3) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be posted on a publicly available interest website of the Department of State and of the Department of Justice.

(e) Prohibition against action on abusive red notices and red diffusions.—An official of the United States may not take any action against a person based solely on the issuance of an INTERPOL red notice or red diffusion issued by a country identified on the list required by paragraph (2)(B) unless the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the red notice or red diffusion was not issued for political purposes.

(f) Appropriate congressional committees defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) In March 2016, Amnesty International issued a report stating, “Syrian and Russian forces have been deliberately attacking health facilities in flagrant violation of international humanitarian law. But what is truly egregious is that wiping out hospitals appears to have become part of their military strategy.”.

(2) On September 21, 2017, Department of State Spokesperson Heather Nauert said, “The United States is concerned by reports of airstrikes in Idlib province and northern Hama province on September 19 and 20 that killed at least three medical personnel and damaged a number of medical facilities, emergency equipment, and civil defense centers. These attacks fit an all-too-familiar pattern in which medical facilities and personnel—and the civilians they serve—are victims of strikes by the Syrian regime and its Russian allies.”.

(3) In February 2018, Syrian and Russian airstrikes in rebel-held areas killed 230 civilians and hit at least 9 medical facilities. In a statement on February 10, 2018, the office of Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, said the airstrikes “may, depending on the circumstances, all constitute war crimes”.

(4) On March 6, 2018, the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic noted, “[I]n one particularly harmful attack on 13 November, the Russian Air Force carried out airstrikes on a densely populated civilian area in Atareb (Aleppo), killing at least 84 people and injuring another 150. Using unguided weapons, the attack struck a market, police station, shops, and a restaurant, and may amount to a war crime.”.

(b) Report required.—The Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation or paramilitary forces or contractors responsive to the direction of that Government during the operations of that Government in Syria—

(1) not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act; and

(2) not later than 180 days after the date on which the Secretary of State determines that the violence in Syria has ceased.

(c) Elements.—Each report required by subsection (b) shall include the following:

(1) A description of alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity described in subsection (b), including—

(A) any such alleged crimes that may violate the principle of medical neutrality and, if possible, an identification of the individual or individuals who engaged in or organized such crimes; and

(B) if possible, a description of the conventional and unconventional weapons used for such alleged crimes and the origins of such weapons.

(2) An assessment of whether such alleged crimes constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity, including genocide.

(3) A description and assessment by the Office of Global Criminal Justice of the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, the Department of Justice, and other appropriate Federal agencies, of programs that the United States Government has undertaken to ensure accountability for such alleged crimes, including programs—

(A) to train investigators within and outside of Syria on how to document, investigate, develop findings with respect to, and identify and locate alleged perpetrators of, such alleged crimes, including—

(i) the number of United States Government or contractor personnel currently designated to work full-time on such training; and

(ii) an identification of the authorities and appropriations being used to support such training; and

(B) to document, collect, preserve, and protect evidence of such alleged crimes, including support for Syrian, foreign, and international nongovernmental organizations, and other entities, including the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 and the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic of the United Nations.

(d) Protection of witnesses and evidence.—In preparing the report required by subsection (b), the Secretary shall take due care to ensure that the identities of witnesses and physical evidence are not publicly disclosed in a manner that might place such witnesses at risk of harm or encourage the destruction of such evidence by the Government of the Russian Federation or the Government of Syria, violent extremist groups, anti-government forces, or any other combatants or participants in the conflict in Syria.

(e) Form.—Each report required by subsection (b) may be submitted in unclassified or classified form, but shall include a publicly available annex.

(f) Appropriate congressional committees defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

(a) In general.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership a report that includes—

(1) an assessment of the willingness and capacity of the Government of the Russian Federation to ensure the removal of Iranian forces, Iran-aligned and Iran-directed militias and paramilitaries, and other armed group responsive to the direction of Iran, from the territory of Syria;

(2) a list of policies, actions, or activities that the Government of the Russian Federation would take if that Government were willing to ensure the removal of the forces, militias, paramilitaries, and other armed groups described in paragraph (1) from the territory of Syria;

(3) a list of policies, actions, or activities that the Government of the Russian Federation would take to ensure the removal of the forces, militias, paramilitaries, and other armed groups described in paragraph (1) from the territory of Syria if that Government were capable of doing so;

(4) an assessment of whether any of the policies, actions, or activities described in paragraph (2) or (3) are being taken by the Government of the Russian Federation;

(5) an assessment of the specific commitments made by officials of the Government of the Russian Federation to officials of the Government of Israel with respect to the Golan Heights and the presence of the forces, militias, paramilitaries, and other armed groups described in paragraph (1) in the territory of Syria;

(6) an assessment of weapons, technologies, and knowledge directly or indirectly transferred by the Government of the Russian Federation to the regime of Bashar al-Assad, Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran, or Iran-aligned forces in Syria that threaten the security and qualitative military edge of Israel; and

(7) an assessment of whether the presence of Russian forces and Russian contractors in Syria limits the options of the Government of Israel in taking steps to ensure its security from threats emanating from the territory of Syria.

(b) Form.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

(c) Appropriate congressional committees and leadership defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees and leadership” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Speaker, the majority leader, and the minority leader of the House of Representatives.

(a) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership a report detailing the circumstances of the assassination on February 27, 2015, of Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov, including—

(1) a list of the individuals the Secretary determines to have been involved in the assassination as perpetrators or as having organized or directed the assassination;

(2) a description of what measures, if any, have been taken by the Government of the Russian Federation to investigate the assassination and bring the individuals described in paragraph (1) to justice; and

(3) an assessment of the effectiveness of those measures.

(b) Form.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

(c) Appropriate congressional committees and leadership defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees and leadership” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Speaker, the majority leader, and the minority leader of the House of Representatives.

(a) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a detailed report on the personal net worth and assets of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, including—

(1) the estimated net worth and known sources of income of Vladimir Putin and his family members, including assets, investments, bank accounts, other business interests, and relevant beneficial ownership information; and

(2) an identification of the most significant senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in the Russian Federation, as determined by their closeness to Vladimir Putin.

(b) Form of report.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

(c) Appropriate congressional committees defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

It is the sense of Congress that technology companies, particularly social media companies, share responsibility for ensuring that their platforms are free of disinformation sponsored by the Government of the Russian Federation and other foreign governments.